Mefo bills were state-guaranteed bills of exchange used by Nazi Germany between 1934 and 1938 to finance rearmament while postponing cash payments and obscuring the scale of government borrowing. Developed under Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, the arrangement allowed armaments suppliers to receive interest-bearing claims accepted by a nominally private company, Mefo, rather than immediate payment from the Treasury. Suppliers could hold these bills or convert them into money through the banking system. Their credibility ultimately rested on the German state’s guarantee and the Reichsbank’s willingness to rediscount them.
Historical background
Germany’s rearmament after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 required expenditure far beyond what the government wished to finance openly through taxation and conventional borrowing. The economy was recovering from the Great Depression, with substantial unemployment and unused industrial capacity. Military expansion nevertheless posed problems of financing, secrecy, and access to raw materials and foreign exchange.
Schacht’s arrangement drew on an established practice of financing expenditure through bills that banks could discount. Its distinctive feature was the use of an intermediary company to give government-backed military obligations the legal appearance of commercial paper.
The intermediary was Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft mbH, usually abbreviated to Mefo, whose name translates as “Metallurgical Research Company.” Established in 1933 with the participation of major industrial firms, it had only a small capital base and no substantial commercial operations corresponding to the volume of bills it accepted. Its principal function was to serve as the formal acceptor of rearmament bills.
The scheme began operating in 1934, before Germany publicly announced major elements of its rearmament in 1935. It therefore helped conceal military expenditure as well as defer its financing.
How the bills worked
Acceptance and government backing
An armaments contractor supplying the state could draw a bill on Mefo. Mefo accepted the bill, making it formally responsible for payment at maturity. The Reich government guaranteed the obligation.
The arrangement separated three roles that ordinary government procurement would have combined more directly:
- The state ordered the armaments and ultimately bore their cost.
- Mefo appeared as the commercial acceptor of the bill.
- The supplier or a subsequent holder held the financial claim.
The bills generally carried an interest rate of 4 percent. They were initially issued for short periods, commonly three months, but could be renewed under arrangements extending their life for up to five years. These renewals allowed short-term instruments to finance expenditure over a substantially longer period.
Discounting and rediscounting
A supplier did not have to wait until final maturity to obtain cash. It could take a bill to a commercial bank, which could purchase it at a discount. The bank could then hold the bill as an earning asset or rediscount it with the Reichsbank.
Rediscounting meant that the central bank acquired the bill and supplied funds to the banking system. This made the bills relatively liquid despite Mefo’s lack of an independent business capable of paying them.
The mechanism can be represented as:
Government order → delivery of armaments → Mefo acceptance → holding or bank discounting → possible Reichsbank rediscounting.
Not every bill immediately reached the Reichsbank. Suppliers and commercial banks could retain them because they paid interest and could be converted into cash when needed. This distinction is important: issuance created a government-backed credit claim, but did not necessarily produce an immediate, equivalent increase in central-bank money.
Fiscal and monetary functions
Borrowing outside the ordinary budget
Mefo bills enabled the government to incur obligations without presenting them in the same way as conventional Treasury borrowing. Their formally commercial character obscured the extent to which rearmament was being financed through public debt.
They were therefore an instrument of off-budget financing, not a means of avoiding the economic cost of military expenditure. Factories still used labor, machinery, fuel, and materials to produce weapons. The state also remained responsible for the financial obligations behind the bills.
The arrangement postponed the need to raise taxes, sell conventional debt, or obtain direct monetary financing. It did not eliminate that need.
Access to central-bank credit
The Reichsbank’s acceptance of Mefo bills for rediscounting connected government procurement to central-bank credit. Although presented as commercial paper, the bills financed state purchases rather than ordinary transactions supported by an independent private buyer’s revenues.
When the Reichsbank acquired them, its balance sheet expanded and it supplied central-bank funds. When commercial banks or suppliers held them, more of the immediate financing remained outside the central bank.
For this reason, describing Mefo bills simply as “printing money” is incomplete. They combined deferred government payment, private holdings of state-backed claims, and a central-bank liquidity backstop. The arrangement blurred the boundary between fiscal policy and monetary policy.
Why holders accepted them
Their attractiveness depended on several reinforcing features:
- A state guarantee, rather than Mefo’s own financial strength.
- Interest income, which encouraged holders not to demand immediate cash.
- Rediscount eligibility, which provided access to liquidity.
- Renewability, which reduced the government’s immediate repayment requirements.
The arrangement therefore relied less on Mefo’s commercial solvency than on confidence in the institutions supporting its bills.
Scale and termination of new issuance
Approximately 12 billion Reichsmarks in Mefo bills were issued during the scheme’s operation. They became a major source of rearmament finance, although not the only one: taxation, conventional borrowing, and other credit arrangements also financed the military buildup.
New issuance ended in 1938. This did not extinguish the outstanding obligations. As bills approached their maximum extension periods, particularly from 1939 onward, the government faced growing requirements to redeem or refinance them.
The distinction between ending issuance and repaying the accumulated debt is essential. A program could stop creating new bills while leaving a large stock of claims that still had to be financed.
Schacht became increasingly concerned about the financial pressures associated with continued armaments expenditure. His dismissal as Reichsbank president in January 1939 occurred amid a broader conflict over government demands for credit and the limits of the bank’s financing role.
Constraints and economic consequences
Refinancing risk
Short-dated bills that were repeatedly renewed created a mismatch between the legal maturity of individual instruments and the government’s actual financing needs. The scheme depended on continued willingness to hold or refinance the claims.
The state guarantee and Reichsbank support reduced the risk that an individual holder could not obtain payment. They did not remove the government’s aggregate financing burden. Meeting that burden could require additional borrowing, taxation, or monetary expansion, with implications for debt sustainability.
Real-resource and foreign-exchange limits
Domestic credit creation could mobilize idle production, but it could not create unlimited supplies of skilled labor, steel, fuel, or imported materials. As rearmament expanded, these physical constraints became increasingly important.
Nor did issuing Reichsmark claims automatically provide the foreign currency needed for imports. Germany’s external financing difficulties and balance-of-payments constraints therefore remained distinct from the question of how domestic suppliers were paid.
Inflation and controls
Deferring cash payment did not make military expenditure non-inflationary. As unused capacity diminished, expanding state demand intensified competition for resources.
However, the relationship between credit expansion and measured inflation was affected by wage restrictions, price controls, exchange controls, and administrative allocation. Official prices alone could not fully reveal pressures expressed through shortages, restricted civilian consumption, or forced shifts in production.
Historical significance
Mefo bills illustrate how a government can use a nominally private intermediary and central-bank backing to finance expenditure while limiting its immediate visibility in ordinary budget accounts. Their apparent commercial form differed from their underlying economic substance: they were claims created to pay for state procurement and ultimately supported by the state.
They are consequently relevant to the study of fiscal transparency, contingent government obligations, and central-bank independence. Their particular historical role was to support German rearmament before World War II, not to function as an ordinary currency or a generally circulating means of payment.