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Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the European Union’s institutions, lawmaking, rights protections, and external action, entering into force on 1 December 2009.

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The Treaty of Lisbon is an international treaty that amended the constitutional foundations of the European Union (EU). Signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 by representatives of its then 27 member states, it entered into force on 1 December 2009. Its full title is the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Rather than replacing the existing treaties with a single constitutional document, it revised them, renamed the European Community treaty, and reorganized the Union’s institutions and legal framework.

The treaty addressed problems associated with successive enlargements, overlapping institutional responsibilities, and the division of EU activities among different legal arrangements. It strengthened the European Parliament, introduced a new population-based system for many votes in the Council of the European Union, created a longer-term presidency of the European Council, and made the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. It also established an explicit procedure for a member state to leave the Union.

Lisbon retained a system in which authority is divided among EU institutions and national governments, with different decision-making rules for different policies. Its provisions therefore concern not only institutional efficiency but also sovereignty, democratic accountability, the protection of rights, and the limits of European integration.

Origins and negotiation

The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from a reform process that began well before its signature. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, had created the European Union and organized its activities into three commonly described “pillars”: the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in justice and home affairs. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the Nice Treaty of 2001 adjusted this system, but questions remained about voting weights, institutional size, and the allocation of powers. These questions became more pressing as the EU prepared to admit ten new members in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

The Laeken Declaration of December 2001 initiated a broader examination of the Union’s future. A Convention chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing brought together representatives of national governments and parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Its work formed the basis of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. That instrument would have replaced the principal existing treaties with a single text and used explicitly constitutional terminology. It also proposed institutional changes that were subsequently incorporated into Lisbon.

The constitutional treaty failed to secure ratification after voters rejected it in France on 29 May 2005 and the Netherlands on 1 June 2005. Following a period of reflection, governments agreed to preserve many of its substantive reforms while abandoning the attempt to adopt a single constitution. Under the German Council presidency, the European Council adopted a detailed negotiating mandate in June 2007. An intergovernmental conference opened under the Portuguese presidency in July, and political agreement was reached in Lisbon in October. The treaty was signed at the Jerónimos Monastery on 13 December.

The resulting document deliberately used the form of amendments to existing treaties. The proposed title “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” became High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while the proposed categories of “European laws” and “European framework laws” were dropped in favor of existing legal terminology. The treaty did not reproduce the constitutional treaty’s article on the EU’s flag, anthem, and other symbols, although these continued to be used. These choices distinguished Lisbon’s legal presentation from that of its predecessor without removing most of the institutional reforms. The relationship between the two texts consequently became a central issue in national ratification debates.

Ratification and entry into force

Lisbon required ratification by every member state in accordance with its constitutional requirements. Most states used parliamentary procedures. Ireland held a referendum because of its constitutional arrangements governing transfers of authority to the European institutions. In the first Irish referendum, on 12 June 2008, 53.4 percent voted against ratification and 46.6 percent in favor. This prevented the treaty from entering into force on the timetable originally envisaged and required further agreement among governments.

The subsequent negotiations addressed concerns about Ireland’s taxation powers, military neutrality, and constitutional provisions relating to the right to life, family, and education. EU leaders agreed on legal guarantees clarifying that Lisbon did not change the relevant position in these areas. They also agreed that each member state would continue to have a national in the Commission, rather than implementing the treaty’s default reduction in Commission membership. A second Irish referendum took place on 2 October 2009: 67.1 percent voted in favor and 32.9 percent against. The guarantees were later incorporated into a protocol attached to the EU treaties.

Ratification elsewhere also involved constitutional scrutiny and political disagreement. On 30 June 2009, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court held that the Lisbon Treaty was compatible with Germany’s Basic Law, but required stronger domestic legislation governing parliamentary participation in EU affairs before ratification could be completed. Its judgment distinguished the legitimacy of European integration from the continuing responsibility of national constitutional institutions. In the Czech Republic, constitutional challenges and the timing of presidential signature delayed completion. President Václav Klaus signed the ratification instrument on 3 November 2009 after the Czech Constitutional Court rejected a further challenge.

The Czech Republic deposited the final instrument of ratification on 13 November 2009. Under the treaty’s entry-into-force clause, Lisbon then became effective on the first day of the following month, 1 December. Signature in 2007 had authenticated the negotiated text; it had not itself made the reforms operational.

Implementation involved additional decisions and transitional measures. Existing officeholders and parliamentary arrangements could not all be replaced immediately, and some voting changes were postponed. The European Council selected Herman Van Rompuy as its first longer-term president and Catherine Ashton as the first High Representative under the new arrangements. Their appointments marked the beginning of the treaty’s institutional operation, while administrative structures such as the European External Action Service required further legal and organizational work.

Treaty structure and the allocation of powers

Lisbon principally amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the treaty originally establishing the European Economic Community, later the European Community. The latter was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The TEU sets out fundamental values, institutional principles, and major constitutional provisions, while the TFEU contains more detailed rules on policies, powers, and procedures. The two have equal legal value. Protocols and annexes attached to them are integral parts of the treaty framework; declarations have a different status and may assist interpretation without operating as treaty articles.

The EU replaced and succeeded the European Community and expressly received legal personality under Article 47 TEU. This clarified its capacity to conclude international agreements and act in international legal relations. Lisbon largely removed the old pillar structure, bringing former police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the general institutional framework. It did not, however, make all policies subject to identical rules. Foreign and security policy retained special procedures, and the European Atomic Energy Community remained a separate legal entity under its own treaty.

The amended treaties distinguish categories of EU competence. In areas of exclusive competence, such as the customs union, the common commercial policy, and monetary policy for member states using the euro, the Union normally legislates and adopts binding acts. In areas of shared competence, including the internal market, environment, and transport, member states retain authority to the extent that the Union has not exercised its own. In supporting, coordinating, or supplementary fields, such as culture and education, EU action does not generally replace national authority or permit harmonization merely on that basis. Economic and employment policy coordination and foreign policy have additional arrangements that do not fit neatly into a simple three-part classification.

These powers remain governed by conferral: the Union may act only within competences granted by the member states through the treaties. Powers not conferred remain with the states. Subsidiarity governs whether action in non-exclusive fields is better undertaken at Union level, while proportionality requires that the content and form of EU action not exceed what is necessary to achieve treaty objectives.

Lisbon also required the Union to respect national identities inherent in member states’ fundamental political and constitutional structures, including regional and local self-government. These provisions coexist with obligations of sincere cooperation and compliance with EU law. The resulting framework defines both the authority available to the Union and the legal conditions restricting its exercise.

Institutional leadership and representation

Lisbon gave the European Council formal status as an EU institution. Composed principally of the heads of state or government of the member states, it provides political direction and priorities but does not exercise legislative functions. Its new president is elected by the European Council by qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. This replaced the previous arrangement under which the head of government of the country holding the rotating Council presidency also chaired European Council meetings. The purpose was to provide greater continuity in preparing meetings, building agreement, and representing the Union at that level.

The rotating presidency did not disappear. Most configurations of the Council of the European Union continued to be chaired by ministers from the member state holding its six-month presidency, supported by cooperation among groups of three successive presidencies. The Foreign Affairs Council became an exception: it is normally chaired by the High Representative. This distinction is important because the European Council and the Council of the European Union are different institutions, despite their overlapping national leadership and similar names.

The treaty strengthened the connection between European Parliament elections and the selection of the Commission president. Under Article 17 TEU, the European Council must take account of those elections and hold appropriate consultations before proposing a candidate by qualified majority. Parliament then elects that candidate by a majority of its component members. If the candidate fails, another must be proposed. The Commission as a body remains subject to Parliament’s consent before formal appointment. These provisions strengthened parliamentary influence without establishing an automatic treaty entitlement for the lead candidate of any particular European political grouping.

Commission size was another important issue. Lisbon provided that, from November 2014, the Commission would comprise a number of members corresponding to two-thirds of the member states unless the European Council unanimously decided otherwise. Following the political commitments made during Irish ratification, the European Council adopted a decision in 2013 retaining one Commission member for each member state. The smaller Commission contemplated by the treaty therefore did not become the operating arrangement.

For Parliament, Lisbon established a ceiling of 750 members plus the president and required representation to be degressively proportional, with at least six and no more than 96 seats per member state. Smaller states consequently receive more seats relative to population than larger ones. Exact allocations require a European Council decision adopted unanimously on Parliament’s initiative and with its consent. The treaty also recognized the European Central Bank among the Union’s institutions, while preserving the independence associated with its monetary responsibilities.

Lawmaking, Council voting, and public finances

Lisbon renamed the former co-decision procedure the ordinary legislative procedure and extended its use to additional policy areas. Under this procedure, Parliament and the Council must agree on the same text before legislation can be adopted. The Commission normally submits the proposal, followed by readings in both legislative institutions and, if necessary, conciliation. The extension was particularly significant in agriculture, fisheries, and aspects of justice and home affairs. It made Parliament an equal legislative participant in a wider range of policies, although consultation and consent procedures continued to apply in specified fields.

The treaty also replaced the Nice system of weighted Council votes with a “double majority” rule for most qualified-majority decisions. From 1 November 2014, a proposal from the Commission or High Representative normally required support from at least 55 percent of member states, comprising at least 15 states and representing at least 65 percent of the EU population. A blocking minority must include at least four Council members; otherwise the qualified majority is deemed attained. Where the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or High Representative, the normal threshold rises to 72 percent of member states representing at least 65 percent of the population.

Transitional arrangements allowed a member state to request application of the previous voting rules until 31 March 2017. Special calculations apply when not all states participate in a policy. Although Lisbon extended qualified-majority voting, unanimity remained important in areas such as most taxation decisions, major aspects of foreign policy, and treaty amendment. The reforms therefore reduced, but did not eliminate, the ability of an individual government to block decisions.

Lisbon also clarified the distinction between two forms of non-legislative rulemaking. Under Article 290 TFEU, delegated acts may supplement or amend non-essential elements of legislation within conditions set by the legislature; Parliament and the Council may receive powers to revoke the delegation or object to an act. Under Article 291, implementing acts provide uniform conditions for applying binding EU law and generally involve Commission action subject to member-state oversight. These categories allocate different forms of control rather than giving the Commission an unrestricted power to legislate.

In budgetary affairs, Lisbon abolished the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, extending Parliament’s authority across the annual budget. It also gave the multiannual financial framework an explicit treaty basis: the Council adopts it unanimously after obtaining Parliament’s consent. The system for financing the Union remained more closely controlled by national governments, since decisions on own resources require unanimity and approval by member states according to their constitutional requirements.

National parliaments and citizen participation

Lisbon expressly identified national parliaments as contributors to the functioning of the Union. Its provisions gave them more systematic access to draft legislation and information, as well as roles in treaty revision and certain justice and security arrangements. These mechanisms added a national parliamentary channel to the existing relationship between governments in the Council and directly elected representatives in the European Parliament. They did not create a second European legislative chamber composed of national parliamentarians.

The most distinctive innovation was the subsidiarity early-warning mechanism. National parliaments normally have eight weeks to submit reasoned opinions explaining why a draft legislative act does not comply with subsidiarity. Each national parliament has two votes; in bicameral systems, each chamber has one. If objections reach one-third of the allocated votes, the proposal must be reviewed. The threshold is one-quarter for specified proposals concerning the area of freedom, security and justice. This procedure is commonly called the “yellow card.” The proposing institution may maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal, but must explain its decision.

A stronger procedure applies under the ordinary legislative procedure when reasoned objections represent a simple majority of national parliamentary votes. If the Commission maintains its proposal, it must give reasons, and the EU legislature must examine compatibility with subsidiarity. The proposal cannot proceed if 55 percent of Council members or a majority of votes cast in Parliament consider that it breaches subsidiarity. This is commonly called the “orange card.” Neither procedure amounts to a general national parliamentary veto. Their thresholds, time limits, and focus on subsidiarity distinguish them from an unrestricted power to reject EU policy.

Lisbon also created the European Citizens’ Initiative. At least one million EU citizens who are nationals of a significant number of member states may invite the Commission, within its powers, to submit a proposal for a legal act needed to implement the treaties. Subsequent legislation established detailed requirements, including minimum participation thresholds in at least seven member states. The mechanism creates duties of examination and response, not an obligation to introduce the requested legislation. The Right2Water initiative, submitted in 2013, became an early prominent example.

The treaty placed these innovations within a broader commitment to representative democracy, open dialogue with civil society, and institutional transparency. Council meetings must be public when it deliberates and votes on draft legislative acts. At the same time, European decision-making continued to depend heavily on negotiations among governments, parliamentary groups, and the Commission. The formal expansion of participation therefore did not remove questions about how citizens can identify responsibility for decisions reached through several interacting institutions.

Fundamental rights, courts, and justice cooperation

A major legal change was the binding status given to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Proclaimed in 2000 and adapted in 2007, the Charter acquired the same legal value as the treaties through Article 6 TEU. It includes rights concerning dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice. Its provisions bind EU institutions and bind member states only when they are implementing Union law. The Charter does not itself extend EU competences or create a general EU jurisdiction over every national human rights dispute.

The Charter contains rules governing its interpretation and the permissible limitation of rights, including a distinction between rights and principles. Protocol No. 30, concerning Poland and the United Kingdom, addressed aspects of its application. It was often described politically as an “opt-out,” but did not simply exempt either state from the Charter. In its 2011 N.S. judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union explained that the protocol did not release those states from the obligation to comply with the Charter or prevent courts from ensuring compliance.

Lisbon also required the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, while specifying that accession must not alter Union competences. That treaty obligation did not itself accomplish accession. In Opinion 2/13, delivered in December 2014, the Court of Justice found that the draft accession agreement was incompatible with EU law, identifying concerns involving the autonomy and characteristics of the EU legal order. The episode illustrates the difference between establishing a legal objective and completing the international and institutional arrangements necessary to implement it.

Judicial oversight expanded as former third-pillar activities were incorporated into the general treaty framework. Cooperation on criminal law, policing, asylum, and immigration increasingly operated through ordinary EU instruments and procedures, subject to exceptions and transitional provisions. A five-year transition limited some Commission enforcement powers and Court jurisdiction over pre-Lisbon police and criminal-justice measures until December 2014. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom had distinct protocol arrangements affecting participation in justice and home affairs.

Lisbon also relaxed one aspect of access to EU judicial review. Article 263 TFEU allows individuals to challenge regulatory acts that directly concern them and do not entail implementing measures without separately proving individual concern. The Court subsequently interpreted “regulatory acts” for this purpose as non-legislative acts of general application, rather than all legislation. The treaty additionally provided a legal basis for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, later established through enhanced cooperation among participating states to investigate and prosecute offenses affecting the Union’s financial interests.

Foreign affairs, security, and international agreements

Lisbon sought greater continuity in external representation by combining responsibilities previously divided between different offices. The High Representative became both chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and a vice-president of the Commission, with responsibility for coordinating aspects of external action. This “double-hatted” role was intended to connect the member-state-centered Common Foreign and Security Policy with Commission responsibilities such as development cooperation and other external policies. It did not eliminate the separate roles of the European Council president, Commission president, or national diplomatic services.

The European External Action Service was established to assist the High Representative. Its organization was set out in a Council decision of July 2010, and it brought together officials from relevant EU departments and national diplomatic services. EU delegations became an important part of the resulting external network. The service supports policy coordination and diplomatic representation, but it does not possess an independent authority to determine the Union’s foreign policy against the decisions of the responsible institutions and member states.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy retained a distinctive legal character. Decisions generally require unanimity, legislative acts are excluded, and the Court of Justice has only limited jurisdiction, including specified review relating to restrictive measures against persons and entities. The High Representative cannot unilaterally commit the Union to policies requiring Council approval. National governments therefore retained substantial control, especially over politically sensitive diplomatic and military questions.

Lisbon introduced a mutual-assistance obligation in Article 42(7) TEU: if a member state suffers armed aggression on its territory, the other members owe it aid and assistance by all means in their power. The provision recognizes the particular security policies of some states and the role of NATO for its members. France invoked it following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. A separate solidarity clause in Article 222 TFEU concerns joint action in response to terrorist attacks and natural or human-made disasters. The treaty also provided for Permanent Structured Cooperation in defense, established by participating states in 2017; it did not create a single EU army.

For international agreements, Lisbon strengthened Parliament’s role by requiring its consent for a wider range of agreements, including those covering fields governed internally by the ordinary legislative procedure. It also expressly included foreign direct investment within the common commercial policy. These changes expanded EU-level participation in external economic relations without making every international agreement exclusively an EU matter. Agreements containing substantial elements within member-state competence may still require national participation and ratification, depending on their content and legal basis.

Treaty revision, withdrawal, and subsequent use

Lisbon revised the procedures for changing the founding treaties. Under the ordinary revision procedure in Article 48 TEU, proposals may come from a member-state government, the European Parliament, or the Commission. A Convention normally examines proposed changes, followed by an intergovernmental conference, although the European Council may decide, with Parliament’s consent, that a Convention is not justified by the scale of the amendments. Changes require agreement among governments and ratification by every member state in accordance with national constitutional requirements. The procedure may increase or reduce the competences conferred on the Union.

The treaty also created simplified revision mechanisms. Article 48(6) permits amendments to provisions in Part Three TFEU concerning internal policies and action, but cannot be used to increase Union competences. It requires a unanimous European Council decision and approval by member states under their constitutional requirements. This procedure was used to add Article 136(3), recognizing that euro-area states could establish a stability mechanism subject to specified conditions. The Court of Justice examined that amendment and the associated arrangements in the 2012 Pringle judgment.

Separate “passerelle” provisions permit certain changes from unanimity to qualified-majority voting, or from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure, without a full treaty revision. The general passerelle requires unanimity in the European Council and Parliament’s consent, and any national parliament may block it within six months. It cannot be used for decisions with military or defense implications. These safeguards mean that procedural flexibility remains dependent on substantial national and institutional agreement.

Article 50 TEU established an explicit withdrawal procedure. A state may decide to leave according to its own constitutional requirements and notify the European Council. The Union then negotiates a withdrawal agreement, concluded by the Council by qualified majority after obtaining Parliament’s consent. The treaties cease to apply when the agreement enters into force or, failing that, two years after notification, unless the European Council and the withdrawing state unanimously agree to extend the period. The departing state does not participate in the relevant European Council and Council deliberations concerning its withdrawal.

The United Kingdom became the first state to use Article 50, giving notification on 29 March 2017 after the 2016 membership referendum. Following extensions, it left the EU on 31 January 2020 under a withdrawal agreement. During the Brexit process, the Court of Justice held in Wightman in December 2018 that a notification could be revoked unilaterally before withdrawal took effect, provided the revocation met specified conditions, including being unequivocal and unconditional. Lisbon thus supplied both the principal institutional framework for continued EU action and the legal procedure through which a member state ended its membership.