Tsai Ing-wen

Tsai Ing-wen is a Taiwanese politician and legal scholar who served as president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from May 20, 2016, to May 20, 2024. She was the first woman to hold the presidency and the first woman to chair the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Before entering elected politics, she taught law and worked on international trade negotiations and cross-strait policy. (english.president.gov.tw)

Educated in Taiwan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Tsai moved from academic and advisory positions into government, serving as chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council, a legislator, and vice premier. She subsequently led the DPP and won presidential elections in 2016 and 2020. Her presidency encompassed pension and labor reforms, the legalization of same-sex marriage, the COVID-19 pandemic, and military modernization. Cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s international relationships were central issues throughout her administration. She completed two presidential terms and was succeeded by Lai Ching-te in May 2024. (english.president.gov.tw)

Early life and legal education

Tsai Ing-wen was born in Taipei on August 31, 1956. Her family’s roots were in Fangshan Township, Pingtung County, in southern Taiwan, rather than in the capital where she was born. She attended Taipei Municipal Zhongshan Girls High School before entering university. Her father was a businessman, and Cornell Law School’s biographical account connects her initial decision to study law with the prospect of helping his commercial business. This early interest in legal training preceded her subsequent specialization in international economic and trade law. (english.president.gov.tw)

Tsai completed her undergraduate legal education at National Taiwan University, graduating with a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) in 1978. She then pursued graduate study in the United States, earning a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from Cornell University Law School in 1980. These were successive qualifications: the LL.B. was her undergraduate law degree, while the LL.M. was a postgraduate degree undertaken after that initial legal education. Cornell’s own alumni publications identify her as a member of the LL.M. class of 1980 and record that she spent two years at Cornell, although the school’s LL.M. program was ordinarily one year long. (en.wikipedia.org)

In 1980, Tsai began graduate studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in the United Kingdom. Her doctoral supervisor was Michael Elliott, and her thesis was titled Unfair trade practices and safeguard actions. The thesis was completed in 1983; her Ph.D. in Law was awarded in 1984. The distinction between these dates reflects the separate milestones of completing the dissertation and receiving the degree. At that time, the University of London was the degree-awarding body for LSE, so her doctoral education took place at LSE while the formal award was made through the University of London. (etheses.lse.ac.uk)

Her dissertation examined international law governing non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly anti-dumping measures, responses to subsidies, emergency import safeguards, voluntary export restraints, and textile-trade arrangements. It considered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade alongside national implementing legislation and actual administrative practice, using economic analysis to inform the legal discussion. Its three-part structure moved from changes in the world economy and comparative advantage to detailed legal analysis, then to the political constraints on trade-law reform. The concluding discussion examined proposals by Cornell’s John Barceló, New York University’s Andreas Lowenfeld, and LSE’s Brian Hindley. (etheses.lse.ac.uk)

University records establish the award of her doctorate. In a statement dated October 8, 2019, LSE confirmed that both its records and those of the University of London documented her Ph.D. in Law in 1984. The statement also identified her thesis in the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies’ Legal Research in the United Kingdom 1905–1984, published in 1985. LSE’s repository holds a digital copy of her personal thesis copy supplied in 2019. After completing her studies, she returned to Taiwan in 1984 and entered university teaching. (lse.ac.uk)

Academic career and entry into public service

Tsai returned to Taiwan in 1984 and began an academic career teaching law at National Chengchi University and subsequently at Soochow University. Her legislative biography records professorships associated with law departments and an institute of international business, reflecting the intersection of legal scholarship and international commerce in her early work. Her move into public service initially took the form of specialist legal advice rather than elected office: she became chief legal adviser to Taiwan’s trade-negotiating delegation as it pursued participation in the multilateral trading system. (english.president.gov.tw)

The negotiations initially concerned accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), not membership in an already-existing World Trade Organization. GATT received the application on January 15, 1992, and established an accession working party on September 29 that year. With the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the GATT accession process was converted into a WTO accession process; the WTO’s chronology records the application and working-party transformation on December 7, 1995. Negotiations addressed both trade in goods and services: the accession record includes discussions of telecommunications, insurance, banking, securities, and air and road transport. The resulting agreement contained separate schedules of goods concessions and services commitments. Taiwan ultimately entered the WTO on January 1, 2002, as its 144th member, under the designation “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” commonly referred to within the organization as Chinese Taipei. Tsai’s advisory work belonged to this extended negotiating process, rather than constituting a separate accession agreement. (wto.org)

Her work also encompassed the relationship between domestic regulation and international trade. For the APEC Regulatory Reform Symposium of September 5–6, 1998, she prepared a paper titled The Interrelationship Between Competition Policy and Regulation. It examined how regulatory costs could affect competitiveness and how market opening could place pressure on governments to revise domestic rules. Concrete examples included financial-services regulation and telecommunications interconnection charges. The paper distinguished regulation addressing market failures from restrictions that could unnecessarily impede competition, while noting that policy choices depended on an economy’s legal infrastructure, institutional capacity, and sectoral conditions. (apeccp.org.tw)

Tsai subsequently chaired the Group on Services within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s Committee on Trade and Investment. Established in 1997, the group coordinated work on services development, liberalization, and facilitation. APEC’s Guide for SMEs in the APEC Region, 2000 names her as its convenor and describes its contemporary activities as information gathering, analysis, exchange of experience, and transparency; implementation of its Services Collective Action Plan had begun in 1998. These responsibilities were distinct from the negotiations over binding WTO accession commitments. In 1999, Tsai became a senior adviser to the National Security Council, extending her government work beyond trade into cross-strait policy. These academic, negotiating, and advisory positions preceded her appointment as chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council in 2000. (apec.org)

Executive office and legislative experience

Tsai Ing-wen served as chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) from 2000 to 2004, during the first presidential term of Chen Shui-bian. The council was part of the Executive Yuan, rather than an independent diplomatic ministry. Its responsibilities included researching, planning, reviewing, and coordinating policies concerning mainland China, alongside implementing certain interministerial programs. Other ministries retained responsibility for matters within their own jurisdictions, while the council supervised the government-authorized Straits Exchange Foundation in its handling of negotiations, document verification, and services involving cross-strait public affairs. Tsai’s position therefore combined policy development and coordination with administrative oversight; it did not confer the president’s authority to determine major national policies. (forum2000.cz)

A concrete administrative initiative during her tenure was the trial implementation of the “Mini-Three-Links” connecting Kinmen and Matsu with nearby mainland ports, beginning on January 1, 2001. These arrangements provided a limited framework for direct exchanges before the establishment of broader cross-strait transport links. On January 3, Tsai stated that successful implementation of the limited scheme was important to the subsequent development of wider links. She also distinguished central-government authority from local initiatives: on January 29, the council recorded her explanation that a cooperation agreement signed by a Kinmen legislator was unofficial and could not substitute for government negotiations. The council’s August 24 briefing reported 7,346 trips by Taiwan residents to the mainland and 307 trips in the opposite direction between January 1 and August 15, illustrating the initial scale of the program rather than its later expansion. (mac.gov.tw)

Tsai joined the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2004 and subsequently entered the Legislative Yuan as a legislator-at-large. Her parliamentary record gives February 1, 2005, as her starting date and lists service on the Finance Committee. Unlike a constituency legislator elected to represent a particular geographical district, she occupied a nationwide seat through the DPP’s party list. Such seats formed the proportional-representation component of the electoral system: in the December 11, 2004, election, 41 of the legislature’s 225 seats were allocated to nationwide party lists, with a further eight allocated for overseas representation. Her seat thus depended on the party’s electoral entitlement and list nomination, not on winning an individual district contest. Her legislative service lasted into 2006, when she returned to executive office. (english.president.gov.tw)

In January 2006, Tsai became vice premier under Premier Su Tseng-chang, serving until May 2007. Formally titled vice president of the Executive Yuan, this was a cabinet position distinct from the vice presidency of the republic. Article 53 of the Constitution identifies the Executive Yuan as the state’s highest administrative organ; Article 56 provides for appointment of its vice president by the national president on the premier’s recommendation. Article 58 includes the vice premier in the Executive Yuan Council, which deliberates on legislative and budget proposals and matters shared by ministries and commissions. Tsai consequently served within the premier-led administration, rather than exercising the head-of-state authority she would later hold as president. During her vice premiership, she worked with Academia Sinica and the Institute for Biotechnology and Medicine Industry on drafting the 2007 Act for the Development of Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Industry. (taiwan.gov.tw)

Leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party

Tsai Ing-wen was elected chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on May 18, 2008, after the party lost both the legislative and presidential elections that year. She received approximately 57.1 percent of the votes in the party leadership ballot, defeating former presidential adviser Koo Kwang-ming, and took office on May 20. Her election made her the first woman to lead a major political party in Taiwan. The position placed her at the head of an opposition party following the transfer of the presidency from Chen Shui-bian to the Kuomintang’s Ma Ying-jeou; it did not confer executive authority within the national government. (taipeitimes.com)

Her chairmanship is commonly divided into three periods: 2008–2012, 2014–2018, and 2020–2022. During the first period, she was re-elected party leader in 2010 and subsequently became the DPP’s presidential candidate. After losing the presidential election on January 14, 2012, she announced her resignation as chairperson. The party’s Central Executive Committee accepted it on January 16 but asked her to remain temporarily to manage the transition. Her resignation took effect on March 1, when Kaohsiung mayor Chen Chu became acting chairperson. This sequence distinguished the announcement of political responsibility for an electoral defeat from the formal transfer of the party office. (en.wikipedia.org)

Tsai returned to the leadership through the party election held on May 25, 2014. The DPP reported that she received 85,410 votes, or 93.71 percent, against Kuo Tai-lin’s 5,734 votes, or 6.29 percent. Her second period began on May 28. Under her chairmanship, the party won 13 of Taiwan’s 22 city and county executive posts in the November 2014 local elections. She remained chairperson after becoming president in May 2016, thereby holding a party leadership position and a national constitutional office concurrently. These remained distinct roles: her subsequent departure from the party chairmanship did not terminate her presidential term. (dpp.org.tw)

On November 24, 2018, Tsai announced her resignation as DPP chairperson following that day’s local elections. The party won six city and county executive posts, compared with 13 in 2014, and lost control of Kaohsiung and Taichung to Kuomintang candidates. Her resignation concerned the party office rather than the presidency. She also declined the resignation offered by Premier Lai Ching-te that evening, separating the party leadership change from the immediate continuation of cabinet administration. (scmp.com)

Tsai resumed the chairmanship on May 20, 2020, the day her second presidential term began. On returning to party headquarters, she identified expanding membership, developing younger political personnel, and strengthening the party’s online organization as priorities. This third period ended on November 26, 2022, when she again resigned following local election losses. The DPP won five of the 21 city and county executive contests held that day, while Kuomintang candidates won major mayoral races including Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, and New Taipei. Tsai announced that she was taking responsibility for the party’s performance; she continued serving as president after relinquishing the chairmanship. (taiwannews.com.tw)

Presidential campaigns and elections

Tsai Ing-wen first contested the presidency of Taiwan as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominee in the election of January 14, 2012, with Su Jia-chyuan as her vice-presidential running mate. Her principal opponent was incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT), running with Wu Den-yih; James Soong, representing the People First Party, also contested the election. The official result gave Ma 6,891,139 votes, or 51.60 percent, against Tsai’s 6,093,578 votes, or 45.63 percent. Soong received 369,588 votes, or 2.77 percent. Tsai therefore finished second, while Ma secured another four-year term. Presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently, and presidential turnout was 74.38 percent. (en.wikipedia.org)

In the presidential election of January 16, 2016, Tsai ran with Chen Chien-jen against KMT nominee Eric Chu, whose running mate was Jennifer Wang, and Soong, running with Hsu Hsin-ying. Tsai and Chen won 6,894,744 votes—approximately 56 percent of valid ballots—compared with 3,813,365 for Chu and Wang and 1,576,861 for Soong and Hsu. The victory made Tsai Taiwan’s first woman elected president. In the simultaneous election for the 113-member Legislative Yuan, the DPP won 68 seats, obtaining its first outright parliamentary majority; the KMT won 35. These were separate electoral victories: Tsai won the presidential contest, while the DPP’s legislative candidates and party list secured control of the legislature. (uscc.gov)

Before seeking reelection in 2020, Tsai faced a challenge for the DPP nomination from former premier Lai Ching-te. The party selected its candidate through public-opinion polling rather than a conventional ballot of party members. Results announced on June 13, 2019, gave Tsai approximately 35.67 percent support against Lai’s 27.48 percent in comparative surveys that tested prospective general-election matchups. These figures represented support in the nomination surveys, not shares of votes cast in the subsequent presidential election. Tsai defeated Lai in that process, but they ultimately contested the general election together, with Lai replacing Chen as her vice-presidential running mate. (taipeitimes.com)

The election took place on January 11, 2020. Tsai and Lai faced the KMT ticket of Han Kuo-yu and Chang San-cheng, and the People First Party ticket of Soong and Yu Hsiang. Central Election Commission figures recorded 8,170,231 votes for Tsai and Lai, or 57.13 percent of valid ballots, securing Tsai a second term. Han and Chang received 5,522,119 votes, or 38.61 percent, while Soong and Yu received 608,590, or 4.26 percent. Turnout was 74.90 percent, with 14,464,571 ballots cast by an electorate of 19,311,105; the commission counted 14,300,940 valid votes and 163,631 invalid ballots. (web.cec.gov.tw)

Presidential institutions and domestic reform

Tsai’s first presidential term ran from May 20, 2016, to May 20, 2020, and her second from May 20, 2020, to May 20, 2024. Under the Republic of China’s constitutional framework, the president appoints the premier and promulgates laws, but does not personally exercise all administrative or legislative powers. The Executive Yuan, headed by the premier, is the highest administrative organ; its ministries prepare and implement policies, and the cabinet is accountable to the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan passes legislation and budgets and questions executive officials. Consequently, reforms associated with Tsai’s presidency involved distinct stages of presidential agenda-setting, cabinet preparation and administration, and legislative enactment. (english.president.gov.tw)

Pension reform principally affected the separate retirement systems for civil servants, public-school teachers, and military personnel. Tsai approved guidelines establishing a presidential pension-reform committee on May 27, 2016; the committee was established the following month. The resulting legislative changes took effect on July 1, 2018. For civil servants and teachers, they phased in a pension-eligibility age of 65, revised the salary basis for calculating benefits, lowered income-replacement ratios over ten years, changed preferential interest arrangements on retirement deposits, and increased pension-fund contributions. Military provisions retained eligibility after twenty years of service but revised benefit calculations, reduced preferential deposit interest, and gradually reduced payments exceeding the new standards. Savings from reduced benefits were directed back into the respective pension funds. These measures concerned public-sector retirement schemes rather than a single unified pension system covering all workers. (english.president.gov.tw)

Changes to the Labor Standards Act followed a separate legislative sequence. Tsai promulgated amendments on December 21, 2016, with most provisions taking effect on December 23. They established the arrangement commonly called “one fixed day off and one rest day” in each seven-day period, increased compensation for work on rest days, required employers to provide wage-calculation details, and strengthened complaint protections and penalties. Revised national-holiday and annual-leave provisions took effect on January 1, 2017. Another amendment, passed on January 10, 2018, became effective on March 1. It implemented an eleven-hour minimum interval between shifts, while allowing reductions to at least eight hours in specified circumstances subject to statutory procedures. It also permitted qualified industries to adjust the scheduling of fixed days off under defined conditions, rather than granting employers unrestricted discretion over rest periods. (english.mol.gov.tw)

The administration’s transitional-justice program addressed state actions during the legally defined authoritarian period, August 15, 1945, through November 6, 1992. The Act on Promoting Transitional Justice provided the framework for the Transitional Justice Commission, established under the Executive Yuan in May 2018. Its remit included opening political archives, investigating historical events, redressing judicial injustices, and addressing authoritarian symbols. For criminal cases involving violations of constitutional freedoms or fair-trial principles, the act provided mechanisms to revoke qualifying convictions and associated penalties and expunge criminal records. These statutory procedures were distinct from individual presidential pardons. (law.moj.gov.tw)

Archival access and public commemoration were separate components of this framework. The Political Archives Act, implemented on July 24, 2019, regulated the collection, preservation, and accessibility of relevant records held by government agencies, political parties, and affiliated bodies. It assigned archival administration to the National Archives Administration and incorporated protections for individuals’ privacy. The transitional-justice legislation also required symbols commemorating authoritarian rulers in public buildings or spaces to be removed, renamed, or otherwise dealt with, while requiring sites of large-scale human-rights violations to be preserved or reconstructed as historical sites. These provisions established legal responsibilities rather than demonstrating that every monument had been removed or every archive opened. (archives.gov.tw)

By May 2022, the Executive Yuan reported that the commission had publicly exonerated nearly 6,000 wrongfully convicted individuals and completed its concluding report. On May 17, the legislature passed a law restoring rights infringed by illegal state acts during authoritarian rule, together with amendments governing the continuation of transitional-justice work. The commission dissolved on May 30, 2022, and its responsibilities passed to six ministries and agencies. Coordination continued through an Executive Yuan transitional-justice board and the Department of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, rather than through a permanent presidential commission. (english.ey.gov.tw)

Marriage equality and Indigenous historical justice

The legal basis for recognizing same-sex marriage emerged through judicial review, rather than a presidential decree. On May 24, 2017, the Judicial Yuan issued Interpretation No. 748, holding that the Civil Code’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage violated the freedom of marriage protected by Article 22 of the Constitution and equality under Article 7. The proceedings combined petitions from marriage-equality campaigner Chi Chia-wei and the Taipei City Government. The court gave the competent authorities two years to amend or enact legislation, leaving the legislative form to their discretion. If they failed to act, same-sex couples would become entitled to register marriages directly under the procedure specified in the ruling. Chi’s petition exemplified the role of civil-society advocacy and litigation in establishing the constitutional obligation subsequently implemented during Tsai’s presidency. (cons.judicial.gov.tw)

The referendums held on November 24, 2018, shaped the legislative route. In particular, voters approved Proposition 12, which called for protecting the rights of two people of the same sex to maintain a permanent shared life through provisions outside the Civil Code’s marriage chapter. The Executive Yuan treated this result and Interpretation No. 748 as obligations to be reconciled: separate legislation would implement the constitutional right without changing the existing Civil Code definition of marriage. On February 21, 2019, the cabinet, headed by Premier Su Tseng-chang, approved a Ministry of Justice draft and transmitted it to the Legislative Yuan. The referendum therefore affected the statutory form of recognition, rather than removing the constitutional requirement to provide it. (ey.gov.tw)

The Legislative Yuan passed the Act for Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation No. 748 on May 17, 2019. Tsai promulgated it on May 22, and it entered into force on May 24, the second anniversary of the constitutional ruling. The act recognized a permanent, exclusive union between two people of the same sex and provided for marriage registration through household-registration offices, requiring a written document signed by at least two witnesses. These steps distinguished the institutions’ responsibilities: the court established the constitutional requirement, the ministry drafted the bill, the cabinet submitted it, the legislature enacted it, and Tsai performed presidential promulgation. Her role was thus part of a judicial, legislative, and administrative sequence, not the sole legal source of recognition. (english.ey.gov.tw)

On August 1, 2016, Indigenous Peoples’ Day, Tsai formally apologized to Taiwan’s Indigenous peoples on behalf of the government at the Presidential Office. Her address acknowledged four centuries of mistreatment under successive regimes, identifying land seizure, armed suppression, assimilation policies, and restrictions on Indigenous languages. She separately addressed the storage of nuclear waste on Orchid Island without the Yami people’s knowledge. The apology also acknowledged inadequate implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law and announced an institutional mechanism for pursuing historical redress. (english.president.gov.tw)

Tsai approved the establishment guidelines for the Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee that same day and served as its convener. The original guidelines prescribed 29–31 members, including one representative from each of the 16 officially recognized Indigenous peoples and three representatives of the Pingpu groups. Representatives were to be selected through Indigenous assemblies or community consensus processes. Other members included government representatives, scholars, and Indigenous civic organizations; at least half of the expert and scholarly members had to be Indigenous. One deputy convener was presidentially appointed, while the Indigenous representatives elected the other from among themselves. (english.president.gov.tw)

The committee’s remit included documenting historical violations, proposing restitution or compensation, and reviewing discriminatory laws and policies. Its recommendations were to receive administrative follow-up through the Executive Yuan’s mechanism for implementing the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law. Tsai chaired its first formal meeting on March 20, 2017. Five thematic subcommittees covered land, culture, languages, history, and reconciliation, providing a structure for investigating historical records and developing policy proposals. (english.president.gov.tw)

Economic strategy, energy, and climate policy

Tsai’s administration organized industrial policy around the “5+2 innovative industries” program introduced in 2016: intelligent machinery, the Asia Silicon Valley initiative, green energy, biomedicine, defense and aerospace, new agriculture, and the circular economy. Its stated purpose was to move Taiwan beyond contract manufacturing toward higher-value products and services. In her May 20, 2020, inaugural address, Tsai outlined six core strategic industries; the Executive Yuan adopted an implementation plan on December 10. These encompassed information and digital technology, cybersecurity, precision health, green energy, defense-related industries, and strategic supplies. The program emphasized securing critical inputs, including semiconductor materials and equipment, while supporting industrial parks, research and development, and skilled personnel. These were policy objectives rather than independently established measures of economic performance. (ey.gov.tw)

Semiconductor workforce development acquired a specific institutional mechanism through legislation passed in May 2021 permitting national universities and companies to establish research institutes in priority fields. Corporate partners had to provide more than half the funding and participated in institute management, curriculum design, and instruction. By June 2023, six semiconductor institutes had been established, including those at National Taiwan University and National Tsing Hua University; together they admitted 483 master’s students and 80 doctoral students in 2022. Investment policy also included three programs launched from January 2019 for returning Taiwanese businesses, established domestic enterprises, and small and medium-sized companies. As of August 26, 2022, the government reported approvals for 1,244 companies with proposed investment totaling approximately NT$1.783 trillion. This administrative total represented approved investment plans, not completed expenditure or a measured contribution to economic growth. (english.moe.gov.tw)

The energy-transition program combined expansion of renewable energy with a “nuclear-free homeland” objective for 2025. The administration’s announced electricity-generation mix for that year was 20 percent renewables, 50 percent natural gas, and 30 percent coal. A November 24, 2018, referendum approved repeal of the statutory deadline for ending nuclear generation; the legislature subsequently removed the provision on May 7, 2019, while the government retained its phaseout policy. Solar photovoltaics and offshore wind were central to renewable expansion, with announced 2025 capacity targets of 20 GW and approximately 5.7 GW respectively. These capacity targets were distinct from the intended shares of actual electricity generation. (ly.gov.tw)

Measured deployment remained below those announced capacity targets at the end of 2023: the Ministry of Economic Affairs reported 12.418 GW of installed solar photovoltaic capacity and 1.763 GW of offshore wind capacity. PwC’s report on Taiwan’s electricity market recorded total generation of 282.1 TWh in 2023, with renewable sources supplying 9.5 percent and nuclear power 6.3 percent. Installed capacity therefore did not translate directly into an equivalent generation share; the two indicators describe different aspects of the electricity system. These year-end figures also establish that nuclear generation continued during Tsai’s presidency despite the administration’s longer-term phaseout objective. (moea.gov.tw)

On April 22, 2021, Tsai announced the objective of net-zero emissions by 2050. The National Development Council published Taiwan’s transition pathway on March 30, 2022, organizing it around transformations in energy, industry, lifestyles, and society, supported by technological research and climate legislation. Its twelve key strategies included wind and solar power, hydrogen, energy storage, efficiency, carbon capture, electric vehicles, recycling, carbon sinks, green finance, and a just transition. In April 2022, Tsai described planned government investment of NT$900 billion through 2030 to support the transition; this was a prospective allocation, not a statement of spending already completed. (english.president.gov.tw)

The legislative component progressed from proposals described by Tsai in April 2022 to the Climate Change Response Act, passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 10, 2023, and promulgated by presidential order on February 15. The act placed the 2050 net-zero objective in law and authorized carbon pricing through a carbon fee on designated emission sources. Fee revenues were earmarked for emissions reduction, low-carbon technologies, and related investment incentives; approved voluntary reduction plans could qualify liable enterprises for preferential rates. The law established the framework rather than immediately collecting fees: in October 2023, the Ministry of Environment still described the collection system as under development. (english.president.gov.tw)

The COVID-19 pandemic

Taiwan’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic began before Tsai’s second presidential term. The Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) was activated on January 20, 2020, to coordinate disease prevention across government agencies. The Executive Yuan, headed by Premier Su Tseng-chang, organized economic relief and proposed special funding; the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Taiwan Centers for Disease Control administered the health response. Health Minister Chen Shih-chung became the principal public spokesperson through daily CECC press conferences. Tsai’s role included public communication and support for the government’s response rather than operational command of testing, quarantine, or hospital services. During a May 18, 2021, visit to the CECC, she addressed vaccine procurement and the expansion of facilities for patients with mild or asymptomatic infections. (english.ey.gov.tw)

Border restrictions established in 2020 continued into her second term. From March 19, 2020, most foreign nationals were denied entry, with exceptions for residents, diplomatic personnel, and other authorized travelers; admitted travelers were required to undergo fourteen days of quarantine. An electronic entry system collected travel histories and health declarations, while quarantine arrangements involved both central authorities and local governments. Requirements subsequently changed with epidemic conditions: from January 2021, travelers generally needed a negative RT-PCR result issued within three days before boarding and documentation of suitable quarantine accommodation. Separately, the Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens, promulgated on February 25, 2020, provided the framework for response and relief funding, initially set at NT$60 billion. (covid19.mohw.gov.tw)

A domestic outbreak in May 2021 brought more extensive restrictions. The CECC raised the epidemic alert to Level 3 in Taipei and New Taipei on May 15 and nationwide on May 19. Measures included limits on gatherings, closure of entertainment venues, and restrictions on movement. The national announcement also established daily coordination meetings with city and county governments and called for additional testing sites, quarantine hotels, group quarantine facilities, and designated hospitals. The nationwide Level 3 alert was repeatedly extended, ultimately through July 26, with some restrictions relaxed from July 13. These measures were issued and coordinated by the CECC, while local governments participated in implementation. (cdc.gov.tw)

The vaccination program began on March 22, 2021, using AstraZeneca doses, initially prioritizing medical personnel working in COVID-19 wards, isolation wards, and specimen collection. The first shipment contained 116,500 doses, distributed initially to 57 vaccination sites. The program subsequently used Moderna, Pfizer–BioNTech, and the domestically developed Medigen vaccine alongside AstraZeneca. Testing arrangements also expanded beyond clinical facilities: on April 28, 2022, the government introduced a name-based distribution system for at-home rapid antigen tests, using National Health Insurance cards to regulate purchases. This extended an administrative mechanism already used for distributing masks to the supply of household testing materials. (cdc.gov.tw)

Reopening proceeded through changes to entry rules rather than a single termination of all controls. On September 29, 2022, the CECC announced that mandatory quarantine for arrivals would end on October 13, replaced by seven days of “self-initiated prevention.” The new rules suspended electronic quarantine monitoring and pre-arrival health declarations, restored visa-exempt entry, and lifted the ban on tour groups. Arrivals aged two and above received four rapid test kits; during the seven-day period, a recent negative test was required before going out. Tsai attended the CECC’s final press briefing on April 27, 2023, ahead of its scheduled disbandment on May 1. Subsequent disease updates were assigned to Taiwan CDC’s regular weekly briefings. (cdc.gov.tw)

Cross-strait relations

During Tsai’s presidency, Taiwan remained governed by the Republic of China (ROC), with its government in Taipei, while mainland China was governed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), based in Beijing. The separation of the two governments dated from 1949, when the ROC government relocated to Taiwan following its defeat on the mainland in the Chinese Civil War. Beijing claimed Taiwan as part of PRC territory; Taiwan’s government did not recognize Beijing’s authority over the island. These competing positions on sovereignty formed the background to Tsai’s policy of maintaining the cross-strait status quo rather than accepting Beijing’s proposed political unification. (ksl.com)

In her inaugural address on May 20, 2016, Tsai pledged to preserve existing mechanisms for cross-strait communication and conduct relations under the ROC Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation. She acknowledged that the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits had reached certain understandings during their 1992 talks, describing their effort to seek common ground while setting aside differences as a historical fact. She identified four foundations for continued relations: those talks, the existing ROC constitutional order, the results of more than twenty years of exchanges and negotiations, and Taiwan’s democratic principles and public will. This formulation acknowledged the talks without explicitly endorsing the “1992 Consensus” demanded by Beijing. (ey.gov.tw)

The disagreement had an immediate institutional consequence. On June 25, 2016, the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced that cross-strait contact and communication mechanisms had been suspended because Tsai’s administration had not confirmed the “1992 Consensus,” which Beijing described as embodying the one-China principle. The affected channels included contacts between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office, and between the two sides’ intermediary negotiating organizations. Beijing therefore treated acceptance of its stated political foundation as a condition for these mechanisms, whereas Tsai’s inaugural formulation proposed continued dialogue on the constitutional and historical foundations she had enumerated. (investing.com)

On January 2, 2019, PRC President Xi Jinping proposed exploring a Taiwan arrangement under “one country, two systems”, presenting it as a framework for peaceful unification while retaining the option of force against what he described as external interference and separatist activities. Responding that afternoon, Tsai explicitly stated that her administration had never accepted the “1992 Consensus” and rejected “one country, two systems.” She argued that Beijing’s interpretation linked the consensus to both one China and that proposed governing framework; this was her characterization of Beijing’s position, not an agreed definition between the governments. Tsai nevertheless expressed willingness to negotiate, stipulating that political consultations must be authorized and monitored by Taiwan’s people and conducted government-to-government. (xinhuanet.com)

Tensions intensified following United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on August 2–3, 2022. Beginning on August 4, the People’s Liberation Army conducted exercises in six announced zones surrounding Taiwan, involving naval, air, rocket, and supporting forces. Taiwan’s authorities reported eleven Dongfeng ballistic missiles fired into surrounding waters that day; Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi reported that five missiles landed within Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Taiwan’s defense authorities monitored the launches and placed forces on alert while stating that they sought to avoid escalation. Tsai’s Presidential Office called for restraint and described the exercises as undermining the status quo and disrupting international shipping and aviation routes. Those assessments were the Taiwan government’s stated response to the documented military activity. (uscc.gov)

International relationships and defense policy

During Tsai’s presidency, relations with the United States remained unofficial rather than constituting diplomatic recognition. The United States had recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979; the Taiwan Relations Act provided the legal framework for continued unofficial ties and assistance with Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. Security cooperation included arms sales and military training. Congressional contacts included Tsai’s reception of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in Taipei on August 3, 2022, and her meeting with Pelosi’s successor, Kevin McCarthy, on April 5, 2023, local time, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. McCarthy was accompanied by a bipartisan congressional delegation; Tsai’s remarks addressed self-defense cooperation, economic ties, and international participation. These contacts took place within the existing unofficial relationship. (2017-2021.state.gov)

The New Southbound Policy, whose guidelines were adopted on August 16, 2016, extended the administration’s external engagement beyond security partnerships. It targeted 18 countries: the ten then-members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, six South Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand. Its four principal components were economic and trade cooperation, talent exchanges, resource sharing, and regional connectivity. Implementation combined support for Taiwanese businesses and investment with educational recruitment, employment-related exchanges, tourism, and cultural contacts. For example, the Executive Yuan encouraged students from Southeast Asia to enroll in Taiwanese institutions and sought channels through which qualified graduates could remain in Taiwan. Visa-facilitation measures introduced in 2016 supported short-term tourism, business travel, family visits, and cultural exchanges. (ey.gov.tw)

Defense procurement combined domestic development with foreign purchases. The T-5 Brave Eagle advanced jet-trainer program began in 2017, and its first prototype flew in June 2020. Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation identified domestic manufacturing, aerospace workforce development, and strengthening local supply chains as program objectives. Construction of an indigenous submarine began in November 2020; Tsai presided over the naming and launch ceremony for the prototype, Narwhal, on September 28, 2023. These were development milestones rather than evidence of operational deployment. Separately, on August 20, 2019, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of an approved possible sale of 66 F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft, associated equipment, training, and support, with an estimated value of US$8 billion. (aidc.com.tw)

Defense funding increased alongside these programs. In an August 17, 2023, statement, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that the national defense budget had risen from NT$355.7 billion in 2017 to NT$580.3 billion in 2023, an increase of approximately 63 percent. The administration subsequently proposed NT$606.8 billion for defense in 2024. That broader proposed total included the regular defense allocation, special procurement budgets, and supplementary funds; it should therefore be distinguished from the ministry’s baseline budget and from actual expenditure. (mnd.gov.tw)

On December 27, 2022, Tsai announced a military-force realignment organized around four elements: a main battle force centered on volunteer personnel; a standing garrison force composed principally of conscripts; a civil-defense system integrating central and local government agencies, alternative-service personnel, and private-sector resources; and a reserve system. The plan restored one-year compulsory military service from 2024 for eligible men born on or after January 1, 2005, replacing the four-month military-training requirement for that cohort. It also provided for expanded training capacity, revised training content, higher conscript pay, and recognition of service time within the labor-pension system. (english.president.gov.tw)

Completion of office and subsequent public activity

Tsai Ing-wen’s second presidential term ended on May 20, 2024, concluding eight years in office that had begun on May 20, 2016. Under the Additional Articles of the Republic of China’s Constitution, the president serves a four-year term and may hold office for no more than two consecutive terms; she was therefore ineligible to seek a third consecutive term in the 2024 election. Her successor, Lai Ching-te, who had served as vice president during her second term, was sworn in on May 20 alongside Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. The succession began a third consecutive presidential term for the Democratic Progressive Party, while bringing Tsai’s exercise of presidential authority to an end. (english.president.gov.tw)

Tsai subsequently undertook international engagements in her capacity as a former president, rather than as Taiwan’s incumbent head of state. Her October 2024 European visit received explicit support from Lai’s administration. On October 7, Presidential Office spokesperson Karen Kuo announced that Lai had directed the National Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist with itinerary planning, security, and related arrangements. The announcement followed a meeting between the current and former presidents to discuss the visit, and described Tsai as a former head of state able to speak for Taiwan internationally. This government assistance did not change the capacity in which she attended the events. (english.president.gov.tw)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded her European visit as taking place from October 13 to 19, 2024, with engagements in the Czech Republic, France, and Belgium. On October 14, she addressed the twenty-eighth Forum 2000 conference in Prague, delivering a speech titled “Overcoming Authoritarian Threat through Democratic Unity.” She called for cooperation among democratic societies and discussed Taiwan’s responses to the pandemic, climate change, and authoritarian pressures. At the conference, Czech President Petr Pavel greeted her; she also met Senate President Miloš Vystrčil and Chamber of Deputies President Markéta Pekarová Adamová. These were conference and parliamentary contacts undertaken after her departure from office. (mofa.gov.tw)

In France, Tsai spoke at a Taiwan–France business exchange organized by MEDEF International, identifying semiconductors, new energy, drones, and space technology as potential areas of cooperation. She also attended a Senate luncheon hosted by Taiwan friendship-group chair Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne and visited Université Paris-Saclay. In Brussels, European Parliament Vice-President Pina Picierno welcomed her, while Miriam Lexmann hosted a reception on behalf of the parliament’s Taiwan friendship group. According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry, more than thirty members of the European Parliament attended. Tsai used the reception to thank European parliamentarians for their support and to advocate Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations. (mofa.gov.tw)

Further European engagements followed from May 10 to 19, 2025, when Tsai visited Lithuania, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. On May 15, she visited the British Parliament at the invitation of British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group co-chairs Sarah Champion and Lord Rogan, met House of Commons Speaker Lindsay Hoyle, and addressed a reception in the House of Lords. During the British portion of the trip, she also delivered “In an Era of Shifting World Order: Taiwan as a Stabilizing Force” at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her remarks emphasized multilateral cooperation, economic fragmentation, and Taiwan’s role in international supply chains. The foreign ministry’s May 20 record additionally documented an address at Cambridge University, exchanges at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and participation in a Royal United Services Institute forum, consistently identifying her as a former president. (en.mofa.gov.tw)

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