Oman

Oman, officially the Sultanate of Oman, is a state on the southeastern corner of the arabian-peninsula, where the Gulf of Oman meets the Arabian Sea. Its capital is Muscat. It borders the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and its exclave of Musandam overlooks the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The country is often described as the oldest independent state in the Arab world, and its long maritime tradition shaped its ties with the Indian Ocean, Persia, Portugal and Britain.

Oman matters for several reasons. Its location on major sea routes has made it a hub for trade and logistics, and its economy has long depended on oil and natural gas. Its own policy agenda, Oman Vision 2040, is a case study in how a hydrocarbon-based economy attempts to diversify. The country is also a member of the United Nations, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it is a member of the World Trade Organization.

This entry covers Oman's geography, climate and ecology; its history from ancient copper-age societies through the Ibadi imamates, the Al Said dynasty and the modern state; its political system and foreign relations; its population, religion, language and culture; and its economy, including energy, labor, infrastructure, tourism and human development. It ends with the country's main environmental, fiscal and social challenges. Where sources disagree on figures, such as population and GDP, the entry notes the range and relies on the most recent official or international estimates.

Location, borders and territorial extent

Oman occupies the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, facing the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to the north and the Arabian Sea to the south and east. Reference works give its land area as about 309,500 km², while others, such as the Wikipedia country profile, give about 315,331 km², so the figure depends on the measurement source. Its coastline is about 2,092 km, but estimates that include islands and inlets run much longer, to roughly 3,165 km.

Oman has three land neighbours. The border with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) runs about 410 km from the Gulf of Oman coast to the tripoint where the UAE and Saudi Arabia meet. The border with Saudi Arabia is about 658 to 676 km long, depending on the source, and runs almost entirely through the desert of the Rub' al Khali (Empty Quarter). The border with Yemen is about 288 km and runs south to the Arabian Sea.

The territory is more fragmented than these figures suggest. The Musandam Peninsula at the northern tip is separated from the main body of Oman by a strip of UAE territory, and it is governed as a separate governorate on the Strait of Hormuz. Madha, a second exclave, lies between Musandam and the main territory and is surrounded by UAE land. Musandam's approximately 1,800 km² is reached by land only through UAE roads, or by sea or air.

The boundaries were settled slowly and largely through bilateral agreements. Before the twentieth century, most of the interior was not delimited by fixed lines. The dispute over the Buraimi oasis, where Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia had competing claims, came to a head in the early 1950s. Saudi forces were removed in 1955 by British-led forces acting for the Trucial States and Muscat and Oman, and the oasis was then divided between Oman and Abu Dhabi. The UAE and Oman delimited their line at Buraimi in 1974, and later maps and demarcation agreements followed in 1999, 2002 and 2005, with sources differing on the exact dates.

The Saudi border was fixed by a treaty signed by King Fahd and Sultan Qaboos at Hafr al-Batin on 21 March 1990. It was ratified in 1991 and deposited with the United Nations, and it followed the modified 1955 Riyadh line. The agreement also provided for shared grazing rights and the use of water resources in the border zone. The Yemen boundary was delimited in a 1992 agreement, after the unification of the two Yemens, and its terminus meets the Saudi line at a tripoint near 19° N. Saudi Arabia later disputed the northern terminus of the Oman–Yemen line, and the Saudi–Yemeni boundary itself was finalised only in 2000.

The Oman–Yemen agreement also allowed cross-border movement of people and livestock. The border between Oman and the UAE has been subject to tighter controls. The UAE built checkpoints and fencing, and it continues to maintain a border wall in parts of the frontier, which reflects the sensitivity of the line despite the two states' close relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Physical geography and relief

The Hajar Mountains are the dominant relief of northern Oman. The Hajar Mountains run from the Musandam Peninsula to its southern foothills for about 600 kilometres along the northern coast of the Sultanate. A natural passage, the Samail Rift, separates the mountains into an eastern and a western part. The highest summit, Jebel Shams, lies in the western section and is part of the Jabal Akhdar massif. Published heights vary: one source gives approximately 3009 meters, while another gives 3,018 m (9,902 ft). The relief shapes where people live. In Jebel Akhdar, wadis and terraced orchards support crops such as pomegranates and apricots. The range is mostly desert, but at higher altitudes receives around 300 mm (12 in) of precipitation, which makes the higher slopes the main zone for permanent cultivation.

Between the mountains and the sea lie the coastal plains. The Batinah plain runs along the Gulf of Oman in the north, and the Sharqiyah region occupies the eastern coast facing the Arabian Sea. Wadis, the seasonal river valleys that drain the Hajar, cross these plains toward the coast. They carry water only after rain, and they can produce flash floods, which is why their channels have historically been used for settlement, farming and groundwater recharge.

The Musandam Peninsula, separated from the rest of Oman by UAE territory, has a very different shape. The coastline is deeply indented by fjord-like inlets (called khors) and small islands (jazirat). Mountains of the Western Hajar range rise steeply from the sea, creating dramatic cliffs up to 1,200 m in places. Other sources give a lower figure of the highest cliffs reaching up to 1,000 meters above sea level. The highest peak on the peninsula is Jebel Harim ("Mountain of Women"), the tallest peak in the peninsula, reaching an altitude of 2,087 meters above sea level.

In the south, the Dhofar mountains form a sharp contrast. From the dry plain, the landscape rises to the almost thousand-metre-high Dhofar Mountains. This limestone massif breaks off towards the coast into a wide plain, along the edge of which run long, palm-fringed sandy beaches. Between July and September, this region is blessed by the monsoon's tails which are blocked by Dhofar mountains, and the resulting seasonal humidity turns the landscape green during the khareef.

The central interior separates the northern and southern mountain systems. For 800 kilometres, all the way to the Dhofar Mountains, there is hardly any vegetation, nor are there many people in this hostile environment. The interior is dominated by desert terrain, including the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) and the Wahiba and Huqf deserts.

Geological structure and groundwater

Much of the northern mountain core is made of an ophiolite, a fragment of oceanic crust and upper mantle that was pushed onto the continental margin. The Samail ophiolite in the Sultanate of Oman, the largest and best exposed ophiolite sequence on Earth, is well-suited to the study of low temperature serpentinization. Its large exposed surface area (15,000 km2), weak weathering, and a good knowledge of its geological structure make it a well-studied hydrogeological system.

The rock behaves as a fractured aquifer rather than a porous one. Groundwater circulation takes place mostly in the fissured near-surface horizon (≈50 m thick), and, to a lesser degree, in the tectonic fractures. These fractures began to develop when the ophiolite was hydrothermally altered at the mid-ocean ridge, ∼95 million years ago during the Middle Cretaceous. The groundwater in the ophiolite is recharged in two ways. Groundwater δ2H and δ18O values suggest two recharge sources to the ophiolite aquifer: lateral flow from the HSG and direct infiltration. The HSG is the Hajar Super Group, a sequence of carbonate rocks that surrounds the ophiolite.

The chemistry of this groundwater is also significant. Groundwater in the HSG is characterized by carbonate minerals dissolution contrary to the groundwater in the ophiolites where silicate dissolution dominates. Where water is isolated from the atmosphere, it can become strongly alkaline. The resulting Type II hyperalkaline (pH >10) Ca-OH waters emerge in springs that are of scientific interest. Serpentinization of the peridotite produces a continuous flux of hydrogen through low-temperature water/rock reactions. Researchers have also studied the rock for its capacity to store carbon dioxide, since the Samail Ophiolite, Oman is a site of natural CO2 mineralization in ultramafic rocks and is being investigated as a site for engineered geological CO2 storage.

Climate, water resources and natural hazards

Climate

Under the Köppen system, the national climate falls into the hot arid desert class, with annual mean temperatures at or above 18°C (a hot, arid desert climate where the mean annual temperature is greater than or equal to 18°C (64.4°F)). The summer half of the year is the most extreme. Inland districts can record very high readings, and sources differ on the peak: one lists daytime temperatures exceeding 45°C (113°F) in some regions, especially inland, while another puts the interior at temperatures soaring to over 50°C (122°F). Along the Gulf of Oman coast, humidity compounds the heat, and the hot season there is especially oppressive.

Rainfall is scarce across most of the territory. Muscat averages about 100 mm a year, and most of it falls from November to April. Outside the far south and the high mountains, annual totals are low; the country's annual rainfall is below 125 millimeters (5 inches) except in the Dhofar hills in the extreme south. The Jebel Akhdar massif is the main exception, where the annual rainfall on the higher parts of the Jebel Akhdar is likely to reach 500 millimeters (20 inches). Altitude also moderates temperature: in mountain regions like Jebel Akhdar, temperatures are cooler year-round, often 10–15°C lower than in the lowlands.

The khareef, the southwest monsoon, reaches only the southern coast. Its moist air mass arrives in the Dhofar governorate between mid-June to mid-September, bringing cool, damp and misty weather. Dhofar's hills gain extra rain in July and August, and the resulting fog and drizzle sustain a green, grazed landscape that contrasts with the arid north and interior. Central Oman, by contrast, sees little of this system.

Water resources

Groundwater is the principal resource. Over-abstraction has had serious effects: a FAO-linked assessment notes that groundwater depletion already takes place, especially in coastal areas, leading to sea water intrusion and a deterioration in the water quality. Al Batinah, the northern coastal plain, is the most intensively farmed area, holding almost 57% of the country's irrigated land as of the early 1990s. Much of the stored water dates from wetter periods, and present recharge is very low, if any. National policy now aims to remove groundwater from drinking-water supplies, to relieve pressure on the aquifers (eliminate groundwater from potable supplies in order to reduce pressure and reliance on groundwater resources).

The aflaj (singular falaj) are gravity-fed underground channels that tap aquifers and carry water to fields and villages without pumps. Because they run by gravity, they channel groundwater by gravity to sustain agricultural and domestic water needs without requiring external energy input. Many are very old; many of the systems currently in use are estimated to be over a thousand years old. About three thousand remain in service and together draw on roughly a third of the groundwater used in the country (roughly 3000 falaj systems still in use today, accounting for approximately 30% of Oman's groundwater). Their decline has been driven by the pumping of nearby wells: many aflaj are no longer operable due to channel collapse or water level drop caused by excessive pumping and climate change. A Middle East Eye report cites a share of dried-up systems above 30 per cent, though no official census is quoted ('More than 30 percent of the total number of aflaj are dried up now'). Recharge dams offer a partial remedy: a 24-year study in North Sharqiyah found that the construction of recharge dams increased annual Aflaj discharge volumes by approximately 65 % compared to pre-dam conditions.

Desalination has expanded to close the gap. Accounts differ on when it began; one dates the first plant to 1976, while another says that sea water desalination in Oman started to supply potable water to Muscat and the coastal area in the early 1970s. The public utility buys from seven major plants operating in Oman that have a total capacity of ~240 MCM/year. In 2014, output of about 225 million cubic metres accounted for ~10% of Oman's total freshwater supply. The share is rising, since the country is increasingly reliant on non-conventional water sources such as desalination and treated waste water to meet demand.

Natural hazards

Cyclones from the Arabian Sea and flash floods from intense storms are the main hazards. Tropical cyclones have struck the coast in several years, most notably Gonu in 2007 and Shaheen in 2021, which brought heavy rain and flooding to the northern Batinah and Muscat areas. Flash floods are more frequent in the mountain wadis of the Hajar range, where short, intense downpours can produce rapid runoff that scours channels, undercuts roads and bridges, and reaches low-lying settlements and farms within hours. Damage to the aflaj is a particular concern, since flooding can silt and break intake shafts and channels, while coastal storm surges threaten ports, desalination intakes and power infrastructure. Building codes, wadi-crossing design and early-warning systems have been adjusted in response, though coastal and mountain communities remain exposed.

Ecology and biodiversity

Oman's ecosystems range from interior sand and gravel deserts to montane woodlands, coastal salt flats, mangrove stands and coral reefs. The interior and the Empty Quarter support sparse desert vegetation dominated by hardy shrubs and acacias. The coastal plains of the Batinah and Dhofar are edged with dunes and saline marshes, where salt-tolerant plants and white mangrove (Avicennia marina) are the leading species. Sand dunes along the coast help stabilise beaches and limit wind-blown sand from covering inland areas, while khwars (tidal creeks) act as fish-breeding and nursery grounds. The Qurm Mangrove Reserve in Muscat was designated a Ramsar site after Oman acceded to the Ramsar Convention in 2013, covering 171 hectares. Offshore, the reef systems and seabird colonies are a major part of the country's marine biodiversity. Coral reef rehabilitation through artificial reef structures is among the most visible marine projects, intended to restore damaged coral reefs, support sustainable fishing and protect the coast.

The fauna includes several species of high conservation concern. The Arabian leopard is a critically endangered subspecies, with fewer than 200 believed to survive in the wild across the Arabian Peninsula. Its largest known population lives in the Jabal Samhan Nature Reserve in Dhofar, and a 2025 study recorded the species returning to the Nejd plateau, extending its known range in Dhofar by about 40 km northward. The Arabian oryx was extinct in the wild by 1972. A breeding sanctuary established in 1980 in the Al Wusta Governorate was the basis for reintroduction, and the sanctuary held 738 animals in 2021, allowing releases into the wild to begin. The Arabian tahr, a goat-like mammal, is endemic to the Hajar mountain region. Sea turtles nest on the beaches of the Ras al Jinz reserve and on the islands off Dhofar, while whales and dolphins are regularly seen around the Hallaniyat Islands. Other species highlighted in conservation planning include the Arabian gazelle, the Nubian ibex and birds of prey.

Oman's documented species count is large for an arid country. A national report to the Convention on Biological Diversity lists more than 1,200 plant species, about 518 bird species and 93 mammal species, several of them globally threatened. Endemism is high in plants. A 2014 assessment counted 191 range-restricted species, about 13.6 per cent of the flora, which is attributed to past ecological conditions that limited species' ranges. The most species-rich areas are the monsoon-affected mountains of southern Oman, the northern Hajar mountains and the central coast, which are recognised as local centres of endemism. In Dhofar, the mountain slopes are dominated by Anogeissus/Terminalia woodland, including the endemic T. dhofarica, which depends partly on moisture from monsoon fog. The Hajar range also hosts Ziziphus hajarensis, a tree described as endemic to the mountains of Oman.

Protected-area figures in the sources differ, mainly because of how marine areas and overlapping designations are counted. An older national submission to the Convention on Biological Diversity reported about 4.27 per cent of the territory under protection, while a more recent Oman Observer report describes 32 nature reserves covering roughly 17,840 square kilometres, or about 5.76 per cent of the country. The Environment Authority manages the reserves, which fall into desert, mountain, marine and mixed categories. Notable sites include the Daymaniyat Islands Nature Reserve, the Ras al Jinz Turtle Reserve, the Jabal Samhan reserve, the Al Wusta Wildlife Reserve, and the Hallaniyat Islands Marine Buffer Zone established in Dhofar. Two Hajar-area reserves, Jabal Akhdar and Al Sareen, have been added to UNESCO's World Network of Biosphere Reserves. Marine protection is less complete than the headline figures suggest: one marine protected-area database records 18 sites but only about 0.12 per cent of the marine estate as implemented. Assessments of the national conservation system also identify 33 Key Biodiversity Areas, 26 of which had no coverage by protected areas or other effective measures. Pressures include urban expansion, which a regional study identified as a threat to 48 plant species found only in Dhofar, as well as livestock browsing and illegal wildlife trade, which the government has said it is combating through enforcement and public education.

Prehistory and ancient period

The Umm an-Nar culture, which flourished around 2600–2000 BCE, is the best-known early society in the territory. Among the oldest sites, dated to the Early Bronze Age or the so-called Umm an-Nar period (c. 2600–2000 BCE), were round stone towers typical of this culture and tower tombs. Its range also covered parts of what is now the UAE, which is why the culture carries the name of a small island settlement there. The culture was located in modern-day UAE and northern Oman. Its most distinctive architecture is the monumental tower. The Bat complex in the Ibri area includes several large towers whose ring walls measure roughly 20 to 25 metres across, with paired rows of compartments flanking a central well. The towers feature a circular outer wall about 20–25 m in diameter, and two rows of parallel compartments on either side of a central well. Other settlements followed a similar pattern. At a Qumayrah Valley site, the settlement is exceptional for including at least four towers: three round ones and an angular one. One of the round towers had not been visible on the surface despite its large size of up to 20 m in diameter. Burial was typically in stone circular tombs, and these tombs are often near towers, many built around water sources. Settlements combined these features with storage and public functions. A stone-built site in Al Batinah held warehouses, administrative buildings, ritual buildings, and an industrial site for processing copper ore.

Copper was the economic foundation of this world. Metal working had earlier roots, but output expanded most strongly in the Hafit phase that came before Umm an-Nar. Only the monumental towers from the first half of the 3rd millennium BCE, i.e., the Hafit period, feature larger quantities of ground stone tools as well as copper processing waste. Towers from the second half of the 3rd millennium BCE, i.e., the Umm an-Nar period, have none. Research at Al-Khashbah, where archaeological research revealed a large Early Bronze Age (3rd millennium BCE) site. One reading of this shift is that copper work was concentrated in the earlier towers and later moved elsewhere, though the evidence for the reasons is still debated. The external significance of this production is clearer from written sources. Mesopotamian records name the region Magan, a name which can be identified with modern day Oman. It was referred to in Sumerian cuneiform texts of around 2300 BCE and existed until 550 BCE as a source of copper and diorite for Mesopotamia. Recent fieldwork in the Qumayrah Valley has tied local production to these texts. Excavators reported proof of copper working at the site, as well as some copper objects, and they linked the settlement to the trade known from cuneiform sources.

Oman's location also made it a relay point as well as a producer. The peninsula provided a source of raw materials as well as a transshipment point for goods from the East. Umm an-Nar communities took part in a wider network that linked Mesopotamia and the Indus valley. The Umm Al Nar culture also traded carnelian jewelry from the Indus Valley. Ingots of Omani copper may have been exchanged for Indus goods. Copper ingots from Oman and bitumen from Mesopotamia is likely to have been exchanged for cotton textiles and domestic fowl from the Indus region. The Gulf littoral was the main axis of these contacts. The ancient Magan culture thrived along the coasts of the Persian Gulf during the early Bronze Age (2500-2000 B.C.). Dilmun, the island-based trading partner in the Gulf, operated in the same system. By 2000 B.C., Dilmunites were leaving their homeland to become seagoing merchants and establish a powerful trading network that eventually stretched from India to Syria. Later, the transition to the Wadi Suq period was evolutionary. The Wadi Suq culture saw more inland settlement. Metallurgy became more advanced.

Frankincense added a second commodity to this trade, and the Dhofar region was its chief source. Dhofar was the main source of frankincense in the ancient period, and it seems likely that the foundation of the settlement was in part motivated by a Hadrami wish to control the production of this valuable commodity. The best-known port of this trade is Sumhuram, also called Khor Rori, which lies about 35 km east of the modern city of Salalah, in Dhofar, the southernmost region of the Sultanate of Oman. The site was founded in the 3rd century BC as an outpost for the Kingdom of Ḥaḍramawt. Its harbour provided access to trade on the Indian ocean and was important to the export of frankincense which came from the interior of Arabia. Sources give differing chronologies. One places its founding towards the end of the 1st century BC, another dates its occupation to the 3rd century BC and abandoned in the 5th century AD. A third gives the most active period between the 4th century BC and the 4th century AD. The site is now part of the Land of Frankincense property, which since 2000, is a part of the UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Islamic conquest, Ibadism and the imamates

Oman's early Islamic history centred on the Azd tribal confederation and its ruling Julanda family, who governed the country from the 6th century until Umayyad forces overthrew them. Jayfar bin al-Julanda, who co-ruled with his brother at the time of Islam's emergence, accepted the faith after receiving a letter from the Prophet Muhammad. The Umayyad campaign that later removed the family was led by al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf under Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan. Oman's conversion thus came early, but the country's distinctive religious and political character developed later, through the Ibadi movement.

Ibadism grew out of Kharijite thought in the early Islamic period. Omanis took part in founding the school in Basra in the mid-7th century, and the doctrine then spread back into Oman. Ibadis separated from the more radical Kharijites over questions of conduct and attitudes toward other Muslims, taking a more conciliatory line toward outsiders. Tradition credits Jabir bin Zayd, a scholar from a village in the Omani interior, as the first Ibadi figure of major significance. In belief and ritual Ibadism is close to Sunni Islam, but it departs from it on leadership: the community chooses its imam rather than accepting a hereditary succession. The mountainous and geographically isolated interior gave Ibadi communities refuge, and they converted many of the leading tribal clans.

The first Ibadi imamate was established in the mid-8th century. Sources differ on the exact date: the Ibadi ulama elected al-Julanda bin Masud as imam in 749, while other accounts place the founding of the imamate in 750. His rule ended with his death in 751 while defending against an Abbasid invasion. The imamate unified Oman politically and gave the country a degree of independence from the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. The imam served as both temporal and religious leader, so the office combined what would elsewhere be separate spheres of sovereignty and religious authority. Selection depended on agreement among religious scholars and the heads of the major tribal groups, especially the two confederations known as the Ghafiris and the Hinawis. The imam resided in the capital, and appointed walis governed the regions. Al-Julanda's own rule was contested within his family: rivals refused to swear allegiance, and his subsequent execution of them drew criticism from Ibadi zealots.

A recurring pattern marked the first imamate's decline. Elected imams gradually gave way to hereditary dynasties, which then collapsed through family disputes and the revival of Ibadi ideals. Tribal rivalry was a constant problem, as rival tribes often accused imams of impiety in order to challenge them. The ninth-century imamate under Imam al-Salt bin Malik (851–885) was ended by a civil war between Qahtanite and Adnanite tribes and an Abbasid invasion. Religious disagreement compounded the political fragmentation: scholars in the Nizwa school suspended judgement on al-Salt's deposers, while the Rustaq school regarded them as apostates. In 1052 a rival imamate emerged among Ibadis in Hadhramaut.

In the 17th century the Nabhani dynasty had weakened to the point of controlling only half of the kingdom, while the Portuguese held the main coastal ports. Nasir bin Murshid, who founded the Ya'rubi dynasty, took power in 1624 during this disorder. Through a series of campaigns he re-established authority over the Omani tribes and ruled until 1649. The Ya'rubi imams extended Omani influence overseas, notably on the East African coast under Saif bin Sultan (1692–1711). Their later years were marked by succession disputes and the civil war of 1718–1744, during which Persian forces intervened. Those events led to the rise of the Al Said family, covered in the early modern section.

The Ibadi tradition left a lasting imprint on Omani society. The principle that legitimacy rests on consultation and community consent, the authority of religious scholars, and the link between tribal leadership and religious office all shaped the country's institutions long after the imamates lost power. Ghalib bin Ali al-Hinai, the last imam, led the imamate during the 1950s until the Jebel Akhdar campaign of 1959, and he died in exile in 2009. In the modern period, the government under Sultan Qaboos is often described as having combined Ibadi and sultanic traditions, a balance that continues to define Omani religious identity.

Early modern history: Portuguese, Persian and Al Said rule

Portuguese power reached the Omani coast in the early sixteenth century and centred on Muscat. Muscat, a port on the main trade routes, was under Portuguese control from 1507 until 1650 (Muscat, which is located in a strategic location on trade routes, came under the control of the Portuguese Empire between 1507 and 1650.). Their hold never extended across the whole country: the Portuguese did not succeed in controlling Oman in its entirety, and Omani forces pushed them out of Muscat by the mid-seventeenth century (In mid-17th century, the Omani tribes were able to end the Portuguese presence in Muscat.).

The most visible legacy of this period is the pair of forts that still guard the harbour. Al Jalali, known to the Portuguese as São João, was built in the 1580s on an older Omani stronghold, after Ottoman raiders had twice sacked the town (The fort was built by the Portuguese in the 1580s on an earlier Omani fortress to protect the harbor after Muscat had twice been sacked by Ottoman forces.). Al Mirani was rebuilt by the Portuguese in 1587 and is credited with being the first fort in Oman to mount cannon (The fort existed prior to the Portuguese invasion and was later rebuilt by the Portuguese in 1587. The fort became the first to use cannons in Oman.). Al Jalali later fell to Omani forces in 1650 (The fort fell to Omani forces in 1650.). The Ottoman raids that had prompted the fortifications were part of a wider contest for the Gulf and western Indian Ocean.

The eighteenth century brought a second foreign occupation, this time Persian. The civil wars that followed the death of Imam Sultan bin Saif II broke out in 1718 and weakened the Ya'rubid dynasty (Following the death of Imam Sultan bin Saif II, the Omani Empire was plunged into civil war in 1718 which weakened the dynasty as rival claimants competed for the imamate.). Imam Saif bin Sultan II turned to Nader Shah for help against his rivals, and Persian forces occupied parts of the country on two occasions between 1737 and 1744 (Imam Saif eventually asked for help against his rivals from Nader Shah of Persia whose forces occupied parts of the country on two occasions between 1737 and 1744.). Persian troops held Muscat and Sohar in 1743 (the Iranians, who occupied Muscat and Suhar in 1743.). Al Jalali itself changed hands twice during these conflicts (During the civil wars between 1718 and 1747, the fort was twice captured by Persians who had been invited to assist one of the rival Imams.).

The expulsion of the Persians was led by Ahmad bin Said of the Al Bu Said, a family from the interior. He had become a prominent merchant in Sohar and was appointed its governor in 1737 (He became a leading merchant of the port city of Sohar. In 1737 he was appointed governor of this city.). After a siege of Sohar, Ahmad bin Said negotiated his way out, and he later turned on the Persians; one account says he invited their commanders to a feast and had them killed (To initiate the revolt, he invited Persian commanders to a feast at his palace in Sohar and then slaughtered them.). This account comes from a single secondary source, so its details should be treated with caution. He was elected imam on 20 November 1744, with Rustaq as the capital (After the Omanis expelled the Persians, Ahmad bin Said became the elected Imam of Oman on 20 November 1744, with Rustaq serving as the capital.). This election ended the Ya'rubid line and founded the Al Bu Said dynasty, which still rules Oman (The civil war ultimately ended with the election of Ahmad bin Said Al Busaidi as imam in 1744, marking the collapse of the Ya'aruba dynasty and the establishment of the Al Bu Said dynasty, which has ruled Oman ever since.).

Under the Al Said, Oman developed a maritime empire across the Indian Ocean. Zanzibar had already come under Omani control in 1698 (In 1698, Zanzibar became part of the overseas holdings of Oman, falling under the control of the sultan of Oman.). The most important ruler of this era was Said bin Sultan, who reigned from 1804 to 1856 (Reign: 1804 – 19 October 1856). He moved his court to Stone Town on Zanzibar in 1832 or 1840, according to differing sources (In 1832 or 1840, Omani ruler Said bin Sultan moved his court from Muscat to Stone Town on the island of Unguja). A study of the move points to economic motives as the main driver (The economic motivators are the most important factors that push Sultan Said to move his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1832 AD, and settle there until 1840 AD.). On Zanzibar, he built up clove plantations worked by enslaved labour (He established a ruling Arab elite and encouraged the development of clove plantations, using the island's slave labour.). After Said's death in 1856, the empire was divided between his sons, with one line ruling Zanzibar and the other Muscat and Oman (After the death of Said bin Sultan in 1856 the empire was divided between his sons into two sultanates, an African section (Sultanate of Zanzibar) ruled by Majid bin Said and an Asian section (Sultanate of Muscat and Oman) ruled by Thuwaini bin Said.).

Britain's influence grew through a sequence of agreements during the nineteenth century. Early treaties with the ruling Al Said were largely driven by the Indian Ocean commerce and the suppression of the slave trade, and they gave British officials considerable leverage over Muscat's foreign relations. Britain also pressed the Zanzibar sultanate on slavery; later in the century, pressed by the British, his successor, Barghash bin Said, helped abolish the slave trade in Zanzibar and largely developed the country's infrastructure. By the late nineteenth century, the 1891 Exclusive Agreement had bound Muscat not to cede territory or enter foreign arrangements without British consent, which tied Oman's external affairs closely to London.

Modern state formation under Sultan Qaboos (1970–2020)

Qaboos bin Said took power on 23 July 1970, when he deposed his father, Said bin Taimur, in a palace coup carried out with British backing. Said was sent into exile in the United Kingdom and died there in 1972. Qaboos immediately renamed the state, dropping "Muscat and Oman" in favour of the Sultanate of Oman, which he presented as a way of reflecting the country's political unity. The starting point was very low. Before 1970 the country had no secondary schools, one hospital and roughly ten kilometres of paved road. Oil had been produced commercially only since 1967, and Qaboos directed the revenue from it toward education, health care, agriculture and physical infrastructure, gradually moving the economy away from subsistence farming and fishing.

The first major test of the new government was the Dhofar rebellion in the southern province. The insurgency began in the mid-1960s as a movement of Dhofari tribes opposed to the old sultan's rule. After a Marxist government took power in South Yemen, it acquired a communist ideology and became a regional conflict. Britain, Iran and Jordan supported the sultan, while South Yemen, China and the Soviet Union backed the insurgents. Sources date the war differently, with starts between 1962 and 1965 and ends between 1975 and 1979, but the government's victory is generally placed in the mid-1970s, with the last major fighting concluding in 1975 and formal end-points following in 1976. Qaboos's approach paired conventional operations with civil development and political reform. Aircraft and helicopters allowed ground forces to reach remote areas, and most remaining rebels accepted an amnesty or fled into Yemen.

Once the insurgency was contained, the state expanded its reach across the country. Roads, schools, health facilities and administrative bodies were built or extended, and the central government began to provide services that had previously been absent in much of the interior and the south. This programme underpinned the broader modernization drive that defined the Qaboos era, although its results were uneven across regions and social groups.

Oman's international profile was rebuilt in the same period. The country first gained recognition from the Arab League and then, in October 1971, was admitted to the United Nations, becoming its 128th member. In 1981 Oman was one of the six founding states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was established in Riyadh in May 1981 with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC framework tied Oman's security and economic policy to its neighbours and to a regional bloc of Gulf monarchies.

Qaboos ruled for almost half a century, from 1970 until his death on 10 January 2020 at the age of 79. At the time of his death he was the longest-serving leader in the Middle East and the Arab world. He died without a named successor being publicly announced, and the succession was settled under the procedures set out in the Basic Statute of the State, which requires the ruling family council to select a successor. The council did not act on a public list; instead, a sealed letter from the sultan was opened, naming his first cousin Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, who had long experience in the Foreign Ministry. The transfer was therefore orderly and within the Al Said dynasty, but it was also the first succession in the modern state to be handled entirely through this written instrument, which made the mechanism itself a point of institutional significance.

Sources:

• BTI 2026 Oman Country Report | https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/OMN
• 1970 Omani coup d'état | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Omani_coup_d'%C3%A9tat
• Qaboos bin Said | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qaboos_bin_Said
• History of Oman (RAF Museum) | https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/an-enduring-relationship-a-history/a-history-of-oman/
• His majesty the Sultan of Oman | https://apps.oman.om/en/home-top-level/whole-of-government/oman-government/his-majesty-the-sultan-of-oman
• Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Sultan of Oman | https://www.unofficialroyalty.com/qaboos-bin-said-al-said-sultan-of-oman/
• The Dhofar Revolution: An Archival Analysis of the Conflict (1965-1976) | https://journals.umt.edu.pk/index.php/JITC/article/download/6066/2955?inline=1
• Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965–1975 (RAND) | https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.34.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A604415d4d3e80f0bfa06580a758892c7&acceptTC=1
• Dhofar Rebellion (Fandom) | https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Dhofar_Rebellion
• The Dhofar War (RAF Museum) | https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/an-enduring-relationship-a-history/the-dhofar-war/
• Study of Internal Conflict case study | https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/08/2003459842/-1/-1/0/20240506_OMANDHOFAR_1962-79.PDF
• Dhofar rebellion (Wikipedia) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhofar_rebellion
• Multilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) | https://www.fm.gov.om/en/policy/multilateral-relations/
• History of the Foreign Ministry | https://www.fm.gov.om/en/ministry/about-us/history-of-the-foreign-ministry/
• The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Britannica) | https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gulf-Cooperation-Council
• The Gulf Cooperation Council - Middle East Institute | https://mei.edu/backgrounder/the-gulf-cooperation-council/

Political system and governance

Oman is a hereditary monarchy. Its constitution is the Basic Statute of the State, which provides the legal framework for the development and implementation of all legislation and government policy. The text was first issued in November 1996 under Sultan Qaboos, and was later reissued by a 2021 royal decree. Article 5 limits succession to male descendants of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan, and the Royal Family Council shall, within three days of the throne falling vacant, determine the successor to the throne.

The sultan and the executive

The sultan occupies the apex of the system. The Basic Statute makes His Majesty the Sultan Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He is the symbol of national unity and its guardian. The executive branch sits under him: the Council of Ministers assists the Sultan in formulating State policy and is entrusted with its implementation.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq succeeded his cousin Qaboos bin Said. After his cousin, Sultan Qaboos, died on 10 January 2020, Haitham bin Tariq became Sultan of Oman. He ascended the throne on 11 January 2020, and he also holds the post of Prime Minister. His son, Theyazin bin Haitham, has been Crown Prince since 2021 and became a Deputy Prime Minister in January 2026.

The Council of Oman

Legislative power rests with the Council of Oman (Majlis Oman), which was established by Royal Decree 86/97. The Council of Oman is made up of two chambers: the Shura Council (Majlis A'Shura) which is directly elected and the State Council (Majlis A'Dawla) which is appointed by Royal Decree. The two houses differ in their composition and terms. Majlis A'Shura consists of 85 members representing the Sultanate's Wilayats, elected once every four years. The State Council's members are appointed by a royal decree, and it is composed of a number of members not exceeding the number of members of the Shura Council.

The Council of Oman is the competent body to pass or amend laws, and it also discusses development plans and the state budget in addition to other powers as set out in the law. Its legislative and oversight powers were expanded in 2011 through Royal Decree 39/2011 and amendments made by Royal Decree 99/2011. The Shura chairman and deputies are elected internally, by secret ballot and the majority of votes of the members of the Shura Council.

Courts and the rule of law

The Basic Statute provides for an independent judiciary alongside the Council of Oman. Since its promulgation the Basic Statute has been the basis for all legal decisions in the Sultanate of Oman and is the ultimate point of reference for judicial authority. Article 9 states that governance rests on justice, shura and equality, and that citizens may take part in public affairs under the conditions set by law.

Participation, rights and assessments

The government presents shura, a tradition of consultation, as the founding principle of Omani political life. The official account describes shura as a process of participation and consultation, and it points to the 2011 reforms and the expansion of elected representation as evidence of institutional development. Independent human-rights and democracy assessments reach a different conclusion. They generally rate Oman's political rights and civil liberties as restricted, pointing to limits on political parties, the absence of a fully elected executive, and constraints on expression. The gap between the government's description of consultative institutions and these external assessments remains a central point of debate in discussions of Oman's governance.

Foreign policy and regional role

Oman's diplomacy is usually described as neutral and mediating, though the label is looser than it sounds. Oman is sometimes colloquially referred to as the "Switzerland of the Middle East," though it does not formally espouse neutrality as a principle of its foreign policy. Its positions also sometimes diverge from those of some of its fellow GCC members, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Muscat's approach rests on a practical calculation: Omani leaders, including Sultan Haythim, have consistently asserted that engagement with Iran better mitigates the potential threat from that country than confrontation. Analysts also link the posture to domestic conditions. Oman's small population and diverse social fabric make internal cohesion a priority, so mediation serves not only as a foreign policy instrument but also as a safeguard for the regime.

Iran, the United States and the Gulf

Oman has been one of the main channels between Tehran and Western capitals. It served as one of the key interlocutors during U.S.-Iranian negotiations over the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). More recently, after the United States and Iran agreed to renew talks on Iran's nuclear program in early 2025, Oman hosted five rounds of mostly indirect negotiations beginning in April. Muscat has also helped on regional rapprochement: its mediation is credited with restoring Iran-Iraq relations, facilitating Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and brokering the $6 billion prisoner exchange between the US and Iran in 2023. During the 2026 regional fighting, Oman kept its diplomatic ties with Tehran. Tehran did not take responsibility for the strikes on Oman, and Omani authorities refrained from naming Iran as the responsible party. Iran's foreign minister later described the Strait of Hormuz as lying in the territorial waters of both countries, a claim that goes beyond existing maritime arrangements. Araghchi claimed that the Strait was "located in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman" and that there were "no international waters in between."

Yemen and the limits of neutrality

Oman's conduct in Yemen is the clearest test of its doctrine. Unlike other GCC members, Muscat refused to join the Saudi led coalition in 2015, maintaining open diplomatic channels with all actors: the Houthis, the Yemeni government and the United States. The foreign minister, Yusuf bin Alawi, justified the refusal by pointing to close emotional and social ties between Omanis and Yemenis, and said Oman would focus on humanitarian relief. Oman has also mediated several times between the Saudis and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen by hosting meetings that have been appreciated by the United Nations and the United States. The strain has grown in recent years. Analysts point to Saudi interference through military deployments, infrastructure projects and ideological influence, along with growing local tensions and the strengthening Oman–Houthi relationship, which have made Al-Mahra governorate a test for Muscat's diplomacy.

Multilateral membership

Oman is a member of the United Nations, which it joined in 1971, and of the Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981. It also belongs to the Arab League and the World Trade Organization. Its GCC membership sits alongside its separate diplomacy with Iran, which is why its position is often treated as an exception within the bloc.

Borders and shared resources

Oman's land boundaries were mostly settled by treaty in the 1990s and after. The boundary with Saudi Arabia was fixed by a 1990 agreement. King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia and Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id of Oman on 21 March signed an agreement demarcating their border on the basis of the "declared line," or roughly the border which already exists. The text was deposited with the United Nations in 1991, and on-the-ground demarcation followed with the assistance of the German aerial photography company Hansa Luftbild, being completed in 1995. The accord also covered practical arrangements, with the agreement provided for rights to share water resources as well as grazing fields. Some sources are less definite. One travel guide holds that the borderline is not yet finalized since Saudi Arabia is claiming some tracks of land in Oman and adjacent countries of Yemen and UAE.

The UAE border was settled in stages. The border from Umm Al Zamul to east of Oqaidat has already been delineated, in accordance with the agreement signed between the two countries in Sohar on May 1, 1999. A later accord completed the land line, though the technical definition of the tripartite meeting point in Umm Al Zamul area between the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia remained open. The Yemen boundary dates from a 1992 agreement that consists of straight line segments connecting the following turning points, beginning at the coastal terminus at Ras Dharbat Ali.

Musandam and the Strait of Hormuz

Musandam is an exclave, and this gives Oman a direct stake in the Strait of Hormuz. The strait is a narrow channel, approximately 30 miles wide at the narrowest point, between the Omani Musandam Peninsula and Iran. Its shipping lanes are narrower still, and although the narrowest point in the strait is just 33km wide, the shipping lanes in both directions are only 3km wide. Commercial traffic generally follows a separation scheme north of Musandam, while the Omani government restricts access to this area to smaller vessels in normal, peacetime situations in the inshore zone near Didimar. Volumes are large: in 2023, around 20.9 million barrels of oil per day — roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption — passed through it. Because of this dependence, bypass pipelines have been proposed, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia have proposed building more oil pipelines to avoid the problematic waterway.

Population, demography and social structure

Oman's population figures differ by publisher and reference date. The National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI) reported about 5.36 million people at the end of 2025, a rise of roughly 91,500 over the previous year. Demographic estimates from the United Nations are higher, placing 2025 at about 5.49 million, while a commercial compilation gives 5.31 million for the same year. The spread comes from differences in whether temporary residents are counted, whether a figure is a registered count, an estimate or a projection, and how often the base data are revised. Registered counts from the NCSI for late May 2026 stood at about 5.39 million.

Growth and age structure

Growth has been driven by both natural increase and net migration, but the two components have behaved differently. UN-based series show fertility of about 2.5 children per woman, close to replacement level, and life expectancy of about 79 years for men and 82 for women. The UN Population Fund's 2025 report puts about 24 percent of the population under 15, about 73 percent between 15 and 64, and only about 3 percent aged 65 or over. Median age estimates range from about 29.7 to 30.8 years depending on the source. The national median is higher than the figure for Omani citizens alone, which the NCSI put at 22 years in its 2019 bulletin. The difference reflects the adult working-age concentration among expatriates, whose average age was reported at around 35.

Citizens and expatriates

Omani nationals make up a little under 57 percent of residents, and expatriates about 43 percent. The expatriate share fell to about 38.8 percent in 2021, when departures during the pandemic reduced the foreign population, and then recovered above 40 percent in 2022. Its level has since stayed close to 43 percent. Gender imbalance is pronounced: the NCSI counts roughly 101 Omani males per 100 Omani females, but about 284 expatriate males per 100 expatriate females, reflecting the male-dominated labour migration in construction, logistics and services. South Asian nationals form the largest expatriate communities, with India and Bangladesh followed by Pakistan. Domestic workers, numbering about 140,000 in a 2021 estimate, form a distinct group under the kafala sponsorship system, which ties their residence to an individual employer. These patterns shape the composition of workplaces, neighbourhoods and schools, and they make the labour market a central concern of social policy (see labour market).

Urbanization and the Muscat region

Most of the population lives in towns. UN-based estimates put the urban share at about 89.6 percent in 2026, and this level has been reached through rapid growth in Muscat and the northern coastal governorates. Muscat Governorate had about 1.54 million registered residents in May 2026, of whom about 61 percent were expatriates. Its population density was about 383 people per square kilometre in 2025, far above the national average of about 17 per square kilometre. Within the governorate, Seeb had the largest Omani population, about 284,300 people, while Bawshar had the highest expatriate concentration, at roughly 78 percent of its residents. Along the Batinah coast, Sohar and As Suwayq each have populations above 100,000 in some estimates. This urban concentration places service demand, housing and transport pressures on a small area.

Regional differences

National averages conceal wide contrasts. Muscat, Dhofar and Al Wusta have expatriate majorities; Dhofar's registered population was about 536,000, of whom roughly 54 percent were expatriates. Al Wusta, a large desert governorate that includes Duqm, had only about 65,000 residents, with about 57 percent expatriates. By contrast, Ad Dakhiliyah and Ad Dhahirah have Omani majorities of more than 70 percent. The populous north, centred on Muscat and the Batinah, contrasts sharply with the sparsely settled interior and the southern governorates, where settlement depends on oases, wadis and the coastal towns of Dhofar. Because most of the land is desert, the low national density says little about the everyday experience of life in the northern cities.

Religion, language and cultural identity

Islam is the state religion, and the Muslim population is divided among Ibadi, Sunni and Shia communities Islam is the state religion, and the country's Muslim population includes Ibadi, Sunni and Shia communities. Published figures on this split are scarce. The government does not publish statistics on the percentages of citizens who practice Ibadhi, Sunni, and Shia Islam. The numbers most often quoted come from outside estimates. A 2015 study by a Dubai-based research centre placed Sunnis at nearly half of citizens and Ibadis at 45 percent, with Shia, Hindu and Christian residents together making up about 5 percent In 2015, the Dubai-based al-Mesbar Center estimated Sunni Muslims at nearly 50 percent of the citizen population, Ibadhi Muslims at 45 percent, and Shia Muslims, Hindus, and Christians at a combined 5 percent.. Other calculations, which measure the share of Muslims rather than of citizens, give Ibadis a far larger proportion, and the gap between these figures reflects the lack of official sectarian data.

Ibadism, the school most closely associated with Oman, took root after its adherents left Basra in Iraq The Ibaadi denomination, a branch of the Khawarij, established itself in Oman after fleeing Basra in modern-day Iraq. Its imams were chosen by election rather than by dynastic inheritance, and individual communities could select their own leader The position of Ibadi Imam was elected, unlike the dynastic succession of the Sunnis and Shi'as, and was not exclusive, with individual communities encouraged to elect their Imam.. The ruling family is itself Ibadi Ibadis still form the majority of the contemporary Omani population and the royal family of Oman are Ibadi.. The state funds the salaries of some Ibadi and Sunni imams, while Shia and non-Muslim clergy are privately funded The government continued to fund the salaries of some Ibadhi and Sunni imams, but Shia or non-Muslim religious leaders were privately funded..

Religious minorities outside Islam are small and largely made up of migrants. Virtually all non-Muslims in Oman are foreign workers. Christian communities are concentrated in the main urban centres of Muscat, Sohar and Salalah Christians are centered in the major urban areas of Muscat, Sohar, and Salalah, and include Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, members of the Church of Jesus Christ, and Protestants.. Assessments of religious freedom differ in tone. Some independent observers argue that Oman imposes substantial restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and the freedoms of expression, assembly and association., while official accounts and tourism-oriented sources emphasise long-standing coexistence and tolerance.

Arabic is the sole official language, but the linguistic landscape is varied. Arabic is recognized as Oman's national and official language. Most citizens speak Omani Arabic, a Gulf Arabic variety that is distinct from its neighbours The majority of the population consists of Arabs who speak Omani Arabic. Regional varieties include Shihhi Arabic in Musandam and Dhofari Arabic in the south The dialects of Omani Arabic include Shihhi Arabic which is heard in Oman's Musandam Governorate and Dhofari Arabic used in the Dhofar Governorate.. Several non-Arabic languages persist. Baluchi is widely spoken by the Baloch community, which is among the largest non-Arab groups in the country Baloch form the largest non-Arab community in Oman, and most of them have al-Balushi as a surname.. In Dhofar, Modern South Arabian languages such as Mehri are spoken, while Swahili survives among families with ties to East Africa and Zanzibar Additionally, there are ethnic minorities such as Lurs, Mehri, and Swahili speakers who are returnees from the Swahili Coast, particularly Zanzibar.

English plays a central role outside the home. It is taught from an early age and is especially popular among business circles in Oman. It is widely used in commerce, finance, education and healthcare English has become a common language in many sectors, including commerce, finance, education, and healthcare., and bilingual signage helps expatriates and visitors find their way Many posters, road signs, and notices are in Arabic and English making it easy for expatriates and tourists to get around Oman..

Traditional crafts remain closely tied to identity. Omani artisans are known for woodcarving, weaving, and silver- and goldsmithing and for the manufacture of daggers and swords. Silver holds particular significance, and Omani silversmiths are celebrated for their workmanship, especially the khanjar, a curved ornamental dagger. The khanjar is a hallmark of Omani heritage, identity, manhood and pride.. It is worn at formal occasions and forms part of ceremonial dress, and an image of the dagger and its belt appears on the national flag and emblem Together with two crossed swords, an image of the khanjar, along with its waist belt, is used on the Omani flag and is the national emblem.. Silver jewellery is part of women's dress, from bracelets and rings to headdresses and earrings, and it features in traditional dance is a feature of female Omani attire and also plays a role in traditional dance routines..

Social life combines tribal and family ties with Islamic norms. Oman is still described as a tribal society, although tribal influence is gradually declining.. Traditional dress remains common, including the ankle-length robe known as the dishdasha, which men often wear with the embroidered kummah cap Traditional male dress in Oman includes the dishdasha, an ankle-length, collarless robe with long sleeves. Men may wear it with the kummah, an embroidered cotton cap, or the massar, an embroidered cloth wrapped around the head; the kummah is also commonly worn as part of everyday dress.. Hospitality is a prominent social value, and the khanjar is still worn at weddings and other significant events The khanjar forms part of traditional male dress in Oman and is worn at national and religious events and on special occasions such as weddings..

Oil and gas economy and public finances

Hydrocarbons remain the core of Oman's export earnings and public revenue. Economy.com's factbook estimates that oil and gas can generate between 68 and 85 percent of government revenue, depending on commodity prices. Petroleum and natural gas output and prices therefore pass quickly into the budget. In the second quarter of 2026, petroleum activity expanded by 14.7 percent year on year, while non-petroleum activity grew by only 0.7 percent, and the Ministry of Finance attributed a 9 percent rise in public spending in the same quarter mainly to higher oil revenues. The government's policy objective is to reduce the sector's contribution to GDP through diversification, even as it works to raise output with enhanced oil recovery techniques.

Oman's gross domestic product is commonly estimated at roughly $107 billion for 2024, using World Bank data, and at about $117 billion for 2026 in IMF-based estimates. The gap between these figures partly reflects the timing of estimates and the exchange-rate basis, and it should be read as a range rather than a precise series. The economy's sensitivity to prices appears clearly in official and private forecasts. The Central Bank of Oman projects a fiscal surplus of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2026, based on an assumed average oil price of $81 per barrel, and expects that surplus to narrow to 0.6 percent in 2027 as prices moderate. Fitch, by contrast, assumes a Brent price of $63 per barrel and expects a deficit near 1 percent of GDP in 2026–2027. The same divergence in price assumptions produces materially different fiscal outcomes, which is why fiscal policy in Oman is often discussed in terms of the breakeven oil price.

The fiscal balance has swung between deficit and surplus in recent years. The Central Bank estimates a deficit equivalent to 1.1 percent of GDP in 2025. The government's preliminary 2025 deficit was OMR 480 million, below the OMR 620 million originally budgeted. The 2026 budget plans a deficit of OMR 530 million, with projected revenue of OMR 11.45 billion against expenditure of OMR 11.98 billion, and the government has said it will raise about OMR 850 million (around $2.2 billion) through bonds and sukuk listed on the Muscat Stock Exchange to cover the shortfall and debt obligations. Public debt stood at about OMR 14.6 billion at the end of 2025. Official and quasi-official figures for the debt ratio disagree: one budget-related account describes the ratio as falling to 35.7 percent, while another describes it as rising from 34 percent in 2024 to 35.7 percent in 2025, and the Central Bank puts the 2025 ratio at 34.6 percent, with a projected decline to 27.8 percent by 2030.

Oman has reached investment-grade status with all three major rating agencies, a shift that matters for the cost of financial-market borrowing. Moody's raised its rating from Ba1 to Baa3 in July 2025, S&P had restored BBB- in September 2024, and Fitch moved from BB+ to BBB- in December 2025. In September 2026, S&P affirmed the BBB- rating with a stable outlook, citing higher hydrocarbon output, fiscal consolidation and external buffers. Liquid government assets are estimated above 40 percent of GDP, and gross foreign-exchange reserves are close to 20 percent of GDP. Fitch indicated that a further upgrade would depend on broadening non-oil revenue, reducing debt further and expanding the assets of the sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises and sovereign investment vehicles are central to this balance-sheet picture. The Ministry of Finance linked the improvement in ratings to lower liabilities of state-owned enterprises and to growth in external assets. Fitch's reference to the sovereign wealth fund suggests that accumulated financial assets function as a buffer against oil-price shocks, reducing the need for borrowing when revenues fall. In practice, the state uses these holdings alongside central bank reserves and bond issuance to manage the gap between hydrocarbon income and spending commitments.

Economic diversification and Vision 2040

The Vision 2040 framework

Launched in January 2021 under Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, the plan charts Oman's shift from a hydrocarbon-dependent economy. It is organised around four axes: people and society, economy and development, sustainable environment, and governance and institutional performance. Its economy pillar groups five priorities, covering diversification and fiscal sustainability, the labour market, the private sector and investment, and the development of governorates and sustainable cities targeting diversification, fiscal sustainability, labour market reform, private sector growth, and balanced regional development. The economic aim is a diversified economy grounded in technology, knowledge and innovation that remains competitive and reaches fiscal sustainability.

Quantitative targets are less uniform. One consultancy summary states that oil's share of GDP, about 30 percent in 2020, should fall below 10 percent by 2040 while non-oil sectors grow, and that manufacturing's share should rise from roughly 10 percent to about 21 percent. The plan aims to reduce oil's share of GDP from around 30% in 2020 to under 10% by 2040, while growing non-oil sectors. Official reporting on the 2024–2025 period, as cited by a secondary commentary, puts the non-oil share of GDP at 72.5 percent. Because the two figures use different bases and dates, they should be read with care.

The five-year plans and Tanfeedh

Vision 2040 is implemented through five-year plans. The ongoing 5-year plan (2021-2025) is the first executive plan under the Oman 2040 vision. It translates the strategic directions into priority national goals, practical programmes, and criteria for monitoring results. The plan's financial framework, as summarised by PwC, projected about 135,000 jobs over its period and a gradual fall in the deficit to 1.7 percent of GDP by 2024, with a small surplus targeted for 2025. Its projections also assumed an average oil price of $45 a barrel, a figure that underlines how conservatively the budget was framed.

Running alongside the plans is the National Programme for Enhancing Economic Diversification (Tanfeedh). Officials say both Vision 2040 and Tanfeedh focus on a sustainable non-oil future. Tanfeedh organises its work around a set of national priorities that are pursued through parallel work streams.

Non-oil growth: manufacturing, logistics and green hydrogen

Manufacturing is one of the most visible areas of non-oil growth. Manufacturing value added reached RO 3.710 billion at constant prices in 2025. Yet foreign investment in the sector has moved more slowly: manufacturing value added rose 2.5 percent in 2025, while manufacturing FDI rose only slightly from RO 2.482 billion in 2023 to RO 2.489 billion in 2024. Logistics is another focus, since the country's strategic location between Asia, Africa, and the Middle East makes logistics and transport a key sector, with significant investment in ports, warehousing, and freight services.

Green hydrogen is the sector where the state has made its largest bet. Hydrogen Development Oman (Hydrom) was established in 2022 as the central entity orchestrating the country's green hydrogen interests. Its short-term target is 1 MTPA of green hydrogen production by 2030. Land blocks were auctioned in rounds, with two blocks in Duqm awarded in June 2023 and further blocks in Salalah in 2024. Targets have been revised in official statements: seven active developments remain in the portfolio, targeting about 1 million tonnes a year by 2030, after two legacy projects were concluded by mutual agreement. The first Duqm project is in physical construction, with the first phase targeting 100,000 tonnes a year of green ammonia and 17,000 tonnes a year of green hydrogen, with an expected commercial operation date in the first quarter of 2027.

The transition also has a tension to manage. Gas-based iron production planned in Duqm would draw heavily on domestic supply: the three large-scale DRI projects in Duqm, with a combined capacity of 12.5Mtpa, will require about 3.33 billion normal cubic metres of gas, equivalent to nearly a quarter of the country's gas exports. The government nonetheless has a clear plan to reduce its reliance on gas.

Special Economic Zones and investment incentives

Special Economic Zones are the main physical platform for diversification projects, and Duqm is the most developed example. The Amnah hydrogen project, for instance, is expected to develop approximately 200 KTPA of green hydrogen for planned green steel plants located in Port of Duqm, within SEZAD. Preliminary planning is also underway for a dedicated green hydrogen zone in the Duqm Special Economic Zone. The zone aims to co-locate production plants, storage, export facilities, and service corridors, hosting downstream elements of at least five confirmed megaprojects.

Foreign direct investment goals and investor incentives form the external side of this strategy, though the manufacturing FDI figures above show that attracting capital into new industries remains a work in progress. Sohar is the other zone named in the diversification agenda.

Labor market and Omanisation

Oman's labour market is divided largely along nationality lines. The National Centre for Statistics and Information recorded 1,808,451 workers in the first quarter of 2025, and expatriate workers made up 68 percent of the overall employed labour force and 86 percent of private-sector jobs, according to an IMF staff report. Expatriates cluster in construction, domestic labour, and trade, while Omanis hold a larger share of jobs in sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises, including electricity and mining, and only a small minority of jobs in tourism, construction, and real estate.

The headline unemployment rate is low. One series puts it at 3.3 % at 31/12/2025, but the aggregate hides sharp gaps. Youth unemployment is higher at 14 percent. The World Bank series for 2024 shows female unemployment at 11.42 percent, against 1.66 percent for men. Labour-market analysts therefore treat unemployment among young Omanis and women as the more pressing problem.

Omanisation is the main policy response. It is an "Omanization" drive aimed at increasing the percentage of Omani citizens in the labor market. Researchers date measurable effects to 1995, when the expatriate share of employment in both the public and private sectors began to fall. Its enforcement has since moved toward firm-level obligations. Since April 2024, wholly foreign-owned companies have had to employ at least one Omani national within a year of starting commercial activity and register that person with the Social Protection Fund. A newer mechanism ties the obligation to appoint Omani employees to the duration and scale of commercial activity.

Published quota figures differ between sources, so employers need to check them against the Ministry of Labour. One 2026 compliance guide lists 60% Omanis for banking and finance and a 21% target for 2026 in transport and logistics, while another guide gives retail as one where retail may require up to 35% Omani employees, while banking can exceed 90%. Expatriates are not excluded from the market; they work under a sponsorship arrangement in which a local sponsor applies for the work permit on their behalf, and expatriates must generally remain with that sponsor while in the country.

Private-sector growth has become the main source of jobs for nationals. In the first half of 2026, the private sector accounted for virtually all net job creation as government hiring remained largely unchanged. The national employment plan for 2026 targets 33,000 opportunities for citizens in the private sector across manufacturing, energy, logistics, finance, technology, mining and other activities. The Five-Year Plan for 2026–2030 is expected to generate 300,000 positions in the public and private sectors, and the private sector is to provide 50,000 of these each year. Wage policy is shifting in the same direction: private-sector employers have been required to provide a minimum annual salary increment to eligible Omani employees from 1 January 2026. The fiscal cost of public employment and social benefits is discussed in the fiscal policy section.

Training is the remaining bottleneck. Earlier research attributed the difficulty young Omanis faced in finding work to the lack of vocational/higher education and/or the lack of practical work experience compared to expatriate laborers working in similar positions. Reform efforts therefore concentrate on vocational training and higher education linked to private-sector needs, with the aim of building human capital that matches the skills employers are seeking.

Infrastructure, ports and energy transition

Oman's transport and power networks are organised around its two coastlines, and the state has pursued port expansion, cross-border rail and a gradual move away from gas-fired power. Most of these projects are still in construction or planning, so their progress is reported at different stages.

Ports and trade corridors

Salalah, Sohar and Duqm are the country's three deep-water ports. Cargo through Omani ports reached about 137 million tonnes in 2024, a rise of roughly 15 percent on the previous year. Growth was uneven: bulk cargo at Sohar rose by 72 percent, and Duqm's volumes grew by 152 percent from a much smaller base. Salalah handled about 3.3 million TEU in 2024, and a US$300 million expansion completed in early 2025 raised its container capacity to 6.5 million TEU. Sohar is jointly managed by the Port of Rotterdam and Oman's Asyad, and its container throughput grew in 2024 while its bulk volumes dipped.

Duqm sits inside the Duqm Special Economic Zone and is positioned as an industrial-logistics gateway. Its 18-metre draft and long commercial quay allow it to handle large container ships, and its location on the Arabian Sea gives it a route that does not pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a point that distinguishes it from other Gulf ports. Salalah, by contrast, is oriented to transshipment on East–West shipping routes. Both ports support Oman's wider aim of building trade corridors and reducing its reliance on oil exports.

Rail and urban transit

As of mid-2026, Oman has no operational passenger railway, and freight tracks exist only at certain industrial and port sites, such as Sohar. The most advanced project is Hafeet Rail, a planned 238-kilometre rail line linking Sohar with the UAE network through Al Buraimi and Al Ain. It is valued at about US$2.5 billion and is run as a joint venture involving Etihad Rail, Oman Rail and Mubadala. The bilateral agreement was signed in June 2026 and took effect in September after ratification by royal decree. Reported completion stood at about 40 percent in April 2026. Oman's section is also part of the proposed GCC Railway, which would connect all six Gulf Cooperation Council states; the Wikipedia entry lists its planned opening as the end of 2030.

Within Muscat, the planned Muscat Metro would run for about 55 kilometres from Sultan Haitham City to Ruwi, with 42 stations including one at Muscat International Airport. The project is being developed in partnership with France, but no launch date has been announced.

Electricity and the energy transition

Electricity generation remains heavily dependent on natural gas, which accounts for about 97 percent of output. The government aims to source 30 percent of power generation from renewable energy by 2030, from less than one percent in 2024. Renewables reached about 9.5 percent of grid electricity in 2025, supported by roughly 1,550 MW of installed capacity connected that year. The Ibri II solar plant, rated at 500 MW, began commercial operation in August 2021.

Nama Power and Water Procurement Company (Nama PWP) is the country's sole buyer of electricity and water and manages most of the tendering. It began procuring around 1,600 MW of solar and wind capacity in January 2026, and in May 2026 it signed a power purchase agreement for a hybrid project in Mahoot and Duqm that combines solar, wind and battery storage. The agreement was reported at 2.7 GW, whereas earlier procurement plans described a round-the-clock project of about 1 GW, so the figures differ across sources. The company's broader target is 7 GW of solar and 3 GW of battery storage by 2030. The output of these projects has to be integrated into the national electrical grid, which has been a central issue in planning them.

Water and desalination

Because Oman's water resources are limited, the expansion of desalination capacity is a key part of its infrastructure plans. Nama PWP intends to procure two independent water projects with combined capacity of 230,000 cubic metres per day, with commercial operation scheduled for the second quarter of 2029. The government presents the renewable and water programmes together as part of its effort to reduce dependence on gas and support industrial decarbonisation under Vision 2040. Duqm is also cited as a possible base for future hydrogen export logistics, though the scale of such exports remains undetermined.

Education, health and human development

Formal state education was limited before the early 1970s. Public schooling expanded after Sultan Qaboos came to power, and enrollment rose for both boys and girls, with education provided free to all Omanis. Schooling therefore became a core element of the human capital strategy that the state pursued through the following decades, and the expansion of education has been the main channel for reaching girls.

Higher education began later. The national university, Sultan Qaboos University, traces its origin to a promise announced by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said during the 10th anniversary of Oman's National Day in 1980. Construction started in 1982 and the first Sultan Qaboos University students were enrolled in 1986. The institution opened in Muscat, the capital of Oman, in 1986, when there were only 500 students. Enrolment later grew sharply, and one source notes that student enrollment has grown from 500 in 1986 to more than 10,000 in 2005. The university began with five colleges and now has nine in total. Sources give differing current figures: one reports around 15,357 students, while another states there are now more than 7,000. Private colleges also operate alongside the public sector, as several private colleges exist in the country. In international rankings, the university is placed 501–550th in World University Rankings 2027.

Health outcomes have improved markedly over the same period. The lowest life expectancy was recorded in 1950, when it was 29.30 years. Recent estimates are considerably higher, though they vary by source. The World Bank series gives 80.03 for 2023, while Our World in Data reports that in 2023, life expectancy was 81.9 years for women, and 78.5 years for men. The UN World Population Prospects estimate for 2024 is 80.2 years, and a different series gives 78.98 for 2025. These differences reflect methodology and reference year rather than a dispute about the trend. Infant mortality stood at 14.45 deaths per 1,000 live births in a 2022 estimate. The rise in life expectancy is consistent with the expansion of public health services and the health system, alongside higher living standards.

The Human Development Index (HDI) summarises these gains. The UNDP's 2025 report placed Oman improving its ranking by nine places to 50th, and Oman is classified among countries with 'Very high human development'. The index value was 0.858, up from 0.819 last year. The index analyses progress across a range of indicators, including health, education and income, which form the basis of the index. Among Gulf Cooperation Council states, the UAE ranked highest, followed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait. Some compilations still list an earlier rank of 59th (2023), so the position depends on the edition consulted. The value has risen steadily from 0.702 in 2000.

Gaps remain, particularly in vocational training, research capacity and the quality of higher education. Expanded enrolment has not automatically translated into skills that match the needs of private-sector employers, which is why vocational programmes and graduate placement have become a policy concern tied to the labour market. Research output and the international visibility of the university also remain modest relative to its size, as the rankings above suggest.

Tourism and cultural heritage

Tourism's economic role

Tourism is one of the sectors the government wants to expand alongside hydrocarbons. Official data show its direct contribution to GDP at about RO 1.135 billion in 2025, a 3.7 percent increase compared to OMR 1.095 billion in 2024. In the fourth quarter of 2025 the sector accounted for 3% of total GDP, so the direct share remains modest. Growth is concentrated in lodging: tourism-related establishments totaled over 24,000 by 2025, an increase of more than 40 percent compared to 2020 levels, and Muscat accounted for the largest share at 43.5 per cent, followed by Dhofar at 17.5 per cent and Al Batinah North at 11 per cent. Hotel capacity has also expanded, with the number of hotels reaching approximately 1,475—an increase of more than 1,000 hotels compared to 2018.

Targets differ depending on the measure used. Oman Vision 2040 targets increasing tourism's contribution to GDP to 3.5 per cent by 2030 and 5.3 per cent by 2040. A property-sector report, by contrast, describes a shift away from oil and build out tourism, lifting its share of GDP toward 5% by 2030 and around 10% by 2040. Broader estimates that include indirect effects are far larger: the World Travel & Tourism Council put tourism's total contribution in 2024 at around RO3.3 billion, which equated to approximately 7.7% of the nation's economy. The Tenth Five-Year Plan put more weight on raising tourism's share of GDP, while the Eleventh focuses on the sector's competitiveness to boost its contribution to economic growth.

UNESCO World Heritage sites

Oman has five properties on the UNESCO World Heritage List, and all of them are cultural. Aflaj Irrigation Systems of Oman (2006), Ancient City of Qalhat (2018), Archaeological Sites of Bat, Al-Khutm and Al-Ayn (1988), Bahla Fort (1987), Land of Frankincense (2000).

Bahla Fort was built by the Banu Nebhan, a tribe that dominated what is now central Oman from the 12th to the 15th century. Its water supply is a notable part of the site: an intricate irrigation system of wells and tunnels brings water from distant springs to this ancient settlement. Visitors can see the Friday Mosque and the towers and walls of the fort.

The aflaj are gravity-fed channels. Groundwater or spring water is collected and delivered through a series of underground or surface channels to the settlements for domestic or agricultural purposes. More than 3,000 aflaj still function in Oman, and UNESCO has highlighted five locations for their historical significance. The system shaped the development of irrigation-based date-palm agriculture in the arid interior, and it remains an example of community-managed groundwater use.

The Land of Frankincense covers a network of sites in Dhofar. It includes Wadi Dawkah where frankincense was collected, a trading post and caravan supply station at Shisr, and ports of Khor Rori and Al-Baleed which were heavily fortified. The property was first listed as the Frankincense Trail and renamed to its present name in 2005.

Muscat's urban heritage

Old Muscat is the most visible concentration of historic buildings. The Al Jalali and Al Mirani forts, which the Portuguese fortified the city and built in the 1580s, still overlook the harbour. Al Mirani was rebuilt in 1588 from a tower to become a Portuguese fort. Al Jalali was restored in the 1980s and Omanis converted it into a private museum to showcase the country's culture and history to state visitors. Other museums are also in historic buildings; the Bait Al Zubair museum occupies three beautifully restored Omani houses.

Restoration in the capital has a long history. A rehabilitation project that began in 1988 covered the restoration and reconstruction of historic forts, mosques, and residences, and the new development of the Diwan and government buildings. The current plan is more ambitious. The National Museum is transforming Old Muscat into an open museum under a long-term conservation and rehabilitation programme that links historic houses, palaces, gardens and educational spaces into a single cultural landscape. Its approach is to return buildings to their original condition by removing modern additions and reviving traditional construction methods. This links heritage conservation with urban planning, as the historic quarter is kept in use rather than treated as a static display.

Diversification and visitor experiences

Tourism policy combines heritage with natural and coastal attractions. Heritage visits are typically organized around the forts, museums and markets of Muscat, including the Muttrah Corniche and the vibrant Old Souk Muscat. Outside the capital, the desert, the mountains and the coast offer different experiences, from Bahla's oasis setting to the frankincense landscape of Dhofar. Developing these sites in a way that protects their fabric and attracts visitors without overwhelming them is an ongoing task for the authorities, and it is part of the wider effort to make tourism a source of economic growth that does not depend on oil revenue.

Challenges and open questions

The fiscal deficit of 15.7 percent of GDP in 2020 was reversed to a surplus of 1.9 percent in 2024, and public debt fell to 35.8 percent of GDP by September 2025. Those gains still rest on hydrocarbon income. In the first ten months of 2025, revenue shrank as oil receipts dropped by 8.5 percent, a 5.5% YoY decline in total revenue, mainly due to an 8.5% YoY contraction in oil revenue. The central bank's forecast for a 2026 surplus assumes an oil price of $81 a barrel, and it expects the surplus to narrow in 2027 as prices ease (The CBO expects the sultanate's fiscal balance to swing from a deficit equivalent to 1.1% of GDP in 2025 to a surplus of 2.5% of GDP in 2026, based on an assumed average oil price of $81 per barrel. The surplus is projected to narrow to 0.6% of GDP in 2027 as oil prices gradually moderate.). Officials have responded by trying to restrain spending: the authorities prioritized reducing the nonhydrocarbon primary deficit through targeted expenditure restraint and further phasing out of subsidies. Regional uncertainty adds a further risk, since the IMF's near-term outlook is cautioned that the regional geopolitical environment remains highly uncertain.

Water is a more structural constraint. Groundwater is the main source of supply, and decades of excessive pumping have produced falling aquifers, failing traditional irrigation and salinisation in coastal zones. Water withdrawals come to 1323 MCM/yr with agriculture accounting for 90 percent. Per-person availability is far below global norms, with less than 1 000 m^3 of freshwater per capita per year, which is significantly less than the world average of around 5 500 m^3. The gap has been bridged largely by desalination, whose supply grew significantly from 146 million m^3 in 2010 to 315 million m^3 in 2018.

Climate projections point towards further pressure, though the outcome depends on emissions. Under a high-emissions pathway, rainfall would decline by up to 20 mm a year by 2061–2080 (a high-emissions scenario projects a decrease in annual average rainfall in most areas of up to 20 mm per year by 2061-2080.). Rising seas compound the problem in coastal districts. The majority of irrigated land (56%) is located in coastal areas, and by mid-century roughly two-thirds of cultivated land in southern Al Batinah may be unusable for groundwater irrigation because saltwater is moving into the Jamma aquifer.

The Omanisation policy faces a gap between targets and outcomes. The Omani share of private-sector employment stood at 22 percent in January 2025, compared to a Vision 2040 target of 35% by 2030. Recent data show movement in the right direction: By the end of August, 445,799 Omanis were working in the private sector, compared with 430,913 at the end of 2025 — a net increase of 14,886. Over the same period, the expatriate private-sector workforce fell by 2,585 to 1,408,882. Yet the quality of these jobs remains unclear. What the headline figures do not reveal is how much of that change is occurring in technical, specialised and leadership positions. Wage data point to concentration at the lower end: The first three published bands, all below RO600, account for 249,496 workers, or 66.5 per cent. Youth joblessness is also high, with one 2026 analysis reporting that youth unemployment among Omani nationals aged 18 to 24 sits at 16 percent, rising to 33 percent among young Omani women.

Debate continues over how far quotas, fines and work-permit conditions can change hiring without weakening competitiveness, and how far pay gaps between public and private employment shape the choices of Omani job seekers.

Questions about political and civil reform are framed differently by the state and by outside observers. Oman is a hereditary monarchy in which the sultan holds ultimate authority, and the elected lower house of the legislature operates alongside an appointed upper chamber. Independent assessments generally describe political rights and civil liberties as restricted, while the government presents its institutional reforms as gradual and locally grounded. How quickly democratic practice and freedom of expression should expand remains a point of disagreement, and the answer will shape how the country manages the economic and environmental pressures described above.

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215. Oman's ports - adding value to the economy - www.fm.gov.omfm.gov.om
216. Cargo volumes at Omani ports grow 15% to 137mn tonnes in 2024hellenicshippingnews.com
217. Oman Logistic and Transhipment: Duqm, Salalah as GCC Hubsmiddleeastbriefing.com
218. Terminals - Port of Duqmportofduqm.om
219. Oman ratifies UAE railway agreement as $2.5bn Hafeet rail project speeds up cross-border Networkgulfnews.com
220. GCC Railway Project: Route map, launch date and more you need to knowtimeoutdubai.com
221. Next stop, Oman: How Muscat Metro highlights key role of rail in driving Gulf progressthenationalnews.com
222. Oman Railway & Transit Guide: Is There a Train in Oman?tracktrainlive.com
223. Gulf Railwayen.wikipedia.org
224. Can Oman Triple Its Renewable Capacity in Five Years to Hit 30 Percentb2bsupplychainmedia.substack.com
225. Oman plans 1.6 GW of solar and wind capacity to boost renewablesenerdata.net
226. Oman Steps Up Energy Transition with 1,600 MW Solar and Wind Projects Under Procurement - MENA & Turkeyenergetica-india.net
227. Oman power company signs 2.7 GW PPA for continuous wind-solar-storage project - pv magazine Globalpv-magazine.com
228. Oman Plans 1-GW Round-the-Clock Renewable Energy Project Integrating Solar, Wind and Battery Storage - SolarQuartersolarquarter.com
229. Oman targets major solar, wind and desalination procurements in 2026zawya.com
230. Solar Energy in Oman — Complete Guide 2026al-dhaw.com
231. Sultan Qaboos Universitybritannica.com
232. About SQUsqu.edu.om
233. Sultan Qaboos Universitytimeshighereducation.com
234. Sultan Qaboos Universityen.wikipedia.org
235. Life expectancy at birthstatbase.org
236. Life Expectancy in Omanworldviewdata.com
237. Oman - Health Country Profileourworldindata.org
238. Oman Population Pyramid 2025 - Demographics & Birth Statisticspopulationpyramids.org
239. Oman Life Expectancy (1950-2026)macrotrends.net
240. Demographics of Omanen.wikipedia.org
241. Oman ranked 50th in Human Development Indexmuscatdaily.com
242. Human development indexstatbase.org
243. Tourism sector contributes over OMR1.1 billion to Oman’s GDP in 2025 - Times of Omantimesofoman.com
244. Oman's tourism output rises 7.8% to RO2.28bn in 2025 - Emerging Travel Newsemergingtravel.news
245. Oman's inbound tourists spend over RO1 billion in 2025 - Oman Observeromanobserver.om
246. Inbound tourism spending surpasses RO 1 bn in 2025 - Oman Observeromanobserver.om
247. Oman Tourism 2026: What It Means for Propertyomniacapitalgroup.com
248. Oman’s Tourism Industry Is Surging With RO3.5 Billion Contribution To Economy In 2025, Says WTTC - Travel And Tour Worldtravelandtourworld.com
249. UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Omaneverything-everywhere.com
250. Your Guide to Oman's Stunning UNESCO World Heritage Sitesscenetraveller.com
251. List of World Heritage Sites in Omanen.wikipedia.org
252. Old Muscat Visiting Hours, Tickets, and Historical Sites Guideaudiala.com
253. Muscatexperienceoman.om
254. Old Muscat Forts: A Stunning Timeless Look at Muscat’s Historic Guardiansperegrinetreks.com
255. Muscat: 15 BEST Tours and Things to Do in 2026viator.com
256. Archnet > Site > Muscat Old Town Rehabilitationarchnet.org
257. Old Muscat to be transformed into open museummuscatdaily.com
258. What To Do In Muscatmemphistours.com
259. Oman Business: Oman tourism GDP contribution rises to $3bngdnonline.com
260. Oman Travel Triumphs With Inbound Visitors Generating Over RO1 Billion Spending in 2025 Growth Milestone - Travel And Tour Worldtravelandtourworld.com
261. Oman UNESCO Sites - Unesco chair for World Heritage and Sustainable Tourism Management in the Arab regionunescochair-whstar.gutech.edu.om
262. Explore Oman's 5 UNESCO World Heritage Sitesgabbettsonthego.com
263. Statement by Mohamed Maait, Executive Director for Oman, and Fadhila Alfaraj,elibrary.imf.org
264. Oman Economy Growth IMF Forecast 3.7% 2026gulf-insider.com
265. (PDF) OMAN WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND THE FUTUREresearchgate.net
266. National Climate Resilience Assessment for Omaniea.org
267. Omanization in a Downturn: How Oman Turned Nationalization Compliance Into a Financial Decision for Private Employers - The GCC Edgethegccedge.com