Ma Ying-jeou

Ma Ying-jeou (born 13 July 1950) is a Taiwanese politician and legal scholar who served as president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 20 May 2008 to 20 May 2016. A member of the Kuomintang (KMT), he previously served as minister of justice and mayor of Taipei, and twice held the party chairmanship. Born in Hong Kong, he studied law in Taiwan and the United States before entering public service. (en.wikipedia.org)

His presidency included expanded economic exchanges and official contacts across the Taiwan Strait, alongside domestic debate over economic policy and legislative scrutiny of cross-strait agreements. In November 2015, he met Xi Jinping in Singapore—the first meeting between the serving leaders of the two sides since 1949. After leaving office, Ma continued to participate in cross-strait educational exchanges and visited mainland China, meeting Xi again in April 2024. His career encompasses legal scholarship, municipal administration, party leadership, national government, and post-presidential public activity. (uscc.gov)

Family background and legal education

Ma Ying-jeou was born on 13 July 1950 in Hong Kong, then a British colony. His family originated in Hunan province on the Chinese mainland; the Presidential Office identifies its ancestral locality as Hengshan County. His parents were Ma Ho-ling and Chin Hou-hsiu, and he was the only son among five children. The family settled in Taiwan in 1952, when he was still a young child, and he grew up in Taipei. His Hong Kong birthplace, Hunan family origins, and Taiwanese upbringing therefore describe different aspects of his background rather than successive places of adult residence. (en.wikipedia.org)

Ma studied law at National Taiwan University, graduating in 1972 with a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.). He subsequently completed compulsory military service in the Republic of China Marine Corps during 1972–1974, before undertaking postgraduate education in the United States. At New York University, he earned a Master of Laws (LL.M.) in 1976. These were distinct qualifications: the Taiwanese degree was his undergraduate legal qualification, while the LL.M. represented postgraduate study rather than a doctorate. His next degree, awarded by Harvard Law School in 1981, was the Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.), a research doctorate in law. (en.wikipedia.org)

At the law school of Harvard University, Ma specialized in the law of the sea and international economic law. His coursework included maritime law with Louis B. Sohn, China and international law with Jerome A. Cohen, international trade law with Harold J. Berman, and international investment agreements concerning mineral resources with Sam Stern. Sohn supervised his doctoral research. In a later account of his education, Ma dated the graduate committee’s approval of his dissertation to March 1981; library catalogues date the dissertation manuscript to 1980, distinguishing the written work’s date from the year of his doctoral qualification. (cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu)

The dissertation, Trouble over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments in the East China Sea, connected two fields of international law: delimitation of offshore jurisdiction and the legal arrangements for foreign investment in seabed petroleum. Its subject was not simply ownership of islands, but the relationship between competing maritime claims and resource exploration and exploitation. Library records classify the work under territorial waters, submerged petroleum resources, petroleum legislation, oil and gas leases, and foreign investment. It was an academic legal analysis, not a treaty, judicial decision, or official determination of territorial boundaries. (hls.harvard.edu)

In 1984, the University of Maryland School of Law published Ma’s Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea, with a foreword by Sohn. The publication examined boundary problems involving Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China, placing his doctoral research within the wider regional problem of overlapping coastal-state claims. (digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu)

Entry into government and constitutional affairs

Ma entered the Presidential Office in 1981 as deputy director-general of its First Bureau and subsequently served as English secretary to President Chiang Ching-kuo. The Presidential Office’s biographical record identifies him as involved in preparations for lifting martial law and permitting Taiwan residents to visit relatives on the Chinese mainland. These were separate policy changes: martial law in Taiwan and Penghu ended on 15 July 1987, while visits to mainland relatives were permitted from November that year. Ma’s role was that of a presidential aide participating in the administrative preparation of these measures, rather than the officeholder formally responsible for adopting them. (english.president.gov.tw)

In 1988, Ma became chairman of the Executive Yuan’s Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, a position he held until 1991. The commission’s responsibilities included policy research, planning, and supervision and evaluation of government programmes. Its remit concerned coordination and assessment across the administration rather than the management of a single policy sector. Alongside his chairmanship, Ma was assigned to organize a Mainland Affairs Task Force and subsequently became its executive secretary. This concurrent appointment placed him in the administrative machinery being developed to address the expansion of contacts between Taiwan and mainland China. (larousse.fr)

Ma served as deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council from 1991 to 1993. The council’s organic law passed the Legislative Yuan on 18 January 1991 and was promulgated on 28 January; the council’s official chronology records its formal establishment on 30 January. As a statutory agency under the Executive Yuan, it was responsible for overall planning and coordination of mainland-related policy. Ma’s appointment thus moved his work from a task-force arrangement into a permanent administrative institution with a defined legal basis. (mac.gov.tw)

In December 1991, Ma was also elected a Kuomintang representative at large to the Second National Assembly, participating in the preparation of the Additional Articles of the Constitution. His membership followed, rather than preceded, the first constitutional revision: the First National Assembly had abolished the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion and adopted the initial Additional Articles in April 1991. Promulgated on 1 May, those articles established the legal framework for renewing the national representative bodies and provided that relations between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait could be specially regulated by law. (english.president.gov.tw)

The Second National Assembly adopted eight further amendments on 27 May 1992, promulgated by President Lee Teng-hui the following day. These supplied a constitutional basis for local self-government and popular election of provincial governors and municipal mayors, and changed the Control Yuan from an elected institution to one whose members were nominated by the president with Assembly consent. They also provided for presidential and vice-presidential election by the people of the republic’s “free area,” with four-year terms and a two-term limit. The explicit requirement for direct popular presidential election was adopted in the subsequent 1994 revision. Ma’s documented participation belonged to this collective amendment process; the reforms were decisions of the Assembly, not constitutional measures enacted by him individually. (english.president.gov.tw)

Justice ministry and return to academic work

Ma Ying-jeou served as minister of justice from 27 February 1993 to 10 June 1996, under President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan. He succeeded Lu Yu-wen and was succeeded by Liao Cheng-hao. His principal administrative priorities were corruption, narcotics, vote-buying, and prison reform. The Presidential Office’s retrospective biography describes these campaigns in favorable terms; the ministry’s chronology identifies particular measures, including public-official asset declarations, a national anti-drug conference, and changes to prison rules. These recorded actions are distinct from assessments of their overall effectiveness. (moj.gov.tw)

Anti-corruption enforcement relied partly on coordination among existing agencies rather than the immediate creation of a separate investigative body. In an interview published by CommonWealth on 1 March 1995, Ma described anti-corruption teams at 18 district prosecutors’ offices, bringing together prosecutors, investigators, and government ethics personnel for monthly meetings. A supervisory group at the Supreme Court Prosecutors’ Office was chaired by Prosecutor-General Chen Han. Ma reported that a 15-month enforcement effort had handled 836 corruption cases and indicted 2,019 people. These were figures for investigations and indictments, not convictions. The ministry’s chronology also records passage of the Public Servant Property-Declaration Act in July 1993, adding an asset-disclosure mechanism to the enforcement program. (cw.com.tw)

The campaign against electoral bribery extended to local representative institutions. A scholarly account of Taiwan’s legal and political transformation reported that 341 of 883 city and county council members were indicted on vote-buying charges in 1994. The distinction between indictment and conviction is important: this figure measures the reach of prosecution, rather than establishing the guilt of every person charged. Ahead of the December 1994 elections, contemporary reporting also recorded Ma’s pledge to intensify enforcement against election-related corruption. (cambridge.org)

Narcotics enforcement formed part of the Lien cabinet’s broader campaign against drugs, announced in May 1993. The Ministry of Justice convened the first National Anti-Drug Conference in June 1994. Enforcement coincided with severe pressure on correctional capacity: a later analysis by criminologist Lai Yung-lien recorded 52,024 people in correctional institutions at the end of 1993, against an authorized capacity of 34,318, an overcrowding rate of 51.6 percent. Lai described the ministry’s response as combining relaxation of parole eligibility with construction and expansion projects. The facilities program continued an initiative begun under Ma’s predecessor and included projects scheduled for 1994–1997, so its implementation extended beyond Ma’s ministerial tenure. (moj.gov.tw)

Prison administration also involved changes to everyday custody conditions. In August 1993, the ministry conditionally relaxed the prohibition on smoking by inmates while encouraging smoking cessation. Ma subsequently remained in Lien’s cabinet as a minister without portfolio in 1996–1997, relinquishing direct leadership of the justice ministry. After leaving that cabinet position, he returned to academic work in 1997 as an associate professor of law at National Chengchi University. This period of university teaching preceded his entry into the 1998 Taipei mayoral contest. (moj.gov.tw)

Mayor of Taipei, 1998–2006

Ma won the 1998 mayoral election in Taipei as the Kuomintang candidate, defeating incumbent Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). He received 766,377 votes, or 51.13 percent, against Chen’s 688,072 votes, or 45.91 percent, in a three-candidate contest. In the election of 7 December 2002, Ma defeated DPP nominee Lee Ying-yuan with 873,102 votes, or 64.11 percent. His two consecutive municipal terms extended from December 1998 to December 2006. (taipeitimes.com)

On 1 July 2000, Taipei introduced per-bag household waste collection charges. Residents paid through the purchase of designated refuse bags, priced at NT$0.50 per litre, making the charge depend on the volume of rubbish presented for collection. The policy linked waste disposal costs to household behaviour and encouraged separation of recyclable materials. Its pricing became an issue in the 2002 election: Lee proposed halving bag prices, while Ma and environmental protection director Stephen Shen argued that the existing charge preserved the incentive to reduce waste. In November 2002, Shen reported that household rubbish collected in October was approximately 60 percent of its pre-policy level. Citywide household food-waste collection began on 26 December 2003, adding a separate recovery stream alongside recycling; the city reported collecting an average of 163 tonnes per collection day during 2004. (taipeitimes.com)

Municipal priorities also included everyday service delivery and expenditure on less visible infrastructure. Ma’s April 2005 report to the city council described a community childcare programme, operating since 2000, that combined caregiver training, placement referrals, and continuing supervision. By February 2005, approximately 8,500 people had completed basic training, and about 600 caregivers remained under supervision. The same report recorded approximately NT$31.1 billion spent on sewerage works during 1999–2004. By March 2005, 488,779 households had been connected to the sewer system, representing 73.5 percent coverage. These were municipal administrative figures, rather than independent assessments of the mayor’s performance. (sec.gov.taipei)

Expansion of public transport during Ma’s tenure continued a programme inherited from earlier administrations. Taipei Metro construction had begun in 1988; the Muzha line opened in March 1996 and the Tamsui line in March 1997, before he became mayor. Subsequent openings included the full Xindian line in November 1999, sections of the Banqiao and Nangang lines in December 1999, and the Xiaonanmen line in August 2000. The network reached 74.4 kilometres with the opening of the Banqiao second phase and Tucheng line in May 2006. These opening dates identify services brought into operation during his administration without attributing the conception or construction of the entire system to it. (english.metro.taipei)

Wireless-network development formed another municipal initiative. Taipei’s 2005 yearbook recorded an agreement signed with Q-Ware Systems on 7 September 2004 to develop wireless broadband access. The resulting WiFly service was operated commercially by the contractor rather than supplied universally without charge. By June 2006, contemporary reporting described approximately 4,200 access points and coverage reaching 90 percent of the population, but only about 30,000 paying users; the monthly subscription cost was NT$399. By September, reported subscriptions had risen to 50,000, and the operator introduced additional short-duration tariffs. The distinction between extensive network coverage and comparatively limited paid adoption was an important feature of the project’s implementation. (www-ws.gov.taipei)

Kuomintang leadership and presidential elections

Ma won the Kuomintang (KMT) chairmanship election on 16 July 2005 while serving as mayor of Taipei. In a ballot of party members, he defeated Legislative Yuan speaker Wang Jin-pyng with 375,056 votes, approximately 72.4 percent, against Wang’s 143,268. He formally succeeded Lien Chan on 19 August at the party’s seventeenth national congress. His announced organizational priorities included resolving the party’s asset problems, strengthening grassroots connections, and preparing to regain the presidency in 2008. The chairmanship was an internal party position, distinct from his elected municipal office: winning it did not confer national governmental authority. At the time, the presidency remained with Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). (taipeitimes.com)

His first chairmanship ended in February 2007. On 13 February, prosecutors indicted him over the handling of his discretionary mayoral allowance; he denied wrongdoing, announced his resignation as party chairman, and declared his intention to seek the presidency. The indictment concerned allegations, not a conviction. The Taipei District Court acquitted him on 14 August 2007, and his acquittal became final when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s appeal on 24 April 2008. The interruption of his party leadership therefore did not prevent his subsequent presidential candidacy. (taipeitimes.com)

In the presidential election of 22 March 2008, Ma stood with Vincent Siew against the DPP ticket of Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates appeared together on a joint ticket; voters elected the pair receiving the most votes, rather than choosing the two offices separately. Ma and Siew received 7,659,014 votes, approximately 58.4 percent of valid ballots, while Hsieh and Su received 5,444,949, approximately 41.6 percent. Turnout was 76.33 percent. The result returned the KMT to the presidency after eight years of DPP administration. Ma and Siew took office on 20 May 2008, a governmental inauguration separate from any appointment to party leadership. (president.gov.tw)

Ma regained the KMT chairmanship through another membership ballot on 26 July 2009. As the sole candidate, he received 285,354 votes, or 93.87 percent of ballots cast, with turnout of 56.95 percent. He formally took over from Wu Po-hsiung on 17 October. He thus held the presidency and party chairmanship concurrently, stating that his purpose was closer cooperation between the party and government in implementing policy. His second period as chairman lasted until 3 December 2014, when he resigned following the KMT’s local-election losses; that resignation did not terminate his presidential term. (taipeitimes.com)

For the election of 14 January 2012, Ma’s running mate was Wu Den-yih, replacing Siew, who did not seek another term. The principal opposition ticket paired Tsai Ing-wen with Su Jia-chyuan; James Soong also contested the election with Lin Ruey-shiung. Ma and Wu won 6,891,139 votes, approximately 51.6 percent, against 6,093,578, or 45.6 percent, for Tsai and Su, and 369,588, approximately 2.8 percent, for Soong and Lin. Turnout was 74.38 percent. Ma’s reelection was therefore secured with a smaller vote share than in 2008. He and Wu began their presidential and vice-presidential terms on 20 May 2012. (en.wikipedia.org)

Presidential administration and domestic economic policy

Under the Republic of China’s Constitution and its Additional Articles, Ma’s presidential office was distinct from the machinery administering domestic economic policy. The president was head of state and commander-in-chief and appointed the premier without legislative confirmation. The premier headed the Executive Yuan, the highest administrative organ; its cabinet coordinated ministries and considered policy, legislation, and budget proposals. The Legislative Yuan passed laws and budgets, questioned the premier and ministers, and could adopt a no-confidence motion against the premier. Consequently, presidential economic commitments required cabinet implementation and, where legislation or appropriations were involved, legislative approval. (english.president.gov.tw)

Vincent Siew served as vice president during Ma’s first term, from 2008 to 2012, and Wu Den-yih during his second, from 2012 to 2016. Six premiers headed successive cabinets: Liu Chao-shiuan, appointed in May 2008; Wu, who succeeded him in September 2009; Sean Chen, from February 2012; Jiang Yi-huah, from February 2013; Mao Chi-kuo, from December 2014; and Chang San-cheng, from 1 February 2016 until the administration ended on 20 May. These appointments were changes in administrative leadership, not separate presidential terms. (en.wikipedia.org)

The global financial crisis sharply reduced demand for Taiwan’s exports at the beginning of Ma’s presidency. Official figures published in late 2011 recorded a 20.3 percent decline in merchandise exports in 2009 and a 1.81 percent contraction in real GDP, followed by export growth of 34.8 percent and GDP growth of 10.72 percent in 2010. The rebound also reflected comparison with the depressed 2009 base. Growth subsequently weakened: the February 2016 preliminary estimate put full-year 2015 growth at 0.75 percent. These fluctuations therefore cannot be attributed solely to presidential decisions; international demand and the export-oriented structure of Taiwan’s economy were substantial influences. (ws.ndc.gov.tw)

Labor-market recovery was slower than the initial output rebound. Annual unemployment rose from 4.14 percent in 2008 to 5.85 percent in 2009, before declining to 5.21 percent in 2010; by January 2015 the monthly rate was 3.71 percent. Nominal average monthly regular earnings in industry and services increased from NT$36,233 in 2010 to NT$38,218 in 2014. These figures exclude irregular earnings such as overtime payments and annual bonuses and do not measure purchasing power. A January 2016 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission staff report found that inflation-adjusted monthly wages had recovered only weakly after the crisis and remained below their pre-crisis level in the series it examined. (ws.ndc.gov.tw)

An enacted fiscal stimulus measure was the distribution of consumption vouchers beginning on 18 January 2009. Each citizen could receive NT$3,600 in NT$200 and NT$500 denominations, usable through 30 September, to encourage domestic purchases. The Ministry of Finance handled budgeting and reimbursement, while the Ministry of the Interior distributed them. Business taxation also changed: legislation initially lowered the corporate income-tax rate from 25 to 20 percent for 2010, and a June 2010 amendment reduced it further to 17 percent, retroactive to 1 January. Other measures were subsequently reversed: the securities capital-gains tax advanced in 2012 underwent revisions before legislators repealed it effective 1 January 2016. (nta.gov.tw)

Investment promotion included the Free Economic Pilot Zones initiative. Its first phase used existing administrative powers; a broader bill approved by the cabinet on 26 December 2013 proposed easier entry for foreign businesspeople, customs changes, and tax exemptions for overseas profits introduced into the zones for investment. Cabinet approval did not itself enact these provisions, and the bill encountered legislative obstruction in May 2014. A Legislative Yuan assessment recorded 20 new investment projects worth approximately NT$1.672 billion across eight pilot locations between August 2013 and April 2014, almost all concentrated in the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park. It distinguished these recorded commitments from the initiative’s projected NT$21 billion increase in private investment during 2014. (english.ey.gov.tw)

Disaster response and legislative scrutiny

Typhoon Morakot brought severe flooding and landslides to southern Taiwan in August 2009, damaging settlements, roads, bridges, farmland, and aquaculture facilities. The national response involved military personnel, the National Airborne Services Corps, civilian rescue organizations, and central and local authorities. On 14 August, Ma convened a National Security Council meeting to coordinate rescue, resettlement, and reconstruction. According to the presidential briefing, military and airborne-service helicopters had rescued more than 2,200 people on 13 August alone. Ma also called for special reconstruction legislation: ordinary disaster-financing provisions could make approximately NT$40 billion available, whereas the government then estimated that NT$110 billion would be needed. These figures described the administration’s immediate funding assessment, rather than the eventual reconstruction expenditure. (english.president.gov.tw)

On 18 August, Ma publicly apologized for shortcomings in the government’s emergency response. At a domestic press conference, he and senior officials stood and bowed; in subsequent remarks to foreign journalists, he acknowledged that relief operations had not been sufficiently rapid or orderly and accepted presidential responsibility for government mistakes or neglect. He announced an investigation into the response and possible administrative or political accountability for officials. The subsequent reconstruction framework combined a dedicated Executive Yuan council with special legislation and financing. The Special Act for Post-Typhoon Morakot Disaster Reconstruction was promulgated on 28 August 2009, and a special budget of NT$116.5 billion was approved within three months of the disaster. The act assigned the reconstruction council responsibility for coordination, policy formulation, implementation, and supervision, while requiring reconstruction in Indigenous areas to comply with the Basic Law for Indigenous Peoples. (english.president.gov.tw)

The immediate legislative dispute behind the Sunflower Movement concerned review of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement, signed in June 2013. Legislative caucuses had agreed that the agreement would undergo article-by-article deliberation and voting. On 17 March 2014, Kuomintang committee convener Chang Ching-chung declared the committee review completed and sought to send the agreement to the legislative floor without that detailed examination. Students and other activists occupied the Legislative Yuan chamber on 18 March. The occupation continued until 10 April, making legislative procedure and the institutional supervision of agreements with China central issues alongside objections to the agreement’s economic and political implications. The committee declaration was not equivalent to final legislative approval: implementation of the services agreement remained stalled. (cambridge.org)

The administration and movement participants advanced different oversight mechanisms. On 3 April, the Executive Yuan approved a supervisory bill combining national-security screening with communication and consultation at four stages: issue formation, negotiations, before signature, and after signature. A civil-society alternative sought stronger legislative authorization before negotiations, including a 90-day period for legislators to consider negotiating plans, and a 180-day assessment period after negotiations but before signature. These were competing proposals, not enacted requirements. The government defended its approach as preserving executive negotiating authority, while movement participants demanded a binding oversight law before further consideration of the services agreement. (english.ey.gov.tw)

On 6 April, Legislative Yuan president Wang Jin-pyng promised not to convene interparty negotiations on the services agreement before passage of an oversight law. Ma’s statement the following day reiterated support for article-by-article review and urged legislators to pass the supervisory legislation during the current session. Wang’s commitment provided the procedural basis for ending the occupation on 10 April, but did not itself create an oversight statute or approve the trade agreement. When Ma’s presidency ended on 20 May 2016, the supervisory legislation remained unpassed and the services agreement remained unratified. (english.president.gov.tw)

Cross-strait policy and agreements

Ma framed his cross-strait policy as preservation of the status quo under the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, using the formulation “no unification, no independence, and no use of force.” During his presidency, this meant rejecting both a move toward unification and a declaration of Taiwan independence while pursuing negotiated exchanges. His administration identified the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for dialogue, interpreting it as “one China, respective interpretations”: each side acknowledged “one China” but could state its own understanding of that expression. Ma identified his administration’s interpretation with the Republic of China. These were his government’s constitutional and political formulations, rather than a mutually accepted settlement of sovereignty or a universally accepted definition of the consensus. (english.president.gov.tw)

Negotiations initially proceeded through the government-authorized Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan and the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Agreements signed on 13 June 2008 provided for weekend charter flights and mainland tourist visits. Weekend flights began on 4 July, alongside an inaugural mainland tourist group; the general group-tour programme formally opened on 18 July. On 15 December 2008, further agreements expanded passenger charter flights to daily operations and introduced direct cargo flights, shipping, and postal services. These arrangements widened existing, more restricted links and provided transport and administrative mechanisms for increased business travel and tourism. (mac.gov.tw)

The principal economic framework was the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in Chongqing on 29 June 2010 and effective from 12 September. Rather than immediately liberalizing all bilateral trade, it combined an “early harvest” programme of selected concessions with a framework for subsequent agreements on goods, services, investment protection, and dispute settlement. The goods programme covered 539 categories of Taiwanese exports to the mainland and 267 categories of mainland exports to Taiwan. Tariff reductions began on 1 January 2011 and were phased over three years; covered Taiwanese products included textiles, machinery, petrochemicals, transportation equipment, and selected agricultural goods. ECFA therefore delivered specified market-access concessions while leaving broader liberalization dependent on further negotiations and domestic approval. The services agreement signed in 2013 remained unratified during Ma’s presidency; its legislative scrutiny is addressed separately. (ecfa.org.tw)

Direct official communication developed alongside, rather than replacing, the SEF–ARATS negotiating channel. On 11 February 2014, Mainland Affairs Council minister Wang Yu-chi met Taiwan Affairs Office director Zhang Zhijun in Nanjing. This was the first formal meeting between the heads of the two governments’ cross-strait agencies since the sides came under separate rule in 1949; they addressed one another by their official titles. The meeting established a regular communication and liaison mechanism for handling cross-strait issues. Agreement negotiations and signing nevertheless remained functions of SEF and ARATS, distinguishing the new official channel from the existing arrangements for practical agreements. (mac.gov.tw)

On 7 November 2015, Ma met Xi Jinping at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, the first meeting between the two sides’ serving leaders since 1949. Its protocol avoided presidential titles: the participants addressed each other as “mister,” appeared together for a handshake and opening remarks, and then held closed discussions. Neither a signed agreement nor a joint statement resulted. Ma subsequently described his presentation of the 1992 Consensus as allowing each side to express its interpretation of “one China” verbally. The meeting thus brought the dialogue to leadership level without converting it into a treaty or resolving the parties’ constitutional claims. (time.com)

Foreign relations and international participation

Ma’s administration described its foreign policy as “viable diplomacy,” combining the maintenance of formal diplomatic partners with stronger substantive relations with countries that did not recognize the Republic of China (ROC). Its stated rules for foreign assistance required legitimate purposes, lawful procedures, and effective implementation. Ma also advocated a “diplomatic truce” with China: rather than competing to persuade each other’s diplomatic partners to switch recognition, Taipei and Beijing would refrain from such competition. This was a tacit understanding, not a treaty establishing reciprocal recognition. Taiwan had 23 diplomatic partners in 2008; following the loss of The Gambia, it had 22 near the end of Ma’s presidency. Relations with those partners remained formally distinct from Taiwan’s unofficial relationships with major powers. (english.president.gov.tw)

Relations with the United States continued through the American Institute in Taiwan and Taiwan’s representative offices, within the framework established by the Taiwan Relations Act after Washington changed diplomatic recognition in 1979. Cooperation under Ma did not restore formal diplomatic relations. A concrete expansion of civilian exchanges came with Taiwan’s admission to the US Visa Waiver Program: from 1 November 2012, eligible passport holders could travel for qualifying business or tourism visits of up to 90 days, subject to the program’s requirements. With Japan, relations likewise remained non-governmental and working-level under Japan’s policy following the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué. Japan’s Interchange Association and Taiwan’s Association of East Asian Relations provided institutional channels for practical agreements without an exchange of embassies or diplomatic recognition. (web-archive-2022.ait.org.tw)

Participation in international organizations expanded through arrangements that fell short of membership. In 2009, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan invited Taiwan’s Department of Health to send a delegation to the 62nd World Health Assembly in Geneva as an observer under the name “Chinese Taipei.” Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan led the delegation. Taiwan subsequently attended the assembly annually through 2016, but this did not make it a member of the World Health Organization. In September 2013, the president of the International Civil Aviation Organization Council invited Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration to the organization’s 38th Assembly in Montreal under the designation “Chinese Taipei CAA.” Its capacity was that of a guest of the Council president, rather than a contracting state or assembly observer; the invitation concerned that assembly, not permanent participation. (taipeitimes.com)

On 5 August 2012, Ma proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative amid disputes involving the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Its five proposals called for restraint, continued dialogue despite disagreements, peaceful settlement under international law, negotiation of a regional code of conduct, and cooperation in developing resources. The initiative distinguished the parties’ incompatible sovereignty claims from the possibility of practical cooperation: shelving a dispute for resource management did not require relinquishing a territorial claim. It was a policy proposal, not an agreed settlement or binding regional code. (english.president.gov.tw)

The Taiwan–Japan Fisheries Agreement, signed in Taipei on 10 April 2013 after the seventeenth round of fisheries talks, applied this distinction to fishing operations. The signatories were the Association of East Asian Relations, headed by Liao Liou-yi, and Japan’s Interchange Association, headed by Mitsuo Ohashi. It established arrangements in designated waters south of 27° north and north of Japan’s Yaeyama and Miyako islands; Taiwan’s foreign ministry reported that it expanded Taiwanese fishermen’s operating area by approximately 4,530 square kilometres. A joint fishery committee supplied a continuing mechanism for negotiating operating rules, conservation, and safety, approving longline-fishing regulations in January 2014. The agreement addressed overlapping fisheries interests while preserving each side’s legal positions; it neither resolved sovereignty over the islands nor constituted a maritime-boundary settlement. (mofa.gov.tw)

Final presidential years and transfer of office

In the local elections of 29 November 2014, the Kuomintang (KMT) won six of the 22 mayoral and county-magistrate contests, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won thirteen and independent candidates won three. The KMT retained only one of the six special municipalities, New Taipei City, where Eric Chu secured reelection. In Taipei, the DPP-backed independent Ko Wen-je defeated the KMT’s Sean Lien, ending sixteen years of KMT control of the mayoralty; in Taichung, the DPP’s Lin Chia-lung defeated incumbent Jason Hu. Across the 22 executive contests, the KMT received 40.7 percent of votes, compared with the DPP’s 47.55 percent. These figures concerned local executive offices, not the presidency or national legislative seats. (uscc.gov)

Ma resigned as KMT chairman on 3 December 2014 at a meeting of the party’s Central Standing Committee, accepting responsibility for the electoral losses and apologizing to supporters. Vice President Wu Den-yih became acting chairman pending a party election. Ma’s resignation relinquished party leadership, not the presidency: he continued to head the outgoing national administration. Contemporary analysis by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified wages, housing prices, and food safety among voters’ concerns, rather than assigning the outcome to a single issue. Ma subsequently maintained, in a May 2015 interview, that the losses principally reflected domestic issues rather than his mainland policy. (taipeitimes.com)

The constitutional framework required a presidential succession in 2016 regardless of the KMT’s electoral prospects. Under the Additional Articles of the Republic of China’s Constitution, the directly elected president serves a four-year term and may serve no more than two consecutive terms. Having held the presidency since 2008 and won reelection in 2012, Ma could not seek another consecutive term. The KMT’s candidate-selection process therefore concerned his prospective successor, not a third Ma administration. On 17 October 2015, an extraordinary party congress replaced its previously nominated presidential candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu, with chairman Eric Chu. Ma supported the replacement, but Chu, rather than Ma, headed the party’s presidential campaign. (english.president.gov.tw)

In the presidential election on 16 January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate Chen Chien-jen received 6,894,744 votes, or 56.12 percent. The KMT ticket of Chu and Wang Ju-hsuan received 3,813,365 votes, or 31.04 percent; the third ticket was headed by James Soong. Chu conceded defeat and resigned as KMT chairman. The election determined the next presidential administration but did not immediately end Ma’s tenure, which continued until the scheduled transfer of office in May. (vote.nccu.edu.tw)

On 20 May 2016, Tsai and Chen took their oaths of office at the Presidential Office Building, completing Taiwan’s third party alternation through presidential elections. Ma attended the ceremony, at which Judicial Yuan president Lai Hau-min administered the oaths and Legislative Yuan president Su Jia-chyuan presented the presidential seals to Tsai. Afterward, Tsai and Chen accompanied the outgoing Ma and Wu from Ching-kuo Hall; Ma and Wu greeted the crowd outside before departing. The ceremony ended Ma’s eight-year presidency and transferred the office from the KMT to the DPP. (president.gov.tw)

Post-presidential exchanges and public activity

Ma established the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation on 27 July 2018 as a private cultural, educational, and public-policy organization. At its inauguration, he described its purposes as providing a forum for policy discussion and addressing young people’s employment, wages, housing, and future prospects. Its educational activities include the Dajiu Academy (大九學堂), which combines lectures by scholars and practitioners with thematic visits and discussion of public affairs. The recruitment announcement for its seventh program, scheduled for 7–9 February 2025 in Taipei, invited Republic of China citizens under 30 enrolled in undergraduate or master’s programs; the foundation covered instruction, accommodation, and meals. These programs and the foundation’s cross-strait delegations were nongovernmental activities, rather than missions representing Taiwan’s administration. (cna.com.tw)

From 27 March to 7 April 2023, Ma visited mainland China, becoming the first former Taiwanese president to do so since the two sides came under separate governments in 1949. The twelve-day journey combined ancestral observances, historical-site visits, and exchanges involving more than 30 Taiwanese students. He visited Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum in Nanjing and paid respects at his family’s ancestral graves in Xiangtan, Hunan, on 1 April. The educational itinerary included meetings with students at Wuhan University, Hunan University, and Fudan University in Shanghai. The foundation presented the journey as an ancestral and student-exchange visit; it did not include Beijing. Ma advocated communication and peaceful cross-strait relations while travelling in his post-presidential capacity. (cna.com.tw)

The exchanges also operated in the opposite direction. In July 2023, the foundation hosted a nine-day visit to Taiwan by 31 students and six faculty members from five mainland universities. The delegation, led by Peking University party secretary Hao Ping, arrived on 15 July. Ma welcomed the visitors and advocated further student contact as a means of improving mutual understanding and reducing the possibility of conflict. The arrangement linked his mainland university visits with a reciprocal invitation organized through the foundation, rather than through negotiations between the two governments. (scmp.com)

Ma returned to mainland China on 1 April 2024 with another student group for an eleven-day journey. On 10 April, he met Xi Jinping in Beijing, their second meeting after the November 2015 encounter in Singapore. Unlike the Singapore meeting, which took place during Ma’s presidency, the Beijing encounter involved Ma as a former president, not Taiwan’s incumbent head of government. Their public remarks emphasized their respective views on shared Chinese identity and cross-strait relations. Ma warned that another war would impose an intolerable burden and expressed support for resolving differences peacefully. (apnews.com)

On 14 June 2025, Ma departed with Dajiu Academy students on a further mainland visit, with an itinerary extending to 27 June. It included the seventeenth Straits Forum in Xiamen, Fujian, and cultural activities in Dunhuang, Gansu. Before departure, he described face-to-face youth contact and learning about Fujian’s history and industrial development as purposes of the delegation. On 15 June, he met Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, before addressing the forum. In his speech, Ma again advocated continuing civilian exchanges and reciprocal visits by young people, presenting them as central to the foundation’s work. (cna.com.tw)

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