Lebanon

Lebanon is a small country on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, bordered by Syria to the north and east and by Israel to the south. Its relief of coastal plain, mountain ranges and the mountain-flanked Bekaa Valley, together with a Mediterranean climate, has shaped where people settle, how land is farmed and where water is found. Its position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean has made it a crossroads of trade and empires, from the Phoenician port cities of antiquity through the Ottoman period to the modern state.

The modern republic took shape under the French mandate after the First World War, became independent in 1943, and was shaped by a 1975–1990 civil war and the 1989 Taif Agreement, which reorganised a constitutional system of confessional power-sharing among religious communities. The economy is dominated by services, banking, tourism and remittances from a diaspora larger than the resident population, and it has been shaken by a financial collapse that began in 2019 and by renewed conflict in 2024 and 2026.

This entry moves from geography (location, relief, water, climate, ecosystems, geology and resources) through population and history to politics, the economy, urban life, society and the present situation. Figures for population, GDP and the informal economy vary across sources, in part because no official census has been held since 1932 and a large share of economic activity is informal, and the entry notes where estimates differ.

Location, borders and administrative divisions

Lebanon occupies a narrow strip of the eastern Mediterranean coast, with Syria to the north and east and Israel to the south. Its officially stated area is 10,452 square kilometres, and its coastline extends approximately 225 kilometres. The sea forms its entire western frontage, while its land boundaries enclose coastal settlements, mountain districts and the inland Bekaa region within a relatively small territory. Beirut, the capital, lies on the central coast; Tripoli lies farther north, and Sidon and Tyre farther south. (moe.gov.lb)

The southern maritime boundary was delineated through a United States-mediated agreement concluded on 27 October 2022, when Lebanese and Israeli delegations presented their signed instruments at the United Nations premises in Naqoura. The agreement defines an offshore boundary through geographical coordinates but expressly leaves the status of the land boundary unaffected. The nearshore area landward of its easternmost coordinate remains undelimited, with the existing buoy-line arrangement maintained pending further delimitation. For offshore resources, it provides a mechanism under which Lebanon’s Block 9 operator could explore and develop a hydrocarbon prospect extending across the boundary, while separately compensating Israel for any economic rights in deposits on its side. This concerns the allocation of rights, rather than proof of commercially recoverable natural gas. Lebanon also signed an agreement delimiting its exclusive economic zone with Cyprus on 26 November 2025. (un.org)

Administrative descriptions require a distinction between the widely used eight-governorate statistical framework and the subsequent creation of a ninth governorate. The eight are Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Akkar, Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel, South Lebanon and Nabatiyeh; this framework remains in use by the UNHCR information hub. Law No. 52, gazetted on 7 September 2017, separated Keserwan and Jbeil from Mount Lebanon to create Keserwan-Jbeil Governorate, with its seat at Jounieh. Implementation began with the appointment of its first governor in 2020, and the Ministry of Public Health’s 2023 service-mapping report uses nine governorates. The country’s district-based statistical framework comprises 26 units, including Beirut, which has special status rather than being subdivided into districts. (ialebanon.unhcr.org)

Within the nine-governorate arrangement, Mount Lebanon contains Baabda, Matn, Aley and Chouf, while Keserwan-Jbeil contains its two namesake districts. North Lebanon comprises Tripoli, Miniyeh-Danniyeh, Zgharta, Koura, Bsharri and Batroun; Akkar forms a single district. Inland, Baalbek-Hermel contains Baalbek and Hermel, and Bekaa contains Zahle, Western Bekaa and Rashaya. South Lebanon comprises Sidon, Tyre and Jezzine, while Nabatiyeh contains Nabatiyeh, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Hasbaya. Beirut’s administrative boundary encloses only part of the continuous metropolitan settlement. Its position as Lebanon’s primate city is evident in its urban footprint: UN-Habitat measured the Beirut urban area at approximately 110 square kilometres in 2021, about 4.5 times that of Tripoli, the second-largest city by this measure. (en.wikipedia.org)

The territorial framework took shape under French administration after the First World War. On 1 September 1920, General Henri Gouraud proclaimed Greater Lebanon, joining the former Mount Lebanon autonomous territory to Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre and to additional northern, southern and Bekaa districts. These boundaries combined areas previously administered through different parts of the Ottoman Empire, rather than reproducing a single older province. The southern boundary was subsequently surveyed by a Franco-British commission and formalized in the Paulet–Newcombe Agreement of 7 March 1923, separating the French-mandated territories from British-mandated Palestine. Consequently, the modern frontier cut across older district geography: part of the former Ottoman Marjayoun district became incorporated into the Galilee Panhandle south of Lebanon. (en.wikipedia.org)

Relief: coastal plain, mountain ranges and the Bekaa Valley

Lebanon’s relief follows a series of longitudinal belts oriented approximately north-northeast to south-southwest. The narrow Mediterranean coastal plain rises inland into Mount Lebanon, beyond which lies the elevated Bekaa Valley, enclosed on its eastern side by the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. These form four physiographic units, although the coast, western mountains and interior valley constitute the three principal zones of the west-to-east landscape. The two mountain chains run broadly parallel to the shoreline, producing pronounced changes in altitude over short horizontal distances. FAO estimated in 2016 that mountainous terrain occupied about 73 percent of the national territory. (unfccc.int)

The coastal plain is generally only a few kilometres wide; a FAO land-resources assessment described its typical width as less than 5 kilometres. It is therefore a narrow lowland rather than an extensive coastal basin. Immediately inland, foothills give way to steep mountain slopes. Most rivers descending from Mount Lebanon cross the prevailing direction of the range, cutting deeply incised valleys that interrupt the continuity of its western flank. The Qadisha Valley in the north provides a conspicuous example of this rugged landscape: rocky cliffs and restricted access helped make its caves and ledges sites of monastic settlement and refuge. (fao.org)

Mount Lebanon reaches its greatest elevation in the northern part of the range at Qurnat as Sawda, approximately 3,088 metres above sea level. Its high ground contrasts with both the coastal strip and the Bekaa floor, which lies predominantly around 900–1,000 metres. Winter snow remains on high mountain terrain into spring; Lebanon’s agricultural country report describes the nearby mountains as snow-covered from December to May, although this does not imply continuous cover at every elevation. Across the Bekaa, the Anti-Lebanon forms a second highland barrier along much of the border with Syria, with elevations approaching 2,800 metres. (fao.org)

Steep gradients restrict the extent of level ground available for cultivation and construction. They also accelerate runoff and soil erosion, removing topsoil and reducing its capacity to retain water. Agricultural terraces adapt the slopes to cultivation by creating near-level strips behind retaining walls, often built of stone. Fruit trees and other crops suited to higher elevations occupy these stepped plots, rather than the broad fields characteristic of the Bekaa. The continuing importance of this infrastructure is illustrated by FAO restoration work reported in 2018 on abandoned stone terraces in the Shouf Biosphere Reserve and Qadisha Valley. By contrast, the Bekaa’s relatively level floor and alluvial soils support extensive cultivation: FAO’s 2008 AQUASTAT survey identified it as accounting for 42 percent of Lebanon’s cultivated area. (fao.org)

The ranges also divide the humid maritime west from the drier, more continental interior. Moist Mediterranean air rises against Mount Lebanon, favouring precipitation on the western mountains; the Bekaa lies in their rain shadow. FAO’s historical climatic figures indicate annual rainfall of roughly 600–900 millimetres along the coast, increasing to about 1,400 millimetres on high mountains and falling below 200 millimetres in the northeast. Maritime influence moderates coastal temperatures, whereas the elevated interior experiences colder winters, frost and a greater seasonal temperature range. Thus, the Bekaa is not uniformly dry: its wetter southern and central agricultural lands contrast with the increasingly arid northern interior. (doi.org)

Rivers, springs and water resources

The Litani, approximately 170 kilometres long, is the longest river lying wholly within Lebanon. It drains much of the southern Bekaa Valley before turning west towards the Mediterranean north of Tyre. Its principal storage facility, the Qaraoun reservoir, has a nominal capacity of 220 million cubic metres; FAO distinguishes this from an effective year-to-year storage capacity of about 160 million cubic metres. The reservoir regulates flows for irrigation and hydroelectric generation. The Orontes, also called the Assi, drains the northern Bekaa in the opposite direction, flowing north into Syria before continuing to Turkey. Springs, particularly Ain ez Zarqa near Hermel, sustain its perennial flow, making groundwater conditions important to a river shared by three countries. (litani.gov.lb)

Lebanon’s principal groundwater reservoirs occur in karstic carbonate rocks, where dissolution has enlarged fractures into connected passages and caves. A World Bank assessment identifies two main aquifer systems covering approximately 5,600 square kilometres, together with more than 2,000 major and minor springs whose combined annual discharge was estimated at about one billion cubic metres. Winter rainfall and melting mountain snow recharge these systems; water subsequently emerges in valley-side springs, riverbeds or submarine outlets. Groundwater drainage therefore does not necessarily follow surface watershed boundaries. Investigations of the Jeita spring catchment, an important source for Beirut, have demonstrated rapid underground flow pathways that can carry contaminants from recharge areas to water-supply sources with limited natural filtration. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Seasonal abundance does not translate into continuous supply. Recharge is concentrated in the wetter months, while irrigation demand increases during the dry summer, when streamflow and spring discharge diminish. The humid western mountain slopes and coastal catchments contrast with the drier interior, but densely populated coastal districts also experience shortages because storage, conveyance and distribution systems cannot reliably match demand. The World Bank’s assessment of conditions in 2023 attributed more than 55 percent of total water demand to irrigation, compared with about 39 percent to domestic consumption and 5 percent to industry. Heavy pumping supplements surface supplies; in coastal aquifers, declining groundwater levels can promote saltwater intrusion. Households consequently depend in part on private wells, tanker deliveries and stored water rather than uninterrupted public-network service. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Pollution further reduces usable supplies. Untreated municipal sewage, industrial discharges and agricultural runoff enter rivers and can infiltrate aquifers; excessive fertilizer and pesticide use has been a particular concern in the upper Litani basin and Qaraoun reservoir. In its assessment for 2023, the World Bank recorded 39 wastewater-treatment plants with a combined design capacity of 182.4 million cubic metres annually, but only 17 were operational. Just 18.1 million cubic metres received secondary or tertiary treatment—approximately 6–7 percent of the estimated annual municipal wastewater volume. Large coastal plants predominantly provided primary treatment, whereas most higher-level treatment occurred inland, especially in the Bekaa. Building treatment plants without functioning collection networks, reliable power and operating finance therefore leaves a substantial gap between installed capacity and effective pollution control. (fao.org)

Water infrastructure combines dams, canals, tunnels, pumping stations and treatment works, with substantial construction and recurrent operating costs. The Qaraoun system serves irrigation schemes in the Bekaa and southern Lebanon, including the Qasmieh–Ras el Ain coastal scheme. On September 5, 2020, the World Bank cancelled US$244 million in undisbursed financing for the proposed Bisri dam after required environmental, operation-and-maintenance and contractor-mobilization conditions were not fulfilled. On January 15, 2025, it approved US$257.8 million for the Second Greater Beirut Water Supply Project, including completion of bulk-water infrastructure and additions to the Wardanieh treatment plant. Its stated objective was to raise the share of dry-season demand met by surface water from 24 percent to an average of 70 percent; these figures were project targets, not completed outcomes. (fao.org)

Climate and seasonal patterns

Lebanon has a Mediterranean climate, with hot, dry summers and a winter rainy season. Summer dryness is most pronounced from June to September; winter is mild along the coast but cold at higher elevations. Approximately three-quarters of annual precipitation falls between November and March, with January generally the wettest month. Autumn thunderstorms and spring showers account for much of the remainder. The 1991–2020 national climatology shows average monthly temperatures rising from roughly 6–7°C in January to about 24°C in August, although these countrywide averages combine markedly different coastal, mountain and inland conditions. (unfccc.int)

Elevation and exposure to maritime air produce sharp climatic contrasts over short distances. The coast generally receives about 700–1,000 mm of precipitation annually, while wetter mountain areas can receive approximately 1,600 mm, partly as snow. The Mediterranean moderates coastal temperature fluctuations; inland locations have larger daily and seasonal ranges. Mount Lebanon intercepts moisture-bearing air, leaving the Bekaa Valley substantially drier on its eastern side. A World Bank assessment distinguishes the semi-arid Bekaa, with approximately 200–450 mm of annual rainfall, from the wetter coast and western mountain slopes. The interior therefore combines dry, hot summers with colder winters than the coast, rather than simply reproducing coastal conditions at a higher elevation. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Observed climate change is clearest in the temperature record. Lebanon’s Fourth National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, prepared in 2022, identifies an upward trend in annual mean temperature during 1950–2020, strengthening during 1991–2020. Historical precipitation trends are less uniform: the World Bank’s 2018 drought assessment found substantial interannual and decadal variability in Beirut and Tripoli station records, without a conclusive overall trend at those stations. Future projections nevertheless indicate warmer and generally drier conditions. The Fourth National Communication reports modelled temperature increases reaching 4.9°C and precipitation decreases reaching 22% by 2100; these are upper-end projections, not changes already observed or uniform forecasts for every locality. (unfccc.int)

Mountain snow is particularly sensitive to warming because higher temperatures increase the proportion of precipitation falling as rain and accelerate spring melting. The Third National Communication, published in 2016, projected a reduction in snow cover of approximately 40% with 2°C of warming and 70% with 4°C. These scenario estimates describe potential losses rather than measured reductions. Earlier melting shifts water availability away from the dry summer season, while higher evaporation and plant water use reduce soil moisture. Together with declining precipitation and longer rainless intervals, these processes increase drought risk, particularly in already dry inland districts. They also shorten the period of reliable snow cover for mountain winter tourism. (unfccc.int)

Sea-level rise adds a separate coastal hazard. Lebanon’s national coastal diagnostic assessment reports Mediterranean mean sea-level rise of about 2.8 mm per year during 1993–2018 and a projected basin-wide increase of 37–90 cm around 2100 relative to the end of the twentieth century, depending on the emissions scenario. Beirut’s waterfront and coastal suburbs contain concentrated urban and commercial assets exposed to coastal flooding and erosion. Vulnerability is especially pronounced in low-lying stretches around Tripoli, Jounieh, Damour, Jiyeh, Sidon and Tyre. Higher mean sea levels increase the reach of storm-driven inundation and promote saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers; exposure therefore depends on local elevation, shoreline form and development density, rather than distance from the sea alone. (gefmed.paprac.org)

Ecosystems, vegetation and biodiversity

Lebanon’s vegetation includes oak and pine woodland, mountain conifer forests, scrub, grassland and wetland communities. Its steep environmental gradients support considerable biodiversity within a small territory: the Convention on Biological Diversity’s country profile records approximately 2,600 terrestrial plant species, about 3.5% of them endemic to Lebanon and 8.5% endemic to the wider Lebanon–Syria–Palestine region. Mountain forests also contain species near their southern geographical limits, including Cilician fir (Abies cilicica) at Horsh Ehden and hop-hornbeam (Ostrya carpinifolia) at Jabal Moussa. These distributions make individual forest stands important for conserving regional plant diversity, rather than merely maintaining tree cover. (faolex.fao.org)

The Lebanon cedar (Cedrus libani), represented on the national flag, survives in fragmented mountain stands rather than the extensive forests associated with ancient Lebanon. Its timber was highly valued for construction, particularly religious buildings, and prolonged harvesting contributed to the forests’ contraction; overgrazing and further exploitation of woodland resources have also degraded mountain forests. The Cedars of God near Bsharri occupy ground approximately 1,900–2,050 metres above sea level and were inscribed with the Qadisha Valley on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1998. Other surviving cedar stands include those protected at Shouf and Tannourine. (en.wikipedia.org)

The Shouf Biosphere Reserve, designated in 2005, encompasses approximately 49,600 hectares, or about 5% of Lebanon’s territory. Its broader landscape includes the Al-Shouf Cedar Nature Reserve, Ammiq Wetland and surrounding settlements; the biosphere reserve’s boundaries therefore extend beyond strictly protected forest. UNESCO records 620 hectares of cedar forest, 520 plant species and more than 250 bird species within the reserve. Restoration combines forest conservation with management of the surrounding agricultural landscape: Shouf joined the Mediterranean Mosaics initiative in 2012 and subsequently developed landscape-restoration guidelines, including species-selection criteria and nursery protocols. Nationally, the FAO-supported SALMA project, launched in December 2016, reported reforestation of 674 hectares at 23 sites and forest-management plans covering 1,230 hectares. Lebanon’s biodiversity policy specifies native tree species for reforestation and excludes restoration methods that damage existing biodiversity. (unesco.org)

Lebanon lies on migration routes linking Europe, Africa and western Asia, giving its wetlands and coastal islands importance as feeding, resting and wintering sites. Ammiq, a 280-hectare Ramsar site designated in 1999, preserves a remnant of the marshes and lakes formerly more widespread in the Bekaa Valley. Reedbeds dominated by Phragmites and Typha support migratory waterbirds, including ferruginous ducks and great snipe. On the coast, Tyre Beach combines sandy shores with freshwater habitats supplied by artesian springs and provides nesting habitat for green and loggerhead turtles. The Palm Islands Nature Reserve, designated a Ramsar site in 2001, supplies additional bird stopover habitat, while sheltered coastal rocks and caves provide fish spawning grounds. (unesco.org)

Habitat conversion and degradation affect both protected sites and the landscapes connecting them. Urban expansion, coastal construction and agricultural encroachment remove habitat, while excessive harvesting, hunting and fishing place additional pressure on species. Waste disposal, agricultural chemicals and wastewater discharges degrade aquatic environments; inadequate waste management also carries land-based pollution to coastal waters. Forest clearance and uncontrolled fires are particularly consequential in mountain landscapes: UNDP reported that more than 120 fires in October 2019 burned over 1,600 hectares of forest. Biological pressures include introduced marine species entering through the Suez Canal and damaging forest insects; a 2004–2007 conservation project addressed an insect threat to the Tannourine cedar forest. (cbd.int)

Geology, tectonics and natural hazards

Lebanon lies across the Lebanese restraining bend of the Dead Sea Transform, the predominantly left-lateral fault system separating the Arabian plate from the African plate’s Sinai–Levant sector. At this bend, sideways displacement is accompanied by compression, producing folding, thrust faulting and the uplift of Mount Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon range. Movement is distributed among several faults, including the Yammouneh, Roum, Rachaya and Serghaya faults, rather than confined to a single fracture. The Yammouneh fault follows the eastern margin of Mount Lebanon; dating of displaced limestone-clast alluvial fans yielded a long-term slip-rate estimate of 3.8–6.4 millimetres per year. Offshore seismic surveys also document active shortening along the continental margin. These combined strike-slip and compressional structures create earthquake sources both inland and beneath the sea. (agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com)

The historical earthquake record includes destructive events in 551, 1202 and 1759. On 9 July 551, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami devastated Beirut and other coastal cities. Ata Elias and colleagues, publishing in 2007, proposed rupture of an approximately 100–150-kilometre-long offshore Mount Lebanon thrust, with an estimated moment magnitude of about 7.5. Their interpretation combined seabed scarps with evidence of approximately 80 centimetres of coastal uplift during the sixth century. The precise source remains debated: subsequent studies have considered other offshore structures and earthquake-triggered submarine landslides. The destructive 1956 earthquake provides a more recent example; a UN-Habitat neighbourhood study records the destruction of about 700 apartments in Sidon’s Old City. In densely built Beirut, seismic risk also reflects building vulnerability and restricted access to open spaces. A 2023 evacuation-modelling study identified falling debris, narrow movement corridors and barriers around potential assembly areas as factors that could impede evacuation. (agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com)

Much of Lebanon’s exposed bedrock consists of marine sedimentary formations, particularly Jurassic and Cretaceous limestone and dolomite. A UNDP-supported geological assessment estimated that limestone formations cover approximately 6,900 square kilometres, or 66% of the national territory. Folding and faulting have fractured these rocks, allowing water to penetrate and dissolve carbonate minerals. The resulting karst landscape includes caves, sinkholes, enclosed depressions and underground conduits; Jeita’s cave system, developed in the Jurassic Kesrouane Formation, is a prominent example. Geological structure also influences slope stability: fractured rock, steep slopes, weak strata and excavation for roads or quarries can combine to produce rockfalls and landslides. Lebanon’s National Center for Natural Hazards and Early Warning reports that satellite interpretation identified approximately 10,000 mass-movement features for susceptibility maps published in 2010. During the storms of January–February 2024, it recorded around 70 debris-fall and rockfall incidents, including a temporary closure of the Dahr al-Baydar road linking Beirut with the Bekaa Valley. (cedro-undp.org)

Flooding can develop rapidly in mountain catchments, where short-lived storm runoff concentrates in channels and reaches downstream settlements within hours. Research on the 301-square-kilometre Awali basin reconstructed the exceptional flood of early January 2013, described as one of its largest events in three decades. Such flash floods differ from prolonged river flooding, although both can transport sediment, damage roads and inundate villages. In January 2024, seven days of heavy rain caused two northern rivers to overflow simultaneously, spreading mud and debris across the agricultural Akkar plain. (iris.cnr.it)

Forest and brush fires are another recurrent hazard. Prolonged summer drying leaves combustible vegetation, while high temperatures, low humidity and strong winds can accelerate fire spread; Lebanon’s most severe fire episodes frequently occur in September–November, before sustained winter rainfall. The fires of 14–15 October 2019 illustrated this late-season danger. For 2021, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre mapped 50 fires covering 2,360 hectares in Lebanon, including an 882-hectare fire in Andaket, Akkar, in July. This mapped total included agricultural and other non-forest land as well as woodland, and therefore does not represent forest loss alone. (aub.edu.lb)

Natural resources and energy

Lebanon’s commercially exploited mineral resources consist mainly of limestone, building stone and aggregates used in construction and cement manufacture, rather than large deposits of metallic ores. The United States Geological Survey estimated production in 2024 at 3.2 million tonnes of limestone for cement and 2.1 million tonnes of hydraulic cement; mineral production represented only a minor part of the economy. Refined gold and recycled lead also appear in industrial statistics, but these outputs should not be confused with extraction from domestic ore deposits. (usgs.gov) Fertile agricultural land is another important but spatially restricted resource, concentrated in the Bekaa Valley, Akkar, the narrow coastal plains and mountain terraces. The 2010 agricultural census recorded approximately 231,000 hectares of agricultural land, about half irrigated, illustrating the limited land base available within a predominantly mountainous country. (fao.org)

Electricity production relies heavily on imported fossil fuels, making supply vulnerable to fuel costs and the availability of foreign currency. These vulnerabilities became particularly acute during the financial crisis beginning in 2019, when difficulties financing imports compounded longstanding generation and network deficiencies. (mail.lcec.org.lb) The state utility, Électricité du Liban (EDL), operates a system whose installed thermal capacity substantially exceeds what can consistently be supplied with fuel and kept operational. A 2025 World Bank assessment described approximately 2,000 megawatts (MW) of thermal generating capacity and 280 MW of hydropower, with the Zahrani and Deir Ammar thermal stations together accounting for about 975 MW. (documents1.worldbank.org) Chronic rationing has encouraged households and businesses to buy electricity from neighbourhood diesel generators, alongside their EDL connections. In April 2025, public electricity supply was reported at roughly four to six hours daily, with private generators filling much of the gap at substantially higher cost. (apnews.com)

Hydropower provides an established domestic alternative to imported fuel. The Litani River Authority’s Markabi, Awali and Joun stations, commissioned between 1962 and 1968, have a combined installed capacity of 192 MW. Their rehabilitation programme includes replacement of generating equipment and control systems, together with safety improvements at the Qaraoun dam. (litani.gov.lb) More recently, private solar energy installations have expanded rapidly as a response to unreliable grid supply. The Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation recorded an increase in decentralized photovoltaic capacity from 0.3 MW peak in 2010 to approximately 1,081 MW peak in 2023. (lcec.org.lb) A World Bank assessment estimated that standalone solar systems with battery storage reached approximately 1,400 MW by the end of 2024, while noting that adoption remained constrained by households’ and businesses’ ability to finance the initial investment. (documents1.worldbank.org)

The policy framework for renewable energy increasingly addresses the relationship between private production and the public electrical grid. Law No. 318/2023, passed by parliament on 14 December 2023, established a framework for individual and collective net metering and direct renewable-electricity trading between private entities, subject to a 10 MW capacity limit. It assigns implementation and supervisory responsibilities to EDL and the electricity regulator. (lcec.org.lb) These mechanisms extend beyond self-supply by allowing producers to account for exported electricity or enter direct purchase agreements. In October 2024, the World Bank approved a US$250 million project supporting renewable generation, restoration of grid services and electricity-sector reforms. (worldbank.org)

Offshore natural gas remains an exploration prospect rather than an established source of domestic energy. The Qana exploration well in Block 9, drilled in 2023, did not produce positive results; TotalEnergies subsequently relinquished Block 9 in March 2026. (totalenergies.com) On 9 January 2026, TotalEnergies and its partners Eni and QatarEnergy signed an agreement for the Block 8 exploration permit, holding interests of 35%, 35% and 30%, respectively. The initial programme specified a three-dimensional seismic survey covering 1,200 square kilometres to assess exploration potential, not a production development. Consequently, the programme established no timetable for commercial gas supply. (totalenergies.com)

Population, communities and migration

Lebanon’s resident population was estimated by the United Nations at 5.85 million in 2025, including non-citizens. No comprehensive national population census has been conducted since 1932, partly because the numerical balance between religious communities is politically sensitive. Population figures therefore depend on household surveys, administrative records and demographic modelling, with different dates and coverage. The Central Administration of Statistics’ 2018–2019 household survey estimated 4.84 million residents, approximately 80 per cent Lebanese and 20 per cent non-Lebanese, but excluded refugee camps, adjacent settlements and other non-residential accommodation. It consequently cannot be compared directly with estimates covering the entire resident population. Refugee registration totals and the number of Lebanese citizens abroad are separate measures, not interchangeable population counts. (data.un.org)

The state officially recognises eighteen religious communities: twelve Christian communities, Sunni and Shia Muslims, Alawites, Ismailis, Druze and Jews. The Christian communities include Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, and several smaller churches. Recognition has institutional consequences: recognised communities can administer personal-status rules and have marriages and other religious acts accepted by the state. Community affiliation also structures political representation, although the detailed allocation of offices belongs to Lebanon’s system of confessional power-sharing. Religious identity is therefore both a matter of belief and a legal and political category; estimates of affiliation should not be treated as census results. (2021-2025.state.gov)

The Lebanese diaspora, when defined to include descendants of emigrants rather than only citizens living abroad, is generally estimated to exceed the resident population. Published estimates reach approximately fourteen million, but ancestry-based totals are not equivalent to counts of Lebanese nationality or birthplace. Large-scale emigration developed during the late nineteenth century, particularly between 1880 and 1914. Historian Akram Khater identifies declining opportunities in Mount Lebanon’s silk economy, population growth and accounts of earnings overseas as important mechanisms encouraging departure. Family and village networks helped successive migrants establish themselves abroad. Later movements included emigration during the 1975–1990 civil war and labour migration to Gulf countries. Communities developed across the Americas, Australia and West Africa, while remittances maintained economic connections with households in Lebanon. (scholarworks.aub.edu.lb)

Refugee populations form a substantial part of the resident population, but agency registers require careful interpretation. Palestinians arrived following displacement in the 1948 war, and subsequent generations have remained in Lebanon. In February 2025, UNRWA reported approximately 222,000 Palestinians actually residing in the country, including 27,000 Palestinians displaced from Syria, compared with just under 500,000 registered with its Lebanon office. Emigration and deaths are not always reported, and families abroad can continue registering children. Approximately 45 per cent of Palestine refugees lived in twelve camps. The residence estimate amounted to roughly 4 per cent of the UN’s 2025 population estimate, rather than the much larger share implied by the registration total. (un.org)

Syrian displacement expanded after the conflict in Syria began in 2011. The 2026 Lebanon Response Plan used an estimate of 1.12 million displaced Syrians, including those registered with UNHCR. New UNHCR registration of Syrians has been suspended by government decision since May 2015, so registered numbers do not capture the entire displaced population. The planning estimate alone was equivalent to about one-fifth of Lebanon’s estimated 2025 resident population, although the differing reference dates prevent an exact contemporary percentage. Syrian and Palestinian figures also require consistent definitions because Palestinians displaced from Syria are identified separately in humanitarian statistics. (unhcr.org)

Settlement is concentrated in Beirut and surrounding Mount Lebanon, with another substantial population concentration in the north. Within the population covered by the 2018–2019 household survey, Mount Lebanon accounted for 42.0 per cent, Beirut for 7.1 per cent, North Lebanon for 13.2 per cent and Akkar for 6.7 per cent. Administrative registration does not necessarily indicate residence: 58.4 per cent of Lebanese registered in Beirut lived elsewhere. Conflict-related internal displacement repeatedly changes local population distributions; IOM recorded 329,686 internally displaced people across Lebanon on 29 September 2026, a dated movement count rather than a permanent addition to the national population. (opendatalebanon.org)

Ancient history: from Phoenician city-states to the Islamic conquest

Byblos, Tyre and Sidon developed as separate coastal kingdoms rather than provinces of a unified Phoenician state. Byblos was already a flourishing centre in the third millennium BCE, trading cedar timber, oil and wine with Egypt. During the first millennium BCE, Phoenician merchants extended their networks through Cyprus and across the Mediterranean, establishing trading settlements and colonies, including Carthage in North Africa. Their ports connected inland suppliers with overseas markets; purple-dyed textiles, metalwork and carved ivory were important manufactures. By the late eighth century BCE, Phoenician and Greek trading posts encircled the Mediterranean. These exchanges transmitted techniques and artistic motifs as well as goods. (countrystudies.us)

The Phoenicians developed and disseminated an alphabetic writing system from earlier West Semitic traditions, rather than inventing alphabetic writing from nothing. Inscriptions from Byblos, including that on the sarcophagus of King Ahiram, document its early use. Greek adoption of Phoenician letters provided the foundation for subsequent transmission to the Etruscans and Romans and ultimately the Latin alphabet. Maritime contact thus helped spread a writing technology whose influence outlasted the political independence of the coastal cities. (whc.unesco.org)

The coast experienced Egyptian domination during the Late Bronze Age, followed in the first millennium BCE by Assyrian and Babylonian overlordship. Imperial control often operated through tribute while local monarchies continued to govern individual cities. After Cyrus conquered Babylon in 539 BCE, Phoenicia passed into the Persian Empire; its fleets subsequently supported Persian campaigns against the Greeks. Alexander the Great conquered Tyre in 332 BCE, overcoming its island defences by constructing a causeway from the mainland. After his death, Phoenicia became a contested zone between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms before Seleucid predominance. Pompey’s settlement of 64 BCE incorporated the region into the Roman province of Syria. (en.wikisource.org)

Under Roman rule, coastal manufacturing and commerce supported urban construction, roads and monumental public buildings. Tyre’s surviving archaeological remains include baths, an aqueduct and a second-century CE hippodrome; Beirut, known as Berytus, became particularly important for legal education. Justinian recognised its law school as one of the empire’s official teaching centres in 533. The region belonged to the eastern, or Byzantine, empire after the imperial division of 395, and Christianity became an important element of its religious landscape. The earthquake of 551 devastated Beirut and forced the transfer of its law students to Sidon. (countrystudies.us)

Arab Muslim armies displaced Byzantine rule during the seventh century, with the victory at Yarmouk in 636 marking a decisive stage in the conquest of the wider Syrian region. Under Muʿawiya, later founder of the Umayyad dynasty, coastal garrisons and local shipbuilders helped establish a fleet against Byzantine naval power. The Abbasids replaced the Umayyads in 750. Political conquest did not immediately eliminate Christian communities: Christians and Jews retained communal religious life under a system of special taxation. Tyre and Tripoli remained active commercial ports, while textiles, ceramics and glass circulated through Mediterranean markets. (countrystudies.us)

During the Middle Ages, mountain settlements became important centres of distinct religious communities. The Maronite Church originated among followers of Maron, a Syrian ascetic who died around 410; communities associated with this monastic tradition subsequently established themselves in northern Mount Lebanon. The Druze faith emerged in Fatimid Egypt in 1017 and gained adherents in the Levant, including Lebanon. Crusader expansion placed much of the coast under Latin rule: Tripoli fell in 1109, Beirut and Sidon in 1110, and Tyre in 1124. Crusader contacts strengthened Maronite relations with the Latin Church. Castles and churches at sites such as Byblos preserve material evidence of this period, which ended with the Mamluk defeat of the remaining coastal Crusader strongholds in 1291. (encyclopedia.com)

Ottoman rule, Mount Lebanon and the French mandate

The Ottoman Empire incorporated the territory of present-day Lebanon after Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks in 1516. It did not administer this territory as a single Lebanese province: coastal towns belonged to wider provincial structures, while local dynasties exercised considerable authority in Mount Lebanon under Ottoman overlordship. The Maʿn and, subsequently, Shihab emirs governed through local notable families, with authority dependent on taxation, alliances and recognition by imperial officials. Fakhr al-Din II of the Maʿn dynasty expanded his territorial influence and established relations with Tuscany, but Ottoman military intervention ended his rule; he was executed in Constantinople in 1635. Mountain autonomy therefore remained conditional rather than constituting independent sovereignty. (countrystudies.us)

The emirate was replaced in 1842 by two deputy-governorships, one Christian and one Druze, both subordinate to the Ottoman governor of Sidon. This arrangement failed to resolve conflicts involving communal affiliation, landholding and the privileges of local elites. Violence between Druze and Christian communities culminated in 1860 in widespread massacres and destruction, prompting Ottoman intervention and a French expedition. The settlement negotiated by the Ottoman government and European powers established the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate in 1861. Its governor had to be a Christian from outside Lebanon, appointed by the sultan with European approval; the first was the Armenian Catholic official Daud Pasha. A twelve-member administrative council represented six religious communities. France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia participated in the international arrangement, which preserved Ottoman sovereignty while placing the mountain’s administration under external supervision. (countrystudies.us)

Ottoman rule ended with defeat in World War I in 1918. Advocates of an enlarged Lebanon sought the addition of agricultural districts and coastal cities to the former mountain territory, arguing that these would make the state economically viable. On 1 September 1920, French High Commissioner General Henri Gouraud proclaimed Greater Lebanon, with Beirut as its capital. It combined Mount Lebanon with Beirut, Tripoli and Akkar, the Bekaa Valley, and southern districts including Sidon and Tyre. These additions incorporated substantial Sunni and Shia populations into a territory previously centred on predominantly Christian and Druze mountain communities. The League of Nations approved the mandate for Syria and Lebanon on 24 July 1922; it entered into force on 29 September 1923, providing the international framework for French administration. (pub-ucpec2-prd.cdlib.org)

The constitution promulgated on 23 May 1926 established a republic with a Chamber of Deputies, a president elected by that chamber, and a Council of Ministers. It drew on the institutions of the French Third Republic while providing for religious representation in government and public employment. Charles Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox Christian, became the first president. Constitutional institutions nevertheless operated beneath the authority of the French high commissioner, who retained overriding powers. French officials suspended the constitution during political disputes in 1932 and again at the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. The republic’s establishment thus preceded the effective transfer of sovereign authority to Lebanese institutions. (countrystudies.us)

In 1943, President Bechara al-Khouri and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh reached the unwritten National Pact. Its central compromise joined acceptance of Lebanon’s Arab identity and independence with rejection both of Western protection and of incorporation into a larger Arab state. The independence settlement consolidated confessional power-sharing, associated with a Maronite presidency, Sunni premiership and Shia parliamentary speakership; these conventions were not all explicit provisions of the oral pact. The six-to-five parliamentary ratio favouring Christians had been fixed by a French decree in July 1943. On 8 November, parliament removed constitutional references to the mandate. French authorities arrested leading officials and confined them at Rashayya, but released them on 22 November following domestic mobilisation and international pressure—the date commemorated as Independence Day. French troops completed their withdrawal in 1946. (wwws.loc.gov)

Civil war, Taif Agreement and foreign interventions

The Lebanese Civil War began in April 1975 amid disputes over confessional power-sharing, social inequalities and the armed presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). On 13 April, a shooting at a church in Beirut’s Ain al-Rummaneh district was followed by a Phalangist attack on a bus carrying Palestinians and Lebanese; the ensuing fighting became the conventional starting point of the war. Early alignments placed predominantly Christian parties, including the Phalange, against the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition led by Kamal Jumblatt and allied with Palestinian forces. These coalitions subsequently fragmented: the Lebanese Forces, Druze fighters, the Shia Amal movement, Palestinian organizations and competing army formations fought both across and within communal boundaries. The fifteen-year conflict killed an estimated 150,000 people and left thousands missing. (prrn.mcgill.ca)

Foreign intervention repeatedly altered the military balance. Syria deployed its army in 1976, initially intervening against the Palestinian–National Movement coalition; Syrian troops subsequently formed the principal component of the Arab League-authorized Arab Deterrent Force. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in March 1978, after which the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 425, calling for Israeli withdrawal and establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Neither intervention restored a state monopoly on force. During the 1980s, Hezbollah emerged with financial support and military training from Iran, while rival Shia, Palestinian, Christian and Druze forces continued fighting for territorial control. (web.mit.edu)

Israel’s invasion of June 1982 extended beyond the south to Beirut, where Israeli forces besieged the PLO. An internationally negotiated evacuation removed PLO leaders and fighters from the capital under multinational supervision. Following the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel on 14 September, Israeli troops entered west Beirut; Lebanese Christian militiamen subsequently massacred civilians in Sabra and Shatila. American, French and other multinational contingents returned, but their deployment ended without a durable settlement. Israel withdrew from much of Lebanon in 1985 while retaining a southern “security zone,” held by Israeli troops and the allied South Lebanon Army. This occupation continued until May 2000; in June, the United Nations verified Israeli withdrawal in accordance with Resolution 425. (un.org)

The Taif Agreement, adopted by Lebanese deputies meeting in Saudi Arabia on 22 October 1989, supplied the framework for ending the war. It replaced the six-to-five Christian majority in parliament with equal Christian and Muslim representation and transferred executive authority from the presidency to the Council of Ministers, strengthening the cabinet and prime minister. It also designated the abolition of political sectarianism as a national objective, rather than abolishing communal representation immediately. Its security provisions called for dissolving all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and surrendering their weapons to the state within six months of the specified political and constitutional steps. Syrian forces were to assist the restoration of government authority, then redeploy to the Bekaa within a period not exceeding two years; subsequent arrangements were to be negotiated by the two governments, rather than governed by an unconditional two-year withdrawal deadline. (un.int)

General Michel Aoun rejected the settlement, and major fighting ended only when Syrian forces and Lebanese allies defeated his forces in October 1990. Postwar disarmament dismantled most militia military structures, but Hezbollah retained its weapons under a special status as a resistance force against Israeli occupation. Syrian troops remained, and Damascus exercised substantial influence over Lebanese political and security affairs. Thus, the restoration of central institutions did not fully implement Taif’s provisions concerning armed organizations and sovereignty. (web.mit.edu)

The assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005 triggered large demonstrations and intensified international pressure for Syrian withdrawal. Resolution 1559, adopted in September 2004, had already called for the departure of remaining foreign forces and the disbandment and disarmament of militias. Syria completed its declared military withdrawal on 26 April 2005; a subsequent United Nations mission verified the withdrawal of troops and military assets, while noting the greater difficulty of conclusively verifying clandestine intelligence activity. Hezbollah’s retained arsenal and the incomplete disarmament of Palestinian organizations remained unresolved elements of the postwar settlement. (apnews.com)

Political system and power-sharing

Lebanon is a parliamentary republic organised around confessional power-sharing, in which religious affiliation determines the allocation of major offices and parliamentary seats. By political convention, the president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. These office-specific assignments are distinct from the explicit provisions of the constitution: Article 24 requires equal parliamentary representation between Christians and Muslims, with seats apportioned among denominations and regions. The 128-member parliament consequently contains 64 Christian and 64 Muslim seats; the latter allocation includes Druze representatives. The present parity derives from the constitutional reforms following the 1989 Taif Agreement. (congress.gov)

The president is elected by parliament for six years, requiring a two-thirds majority on the first ballot and an absolute majority on subsequent ballots. The president designates the prime minister following binding parliamentary consultations, and the two jointly agree on the government’s formation. Executive authority belongs to the Council of Ministers, which must obtain parliamentary confidence. Under Article 65, cabinet decisions are preferably consensual; otherwise, ordinary decisions require a majority of those present, while specified fundamental matters—including electoral legislation, constitutional amendments and the budget—require two-thirds of all ministers. These thresholds make coalition composition important to both government formation and decision-making. (cc.gov.lb)

On 9 January 2025, parliament elected army commander Joseph Aoun president with 99 votes in the second ballot, ending a vacancy lasting more than two years after Michel Aoun’s term expired in October 2022. Nawaf Salam, then president of the International Court of Justice, was designated prime minister on 13 January following parliamentary consultations. Aoun signed the decree establishing Salam’s government on 8 February 2025. Its 24 ministers were divided equally between Christians and Muslims, and included five women. The formation replaced the caretaker administration that had remained in office since the 2022 parliamentary elections. (apnews.com)

The electoral law adopted in 2017 combines proportional representation with predetermined confessional seats in 15 major constituencies, subdivided into 26 smaller districts. Voters select a candidate list and may also cast one preferential vote for a candidate on that list; seat allocation must satisfy both the list results and the prescribed communal distribution. Electoral geography produces substantial differences in voting weight: the European Union’s observation mission calculated that the 2022 register contained 16,853 voters per seat in Beirut I, compared with 46,866 in South Lebanon II. Electoral-law debates therefore concern district boundaries and the interaction between proportional voting, preferential votes and confessional quotas. (europarl.europa.eu)

Expatriate voting became another disputed element before the elections originally scheduled for May 2026. The 2017 law provided for six seats reserved for non-resident Lebanese, but overseas voters in the 2018 and 2022 elections instead voted in their constituencies of origin for the existing 128 seats. Proposed amendments sought to retain that arrangement rather than implement a separate expatriate constituency. Joint parliamentary committees referred the issue to a subcommittee in 2025. In early 2026, the Interior Ministry reported that it could not accept a candidacy for the expatriate constituency because the necessary implementing decrees had not been issued. (today.lorientlejour.com)

On 9 March 2026, parliament postponed the May elections and extended its mandate by two years, until 2028, citing insecurity and displacement during the renewed armed conflict. The extension received 76 votes. On 7 April, the Constitutional Council rejected challenges to the law, while stating that the postponement should be shortened if circumstances permitted. Earlier institutional deadlocks had centred on presidential elections: disputes over the quorum required to elect a president allowed parliamentary non-attendance to prevent a vote. The 2022–2025 presidential vacancy coincided with a caretaker government, leaving both the presidency and full executive authority unresolved until the elections and cabinet formation of early 2025. (idea.int)

Economy and key sectors

Lebanon’s economy is predominantly service-based, with banking, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, real estate, transport and professional services forming its principal commercial activities. Architectural design and other business services developed alongside property investment and construction, while manufacturing remained comparatively limited. Industrial production includes food processing, wine, jewellery, cement, chemicals, furniture and fabricated metal products. Food processing is particularly important: the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon estimated that agri-food production accounted for 38% of industrial output and 2.9% of gross domestic product in 2018. Its approximately 1,245 companies were concentrated in Mount Lebanon, which contained 48% of the national total. These pre-crisis figures describe the sector’s established structure rather than its subsequent production levels. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Transfers from Lebanese living abroad provide an important source of foreign currency and support household consumption. The World Bank estimated remittances at approximately 27% of GDP in 2024, illustrating their scale relative to domestic production. Such transfers help sustain demand even when local employment and credit are depressed. Their measurement is difficult, however: officially recorded transfers exclude some money carried by travellers or transmitted through informal channels. Lebanon’s weak balance-of-payments statistics and extensive cash transactions further complicate estimates. Remittance-to-GDP ratios also depend on the estimated size and dollar valuation of domestic output; they should not be read as a direct measure of how many households receive assistance or how evenly that assistance is distributed. (blogs.worldbank.org)

The informal economy is substantial, but employment informality, cash transactions and unrecorded production are distinct measures. The January 2022 labour-force survey conducted by the Central Administration of Statistics with International Labour Organization support found that more than 60% of employment lacked, or was insufficiently covered by, formal arrangements and protections. Separately, the World Bank estimated the dollar-denominated cash economy at US$9.9 billion, equivalent to 45.7% of GDP, in 2022. This estimate is not an informal-sector share of GDP: legally registered businesses also receive and make cash payments. The diminished visibility of transactions through banks makes economic activity harder to measure and taxes harder to collect. (ilo.org)

Tourism contributed to the recovery of consumption and services in 2025. Although regional hostilities disrupted flights and arrivals in June, tourist activity strengthened again in July and August. In August 2026, the World Bank revised its estimate of real economic growth in 2025 to 4.2%, supported by tourism, consumption and investment. The currency collapse had meanwhile encouraged widespread dollar pricing and payment across the private sector, including increasing dollarisation of wages, while public-sector pay remained largely denominated in Lebanese pounds. Dollar earnings therefore became an important distinction between households’ purchasing power. The renewed conflict in March 2026 interrupted the rebound and affected tourism and domestic demand. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Domestic demand depends heavily on imported goods, including fuel, machinery, vehicles, chemicals and food products. Lebanese Customs reported merchandise imports of approximately US$17.3 billion in 2024. The imbalance persists even when exports grow faster in percentage terms: in the first half of 2025, goods imports increased by 14.6% and exports by 23% year on year, but the much larger import base meant that the merchandise deficit widened by 12.9%. Tourism receipts and remittances offset part, but not all, of the external gap; the World Bank’s October 2025 estimates placed the 2024 current-account deficit at 22.2% of GDP. With domestic banking intermediation impaired, large importers increasingly relied on offshore bank accounts to finance purchases, while foreign-currency cash inflows remained central to meeting external payments. (trade.gov)

Financial crisis, banking collapse and reform

Lebanon’s financial crisis emerged in 2019 from the interdependence of government borrowing, commercial banks and Banque du Liban, the central bank. Banks had accumulated large claims on the state and central bank, while Banque du Liban’s “financial engineering” operations encouraged them to place foreign currency with it in return for high yields. These arrangements supported attractive interest rates on deposits but increased banks’ exposure to the central bank. When capital inflows stopped and deposit outflows accelerated in 2019, the system could no longer meet demand for dollars. The government’s default on Eurobond debt in March 2020 further impaired bank assets, turning the funding crisis into a combined sovereign-debt, banking and currency collapse. (elibrary.imf.org)

From November 2019, banks imposed discretionary withdrawal and transfer restrictions rather than controls established through a comprehensive statutory framework. Depositors lost access to the full value of their savings; dollar deposits were partly repaid in Lebanese pounds at conversion rates that imposed substantial losses relative to market value. By June 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that the lira had lost 98 percent of its value since the crisis began. Foreign-exchange reserves excluding gold had fallen from approximately US$36 billion at their 2017 peak to about US$10 billion at the end of 2022. Restrictions therefore did not resolve the underlying insolvency, while currency depreciation and triple-digit inflation reduced the purchasing power of local-currency incomes and savings. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Loss of confidence in banks and the currency shifted transactions toward dollar cash. The World Bank estimated the dollarized cash economy at US$9.9 billion, or 45.7 percent of GDP, in 2022. This enabled transactions outside the impaired banking system but weakened the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy. Banking reform consequently involved both allocating accumulated losses and restoring institutions capable of accepting deposits and supplying credit. The IMF’s April 7, 2022 staff-level agreement envisaged a 46-month financing arrangement of approximately US$3 billion, conditional on prior reforms and subsequent Executive Board approval. Those conditions included a bank-restructuring strategy, resolution legislation, independent assessments of the 14 largest banks, changes to banking secrecy and a medium-term fiscal and debt-restructuring framework. (worldbank.org)

On December 26, 2025, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s cabinet approved the draft Financial Stabilization and Deposits Recovery Law, also called the “financial gap” law, for parliamentary consideration. It proposed distributing losses among the state, Banque du Liban, commercial banks and depositors; government estimates had placed the losses at approximately US$70 billion in 2022. The cabinet’s proposal envisaged full repayment over four years for depositors holding less than US$100,000, described by Salam as about 85 percent of depositors. Larger depositors would first recover up to US$100,000 in cash, with remaining balances converted into tradable instruments backed by central-bank revenues and assets. These were proposed recovery mechanisms, not an immediate restoration of unrestricted access to deposits. (investing.com)

The deposit-recovery framework was distinct from the Bank Resolution Law, whose approval the IMF acknowledged in September 2025. Resolution legislation establishes the process for restructuring or liquidating distressed banks; the deposit-recovery framework addresses losses and repayment. During its February 10–13, 2026 visit, IMF staff sought amendments providing an independent, transparent and effective resolution process. It also identified necessary changes to the recovery proposal: shareholders and junior creditors should absorb losses before depositors, repayments should reflect available liquidity, and state contributions should not undermine public-debt sustainability. (imf.org)

An IMF mission led by Ernesto Ramirez Rigo visited Beirut on September 15–18, 2026. It welcomed recently approved amendments to the Bank Resolution Law as establishing an orderly resolution and liquidation framework consistent with international best practices. However, it continued to seek alignment of the Financial Stabilization and Deposits Recovery Law with creditor priorities, bank viability and debt sustainability. Discussions also addressed the draft 2027 budget and a medium-term fiscal framework, including the sequencing of revenue measures and provision for reconstruction and social spending. The mission described continued negotiations toward a comprehensive reform agenda that could receive IMF support; its statement did not announce approval of a financing arrangement. (imf.org)

Beirut, urban development and infrastructure

Beirut’s growth as a metropolitan centre accelerated in the nineteenth century as its port connected the Syrian interior with European markets. Harbour improvements, commercial institutions and new transport links drew businesses and residents beyond the old walled town. The Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866 and later renamed the American University of Beirut, helped orient expansion westward; Saint Joseph University, established in 1875, contributed to development toward Achrafieh in the east. Subsequent urbanization, rural migration and wartime displacement produced a continuous metropolitan area extending beyond Beirut municipality into neighbouring Mount Lebanon municipalities. Concentration of employment, education and services also generated substantial daily commuting from other regions. (britishcouncil.org.lb)

The historic downtown became a principal site of postwar urban redevelopment. Solidere, incorporated on 5 May 1994 during Rafic Hariri’s premiership, was entrusted with reconstructing the central district. Its programme combined restoration and redevelopment with replacement of underground utilities, road improvements and waterfront works. In November 1994, the company awarded an initial infrastructure contract covering water, sewerage, electricity and telecommunications networks. Reconstruction therefore involved not only buildings and commercial premises but the technical systems beneath the streets and the reconfiguration of the waterfront. This concentrated intervention in the central district contrasted with the more fragmented development of the wider metropolis. (upi.com)

On 4 August 2020, ammonium nitrate stored in a port warehouse detonated, killing at least 218 people and injuring more than 6,000. The blast devastated the port and surrounding neighbourhoods, damaging homes, businesses and heritage buildings. The August 2020 assessment prepared by the World Bank, European Union and United Nations estimated physical damage at US$3.8–4.6 billion and economic losses at US$2.9–3.5 billion; housing, transport and cultural assets were among the most severely affected sectors. Damage to water and sanitation facilities alone was estimated at US$40–45 million. Recovery extended beyond emergency repairs: UN-Habitat’s subsequent programmes combined housing rehabilitation with street and service improvements in vulnerable areas of Beirut and Bourj Hammoud, while a US$10 million environmental recovery grant announced in 2022 addressed blast-related waste and pollution. (apnews.com)

Unreliable public services have made private substitutes part of everyday urban life. Households and businesses supplement the electricity grid with diesel generators, whose longer operating hours during the financial crisis increased local emissions. Intermittent piped water similarly requires purchases from tanker suppliers and bottled-water vendors. In January 2025, the World Bank approved US$257.8 million for a second Greater Beirut water-supply project, intended to complete bulk-water infrastructure and improve treatment; tanker water was reported to cost up to ten times as much as piped water. Waste disposal has also depended on vulnerable arrangements: closure of the Naameh landfill in July 2015 triggered the refuse crisis affecting Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Transport remains fragmented and largely informal, with inadequate public alternatives encouraging private-car use and contributing to congestion and high commuting costs. (aub.edu.lb)

Housing conditions vary sharply across the metropolis. Informal settlements and low-income neighbourhoods, including Ouzai, Hayy el-Sullum and Naba’a, reflect overlapping histories of migration, displacement and insecure property arrangements. In 2021, UN-Habitat described Maraach in Bourj Hammoud as an overcrowded neighbourhood of approximately 6,000 residents, with deteriorated buildings, unsafe exposed wiring, limited water and electricity, and few accessible public spaces. Dense construction also affects the urban environment. A 2015 modelling study by Noushig Kaloustian and Youssef Diab simulated summer air temperatures up to $6\,^\circ\mathrm{C}$ lower in areas with larger garden fractions than in dense built-up areas, illustrating Beirut’s urban heat-island effects. Traffic and generators add air pollution at street level; a study reported by the American University of Beirut in 2025 found that 87% of particles emitted by two sampled domestic diesel generators were smaller than 0.33 micrometres. (unhabitat.org)

Society, religion and cultural life

Lebanon’s 18 officially recognized religious communities include Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Greek Catholic, Armenian Apostolic and Armenian Catholic Christians, alongside Sunni, Shia, Druze and Alawite communities. Religious affiliation has legal consequences beyond worship: Article 9 of the constitution protects freedom of belief and respect for communities’ personal-status arrangements. Marriage, divorce, spousal maintenance and child custody are governed through separate religious jurisdictions rather than a unified civil family code. Fifteen personal-status legal frameworks apply across the recognized communities, so procedures and entitlements differ according to religious affiliation. Religious courts operate within the national legal order, but the highest civil court’s oversight of their substantive decisions is limited. This institutional arrangement makes religion a direct factor in family life as well as communal identity. (2021-2025.state.gov)

Article 11 establishes Arabic as the official national language and provides for legislation determining when French may be used; French is not a second official language under that article. French and English nevertheless coexist extensively with Arabic in communication and cultural production. Everyday speech commonly uses Lebanese Arabic, a variety of Levantine Arabic, rather than the standard Arabic register used in formal writing. Multilingualism also produces borrowing and code-switching: speakers may insert French or English words and phrases into Arabic conversation or alternate languages within a message. Digital writing includes Arabizi, the rendering of colloquial Arabic with Latin letters and, where needed, numerals representing Arabic sounds. These practices distinguish spoken and informal written expression from standardized Arabic without replacing its official status. (cc.gov.lb)

Byblos, Baalbek and Tyre were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1984. Their cultural heritage represents different historical layers: Byblos preserves successive phases of settlement and evidence associated with the dissemination of the Phoenician alphabet; Baalbek’s monumental sanctuary combines local religious traditions with imperial Roman architecture; Tyre records the history of a major Phoenician maritime city. Heritage recognition also encompasses living practices. In 2023 UNESCO placed al-man’ouché on its Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. Prepared in households and specialized bakeries, this breakfast flatbread is indented with the fingertips and topped with thyme, sumac, toasted sesame, salt and olive oil. Its preparation transmits culinary knowledge through families and bakery work, linking a widely shared food to specific skills and social practices. (whc.unesco.org)

The Baalbeck International Festival, founded in 1956 under President Camille Chamoun’s patronage, connected archaeological settings with contemporary music, dance and theatre. Its “Lebanese Nights” began in 1957 with Fairuz and the Rahbani brothers, creating a prominent platform for Lebanese musical performance alongside international programming. The festival also presented artists such as Sabah and Wadih El Safi and, later, the Caracalla Dance Theatre. These productions joined song, staged storytelling and folkloric forms rather than treating musical performance as an isolated art. Lebanese cinema has also circulated through international festivals: Nadine Labaki’s Capernaum, centred on a twelve-year-old boy who takes his parents to court for giving him life, received the Jury Prize at Cannes in 2018. (baalbeck.org.lb)

Diaspora cultural production has connected Lebanese literature with both Arabic-speaking and international readerships. Kahlil Gibran (1883–1931), educated in Beirut, Boston and Paris, spent most of his life in the United States and wrote in Arabic and English. His early sketches, stories and prose poems appeared in Arabic newspapers serving immigrant communities, giving literary expression to displacement, loneliness and memories of rural life. Their relatively direct language influenced Arabic literary modernism, while The Prophet, published in English in September 1923, reached a separate international audience. Diaspora newspapers and literary associations thus provided channels through which writing produced abroad circulated back into the Arabic-speaking world. (poetryfoundation.org)

Education, health and social services

Lebanon’s education system combines public schools, fee-charging private schools and subsidized private institutions. High literacy coexists with unequal access to schooling: the Central Administration of Statistics’ 2018–2019 household survey recorded literacy among people aged 15–24 at 98.2% for women and 97.9% for men, but net secondary-school attendance at only 58.7% and 51.2%, respectively. During the economic crisis, declining household incomes prompted movement between private and public schools, while both sectors faced financial pressure. UNICEF’s education response included support for operating costs and teachers through the Transition and Resilience Education Fund, established in 2022, rather than relying solely on assistance to individual pupils. (cas.gov.lb)

Losses in teachers’ purchasing power and interruptions to school operations reduced instructional time. Strikes between December 2022 and March 2023 interrupted education for all 70,406 students registered in formal technical and vocational education institutions, according to UNICEF. Financial barriers also extended beyond tuition to transport, textbooks and other school expenses. In 2025, UNICEF supported 69 financially struggling private and semi-private schools through its Dirasa programme, enabling the enrolment of 14,993 out-of-school children. Conflict-related displacement added further disruption; by June 2026, UNESCO reported providing psychosocial support to more than 10,000 learners and training over 4,000 teachers in crisis-sensitive approaches. (unicef.org)

The Lebanese University, established in 1951, is the country’s only state-funded university and its principal public institution of higher education. Its financing rests mainly on an annual government block grant, supplemented by registration and examination fees. Private institutions include the American University of Beirut (AUB), founded in 1866 and primarily English-medium, and Saint Joseph University, founded by the Society of Jesus in 1875. Their international recruitment and exchange networks connect Lebanese higher education with regional and overseas student markets. AUB’s 2024 recruitment material reported that international students constituted 17% of its 8,188 students, with 90 countries represented. (en.wikipedia.org)

The crisis beginning in 2019 constrained teaching and research through currency depreciation, banking restrictions, reduced project funding and the departure of academic personnel. Low salaries weakened staff retention, while supply interruptions delayed laboratory work and access to research materials. A first-hand account by AUB researchers documented these mechanisms and the additional disruption caused by the pandemic and the 2024 conflict. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education’s 2023–2027 plan proposed changing the Lebanese University’s funding model towards student-based and performance-based allocations, alongside a Higher Education Support and Renewal Fund for public and private institutions; these were reform objectives rather than established replacements for the existing system. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

Lebanon’s health system is predominantly privately provided and oriented towards hospital treatment. A WHO assessment published in July 2025 recorded approximately 13,000 hospital beds in 2023, of which only 2,000 were in 27 operational public hospitals. Financing is divided among public insurance bodies, private insurers and direct household payments. The collapse in the value of contributions and public budgets, combined with the dollarization of medical charges, widened the gap between insured benefits and actual bills. The International Labour Organization reported in 2024 that National Social Security Fund reimbursements sometimes covered no more than 10% of a bill. Patients consequently relied on personal funds and support networks, or delayed consultations, tests and treatment. Medicine, fuel and electricity shortages, together with staff emigration, constrained both public and private facilities; WHO reported in December 2024 that most hospitals were operating below capacity because of financial and staffing shortages. (cdn.who.int)

Social assistance increasingly incorporated targeted cash transfers. The World Bank-supported Emergency Social Safety Net project, known as AMAN and approved in January 2021, established DAEM, a digitized national social registry used to identify eligible households. A financing expansion approved in May 2023 provided for monthly payments of US$25 per household plus US$20 per member, up to six members, giving a maximum of US$145. Payments were redeemable in US dollars through money-transfer operators. Education supplements targeted children aged 13–18 in beneficiary households, covering registration, books, transport and uniforms. Eligibility verification, a complaints mechanism and third-party monitoring formed part of the delivery system. (worldbank.org)

Foreign relations and regional position

Lebanon is a founding member of the United Nations, with membership dating from 24 October 1945, and one of the seven states that founded the Arab League in Cairo on 22 March 1945. These institutions provide distinct frameworks for its diplomacy: the Arab League connects Lebanon to regional political cooperation, while the United Nations has a direct operational role through peacekeeping in the south. Membership in both organizations dates from the first years of Lebanese independence. (un.org)

Relations with Syria combine border security, economic links and the legacy of Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics. Syrian troops entered Lebanon in 1976 and remained after the civil war; their withdrawal was completed on 26 April 2005. The two countries agreed to establish diplomatic missions in 2008. Border demarcation remained unfinished, and on 27 March 2025 their defence ministers signed a Saudi-mediated agreement addressing demarcation and security coordination after cross-border clashes. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam subsequently met Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on 14 April to discuss land and maritime boundaries and security cooperation. Refugee returns constitute another major diplomatic issue: in 2025, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration established assisted voluntary-return programmes in cooperation with Lebanese authorities. (2001-2009.state.gov)

Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted unanimously on 11 August 2006, provided the framework for ending that year’s war between Israel and Hezbollah and expanded the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Its tasks include monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting the Lebanese army’s deployment in the south, facilitating humanitarian access, and assisting the establishment of an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River without armed personnel or weapons other than those of the Lebanese government and UNIFIL. The authorized troop ceiling was increased to 15,000. Resolution 2790, adopted in 2025, extended the mandate for a final time until 31 December 2026 and prescribed an orderly withdrawal within the following year. This timetable distinguishes the mission’s operational mandate from its subsequent withdrawal phase. (unifil.unmissions.org)

France and the United States support Lebanese institutions through diplomacy, humanitarian funding and security assistance. At the Paris conference convened on 24 October 2024, participants announced approximately $1 billion in pledges: $800 million for humanitarian assistance and $200 million for Lebanon’s security forces. American assistance focuses particularly on training, equipment and institutional support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. A June 2024 State Department strategy reported more than $3 billion in assistance to the army since 2006 and $218 million to the Internal Security Forces. These programmes support state security institutions rather than constituting a mutual-defence treaty. (elysee.fr)

Relations with the European Union have a trade and development framework in the Association Agreement, which entered into force on 1 April 2006 and established preferential trading arrangements. The EU announced a €1 billion support package in May 2024; six grant agreements signed in January 2026 under that package addressed security, recovery and reforms. Gulf involvement also operates through mediation and direct institutional assistance: Qatar has supplied the Lebanese army with salary support, food and fuel, while Saudi Arabia hosted the March 2025 Lebanese–Syrian border agreement. France, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt coordinate through the diplomatic “Quintet,” whose joint statements have linked support for Lebanon’s sovereignty to presidential elections and economic reforms. This combination of grants, military assistance and coordinated diplomacy gives external partners concrete channels of influence over institutional capacity and reform priorities. (data.consilium.europa.eu)

Conflict since 2023 and the present situation

Cross-border hostilities began on 8 October 2023, when Hezbollah fired rockets towards Israeli positions in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Exchanges of rockets, artillery fire, drones and airstrikes subsequently became almost daily along the Blue Line, the United Nations withdrawal line separating Lebanon and Israel. The conflict escalated sharply in September 2024: Israel expanded its bombing campaign across Lebanon, including Beirut, and began ground operations in the south on 1 October. These operations, alongside continued Hezbollah attacks towards Israel, displaced civilians on both sides of the line. At the height of the October escalation, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded approximately 899,725 internally displaced people in Lebanon. (lebanon.un.org)

A cessation-of-hostilities arrangement brokered by the United States and France took effect at 4 a.m. on 27 November 2024. It required Lebanon to prevent attacks by Hezbollah and other armed groups, and Israel to cease offensive operations against Lebanese targets. Israeli withdrawal south of the Blue Line and deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were to proceed together within a maximum 60-day implementation period. Starting south of the Litani River, Lebanese forces were to dismantle unauthorized military installations and confiscate unauthorized weapons. A monitoring mechanism hosted by UNIFIL, chaired by the United States and including France, was established to verify implementation. The arrangement was not fully implemented: during 2025, Israeli forces retained five positions inside Lebanon and continued strikes, while the Lebanese army had not established exclusive control over all Lebanese territory. (peaceagreements.org)

Renewed hostilities from 2 March 2026 caused another large displacement emergency across southern Lebanon, Nabatieh, Beirut and the Bekaa. UNICEF reported approximately 1.05 million people affected by displacement by 16 March, including more than 350,000 children; 133,492 people were accommodated in 633 official shelters. Evacuation orders covered an estimated 1,470 square kilometres, about 14 per cent of Lebanon’s territory. The conversion of 353 public schools into shelters directly disrupted education for approximately 115,000 pupils. A ceasefire announced on 20 June and a subsequent trilateral framework involving Lebanon, Israel and the United States enabled substantial but fragile returns. Displacement nevertheless remained extensive: IOM recorded 329,686 internally displaced people on 29 September 2026. (crisisresponse.iom.int)

The renewed conflict interrupted economic recovery and imposed additional reconstruction and relief costs. Following a Beirut mission on 15–18 September 2026 led by Ernesto Ramirez Rigo, the International Monetary Fund projected that economic activity would contract significantly during 2026. Its statement identified extensive damage to housing and infrastructure, large-scale internal displacement and deteriorating living standards among displaced households. Inflation remained in double digits, while the current account deficit had widened principally because of rising energy costs. These pressures coincided with financing constraints on the government; the IMF reported tight budget execution and identified reconstruction and social protection as essential spending priorities. (imf.org)

The government’s stated objective remained a state monopoly on arms. President Joseph Aoun endorsed disarmament on taking office in January 2025, and the cabinet instructed the army in August to prepare a nationwide weapons-control plan. Hezbollah opposed unconditional disarmament and linked the issue to Israeli withdrawal. The June 2026 trilateral framework connected verified disarmament of non-state groups and dismantling of their military infrastructure with progressive Israeli withdrawal and restoration of Lebanese state authority. Implementation remained stalled in late September. After meeting US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington on 28 September, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called for a clear timetable, reciprocal phased implementation and a credible verification mechanism. At that point, Israel had withdrawn from only one of three designated pilot zones intended to test the transfer of exclusive territorial control to the Lebanese army. (commonslibrary.parliament.uk)

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