The recession of 1937–1938 was a severe economic downturn in the United States that interrupted recovery from the Great Depression. Conventionally dated from May 1937 to June 1938, it brought a steep decline in industrial production, renewed mass unemployment, and falling private investment. It occurred during the second administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and prompted a reversal of policies intended to reduce federal deficits and restrain potential monetary expansion. Economists generally identify several interacting causes, while disagreeing about the relative importance of fiscal contraction, monetary policy, and changes in business expectations.
Background: an incomplete recovery
The American economy had expanded rapidly after the banking crisis of 1933. Industrial production recovered, banks stabilized, and output rose under changing monetary conditions and the relief, public works, and regulatory measures associated with the New Deal. Nevertheless, recovery remained incomplete. Unemployment was still high, and important sectors, including residential construction and private investment, had not regained their earlier strength.
By 1936–1937, aggregate real output had broadly recovered to its pre-Depression level, although measures and historical estimates differ. This did not mean that employment or living standards had fully recovered: the population and potential workforce had grown, and substantial productive capacity remained unused.
Policymakers nonetheless became concerned about rising prices, speculative activity, and the federal budget deficit. These concerns encouraged fiscal and monetary restraint before the economy had returned to full employment.
Timing and severity
The National Bureau of Economic Research dates the business-cycle peak to May 1937 and the trough to June 1938, making the contraction 13 months long. These dates identify turning points in overall economic activity, rather than the first and last declines in every individual indicator.
Industrial production fell by roughly one-third from its 1937 peak to its 1938 trough. Durable-goods industries, including automobiles and steel, were particularly hard hit. Businesses reduced orders, liquidated inventories, and cut employment as sales weakened. Stock prices also fell sharply.
Annual real gross domestic product declined by approximately 3 percent in 1938. This annual figure understates the intensity of the peak-to-trough contraction because it averages activity across each calendar year.
A widely used historical unemployment series places the annual unemployment rate at about 14 percent in 1937 and 19 percent in 1938. Such figures require qualification: historical estimates differ over whether people employed in emergency government work programs should be classified as employed or unemployed. The increase in joblessness, however, is evident under either approach.
Unlike the collapse of 1929–1933, the downturn did not involve a comparable nationwide breakdown of the banking system. It was a major interruption of recovery within the broader Depression rather than a repetition of all the mechanisms of the earlier collapse.
Causes and mechanisms
Fiscal contraction
Federal fiscal policy became substantially less expansionary in 1937. Spending declined from the unusually high level of 1936, which had included a large, one-time payment of veterans’ bonuses. Relief expenditures were reduced, while tax receipts increased with the preceding recovery.
Collection of Social Security payroll taxes began in January 1937, before regular monthly retirement benefits began in 1940. Although some lump-sum payments were made earlier, the initial operation of the system withdrew more purchasing power through taxes than it returned through benefits.
Together, these developments reduced the federal deficit and weakened aggregate demand. The fiscal change was larger than discretionary spending cuts alone would suggest, because the expiration of temporary payments and increased tax collections also affected household income and expenditure.
Monetary restraint and bank reserves
The Federal Reserve raised reserve requirements in three stages between August 1936 and May 1937, approximately doubling the required ratios for member banks. Officials hoped to absorb banks’ large excess reserves and prevent those reserves from supporting excessive future credit expansion.
An important issue was whether the reserves were genuinely surplus to banks’ needs. After the banking crises of the early 1930s, many banks preferred to maintain substantial precautionary balances. Higher legal requirements could therefore encourage them to rebuild excess reserves by limiting lending or acquiring fewer securities, rather than simply accepting a smaller reserve cushion.
The Treasury also began sterilizing gold inflows in late 1936. Under normal arrangements, incoming gold could increase the monetary base; sterilization prevented much of that expansion. Consequently, gold continued to enter the country without producing the same monetary stimulus as before.
These measures made monetary policy less supportive of recovery. Their precise effects remain debated: some research assigns reserve requirements a major role, while other work emphasizes gold sterilization, expectations, or the interaction of monetary developments with fiscal contraction.
Private spending, inventories, and expectations
The downturn also involved a sharp reversal in private investment and inventory accumulation. Firms that had expanded production or accumulated stocks during the recovery reduced orders when demand weakened. Inventory liquidation then amplified falling output and employment.
Some interpretations emphasize rising labor costs, labor disputes, changes in taxation, and uncertainty about government regulation. These factors may have affected particular industries and investment decisions, but their economy-wide importance is contested. They do not provide a universally accepted alternative to explanations centered on demand and monetary conditions.
The central analytical disagreement concerns the weight assigned to each mechanism and the ways they reinforced one another, rather than whether a severe contraction occurred.
Government response and renewed recovery
As the contraction deepened, the Roosevelt administration moved away from its effort to balance the budget. In April 1938, Roosevelt proposed a renewed spending and lending program that included expanded work relief and public works. The Works Progress Administration and other agencies became important channels for this renewed support.
Monetary policy also changed direction. The Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements in April 1938, while the Treasury released sterilized gold and ended the sterilization policy. These actions restored a more expansionary monetary environment.
Economic activity began recovering around the middle of 1938. Production subsequently rose strongly, although unemployment remained high. The recovery did not immediately eliminate the Depression’s effects. Later defense spending and mobilization associated with World War II transformed the scale of federal expenditure and the demand for labor.
Political consequences and historical interpretation
The recession weakened confidence in the New Deal’s economic record and gave opponents grounds to criticize the administration. Republicans made substantial gains in the 1938 congressional elections, strengthening the position of conservatives in Congress and making further major domestic reforms more difficult. The downturn contributed to this political shift, alongside disputes over Roosevelt’s judicial proposals, labor relations, and the scope of federal power.
In economic history, the episode is an important case study of tightening policy during an incomplete recovery. Keynesian interpretations emphasize the contractionary effect of lower government spending and higher net taxation. Monetary interpretations stress the interruption of monetary expansion and the consequences of reserve and gold policies.
The recession also illustrates a measurement problem: recovery of aggregate output to an earlier level does not necessarily imply recovery of full employment. Its policy significance rests partly on that distinction, as well as on the difficulty of separating fiscal, monetary, and private-sector influences when several changed within a short period.