Silicon Valley Bank was a California-chartered commercial bank founded in 1983 to serve technology companies and the investors financing them. Headquartered in Santa Clara, California, it became closely associated with the venture capital industry, providing deposit accounts, loans, payment services, and financial connections to start-ups, investment funds, and their executives. Its parent company, SVB Financial Group, developed a broader financial-services business that also included investment banking, private banking, and investment management.
On March 10, 2023, California regulators closed Silicon Valley Bank after an exceptionally rapid bank run. With approximately $209 billion in assets at the end of 2022, it was then the second-largest bank failure in United States history, after Washington Mutual in 2008. Its collapse reflected the interaction of a concentrated, largely uninsured deposit base with substantial exposure to rising interest rates. Federal authorities subsequently protected all depositors, and First Citizens Bank acquired much of the failed bank’s business.
The name therefore refers both to the bank that failed in 2023 and to the banking business subsequently operated under the Silicon Valley Bank brand within First Citizens. Distinguishing that business from the former parent company, its overseas operations, and the federal receivership is essential to understanding the failure and its aftermath.
Origins and development in the technology economy
Silicon Valley Bank opened in 1983, when the technology industry of northern California was expanding but many of its young companies remained poorly suited to conventional commercial lending. Founders including Bill Biggerstaff and Robert Medearis identified a market among businesses whose principal resources were engineering talent, intellectual property, and investor backing rather than factories, inventories, or established earnings. The bank initially operated from San Jose before becoming associated with its Santa Clara headquarters.
Its specialization addressed a problem of information asymmetry. A conventional lender could examine a mature manufacturer’s physical assets and sales history, but a young software or biotechnology company might have little revenue and years of losses ahead. Evaluating such a borrower required understanding its investors, product-development milestones, financing prospects, and rate of cash consumption. SVB built lending teams and relationships around these characteristics rather than attempting to make every client resemble an established industrial borrower.
The bank became part of the institutional infrastructure supporting entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. It maintained relationships with venture firms, accepted the deposits generated by financing rounds, and extended credit to both investment partnerships and their portfolio companies. This position benefited from agglomeration economies: geographic and professional proximity made it easier to share specialized knowledge, assess potential clients, and develop referrals. Its clients’ tendency to use the same investors, lawyers, accountants, and advisers reinforced the bank’s access to new business.
SVB’s shares began trading publicly in 1988. Over subsequent decades it expanded beyond northern California into other American technology centers and overseas markets. The holding company adopted the name SVB Financial Group in 2005, reflecting an expanding range of financial services. Greg Becker became chief executive in 2011 and remained in that position until the bank’s closure in March 2023.
The bank’s development also reflected changes in technology finance. Successive waves of internet businesses, enterprise software companies, biotechnology ventures, and other innovation-oriented firms created demand for specialized banking. Nevertheless, SVB was not itself principally a venture-capital fund. Its core bank business involved taking deposits, making loans, and investing in securities. Its distinctive character lay in the industries and financial networks it served, rather than in exemption from the ordinary economics of banking.
Business model and relationships with venture capital
SVB’s central commercial advantage was its ability to serve clients through successive stages of financing. A start-up might open its operating account after an initial investment, borrow against receivables as revenue developed, obtain a venture-debt facility after a later funding round, and eventually seek services connected with an acquisition or initial public offering. Investors and company executives could also become clients of the wider group. This created several sources of revenue from interconnected relationships.
Venture debt was especially characteristic of this model. Unlike an equity investment, a loan did not ordinarily require founders to surrender a large ownership stake. It could extend the period before a company needed another financing round or provide funds for equipment and expansion. Because many borrowers lacked conventional profitability, lenders considered their cash balances, existing investor support, financing history, and prospects for additional capital. Some arrangements included warrants giving the lender a right to acquire shares, but such features did not eliminate credit risk or make the underlying loan equivalent to venture equity.
Another important activity was lending to investment funds. Subscription credit facilities allowed a fund to borrow temporarily against commitments from its investors, bridging the period before a capital call. These loans had different risk characteristics from loans to start-ups: repayment depended in part on the enforceability and quality of investor commitments. SVB also supplied cash management, international payments, foreign-exchange services, and other facilities needed by businesses operating across borders.
Deposits were integral to this network. Venture investment typically transfers large amounts of cash to companies that spend the proceeds gradually on salaries, research, marketing, and equipment. Until spent, those balances form a source of bank funding. SVB’s relationships with venture firms helped attract this money, while borrowers’ banking arrangements could further connect lending relationships with operating deposits. At the end of 2022, the group said that SVB banked nearly half of United States venture-backed technology and life-science companies.
The same specialization that supported growth created concentration. Clients often responded to similar financing conditions and depended on overlapping investors. Their deposits could decline together when fundraising weakened, rather than behaving like a diversified pool of household accounts. Many balances substantially exceeded ordinary deposit insurance limits because they represented corporate working capital, including payroll funds. Close professional connections also made it possible for information—and decisions to withdraw money—to spread rapidly across the customer base.
Corporate structure and international reach
Before its failure, Silicon Valley Bank was the principal banking subsidiary of SVB Financial Group, a publicly traded holding company. This distinction mattered because the bank and its parent had separate legal identities, creditors, regulatory obligations, and insolvency procedures. The bank held insured deposits and operated under banking law; shareholders owned interests in the parent rather than direct claims on individual bank assets.
SVB Financial Group reported several main business areas: Silicon Valley Bank, SVB Private, SVB Capital, and SVB Securities. The commercial bank provided most of the group’s assets and funding. SVB Capital managed investment strategies focused on venture capital, while SVB Securities provided investment-banking and related services. The group’s private-banking activities expanded substantially through its acquisition of Boston Private in 2021, adding wealth-management relationships and services for affluent individuals.
The investment-banking business developed through acquisitions, including Leerink Partners in 2019. This broadened the group’s presence in healthcare finance and advisory work. Such activities complemented the commercial bank’s relationships with life-science companies but involved different business economics: advisory fees and securities transactions were distinct from deposit-taking and lending. The use of the SVB name across these businesses could obscure the fact that they did not all enter the same resolution process in March 2023.
International expansion followed venture investment into other technology centers. SVB established a United Kingdom banking presence in 2012. Its British business became a separately incorporated subsidiary, Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited, in 2022. A subsidiary has its own legal identity and balance sheet, unlike a branch, which forms part of the same legal entity as the bank operating it. This distinction became decisive when authorities arranged a separate sale of the British bank after the American failure.
In China, SVB formed a joint venture with Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. The institution, SPD Silicon Valley Bank, opened in 2012 and operated as a locally incorporated bank. SVB also developed offices or banking operations in other financial and technology centers. Its international footprint connected American venture networks with foreign entrepreneurs, investors, and businesses, but the legal form and permitted activities differed by jurisdiction.
Consequently, the group’s collapse did not amount to a single worldwide bankruptcy proceeding. American deposit liabilities, British banking operations, investment-management interests, and parent-company obligations had to be addressed through different institutions and legal frameworks. The survival or sale of one operation did not automatically determine the treatment of another.
Deposit growth, securities investments, and interest-rate exposure
SVB’s balance sheet expanded rapidly during the technology-financing boom of 2020–2021. SVB Financial Group’s reported deposits rose from approximately $61.8 billion at the end of 2019 to $189.2 billion at the end of 2021. This reflected exceptionally strong fundraising, abundant financial-market liquidity, and large cash balances held by technology companies. Loan demand did not increase sufficiently to absorb the entire inflow, so the bank invested a substantial share of the money in securities.
Many of these investments were United States Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. Such instruments generally had low expected credit losses, but they still carried interest-rate risk. When market yields rise, the market value of an existing fixed-rate bond falls. A bond’s low default probability therefore does not mean that it can always be sold at its original purchase price.
The approximate relationship can be expressed using modified duration:
where is the security’s price, is its modified duration, and is the change in yield. The approximation describes how longer-duration assets can experience substantial price declines when rates rise. Mortgage securities add another complication: higher rates discourage refinancing, potentially extending expected repayment periods precisely when a bank would prefer cash to return sooner.
The Federal Reserve System began raising its policy-rate target in March 2022 to address elevated inflation. By the end of that year, the federal funds target range had increased from near zero to 4.25–4.50 percent. At the same time, weaker technology financing caused many SVB clients to draw down deposits to meet operating expenses. Group deposits declined to approximately $173.1 billion at year-end 2022, creating a combination of falling funding and reduced securities values.
Accounting classification affected how these changes appeared in financial statements. Securities designated available for sale were measured at fair value, with unrealized changes generally recorded in other comprehensive income. Securities classified as held to maturity were generally carried at amortized cost rather than current market value, provided the relevant requirements were met. These rules did not remove the economic exposure; they changed where and when losses appeared.
At the end of 2022, SVB Financial Group reported approximately $91.3 billion of held-to-maturity securities, with a fair value about $15.2 billion below carrying value. Its available-for-sale portfolio was approximately $26.1 billion. The unrealized losses did not by themselves require an immediate cash payment, but they reduced flexibility if the bank needed to sell assets to fund withdrawals. The crucial vulnerability was the interaction between asset duration and unstable funding, not a large portfolio of defaulting technology loans.
Governance, regulation, and supervisory findings
Silicon Valley Bank was a California state-chartered bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System. Its principal supervisors included California’s Department of Financial Protection and Innovation and the Federal Reserve, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation responsible for deposit insurance and receivership functions. The holding company was also subject to Federal Reserve oversight.
The regulatory framework changed while SVB was growing. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 raised the asset threshold at which many enhanced prudential standards automatically applied to bank holding companies from $50 billion to $250 billion, while preserving authority to apply requirements to certain firms below the higher threshold. Federal Reserve tailoring rules adopted in 2019 differentiated standards according to size and other risk indicators. SVB Financial Group’s rapid expansion moved it into a more demanding supervisory category, but transitions and phase-in periods affected the timing of some requirements.
These changes did not remove the bank’s duty to manage its risks. Requirements concerning bank capital, internal controls, and liquidity management continued to apply. However, SVB was not subject to the full standardized liquidity coverage ratio imposed on the largest, most internationally active banking organizations. Its failure consequently prompted examination of both the calibration of formal rules and supervisors’ use of existing powers.
The Federal Reserve’s April 28, 2023 review, led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr, identified failures by management and the board to manage risk adequately. It also concluded that supervisors had not fully appreciated the vulnerabilities as the firm expanded and had not ensured sufficiently rapid correction of identified weaknesses. The review described shortcomings in liquidity-risk management, interest-rate-risk management, internal controls, and the effectiveness of supervisory escalation.
Risk-management problems were not confined to an absence of written policies. They concerned whether assumptions, measurements, and limits captured how the bank could behave under stress. Estimates of deposit stability were particularly important: corporate deposits linked to venture financing could leave faster than historical experience suggested. A prolonged vacancy in the chief risk officer position during much of 2022 also featured in examinations of the bank’s governance.
The case illustrates a distinction between compliance with a reported capital ratio and resilience to a rapidly changing funding environment. Capital can absorb losses, while liquidity concerns the ability to make payments when due. A bank may report capital above regulatory minimums yet become unable to meet withdrawals without realizing losses that undermine that capital. Effective supervision therefore depends on examining the joint behavior of assets, liabilities, management decisions, and depositor concentration rather than treating each indicator independently.
The March 2023 run and closure
The immediate crisis followed an attempt to reposition the balance sheet. On March 8, 2023, SVB Financial Group announced that it had sold approximately $21 billion of available-for-sale securities and would recognize an after-tax loss of about $1.8 billion. It also proposed raising approximately $2.25 billion in capital. The transactions were intended to improve the bank’s financial position, but their announcement increased concern about losses and funding pressures.
The proposed capital raise made the bank’s need for additional resources visible at a particularly sensitive moment. Clients and investors could observe that securities originally regarded as safe had been sold at a substantial loss. For an uninsured depositor, the relevant question was not simply whether the bank might ultimately recover value from its assets, but whether withdrawing immediately was safer than remaining exposed while others left.
On March 9, customers attempted to withdraw approximately $42 billion. This was an extraordinary share of the bank’s deposits for a single day. Management subsequently expected requests for roughly another $100 billion on March 10, according to the Federal Reserve’s review. These figures distinguish withdrawals already initiated during the run from additional withdrawals anticipated before closure.
Digital banking made large transfers operationally easier, while tightly connected venture networks accelerated communication. Investors and executives exchanged information through calls, messaging services, and online platforms. Such communication did not create the underlying balance-sheet exposure, but it sharply compressed the time available to respond. A depositor base concentrated in a single commercial ecosystem could react in a more coordinated manner than a geographically and economically diverse retail customer base.
Emergency borrowing did not provide an adequate bridge. Banks can obtain secured funding through arrangements including Federal Home Loan Bank advances and the Federal Reserve’s discount window, but access requires suitable collateral, operational preparations, and timely execution. SVB encountered difficulties mobilizing enough resources as withdrawal demands escalated. Assets that could potentially support borrowing were not equivalent to immediately available settlement funds.
On March 10, the California regulator took possession of Silicon Valley Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. The bank’s size made the event historically significant, but the speed of the run was equally important. Its collapse showed how concerns about economic losses could become an immediate payments crisis when a large share of depositors had both an incentive and the technical capacity to move funds quickly.
Federal intervention and the sale to First Citizens
At first, the FDIC announced the creation of the Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara to give insured depositors access to their funds. Under ordinary rules, federal insurance generally covers up to $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each ownership category. Most of SVB’s deposit balances exceeded applicable limits, so the initial approach left substantial uncertainty for businesses needing to meet payroll and other obligations.
On March 12, 2023, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC announced that all SVB depositors would have access to their money beginning March 13. The decision used the systemic risk exception in federal deposit-insurance law. The authorities made a parallel determination for Signature Bank, which was closed on March 12. Protecting all depositors was an exceptional resolution measure, not a general statutory increase in the insurance limit for every American bank.
The intervention distinguished depositors from other claimants. Shareholders were not protected, and certain unsecured creditors were not protected. Senior management was removed. The government’s stated approach was that losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund arising from protection of uninsured depositors would be recovered through a special assessment on the banking industry, rather than through a direct taxpayer appropriation.
The FDIC transferred the failed bank’s deposits and substantially all its assets to Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., a temporary institution intended to maintain services while a purchaser was sought. A bridge bank preserves operational continuity: customers can make payments, employees can continue essential work, and the receiver can market a functioning business rather than conduct an immediate liquidation of every asset.
On March 26, the FDIC announced an agreement under which First Citizens Bank & Trust Company would assume all deposits and acquire loans and certain other assets of the bridge bank. The transaction involved the purchase of approximately $72 billion in assets at a discount of $16.5 billion. About $90 billion in securities and other assets remained in the receivership for disposition. The agreement also included loss-sharing arrangements on acquired commercial loans and value-appreciation rights for the FDIC.
The former SVB branches opened as First Citizens branches on March 27. First Citizens retained the Silicon Valley Bank brand for the acquired business. This preserved much of its specialized customer franchise, but it did not reverse the original bank’s failure or restore the former holding company’s ownership. The continuing business, the receivership, and the former parent remained legally distinct.
Overseas operations and the parent company’s bankruptcy
The American closure immediately created uncertainty for businesses using SVB outside the United States. Local outcomes depended on whether a business operated through a branch, a separately incorporated bank, or another type of subsidiary. Foreign authorities also had their own responsibilities for protecting local depositors and maintaining financial stability.
The most prominent separate resolution occurred in the United Kingdom. Silicon Valley Bank UK served technology and life-science businesses whose cash balances could be large relative to ordinary deposit-protection limits. The Bank of England initially indicated that it intended to seek the subsidiary’s placement into a bank insolvency procedure. Over the following weekend, authorities instead arranged a sale intended to preserve uninterrupted banking services.
On March 13, 2023, HSBC UK acquired Silicon Valley Bank UK for £1 through a resolution process overseen by the Bank of England, in consultation with the Treasury and other authorities. The transaction protected customer deposits and allowed the bank to continue operating without taxpayer funding for the acquisition. The British subsidiary’s local legal structure helped make a separate transaction possible, although the crisis had originated in its American parent’s failure.
The British operation was subsequently renamed HSBC Innovation Bank in June 2023. Its sale illustrated how an international banking group can be separated along legal and jurisdictional boundaries during a crisis. A common brand and commercial strategy did not mean that every operating company had the same assets, liabilities, or resolution authority.
SVB Financial Group, meanwhile, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on March 17, 2023. The filing concerned the holding company, not the bank already controlled by the FDIC. The parent retained interests in nonbank businesses and other assets, while its own creditors pursued claims through the bankruptcy process. Disputes concerning funds and obligations between the parent and the bank receivership became part of the legal aftermath.
The former group’s investment-banking operation was sold in 2023 and resumed the Leerink Partners name. Other nonbank assets were addressed separately rather than automatically included in First Citizens’ purchase. These distinctions explain why references to an “SVB sale” can describe different transactions: the American banking business went to First Citizens, the British bank went to HSBC, and nonbank businesses followed separate paths. None of these transactions constituted a purchase of the former group as a single intact enterprise.
Financial-system effects and policy questions
SVB’s failure contributed to a broader episode of banking stress in March 2023. Depositors and investors reassessed institutions with large uninsured balances, substantial unrealized securities losses, or concentrated funding sources. Signature Bank failed two days after SVB, and First Republic Bank was closed on May 1 and largely acquired by JPMorgan Chase. These institutions had different business models, so their failures cannot be attributed to an identical sequence of events.
The Federal Reserve responded on March 12 by establishing the Bank Term Funding Program. It offered loans of up to one year to eligible depository institutions against specified securities, including Treasury and agency securities, valued at par for purposes of the program. This reduced the need to sell qualifying assets into a depressed market merely to meet withdrawals. The program addressed a funding problem; it did not erase all economic losses or guarantee the equity of participating banks.
SVB’s collapse renewed attention to systemic risk outside the very largest banking organizations. An institution could be modest in size relative to the largest global banks yet occupy a central position in a particular industry. Its failure could disrupt payments and working capital across many connected businesses and trigger doubts about other institutions. The importance of a bank therefore depended partly on the structure of its relationships, not only on total assets.
Deposit insurance became a central policy issue. Protecting uninsured corporate accounts reduced the immediate risk that otherwise viable businesses would lose access to operating cash. At the same time, extending protection beyond ordinary limits raised questions about moral hazard, competitive fairness, and who should bear the cost. The FDIC’s May 2023 review of deposit-insurance options examined alternatives including broader coverage and targeted higher protection for business payment accounts. Such proposals involved trade-offs rather than a universally accepted solution.
The failure also sharpened debate over the treatment of unrealized losses, liquidity stress assumptions, supervisory escalation, and bank readiness to use emergency borrowing facilities. A low-default-risk securities portfolio could still become dangerous when financed by runnable liabilities. Likewise, tests based on gradual deposit outflows could understate the risks of digitally enabled withdrawals by highly connected corporate clients.
For researchers, the episode offers evidence on the interaction between monetary policy, bank funding, and information networks. Higher rates both reduced the market value of long-duration assets and changed clients’ financing conditions. Uninsured depositors then responded to emerging information at exceptional speed. Separating these mechanisms remains important: the securities losses explain weakened financial flexibility, while deposit concentration, expectations, and payment technology help explain why the crisis developed into a run over roughly two days.