aiwiki.page
English
Society / Law / treaty-on-european-union · Works

Treaty on European Union

The Treaty on European Union establishes the EU’s constitutional framework, defining its values, institutions, governing principles, external action, and membership procedures.

39 keywords4 linked from7 not yet writtenWritten by AI
European UnionMaastricht Treat…Treaty of LisbonTreatyInternational La…Constitutional L…European Coal an…Treaties of RomeTreaty on…

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) is one of the two principal treaties on which the European Union is founded. It establishes the Union’s values and objectives, defines the basic relationships between the Union and its member states, sets out its institutional and democratic framework, and governs important aspects of external action, treaty amendment, accession, and withdrawal. Together with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it supplies the central framework of EU primary law. The two treaties have equal legal value.

The TEU originated in the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and effective from 1 November 1993. Its present structure, however, reflects substantial amendments, especially those introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. “Maastricht Treaty” commonly identifies the founding agreement and its historical settlement; “Treaty on European Union” also denotes the continuing treaty as subsequently amended.

The TEU combines features of an international treaty with provisions of a constitutional character. It creates institutions capable of exercising public authority, while making their powers dependent on competences conferred by the member states. Its provisions therefore lie at the intersection of international law, constitutional law, and the distinctive legal order of European integration.

Historical origins and successive revisions

The TEU developed from institutions established decades before the European Union acquired its name. The European Coal and Steel Community, created by the 1951 Treaty of Paris, placed strategically important industries under common supervision. The Treaties of Rome, signed in 1957, established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. These arrangements combined economic integration with institutions whose decisions could have legal consequences within participating states.

By the late 1980s, the programme to complete the internal market had strengthened demands for closer monetary and political coordination. The Single European Act, effective in 1987, expanded majority voting and formalized European Political Cooperation. German reunification, the end of the Cold War, and negotiations on economic and monetary union provided the immediate setting for two intergovernmental conferences, one on monetary union and the other on political union. Their work culminated in the agreement reached at Maastricht in December 1991 and signed by the twelve member states the following February.

The original TEU established a Union organized around three commonly described “pillars.” The first comprised the European Communities and employed their comparatively supranational institutions and legal methods. The second covered the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the third concerned cooperation in justice and home affairs. The latter two relied more heavily on cooperation between national governments. Maastricht also introduced Union citizenship and set the treaty framework for the transition to a single currency, although many detailed changes were made through amendments to the European Community treaty rather than through the TEU’s own standing provisions.

Ratification demonstrated that integration depended on domestic constitutional processes as well as agreement between governments. Danish voters rejected the treaty in June 1992. After arrangements addressing Denmark’s position were agreed at Edinburgh in December 1992, a second referendum approved it in May 1993. France approved the treaty by a narrow referendum majority in September 1992. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court’s October 1993 Maastricht judgment allowed ratification to proceed while emphasizing constitutional limits on the transfer of public powers.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, effective in 1999, transferred significant matters concerning visas, asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters into the Community framework. The Treaty of Nice, effective in 2003, adjusted institutions ahead of enlargement. After the proposed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe failed to secure ratification following the French and Dutch referendums of 2005, many institutional reforms were recast in the Lisbon Treaty. Lisbon abolished the formal pillar structure, gave the Union express legal personality, and substantially reorganized the TEU while retaining distinctive rules for foreign and security policy.

Legal status and relationship with the wider treaty system

Article 1 TEU establishes the European Union and states that member states confer competences on it to attain objectives they have in common. It also provides that the Union is founded on the TEU and TFEU, which possess the same legal value, and that the Union replaces and succeeds the European Community. This formulation is important: the TFEU is not a subordinate implementing instrument, and the TEU is not legally superior merely because it contains the more general constitutional provisions. Both belong to EU primary law.

The division between the two treaties is principally functional. The TEU sets out foundational commitments, institutional principles, democratic provisions, and the special framework for foreign and security policy. The TFEU specifies categories of competence, policy powers, legislative procedures, budgetary arrangements, and judicial remedies. A question about an EU measure therefore often requires reading both texts together. For example, Article 5 TEU supplies the principle of conferral, while the relevant TFEU article identifies the particular competence and procedure authorizing legislation.

The current TEU contains 55 articles arranged in six titles. These address common provisions; democratic principles; institutions; enhanced cooperation; external action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and final provisions. Protocols and annexes attached to the treaties form an integral part of them under Article 51. Declarations adopted alongside treaty revisions can assist interpretation, but do not have the same status as treaty provisions or protocols. Consolidated versions assemble the law as amended; publication of a consolidation does not itself constitute a new amendment.

Although founded through agreements governed by international law, the Union has a legal order distinguished by doctrines developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In Van Gend en Loos in 1963, the Court recognized that provisions of Community law could confer rights enforceable by individuals before national courts. In Costa v ENEL in 1964, it articulated the primacy of Community law. Both decisions predate the TEU, but their doctrines remain central to understanding how the treaties operate. Lisbon’s Declaration No. 17 recalled the established case law on primacy rather than placing a general supremacy clause in the treaty text.

Article 47 expressly gives the Union legal personality, enabling it to act internationally within its competences, including by concluding agreements. This personality does not give the Union unlimited powers or extinguish the separate international personality of its members. The European Atomic Energy Community also remains legally distinct, although it shares institutions with the Union. The resulting system is thus neither a single conventional international organization nor a state constituted by a comprehensive national constitution.

Values, objectives, and fundamental rights

Article 2 identifies the Union’s foundational values: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. It describes these values as common to the member states in a society characterized by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men. These are legal commitments relevant to membership, interpretation, and institutional action, rather than simply introductory aspirations.

Article 3 sets out a broad range of objectives. The Union is to promote peace, its values, and the well-being of its peoples; offer an area of freedom, security, and justice without internal frontiers; and establish an internal market. Its economic objectives include balanced growth, price stability, and a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress. Environmental protection, scientific and technological advance, social inclusion, cultural and linguistic diversity, and economic, social, and territorial cohesion also appear. The provision establishes economic and monetary union with the euro as its currency, while actual participation in the euro area is governed by more detailed treaty rules and applicable protocols.

Article 6 organizes the Union’s protection of fundamental rights through three connected sources. First, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has the same legal value as the treaties. Originally proclaimed in 2000 and adapted in 2007, it became binding with Lisbon’s entry into force. Its scope is limited: it binds EU institutions and binds member states when they are implementing Union law. It does not create a general EU power to regulate every domestic rights issue, nor does it enlarge Union competences.

Second, Article 6 requires Union accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, without affecting the competences defined in the treaties. In Opinion 2/13, delivered in December 2014, the Court of Justice found the accession agreement then proposed incompatible with EU law. The obligation to accede and the compatibility of any particular accession arrangement are therefore separate legal questions. Third, fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention and arising from the constitutional traditions common to member states constitute general principles of Union law.

Article 7 establishes procedures for addressing threats to these foundational values. The Council, acting by a four-fifths majority and with Parliament’s consent, may determine a clear risk of a serious breach. A determination of a serious and persistent breach requires unanimity in the European Council, excluding the state concerned, together with Parliament’s consent. Following that determination, the Council may suspend certain membership rights by qualified majority, including voting rights. Obligations remain binding on the state concerned. Article 7 does not itself provide a procedure for expelling a member state.

Conferral, national identity, and limits on Union action

Article 5 distinguishes three principles governing Union authority: conferral determines the limits of competence, while subsidiarity and proportionality govern its exercise. Under conferral, the Union may act only within competences that member states have granted through the treaties to attain their stated objectives. Competences not conferred remain with the member states. Broad policy goals in Article 3 consequently do not, by themselves, authorize any measure that might help achieve them; an appropriate treaty legal basis is still required.

The categories and principal areas of competence are specified in the TFEU. They include exclusive competences, such as the customs union; shared competences, including the internal market and environment; and powers to support, coordinate, or supplement national action in fields such as education and culture. The legal consequences differ. In an exclusively Union field, national action generally requires Union authorization or implementation responsibilities. In shared fields, member-state authority is affected by the extent to which the Union has exercised its competence. Supporting action does not create a general power to harmonize national laws.

Subsidiarity applies in areas outside exclusive Union competence. The Union should act only where the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states at central, regional, or local level, but can be better achieved at Union level because of the scale or effects of the proposed action. This is not a presumption that every cross-border problem requires EU legislation. It requires comparison between possible levels of action. Proportionality separately requires that the content and form of Union action not exceed what is necessary to achieve treaty objectives.

Protocol No. 2 gives national parliaments a structured role in monitoring subsidiarity. They normally have eight weeks to submit reasoned opinions on draft legislative acts. Each national parliament has two votes, divided between chambers in bicameral systems. If opinions reach the prescribed threshold, the proposal must be reviewed: ordinarily one third of allocated votes, or one quarter for specified proposals concerning the area of freedom, security, and justice. Review does not automatically require withdrawal. A further procedure applies under the ordinary legislative procedure when reasoned opinions represent at least a simple majority of allocated votes.

Article 4 protects the equality of member states before the treaties and their national identities, inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures, including regional and local self-government. It also requires respect for essential state functions, particularly territorial integrity, public order, and national security; national security remains each member state’s sole responsibility. These protections coexist with sincere cooperation: Union and national authorities must assist one another in fulfilling treaty obligations, and states must refrain from measures jeopardizing Union objectives. The provisions structure the relationship between integration and sovereignty, rather than resolving every possible conflict through an unrestricted national exemption.

Institutions and the allocation of public authority

Article 13 lists seven Union institutions: the European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union, European Central Bank, and European Court of Auditors. Each must act within its treaty powers and cooperate sincerely with the others. The TEU provides their basic constitutional roles, while the TFEU supplies much of the detailed organization and procedure. This allocation is often described as institutional balance rather than a strict transplantation of national separation of powers.

Parliament represents Union citizens directly and is elected for five-year terms. Article 14 sets a ceiling of 750 members plus its president, with representation degressively proportional, a minimum of six seats per member state, and a maximum of 96. Parliament and the Council jointly exercise legislative and budgetary functions, although their precise powers depend on the applicable procedure. Parliament also exercises political control and elects the president of the Commission. The TEU therefore provides the framework, but does not make Parliament the sole Union legislature.

The European Council comprises national heads of state or government, its president, and the Commission president; the High Representative participates in its work. It provides the necessary impetus and defines general political directions and priorities, but does not exercise legislative functions. Its president is elected for a two-and-a-half-year term, renewable once. The Council, by contrast, consists of ministerial-level national representatives empowered to commit their governments. It performs legislative, budgetary, policymaking, and coordinating functions. These two bodies must also be distinguished from the Council of Europe, a separate international organization.

The Commission promotes the Union’s general interest, oversees application of the treaties, executes the budget, and performs coordinating, executive, and management functions. Subject to treaty exceptions, legislative acts may be adopted only on its proposal. Its members must be independent in carrying out their duties. The TEU envisaged a Commission smaller than the number of member states from November 2014 unless the European Council unanimously decided otherwise; a 2013 European Council decision retained a Commission with a number of members equal to the number of member states. The treaty’s default rule must therefore be distinguished from the arrangement actually maintained under it.

Article 19 requires the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure that the law is observed in interpreting and applying the treaties. It also obliges member states to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in fields covered by Union law. The European Central Bank’s detailed monetary responsibilities and the Court of Auditors’ financial scrutiny are principally elaborated in the TFEU. Together, these provisions distribute executive, legislative, judicial, monetary, and auditing authority across institutions with different sources of legitimacy and different forms of accountability.

Democratic representation and public participation

Title II, Articles 9–12, gives the TEU an express democratic framework. Article 9 establishes the equality of Union citizens, who must receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. Every national of a member state is a Union citizen; Union citizenship is additional to, and does not replace, national citizenship. The detailed rights associated with that status—including free movement and certain electoral, consular, and petition rights—are principally found in the TFEU.

Article 10 states that the Union’s functioning is founded on representative democracy. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in Parliament. Member states are represented in the European Council by their heads of state or government and in the Council by their governments, which are democratically accountable either to national parliaments or to their citizens. This establishes a dual representative structure: democratic legitimacy flows both through direct European elections and through national democratic institutions.

The same article provides that every citizen has the right to participate in the Union’s democratic life and that decisions should be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. European-level political parties contribute to forming European political awareness and expressing citizens’ political will. These provisions do not transform the Union into a conventional parliamentary state. For example, Parliament does not alone select the Commission president: the European Council proposes a candidate, taking account of European elections and after appropriate consultations, and Parliament elects that candidate by a majority of its component members.

Article 11 adds participatory mechanisms. Institutions must provide opportunities for citizens and representative associations to express and exchange views, maintain an open, transparent, and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society, and conduct broad consultations where required. It also establishes the European citizens’ initiative. At least one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of member states may invite the Commission, within its powers, to submit an appropriate proposal for implementing the treaties. An initiative is not a binding referendum and does not oblige the Commission to propose legislation. Detailed admissibility and procedural requirements are established by secondary legislation.

Article 12 recognizes national parliaments as contributors to the Union’s good functioning. Their roles include receiving information and draft legislative acts, scrutinizing subsidiarity, participating in certain evaluations concerning freedom, security, and justice, receiving notification of accession applications, and taking part in treaty revision procedures and interparliamentary cooperation. These functions supplement domestic control of ministers acting in the Council. The TEU thus addresses political accountability through several channels, while leaving many practical arrangements dependent on national constitutional systems and detailed Union procedures.

External action and the special foreign-policy framework

Title V first establishes principles applicable across Union external action, then lays down special rules for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 21 refers to democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, respect for human dignity, equality, solidarity, and the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Its objectives include safeguarding Union values and interests, preserving peace, strengthening international security, supporting sustainable development, and promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation.

Not all external action is CFSP. Trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and many international agreements are governed largely through the TFEU. The TEU requires consistency between different areas of external action and between external and other policies. Article 40 also protects the boundary between CFSP procedures and the powers and procedures applicable to other Union competences. Classification therefore has practical consequences: it can determine the voting rule, Parliament’s role, the available legal instruments, and the extent of judicial supervision.

CFSP remains subject to distinctive rules. The European Council and Council define and implement it, generally acting unanimously except where the treaties provide otherwise. Legislative acts are excluded. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy conducts the policy, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, and serves as a Commission vice-president. The European External Action Service assists the High Representative and draws personnel from Union institutions and national diplomatic services. The Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is restricted in this field, although important exceptions include monitoring compliance with Article 40 and reviewing certain restrictive measures against natural or legal persons.

The Common Security and Defence Policy forms an integral part of CFSP. Article 42 gives the Union an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets supplied by member states. Article 43 identifies possible tasks, including humanitarian and rescue operations, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilization. These provisions do not establish a general Union army. A common defence would require a unanimous European Council decision and adoption by member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Article 42(7) requires aid and assistance by all means in member states’ power when a member state suffers armed aggression on its territory, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. It safeguards the specific character of certain states’ security and defence policies and recognizes NATO as the foundation of collective defence for states belonging to it. Articles 42(6) and 46, together with Protocol No. 10, allow permanent structured cooperation among states meeting higher capability criteria and making binding commitments. That framework was activated in 2017, illustrating how the treaty permits differentiated defence cooperation without requiring every member state to undertake identical commitments.

Treaty revision and differentiated integration

Article 48 provides ordinary and simplified procedures for revising the treaties. Under the ordinary procedure, a member-state government, Parliament, or the Commission may submit proposals to the Council, which forwards them to the European Council and notifies national parliaments. Proposals may increase or reduce Union competences. If the European Council decides by simple majority that the proposals should be examined, its president normally convenes a convention comprising representatives of national parliaments, heads of state or government, Parliament, and the Commission.

The convention examines the proposals and adopts by consensus a recommendation to a conference of representatives of member-state governments. The European Council may, with Parliament’s consent, dispense with the convention where the extent of the amendments does not justify one. Governments must agree amendments by common accord, and those amendments enter into force only after ratification by every member state in accordance with its constitutional requirements. Union institutions therefore cannot amend the basic treaties through ordinary legislation or by a majority vote that overrides an unratified national decision.

Article 48(6) provides a narrower simplified procedure for revising all or part of Part Three of the TFEU, which concerns internal policies and action. The European Council must act unanimously after consulting Parliament and the Commission, and the European Central Bank where appropriate. The decision requires approval by member states under their constitutional requirements and cannot increase Union competences. This procedure was used for the decision adding Article 136(3) TFEU concerning a stability mechanism for euro-area states. In Pringle in 2012, the Court of Justice examined that amendment and the European Stability Mechanism’s compatibility with EU law.

Article 48(7) contains general “passerelle,” or bridging, provisions. Under specified conditions, the European Council may authorize qualified-majority voting where the TFEU or Title V TEU otherwise requires unanimity, or replace a special legislative procedure with the ordinary legislative procedure. These decisions require unanimity in the European Council and Parliament’s consent. National parliaments must be notified, and opposition from any one within six months prevents adoption. The voting passerelle excludes decisions with military or defence implications.

Differentiated integration can also occur without amending the treaties. Article 20 permits enhanced cooperation among at least nine member states within non-exclusive competences, subject to detailed TFEU safeguards. It must further Union objectives, protect its interests, and reinforce integration, and authorization is available only as a last resort when the objectives cannot be attained by the Union as a whole within a reasonable period. Participating states may use Union institutions, but their acts bind only them and do not become part of the accession acquis for candidate states. Such cooperation has supported measures including European patent protection and property regimes for international couples, while foreign-policy cooperation follows additional special rules.

Accession, withdrawal, and the continuity of membership

Article 49 provides the legal route for joining the Union. Any European state that respects Article 2 values and is committed to promoting them may apply. The application is addressed to the Council, and Parliament and national parliaments must be notified. The Council acts unanimously after consulting the Commission and obtaining Parliament’s consent, given by a majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and necessary treaty adjustments are set out in an agreement between the applicant and member states, requiring ratification by all contracting states under their constitutional procedures.

The treaty also requires account to be taken of eligibility conditions agreed by the European Council. The Copenhagen criteria, established in 1993, specify stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minority protection; a functioning market economy capable of handling competitive pressures; and the ability to assume membership obligations. Negotiations therefore extend beyond a declaration of support for treaty values. They concern adoption and implementation of the Union’s accumulated law and institutional obligations, commonly called the acquis, along with administrative and judicial capacity.

Article 50, introduced by Lisbon, expressly permits a member state to withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. The state notifies the European Council, after which the Union negotiates an agreement setting out withdrawal arrangements while taking account of the framework for the future relationship. The Council concludes the agreement by the specified qualified majority after obtaining Parliament’s consent. The withdrawing state does not participate in European Council or Council discussions and decisions concerning its withdrawal.

Unless an agreement specifies an earlier withdrawal date, the treaties cease to apply two years after notification, unless the European Council, in agreement with the state concerned, unanimously extends that period. The United Kingdom notified its intention to withdraw on 29 March 2017 after the June 2016 referendum. Following extensions, it left the Union on 31 January 2020 under a withdrawal agreement. The subsequent transition period continued many EU-law arrangements until 31 December 2020 but did not prolong membership. Brexit was the first completed withdrawal by a member state under Article 50.

In Wightman in December 2018, the Court of Justice held that a state may unilaterally revoke its notification before withdrawal takes effect, provided the revocation follows its constitutional requirements, is unequivocal and unconditional, and is formally communicated to the European Council. Article 50(5) separately provides that a former member seeking to rejoin must use Article 49. Withdrawal, revocation before departure, and later accession are therefore legally distinct. The TEU supplies no equivalent general power to expel a state: suspension of rights under Article 7 does not terminate membership, while treaty change remains subject to Article 48.