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Trump v. Hawaii

Trump v. Hawaii was a 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision sustaining presidential entry restrictions against statutory and religious-discrimination challenges.

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Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning presidential authority to restrict the entry of foreign nationals. On June 26, 2018, the Court ruled 5–4 that Presidential Proclamation 9645 fell within authority delegated by federal immigration law and that the challengers had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim of unconstitutional religious discrimination. The decision reversed a lower-court judgment sustaining a preliminary injunction against the restrictions. It addressed the third major version of the entry policy introduced during Donald Trump’s first presidency, commonly called the “travel ban” and, by its opponents, the “Muslim ban.”

Background

Earlier executive orders

On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13769, which temporarily restricted entry by nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the refugee admissions program, and indefinitely suspended the admission of Syrian refugees. Federal courts blocked important parts of the order.

A replacement order, Executive Order 13780, followed on March 6, 2017. It removed Iraq from the nationality-based entry restrictions and revised other provisions. Litigation over that order reached the Supreme Court, which temporarily permitted partial implementation while protecting certain people with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States.

Those earlier measures supplied the background to Trump v. Hawaii, but the decision concerned a subsequent presidential proclamation rather than the original January order.

Presidential Proclamation 9645

Issued on September 24, 2017, Presidential Proclamation 9645 followed a worldwide executive-branch review of foreign governments’ identity-management practices, information sharing, and security risks.

The proclamation initially imposed varying entry restrictions on nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. The restrictions were not identical: some covered both immigrant and nonimmigrant entry, while others applied more narrowly. The Venezuelan provisions principally affected specified government officials and their immediate families. Chad was removed from the restrictions in April 2018, before the Supreme Court decided the case.

The proclamation contained exceptions, including for lawful permanent residents and certain dual nationals traveling on passports issued by nondesignated countries. It also provided for case-by-case waivers where denial of entry would cause undue hardship, admission would not threaten national security or public safety, and entry would serve the national interest.

Parties and procedural history

The challengers included the State of Hawaii, the Muslim Association of Hawaii, and individuals whose relatives were affected by the entry restrictions. They argued that the proclamation exceeded statutory presidential authority and violated the constitutional prohibition against governmental establishment of religion.

A federal district court in Hawaii issued a preliminary injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely upheld that relief on statutory grounds, while narrowing its scope. In December 2017, the Supreme Court allowed the proclamation to take full effect while litigation continued.

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on April 25, 2018, and issued its decision on June 26. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor wrote separate dissents, joined respectively by Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Because the case reached the Court through a preliminary injunction, the constitutional issue was framed in terms of whether the challengers were likely to succeed on the merits. Nevertheless, the Court’s statutory interpretation and constitutional reasoning supplied the controlling basis for reversing the injunction.

Statutory issues

Presidential authority to suspend entry

The principal statutory provision was section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). It authorizes the president, upon finding that the entry of aliens or a class of aliens would be detrimental to U.S. interests, to suspend their entry or impose appropriate restrictions.

The majority interpreted this language as a broad delegation of authority. It concluded that the proclamation contained an adequate presidential finding and that the worldwide review and country-specific explanations satisfied the statute.

The challengers argued that the president could not use the provision to displace the immigration system established by Congress. The majority rejected that argument as applied to the proclamation, finding no statutory requirement that restrictions have a fixed expiration date or be limited to the particular kinds of emergencies proposed by the challengers.

Nationality discrimination and immigrant visas

The challengers also relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which generally prohibits discrimination based on nationality and certain other characteristics in the issuance of immigrant visas.

The majority distinguished visa issuance from permission to enter the country. It held that the nondiscrimination provision did not eliminate the president’s separate authority to restrict entry under § 1182(f). This distinction was central to the Court’s statutory interpretation: eligibility for a visa did not itself establish an unrestricted right of admission.

Constitutional issues

Religious neutrality and presidential statements

The constitutional claim arose under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The challengers argued that the proclamation’s stated security justification concealed hostility toward Islam. Their evidence included Trump’s campaign proposal for a shutdown of Muslim entry and later statements concerning the entry policy.

The majority did not treat those statements as wholly irrelevant. Instead, it assumed that it could consider evidence beyond the proclamation’s text, while applying a highly deferential form of rational-basis review in the context of immigration and national security.

Under that approach, the question was whether the policy could reasonably be understood as resting on a justification independent of an unconstitutional religious purpose. The majority concluded that it could. It emphasized the worldwide review, the inclusion of some countries without Muslim-majority populations, the omission of many Muslim-majority countries, the differentiated restrictions, and the exceptions and waiver provisions.

The Court therefore held that the challengers had not shown a likelihood of success on their Establishment Clause claim. It did not hold that all nationality-based entry restrictions are constitutional or that presidential statements can never be examined in constitutional litigation.

Deference and judicial review

The decision illustrated the interaction between judicial review and executive responsibility for admission of foreign nationals. The majority stressed that courts should not substitute their assessments of national-security policy for those of the political branches.

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence added that executive officials remain bound by the Constitution even when judicial scrutiny is limited. Justice Thomas separately questioned the authority and historical foundations of injunctions extending broadly beyond the parties before a court.

Dissents

Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justice Kagan, focused on the operation of the exceptions and waiver system. He considered their implementation important to evaluating whether the proclamation genuinely served its stated security purposes and would have left the injunction in place while the lower courts examined that issue further.

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the majority gave insufficient weight to the evidence of anti-Muslim purpose. She maintained that the proclamation’s context and the president’s statements required a different constitutional conclusion, rather than acceptance of the policy’s facially neutral wording and security explanation.

The dissents thus challenged different aspects of the majority’s reasoning: the practical administration of the policy and the constitutional significance of its origins.

Treatment of Korematsu

The decision also addressed Korematsu v. United States, the 1944 case that upheld a wartime exclusion order directed at people of Japanese ancestry.

Responding to the comparison drawn by Justice Sotomayor, Chief Justice Roberts declared Korematsu gravely wrong when decided and without a place in constitutional law. The majority nevertheless distinguished the wartime exclusion of U.S. citizens from the entry restrictions on foreign nationals before it.

This repudiation of Korematsu was separate from the operative holding sustaining the proclamation. The Court did not endorse the historical exclusion policy as an analogy supporting presidential authority.

Subsequent status and significance

On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden revoked Proclamation 9645 and related entry restrictions through Presidential Proclamation 10141. That executive action ended the challenged policy but did not overturn the Supreme Court’s decision.

Trump v. Hawaii remains an important precedent concerning delegated presidential immigration powers, nationality-based entry restrictions, and judicial examination of alleged discriminatory purpose in national-security policy. Its central doctrinal features are the broad reading of § 1182(f), the distinction between visa issuance and admission, and the deferential constitutional review applied to the proclamation.