Chen Shui-bian

Chen Shui-bian (born 1950) is a Taiwanese lawyer and politician who served as president of the Republic of China, commonly known as Taiwan, from May 20, 2000, to May 20, 2008. The first president from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), he succeeded Lee Teng-hui following an election that ended more than five decades of continuous Kuomintang government in Taiwan. His accession marked Taiwan’s first peaceful transfer of presidential power between political parties. (english.president.gov.tw)

Chen became politically prominent through his work defending opposition activists, subsequently serving as a Taipei city councilor, legislator, and mayor. His presidency encompassed divided government, domestic reforms, and initiatives concerning Taiwan’s identity and international participation. Relations with the People’s Republic of China remained a central issue throughout his two terms. (english.president.gov.tw)

After leaving office, Chen was convicted in corruption cases and imprisoned; he was released on medical parole on January 5, 2015. The subsequent legal history includes separate proceedings and differing outcomes, requiring distinctions between allegations, final convictions, and charges disposed of following legislative amendments. (investing.com)

Family background, education, and legal practice

Chen Shui-bian was born on October 12, 1950, in Xizhuang, a village in Guantian Township, Tainan County, in southern Taiwan. His parents were poor tenant farmers, and his childhood was marked by limited household resources. His actual birth date must be distinguished from February 18, 1951, the date recorded in his identification documents. Accounts of his early life explain that he was a frail newborn and that his parents delayed registering his birth because they were uncertain he would survive. The delayed registration accounts for the appearance of 1951 in some biographical records, rather than indicating a different year of birth. (ahonline.drnh.gov.tw)

His parents devoted their savings to his schooling. Chen attended Longtian Elementary School, Tsengwen Junior High School, and Tainan First Senior High School, achieving high marks at successive stages of his education. In 1969, he entered National Taiwan University in Taipei, initially studying business administration. He changed to law in 1970. CIDOB’s biographical account associates that decision with his exposure to a speech by Huang Hsin-chieh, an opposition politician whose arguments interested him while he was considering his professional future. The change preceded his sustained involvement in opposition politics by approximately a decade. (cidob.org)

In 1973, while still a third-year university student, Chen passed Taiwan’s special examination for lawyers with the highest score among that year’s candidates. He obtained his professional qualification before completing his degree and was described in the official historical record as the country’s youngest lawyer. He began part-time work at a private firm handling international legal disputes while continuing his studies. In June 1974, he graduated first in his class from National Taiwan University’s Department of Law, then moved into full-time legal practice. His graduation in 1974 is documented both by Academia Historica and by the presidential office’s biographical chronology. (ahonline.drnh.gov.tw)

Chen’s early career centered on maritime and commercial law, rather than political or criminal defense. In 1976, he joined Formosa International Marine and Commercial Law, maintaining an association with the firm until 1989. His shipping clients included Evergreen, which continued to retain him after he became involved in politics. The practice provided a substantial income: in a later interview, Wu Shu-chen recalled that Chen used his early earnings to support his parents and repay family debts. His professional standing and financial circumstances thus differed considerably from those of his rural childhood. (taipeitimes.com)

In 1975, Chen married Wu Shu-chen, the daughter of a physician from a comparatively prosperous family. They had a daughter, Chen Hsing-yu, and a son, Chen Chih-chung. Wu’s father opposed the marriage, preferring that she marry a doctor, but the couple proceeded despite that objection. Wu subsequently encouraged Chen to accept political-defense work: in 1980, she supported his decision to join the lawyers representing defendants prosecuted after the December 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. That assignment connected his established legal practice to the opposition movement and preceded his first election to public office in 1981. (taipeitimes.com)

Opposition activism and entry into elected politics

Chen’s entry into opposition politics occurred under martial law, when the Kuomintang (KMT) government prohibited the formation of new political parties. Opposition candidates therefore operated through the tangwai movement—literally “outside the party”—using electoral campaigns and political magazines rather than a legally recognized opposition party. On December 10, 1979, activists associated with Formosa magazine organized a demonstration in Kaohsiung to mark International Human Rights Day. The unauthorized gathering ended in clashes between demonstrators and security forces, followed by arrests. This Kaohsiung Incident brought Chen, then a practicing lawyer, into the defense of opposition leaders. (english.president.gov.tw)

On February 20, 1980, military prosecutors indicted Huang Hsin-chieh and seven other leading defendants on rebellion charges. Chen joined their defense team and represented Huang, the publisher of Formosa. The proceedings placed civilian political activists before a military court; on April 18, all eight defendants were convicted. Although the defense did not secure their acquittal, the public trial and extensive newspaper coverage circulated opposition arguments beyond the magazines’ existing readership. Chen’s participation also connected his legal practice directly with the organized opposition. In 1981, he won election to the Taipei City Council as a tangwai candidate, beginning his first period in elected office. (art.archives.gov.tw)

Political publishing became another part of Chen’s opposition activity. In 1984, he became director of Neo-Formosa, a magazine published by Huang Tien-fu and edited by Lee I-yang. Its June 19, 1984 issue included an article alleging that academic Elmer Fung, also known as Feng Hu-hsiang, had used translations of foreign writings as original scholarship in A Critique of New Marxism. Fung filed a criminal-defamation complaint in October. On January 12, 1985, the Taipei District Court sentenced Chen, Huang, and Lee to one year’s imprisonment each; the judgment also required compensation of NT$2 million. The publication of the article in 1984 and the initial conviction in 1985 thus preceded Chen’s actual imprisonment in 1986. (taiwandc.org)

While the case remained under appeal, Chen resigned his council seat and returned to his home county to contest the November 1985 Tainan County magistrate election. He lost the contest. Shortly afterward, while accompanying him on visits to thank supporters, his wife, Wu Shu-chen, was struck by a vehicle and sustained injuries that left her paralyzed from the waist down. On May 30, 1986, the appellate judgment reduced the three magazine executives’ prison terms to eight months. Chen began serving his sentence at Tucheng on June 10, 1986, together with Huang and Lee, and remained imprisoned until February 1987. (ahonline.drnh.gov.tw)

During Chen’s imprisonment, opposition organizers established the Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986, despite the continuing prohibition on new parties. Wu stood in the December 6 supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan and won a Taipei seat. These supplementary contests added elected representatives to a national legislature that still included members originally elected on the Chinese mainland decades earlier; they were not elections for an entirely renewed parliament. After his release in February 1987, Chen worked as Wu’s special legislative assistant while continuing private legal practice. His own formal entry into the DPP followed in 1987. (english.president.gov.tw)

DPP membership and legislative career

Chen Shui-bian joined the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1987, the year martial law was lifted in Taiwan. He won election to the Legislative Yuan on December 2, 1989, and was reelected on December 19, 1992, serving in the national legislature until 1994. The two elections marked different stages of democratization: the 1989 contest filled supplementary seats alongside members originally elected on the Chinese mainland, whereas the 1992 election renewed the entire chamber. The DPP won 50 of its 161 seats in 1992, while the Kuomintang (KMT) retained a majority. (english.president.gov.tw)

As a leader of the DPP’s parliamentary group, Chen introduced bills and amendments directed toward democratizing national institutions. His legislative career coincided with constitutional reforms under President Lee Teng-hui, including the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion and the complete reelection of the national legislature. These changes transformed the institutional setting of opposition politics: the DPP remained a minority party, but increasingly contested government policy through a nationally elected chamber rather than an assembly partly composed of representatives whose mandates dated from before 1949. (cidob.org)

A central priority was removing criminal penalties for peaceful political dissent. Chen advocated repeal of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, a provision concerning offenses against the state that had permitted prosecution of nonviolent advocacy of Taiwan independence. In a later presidential address, he dated his introduction of a repeal proposal to February 1990, when he first entered the legislature. The eventual outcome was amendment rather than complete repeal: the Legislative Yuan passed the revision on May 15, 1992, and it was promulgated on May 16. The revised provision required violence or threats in carrying out the specified offense, distinguishing punishable insurrection from peaceful expression of constitutional or independence proposals. This change expanded protection for freedom of expression without abolishing the offense itself. (english.president.gov.tw)

Chen also made parliamentary supervision of military affairs a principal concern and chaired the legislature’s defense committee beginning in March 1992. He supported integrating military administration and operational command, which were then separated in ways that limited civilian scrutiny: the chief of the general staff’s command structure stood outside the cabinet agencies normally answerable to legislators. His objective was to make military authority more accountable through the defense ministry and legislative oversight. The practical mechanisms included questioning defense officials and examining budgets and security policy. The Ministry of National Defense established a Legislative Affairs Office in October 1992 to handle legislators’ inquiries, although substantial legal limits on oversight of the command system remained. (cidob.org)

On Taiwan’s political status, Chen combined support for self-determination with an emphasis on protecting democratic freedoms. CIDOB’s biographical account places him within the DPP’s moderate wing: he accepted popular sovereignty and a referendum as the basis for determining Taiwan’s future, while treating independence measures as a defensive response to unilateral action by Beijing or the KMT. From 1991, he and the DPP publicly advocated a “one China, one Taiwan” formula, departing from the KMT’s traditional claim that the Republic of China represented China as a whole. These positions linked the opposition’s constitutional demands to its insistence that Taiwan’s population should decide its political future. (cidob.org)

Mayor of Taipei, 1994–1998

On December 3, 1994, Chen Shui-bian won Taipei’s first direct mayoral election since its conversion into a special municipality in 1967. Standing for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), he received 615,090 votes, or 43.67 percent. His principal opponents were Jaw Shaw-kong of the New Party, with 30.17 percent, and incumbent mayor Huang Ta-chou of the Kuomintang (KMT), with 25.89 percent. The division between the KMT and the New Party, formed by former KMT members, enabled Chen to win a plurality despite their combined majority. His victory placed the capital’s administration under DPP leadership and provided the party with a prominent opportunity to demonstrate its capacity for municipal government. (taiwan-database.net)

Chen’s administrative program emphasized integrity, efficiency, and accessible services. In a July 1995 interview, he described attendance inspections as the starting point of civil-service reform, followed by staffing assessments and organizational restructuring. He also emphasized routine maintenance—level roads, functioning drains, maintained parks, and street lighting—rather than relying exclusively on large construction projects. His 1996 report to the city council identified ten categories of municipal business particularly susceptible to corruption for priority investigation, alongside staff rotation, clearer responsibility, and public participation. These were specific administrative measures rather than a general claim that changing the governing party would itself eliminate misconduct. (cw.com.tw)

Public transport combined the completion of inherited infrastructure with changes to street-level services. Taipei’s rapid-transit network had received central-government approval in 1986, and construction work had begun in 1988; Chen’s administration therefore oversaw an important opening phase rather than initiating the system. The 10.5-kilometer Muzha Line opened on March 28, 1996. The Tamsui Line began operating between Tamsui and Zhongshan on March 28, 1997, and reached Taipei Main Station on December 25 that year. The city also introduced a dedicated bus lane on Songjiang Road on January 27, 1996. Chen’s council report recorded the replacement of 485 aging buses in 1995 and outlined coordination of bus routes, stops, and ticketing with the new metro services. (english.tfam.gov.taipei)

Municipal policing included anti-gang operations and public-safety inspections of designated businesses. A separate, contested initiative ended Taipei’s licensed-prostitution system in September 1997. The city council repealed the governing regulations on July 30, and the municipal government formally implemented abolition on September 6. Licensed sex workers and supporting organizations protested the loss of their livelihoods and sought a two-year transition period. Municipal meeting records show that Chen defended abolition as an established policy and pointed to proposed allowances for occupational transition. The dispute continued beyond his term; licensed workers resumed operations on March 27, 1999, under a temporary arrangement during his successor’s administration. (sec.gov.taipei)

In the December 5, 1998 election, Chen increased his vote to 688,072, or 45.91 percent, but lost to the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, who received 766,377 votes, or 51.13 percent. New Party candidate Wang Chien-shien obtained only 2.97 percent. Unlike the divided competition of 1994, support among voters opposed to the DPP concentrated behind Ma. Chen’s defeat thus occurred despite an increase in both his vote total and vote share. After leaving municipal office, he shifted toward a presidential campaign, carrying his record of Taipei administration into the DPP’s preparations for the 2000 election. (taiwan-database.net)

The 2000 presidential election and transfer of power

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominated Chen Shui-bian for the presidency in July 1999, pairing him with Annette Lu, also known as Lu Hsiu-lien. Their principal competitors were Vice President Lien Chan, the nominee of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), and James Soong, a former governor of Taiwan Province who ran as an independent after failing to secure the KMT nomination. Lien’s running mate was Premier Vincent Siew; Soong’s was Chang Chau-hsiung. Thus, although five tickets appeared on the ballot, the election developed principally into a contest between the DPP and two competing candidacies drawn from the KMT’s political establishment. (cidob.org)

Voting took place on March 18, 2000. The Central Election Commission recorded 15,462,625 eligible voters and 12,786,671 ballots cast, giving a turnout of 82.69 percent. Chen and Lu received 4,977,697 votes, or 39.30 percent of valid ballots; Soong and Chang received 4,664,972, or 36.84 percent; and Lien and Siew received 2,925,513, or 23.10 percent. The remaining tickets—Li Ao and Feng Hu-hsiang, and Hsu Hsin-liang and Josephine Chu—received 0.13 and 0.63 percent respectively. Chen’s lead over Soong was 312,725 votes, approximately 2.46 percentage points. (web.cec.gov.tw)

The presidential election operated through a single-round plurality contest: the ticket receiving the largest number of votes won, without having to obtain an absolute majority or face a runoff. Chen therefore secured the presidency despite receiving less than two-fifths of the valid vote. The division between Lien and Soong was central to the electoral arithmetic: their combined share was 59.94 percent, but those votes belonged to separate tickets and could not be pooled. This result established a victory for the DPP ticket, not a majority endorsement of its programme; the combined opposition total likewise does not establish how voters would have behaved in a two-candidate election. (web.cec.gov.tw)

On May 20, 2000, Chen was sworn in as president of the Republic of China, succeeding Lee Teng-hui, while Lu assumed the vice presidency. This was the first transfer of the ROC presidency between political parties through an election. In his inaugural address, Chen presented the alternation in power as a constitutional and democratic process rather than a replacement of one ruling group by another. He also pledged to observe the existing Constitution and addressed relations with Beijing through conditional commitments whose details concerned his subsequent cross-strait policy. (english.president.gov.tw)

Chen’s initial choice of premier crossed party lines. On March 29, while president-elect, he announced that outgoing defense minister Tang Fei, a longstanding KMT member and former general, would head his administration; Tang became premier when the new presidency began. The appointment brought an experienced official from the outgoing administration into the DPP-led executive. It did not, however, transfer control of the Legislative Yuan to the DPP: the KMT retained its legislative majority, so the interparty presidential transition began with different parties controlling the presidency and parliament. (taipeitimes.com)

Governing institutions and domestic policy

Chen governed with a presidency controlled by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) but a Legislative Yuan dominated by opposition parties, principally the Kuomintang and its allies. Under the amended Constitution, the president appointed the premier without legislative confirmation, while the cabinet remained answerable to legislators through questioning, budget scrutiny, and no-confidence procedures. Presidential election victories therefore did not supply a parliamentary majority for legislation or appropriations. Tang Fei’s initial cabinet was followed by administrations led by Chang Chun-hsiung, Yu Shyi-kun, Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, and Chang again. Chang’s first premiership began in October 2000; Yu served from February 2002 to February 2005. (encyclopedia.com)

The dispute over the fourth nuclear power plant exposed these institutional constraints. The cabinet withheld funding for construction despite an existing legislative appropriation. In Interpretation No. 520, issued on January 15, 2001, the Council of Grand Justices treated the suspension as a change in important national policy requiring a report to the legislature and an opportunity for questioning. The interpretation directed the executive and legislature toward negotiation or the available constitutional procedures rather than recognizing an unrestricted executive power to disregard the approved budget. (cons.judicial.gov.tw)

Financial policy proceeded in two distinct phases. The First Financial Reform, launched in 2001, addressed troubled institutions and bad loans through new legislation, bank restructuring, and write-offs. Its August 2002 “2–5–8” targets called for reducing domestic banks’ nonperforming-loan ratio below 5 percent and raising capital adequacy above 8 percent within two years. The reported bad-loan ratio reached 4.33 percent in December 2003; the Financial Supervisory Commission began operating on July 1, 2004, consolidating supervision. The Second Financial Reform, announced on October 20, 2004, instead emphasized consolidation: three institutions were to attain market shares above 10 percent, government-shareholding institutions were to fall to six, financial holding companies were to be halved, and one institution was to become foreign-managed or listed abroad. These were announced targets, not completed results; in 2007 Chen acknowledged shortcomings in implementation and scheduling. (english.president.gov.tw)

Social-policy legislation included the Gender Equality in Employment Act in 2002 and the Protective Act for Mass Redundancy of Employees in 2003. The Employment Insurance Act, effective January 1, 2003, placed unemployment protection within a statutory system incorporating employment services and vocational training. The Labor Pension Act, passed in June 2004 and implemented on July 1, 2005, introduced worker-owned individual accounts with employer contributions of at least 6 percent of monthly wages. Separately, the legislature passed the National Pension Act on July 20, 2007; its insurance program began on October 1, 2008, after Chen had left office. (ws.ndc.gov.tw)

Infrastructure completed during Chen’s presidency included the Hsuehshan Tunnel on the Taipei–Yilan freeway, which opened to small vehicles on June 16, 2006, and to buses in November 2007. Its construction had begun in 1991, making it a project spanning successive administrations rather than one originating under Chen. His administration also implemented the Keelung River Comprehensive Improvement Plan, approved by the cabinet in May 2002, and developed the Central Taiwan Science Park. These projects combined transport, flood management, and industrial-development expenditure. (freeway.gov.tw)

Cultural and educational policy expanded institutions supporting Taiwan’s linguistic and ethnic diversity. The Council for Hakka Affairs was established on June 14, 2001, and Hakka TV began broadcasting in July 2003. Taiwan Indigenous TV followed in July 2005 and joined the public Taiwan Broadcasting System in January 2007. The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, promulgated in February 2005, established statutory principles concerning autonomy and cultural rights, whereas the administration’s separate Indigenous Peoples Autonomy Act remained a draft. In education, compulsory elementary-school study of a local language began in 2001, offering Taiwanese Hokkien, Hakka, or Indigenous languages alongside the continuing Mandarin curriculum; this extended initiatives already developing before the presidential transition. (english.hakka.gov.tw)

Relations across the Taiwan Strait

In his inaugural address on May 20, 2000, Chen made the conditional commitments commonly called the “Four Noes and One Without.” Provided that the Chinese Communist Party regime had no intention of using military force against Taiwan, he pledged that during his presidency he would not declare independence, change the national title, advocate incorporating a “state-to-state” description into the Constitution, or promote a referendum changing the status quo concerning independence or unification. He also stated that abolishing the National Unification Council or its guidelines would not be an issue. These assurances constrained specified presidential initiatives rather than accepting Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan or committing Taiwan to eventual unification. Chen reiterated their conditional wording in January 2004. (english.president.gov.tw)

The terms for political dialogue nevertheless remained contested. Beijing required acceptance of its one-China framework, while Chen proposed negotiations without either side imposing its sovereignty formula as a prerequisite. On August 3, 2002, addressing the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations in Tokyo by video link, he described Taiwan and China as “one country on each side” of the Strait. In a March 2004 interview, he argued that emphasizing either Beijing’s one-China principle or his own two-country formulation would perpetuate deadlock; he instead proposed talks based on peace, equality, and reciprocity, including mechanisms to prevent military conflict. These proposals did not produce a sovereignty settlement. Beijing also maintained political contacts outside Chen’s administration: Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan and People First Party chairman James Soong visited China and met Hu Jintao in April and May 2005 respectively. Those were opposition-party contacts, not negotiations conducted by Taiwan’s government. (president.gov.tw)

Practical exchanges advanced separately from these disagreements. On January 1, 2001, Taiwan began trial implementation of the “Mini Three Links,” permitting limited transport, commercial, and postal connections involving Kinmen and Matsu and the nearby mainland. The opening remained geographically restricted rather than establishing comprehensive direct links across the Strait. Aviation arrangements developed through separately negotiated charter schemes. An agreement reached in Macao on January 15, 2005, provided for Lunar New Year flights between Taipei and Kaohsiung and Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou from January 29 to February 20. Unlike earlier arrangements requiring an intermediate landing, these flights could operate without stopping in a third territory, although they still passed through Hong Kong’s flight-information region. After a temporary suspension of further talks following the Anti-Secession Law, agreements resumed; in June 2006 the two sides authorized up to 168 annual round-trip passenger charters for four holidays and special occasions. These were limited transport arrangements, not regular unrestricted air services or agreements on political status. (mac.gov.tw)

On March 14, 2005, the People’s Republic of China enacted the Anti-Secession Law. It endorsed peaceful reunification and exchanges, but Article 8 authorized non-peaceful measures if Taiwan’s separation occurred, major incidents entailing separation arose, or possibilities for peaceful reunification were completely exhausted. Decisions on such measures were assigned to the State Council and Central Military Commission. In a six-point response on March 16, Chen rejected the law’s authority over Taiwan’s future and maintained that changes to Taiwan’s status required its people’s consent. He called for differences to be resolved through peaceful dialogue and participated in the March 26 protest in Taipei against the legislation. (us.china-embassy.gov.cn)

On February 27, 2006, following a high-level national security conference, Chen announced that the National Unification Council would cease functioning and the National Unification Guidelines would cease applying. The council, established under Lee Teng-hui in 1990, had last met in 1999. Chen’s decision specified that it would receive no budget and that its personnel would return to their original posts. The announcement used cessation rather than formal abolition, an important distinction given his 2000 pledge. Chen linked the decision to the Anti-Secession Law and military intimidation, while asserting that it did not change the status quo or exclude any future cross-strait arrangement freely chosen by Taiwan’s population. (everycrsreport.com)

Foreign relations and international participation

Chen’s engagement with the United States operated within an unofficial relationship rather than diplomatic recognition. Washington had transferred recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, while the Taiwan Relations Act provided a framework for continuing commercial, cultural, and other contacts with Taiwan. During Chen’s presidency, these arrangements supported economic exchanges and the provision of defensive weapons without restoring formal diplomatic ties. U.S. transit permissions also created opportunities for presidential engagement outside Taiwan, but were distinct from invitations for state visits. (1997-2001.state.gov) On October 31, 2003, Chen departed for Panama on an itinerary that included stopovers in New York and Alaska; on November 1, he received the International League for Human Rights’ award in New York. In September 2005, during a Florida stopover, he spoke by videoconference with Representative Tom Lantos, co-chair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Such contacts involved legislators and nongovernmental organizations rather than recognition of Chen’s government by the United States. (english.president.gov.tw)

Relations with states recognizing the Republic of China involved formal presidential visits, bilateral agreements, and development cooperation. On May 21, 2001, Chen departed on a tour of El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Honduras, all diplomatic partners at the time. Economic agreements subsequently became a concrete component of these relationships: on August 21, 2003, he signed the Taiwan–Panama Free Trade Agreement with Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso. (english.president.gov.tw) His African diplomacy likewise combined meetings with national leaders and cooperation conducted through agricultural and medical missions. Between June 30 and July 10, 2002, he visited Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Malawi, and Swaziland, now called Eswatini. The presidential account of his return identified continuing agricultural technical assistance and medical services, alongside the partners’ commitments to support Taiwan’s international participation. These were relations with governments formally recognizing Taipei, unlike his unofficial U.S. contacts. (english.president.gov.tw)

In the Pacific, Chen helped establish a multilateral forum among Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. On September 4, 2006, he and Palauan president Tommy Remengesau Jr. co-hosted the first Taiwan–Pacific Allies Summit in Koror. Leaders of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu joined Chen in signing the Palau Declaration. Its commitments included law-enforcement training, digital-government development, health care, alternative energy, and agricultural and fisheries assistance. It also provided for additional Taiwanese commercial staff in the region, an action plan, and annual examination of cooperative projects. The participating governments pledged support for Taiwan’s involvement in international and regional organizations; the summit itself was a diplomatic-partner forum, not admission to those organizations. (english.president.gov.tw)

Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization followed a different institutional route. Negotiations had begun with an application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in January 1992, before Chen’s presidency, and became a WTO accession process in December 1995. The ministerial conference approved accession on November 11, 2001; on January 1, 2002, Taiwan became the organization’s 144th member as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” commonly designated “Chinese Taipei.” (wto.org) Article XII of the WTO Agreement permits accession by an autonomous separate customs territory as well as a state. Membership therefore rested on commercial-policy autonomy and negotiated commitments, including market access for goods and services, rather than requiring recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state by every member. (wto.org)

Chen’s 2007 bid for United Nations membership instead sought admission under the name “Taiwan.” His letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was dated July 18, 2007. (english.president.gov.tw) On July 23, the UN announced that its Office of Legal Affairs had returned the application, conveyed by two member states’ permanent representatives, citing General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971 and the organization’s one-China policy. This was a Secretariat refusal to receive the application, not a completed membership vote. (un.org) Supporters subsequently sought General Assembly consideration, but on September 21 the Assembly rejected inclusion of the proposed Taiwan item on its agenda. Unlike WTO accession as a separate customs territory, UN admission required the state-membership procedure involving a Security Council recommendation and a General Assembly decision; Chen’s application did not reach that outcome. (press.un.org)

The 2004 reelection and referendum politics

In the 2004 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu again represented the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Their opponents, Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Lien Chan and People First Party chairman James Soong, formed a joint presidential–vice-presidential ticket. This reunited the principal opposition candidates whose separate campaigns had divided the vote in 2000. The Lien–Soong campaign advocated greater engagement with Beijing and criticized the administration’s economic management and confrontations with the opposition-controlled legislature. Chen’s campaign combined his reelection bid with proposals for referendums and constitutional change. On March 19, while campaigning together in an open vehicle in Tainan, Chen and Lu were shot and lightly wounded. Security forces went on heightened alert, but voting proceeded on March 20. (kharistempleman.com)

The announced count gave Chen and Lu 6,471,970 votes, or 50.11 percent, against 6,442,452 votes, or 49.89 percent, for Lien and Soong: a margin of 29,518 votes, approximately 0.23 percentage points. The Central Election Commission certified Chen’s victory on March 26. Lien refused to concede, and opposition supporters organized protests while the opposition pursued a recount and separate lawsuits challenging the winners’ election and the validity of the electoral process. These challenges did not suspend Chen’s inauguration for a second term on May 20. (taipeitimes.com)

The judicial recount preserved Chen’s victory, although the Taiwan High Court’s adjudication reduced the margin to 25,563 votes. On November 4, 2004, the court rejected the challenge to Chen and Lu’s election; on December 30 it rejected the separate action seeking to invalidate the election itself. In the latter judgment, it rejected claims that holding referendum voting alongside the presidential election had violated ballot secrecy and that the security measures following the shooting had demonstrably prevented enough military or police personnel from voting to affect the outcome. The certified victory and subsequent court rulings were therefore distinct from the opposition’s allegations, which did not establish grounds for overturning the result. (taipeitimes.com)

The accompanying votes arose from the Referendum Act, promulgated on December 31, 2003, and effective from January 2, 2004. Its Article 17 provided a special presidential route for submitting national-security questions to a referendum, with Executive Yuan approval, when an external threat endangered national sovereignty. Chen invoked this “defensive referendum” mechanism, citing China’s missile deployments and refusal to renounce force against Taiwan. The first question asked whether the government should acquire more advanced antimissile weapons if Beijing neither withdrew the missiles nor renounced force; the second asked whether it should negotiate a framework for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Neither ballot proposed a declaration of independence or adopted a new constitution. (english.president.gov.tw)

Under the rules then applicable, passage required participation by at least half the eligible electorate and majority approval among valid votes. The opposition urged supporters to boycott the referendum ballots while still voting in the presidential election. Participation reached only 45.17 percent on the defense question and 45.12 percent on the negotiations question, so both failed the statutory threshold despite affirmative shares of 91.80 and 92.05 percent among valid votes. The March votes were separate from Chen’s broader constitutional program: in December 2003 he had proposed a referendum on a new constitution in 2006, with implementation on May 20, 2008. The constitutional amendments ultimately promulgated on June 10, 2005, instead followed the existing amendment procedure and introduced mandatory popular ratification of future amendments after legislative approval. (kharistempleman.com)

Final presidential years and departure from office

Corruption investigations involving Chen’s relatives and presidential associates became a major political issue in 2006. On May 24, his son-in-law, Chao Chien-ming, was arrested in an investigation into insider trading involving Taiwan Development Corporation shares. On June 1, Chen announced that Premier Su Tseng-chang would assume greater responsibility for day-to-day government affairs; the following day, he suspended the employment of presidential advisers. These measures did not constitute resignation or a constitutional transfer of the presidency. On December 27, the Taipei District Court convicted Chao of insider trading and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment, subject to appeal. That judgment concerned Chao’s conduct, not a criminal conviction of Chen. (everycrsreport.com)

A separate investigation concerned reimbursements from the presidential state-affairs fund. On November 3, 2006, prosecutors indicted Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, and three presidential aides, including former deputy secretary-general Ma Yung-cheng. Prosecutors alleged that approximately NT$14.8 million had been obtained through receipts unrelated to official expenditures between July 2002 and March 2006. They also identified Chen as a suspect, but presidential immunity prevented his indictment while in office. Chen denied embezzlement and maintained that the disputed reimbursements covered confidential diplomatic operations. In a televised response on November 5, he pledged to resign if his wife received a first-instance corruption conviction. The indictments and prosecutorial allegations were not judicial findings of guilt; the subsequent proceedings against Chen belong to his post-presidential legal history. (taipeitimes.com)

The campaign for Chen’s resignation combined legislative action with street demonstrations. Former Democratic Progressive Party chairman Shih Ming-teh organized the “Million Voices Against Corruption, President Chen Must Go” campaign. A sit-in began in central Taipei on September 9, 2006, drawing tens of thousands of demonstrators. Participants’ red clothing became the movement’s identifying symbol, giving rise to the designation “red shirts.” Shih’s campaign sought to pressure Chen to resign, whereas opposition legislators pursued the formal recall procedure. (taipeitimes.com)

The three legislative votes in 2006 were recall motions, rather than completed impeachment proceedings. Under the Additional Articles of the Constitution, a presidential recall required initiation by one-quarter of all legislators and approval by two-thirds before submission to the electorate. The final popular vote would require participation by more than half the electorate and approval by more than half the valid ballots. Impeachment followed a different route, involving legislative approval and adjudication by the Constitutional Court. The first recall motion, on June 27, received 119 affirmative votes, below the required 148. Further motions on October 13 and November 24 received 116 and 118 votes respectively and also failed. Consequently, no presidential recall vote was held among the electorate, and Chen remained in office. (english.president.gov.tw)

Chen’s departure ultimately followed the scheduled expiration of his second term. Constitutionally ineligible for another consecutive term, he prepared to transfer power after Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the March 22, 2008 presidential election with approximately 58.4 percent of the vote. On March 28, Chen approved the presidential transition team and guidelines governing the handover; on April 1, he met president-elect Ma. Chen attended the inauguration at the Presidential Building on May 20, 2008, when Ma and Vice President Vincent Siew took their oaths. Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng presented the presidential seals to Ma. After the ceremony, Ma and Siew escorted Chen and outgoing vice president Annette Lu through the building, where staff bid them farewell, ending their eight years in office. (english.president.gov.tw)

Criminal proceedings, imprisonment, and later public activity

Post-presidential proceedings developed into several separate cases, although charges were initially tried together. Prosecutors indicted Chen on December 12, 2008, on corruption and money-laundering charges; he had first been detained on November 12. On September 11, 2009, the Taipei District Court sentenced Chen and his wife, Wu Shu-chen, to life imprisonment. The Taiwan High Court reduced Chen’s sentence to 20 years on June 11, 2010. These were not the final outcomes of every charge: subsequent Supreme Court decisions upheld some convictions while returning others for retrial. In December 2010, Chen began serving the sentences that had become final, following approximately two years of pretrial detention. (cna.com.tw)

The Longtan land case concerned payments connected with a government science park’s acquisition of land in Taoyuan. On November 11, 2010, the Supreme Court imposed an 11-year sentence on Chen for bribery and a separate eight-year sentence for accepting NT$10 million in connection with securing a securities-company appointment for Diana Chen. These two sentences were consolidated into a 17½-year term rather than simply added together. On July 26, 2012, a separate two-year conviction for laundering Longtan proceeds became final. Another prosecution, concerning the Yuanta–Fuhwa merger during the administration’s financial reforms, resulted in a final ten-year sentence and NT$100 million fine on December 20, 2012. Following consolidation of multiple convictions, his enforceable prison term was 20 years. (taipeitimes.com)

The Nangang Exhibition Center proceedings concerned improper assistance in obtaining confidential procurement information, and should not be confused with the Longtan purchase or presidential expenditure cases. Wu’s nine-year conviction for unlawfully benefiting the contractor became final on July 26, 2012; the associated money-laundering proceedings continued separately. The presidential state-affairs-fund case, meanwhile, concerned the accounting and reimbursement of presidential expenditures. At the August 26, 2011 retrial, the High Court found Chen not guilty of corruption in that portion but sentenced him to ten months for document forgery. The Supreme Court subsequently remanded the fund proceedings again in July 2012. Thus, neither the original life sentence nor the later retrial judgment represented the final disposition of all the combined cases. (judicial.gov.tw)

On January 5, 2015, the Ministry of Justice’s Agency of Corrections approved Chen’s release on medical parole, initially for one month. A ten-member review committee consulted physicians and compared successive assessments, determining that his condition had deteriorated and met Article 58 of the Prison Act’s criterion that appropriate treatment could not be provided in prison. The decision followed an expanded medical panel’s December 30, 2014 report recommending home recuperation and increased family support. Subsequent extensions required further medical assessments and prison-authority review. The release permitted treatment outside prison; it did not overturn his convictions or constitute a pardon. (moj.gov.tw)

The state-affairs-fund charges were disposed of on a different legal basis in 2022. On May 30, the Legislative Yuan passed amendments to Article 99-1 of the Accounting Act, promulgated on June 15, retrospectively removing criminal liability for covered state-affairs expenditures incurred before December 31, 2006. On July 15, the High Court entered a judgment of exemption from prosecution for Chen and other defendants on the covered corruption, forgery and laundering charges, applying Article 302(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the subsequent law had abolished punishment. This was a statutory termination of proceedings, not a finding of factual innocence, and did not reverse convictions in separate cases. The same hearing produced distinct laundering sentences for Wu and other family members. (cna.com.tw)

Chen subsequently undertook public and media activities under continuing parole supervision. He held a press conference about the state-affairs fund in April 2022 and, on January 3, 2021, had begun hosting a weekly Smile Taiwan radio program presented as interviews about life experiences rather than politics. Prison officials said they would evaluate its content. A proposed interview program for Mirror TV’s YouTube channel was canceled before its scheduled January 4, 2026 premiere. Taichung Prison stated that its review board had halted the program because his medical-parole conditions prohibited political activities, campaign events, stage appearances, public addresses and media interviews. (news.pts.org.tw)

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