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John Rawls

John Rawls was an American political philosopher whose theories of justice and political liberalism reshaped debates about equality, freedom, and democratic legitimacy.

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John Rawls (February 21, 1921–November 24, 2002) was an American philosopher whose work transformed twentieth-century political philosophy. His principal book, A Theory of Justice (1971), presented “justice as fairness”: an account of the principles that should govern the basic institutions of a society of free and equal citizens. Against approaches that justify institutions by their contribution to aggregate welfare, Rawls argued that each person has claims that cannot simply be overridden by greater benefits to others. His theory combines strong protections for basic liberties with demanding requirements concerning opportunity and the distribution of economic advantages.

Rawls’s later writings addressed how a just constitutional democracy could remain legitimate when its citizens disagree deeply about religion, morality, and the meaning of life. Political Liberalism (1993) distinguished a shared political conception of justice from comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrines, while The Law of Peoples (1999) extended his inquiry to international relations. Across these works, Rawls developed an interconnected account of fair cooperation, public justification, institutional design, and the limits of toleration.

Life, education, and intellectual development

John Bordley Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland, to William Lee Rawls, a lawyer, and Anna Abell Stump Rawls. He attended the Kent School in Connecticut and entered Princeton University in 1939, graduating in 1943. His early intellectual interests included theology as well as philosophy. His undergraduate thesis, later published as A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, articulated a Christian ethical outlook quite different from the political liberalism of his mature work. It nevertheless displayed an early concern with community and opposition to understandings of social relations based solely on bargaining or individual advantage.

During World War II, Rawls served in the United States Army in the Pacific, including in New Guinea and the Philippines, and subsequently in occupied Japan. His wartime experiences contributed to his abandonment of orthodox Christian belief. His later political thought did not rest on a religious foundation, although the political standing of religious citizens became an important subject in his writings. After military service, he returned to Princeton, receiving his doctorate in philosophy in 1950.

Rawls spent the academic year 1952–1953 at Oxford on a Fulbright fellowship, where the intellectual environment included Isaiah Berlin and H. L. A. Hart. He subsequently taught at Cornell University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before joining Harvard University in 1962. Harvard remained his principal academic home for the rest of his career. He married Margaret Warfield Fox in 1949; they had four children. In 1999, he received both the National Humanities Medal and the Rolf Schock Prize in logic and philosophy.

The development of Rawls’s theory can be traced through papers preceding his major books. “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” appeared in 1951, “Justice as Fairness” in 1958, and “The Sense of Justice” in 1963. These writings introduced questions about moral justification, fair principles, and the psychological conditions under which people sustain just arrangements. A Theory of Justice brought these strands together in 1971; a revised English edition appeared in 1999. His subsequent books did not merely repeat that argument. They reconsidered its account of stability, clarified its institutional implications, and extended its scope. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), edited by Erin Kelly, offered a concise presentation of his mature domestic theory. Rawls died in Lexington, Massachusetts, in 2002.

Justice as fairness and philosophical method

Rawls’s central question concerns the fair terms of social cooperation. A society is not merely an association of people pursuing independent goals, nor is it a system in which whoever possesses superior bargaining power may dictate the rules. Its institutions distribute rights, duties, opportunities, and benefits among people whose activities depend upon one another. Rawls asks which principles citizens could accept as specifying fair terms for this continuing cooperation. His answer, justice as fairness, renews the social contract tradition associated with John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, without treating political obligation as the consequence of an actual historical agreement.

The principal subject of justice is the basic structure of society: the way major political, legal, economic, and social institutions fit together. A constitution, property rules, educational arrangements, and the organization of the family can profoundly influence people’s prospects from birth. Rawls therefore does not begin by asking whether each isolated transaction is voluntary or whether each individual receives what personal merit deserves. He examines the institutional background that makes particular transactions possible and shapes the distribution of life chances.

His method of justification is reflective equilibrium. Considered judgments about particular cases, proposed general principles, and relevant background theories are adjusted in relation to one another. A judgment against religious persecution, for example, may support a principle of equal liberty; that principle can then reveal inconsistencies in judgments about unpopular minorities. Neither immediate intuition nor an abstract formula is automatically immune from revision. In wide reflective equilibrium, competing conceptions and the arguments supporting them also enter the process. The aim is a coherent and critically examined position, rather than a deduction from supposedly self-evident moral premises.

Rawls presents justice as fairness primarily as a theory of institutions under reasonably favorable conditions. Much of the argument initially assumes a well-ordered society whose members generally comply with principles they publicly recognize. This “ideal theory” supplies a standard for evaluating institutions, while nonideal theory concerns such matters as injustice, disobedience, and unfavorable conditions. The distinction does not imply that actual societies are nearly just. It expresses a methodological claim that identifying a defensible institutional goal helps clarify how departures from justice should be assessed.

The theory also challenges utilitarianism. Rawls objects that maximizing aggregate or average welfare can permit serious losses for some people whenever those losses produce sufficient benefits for others. His criticism emphasizes the separateness of persons: gains and losses distributed across different lives cannot be treated exactly like sacrifices and benefits within one person’s life. Justice must regulate the terms on which people may make claims upon one another, not merely calculate a socially optimal total.

The original position and the veil of ignorance

The best-known device in Rawls’s theory is the original position, a hypothetical choice situation designed to represent fair conditions for selecting principles of justice. It is a thought experiment, not an account of how governments historically arose. The parties represent citizens whose fundamental interests must be protected, but their choices are constrained so that principles cannot be tailored to privileged social positions. The device makes explicit Rawls’s view that the justification of basic institutions should not depend on advantages that are arbitrary from a moral standpoint.

The parties deliberate behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know their social class, wealth, natural abilities, race, sex, religious commitments, or particular conception of a good life. They do know general facts about social organization, economic life, human psychology, and the circumstances in which cooperation is both possible and necessary. Thus the veil does not deprive them of all knowledge. It withholds information that would allow them to favor their own particular circumstances while retaining the general information required to assess workable institutional principles.

Rawls assumes that the parties seek to secure adequate primary goods for those they represent. These are things citizens generally need to pursue a wide range of permissible aims: basic rights and liberties, opportunities, powers and prerogatives associated with offices, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. The parties are mutually disinterested in the technical sense that they do not choose principles out of affection or hostility toward other represented individuals. This does not mean that citizens in the resulting society must be selfish. The distinction separates the motivations used in the model from the moral motivations of people living under just institutions.

Because the parties do not know which position they will occupy, they cannot simply protect an existing advantage. Rawls argues that, under the specified conditions, they would reject principles that allow basic interests to be sacrificed for a larger aggregate benefit. His argument sometimes employs maximin reasoning: attending to the worst outcome associated with each available alternative and selecting the alternative whose worst outcome is best. This is not offered as a universal rule for ordinary decisions under uncertainty. Rawls connects its relevance to special features of the original position, including the absence of a basis for assigning probabilities to personal social positions and the seriousness of unacceptable outcomes.

Another consideration is the “strains of commitment.” Principles must be ones that people can reasonably be expected to uphold when the veil is lifted and their actual situation becomes known. An agreement that requires some citizens to accept severe deprivation for others’ advantage may fail that test. The original position therefore models not merely impartial choice but a publicly sustainable agreement among people who must live together on equal terms.

The two principles of justice

Rawls’s mature formulation assigns each person an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with the same scheme for everyone. Social and economic inequalities must then meet two conditions: they must attach to offices and positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. These requirements form an ordered conception rather than a list of values to be traded off without restriction. The first principle has priority over the second, and fair equality of opportunity has priority over the requirement governing economic inequalities.

Basic liberties include liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, political freedoms, freedom of association, protections for personal integrity, and rights secured by the rule of law. Their priority means that restrictions on these liberties cannot ordinarily be justified merely by increases in income or administrative efficiency. Rawls does not claim that every activity described as a liberty has this priority. Nor does he include unrestricted ownership of productive assets or freedom of contract among the protected basic liberties. His later language of a “fully adequate scheme” avoids suggesting that justice requires maximizing an undifferentiated quantity of freedom.

Fair equality of opportunity demands more than formal eligibility for employment or office. People with similar abilities and willingness to use them should have similar prospects regardless of the social class into which they are born. A society in which elite education is effectively reserved for wealthy families may therefore fail this requirement even if its laws prohibit explicit hereditary exclusion. The principle concerns the institutions that develop capacities and shape competition, not only the rules applied at the final moment of selection.

The difference principle allows inequalities only when they improve the prospects of the least advantaged compared with feasible alternative institutional arrangements. It neither requires strict equality in all holdings nor licenses any inequality that produces some incidental benefit for poorer people. If a less unequal arrangement would place the least advantaged in a better position, the more unequal arrangement fails the principle. The relevant comparison concerns enduring expectations under social institutions, assessed through an appropriate index of primary goods, rather than a snapshot of individual income.

Rawls also distinguishes legitimate expectations from moral desert. People may acquire valid claims under just public rules—for example, to payment for work performed—without deserving their native abilities or favorable starting positions in a deeper moral sense. This does not erase responsibility or effort. It rejects the inference that market rewards necessarily measure intrinsic moral worth. The two principles instead ask whether the institutional system within which abilities and effort generate rewards is justifiable to citizens as equals.

Economic institutions, opportunity, and intergenerational justice

Rawls’s principles constrain economic arrangements without supplying a complete economic blueprint. Markets can coordinate production and distribute information, but their outcomes do not automatically establish distributive justice. The distribution of purchasing power depends on property rights, education, inheritance, political decisions, and the institutional background in which exchanges take place. Transactions that are locally voluntary can cumulatively concentrate wealth and undermine fair opportunity. Maintaining background justice consequently requires continuing institutional regulation rather than a single fair initial allocation.

In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls distinguishes five types of social system: laissez-faire capitalism, welfare-state capitalism, state socialism with a command economy, property-owning democracy, and liberal socialism. He argues that the first three do not adequately realize his principles. His objection to welfare-state capitalism is not simply that its transfers are too small. Such a system can permit productive wealth and political influence to remain concentrated while compensating disadvantaged people after economic outcomes occur. Formal rights may then coexist with durable dependence and unequal political power.

Property-owning democracy seeks to disperse ownership of productive assets and human capital throughout society. Education, limits on excessive concentrations of wealth, and the regulation of inheritance can help prevent a small class from dominating economic and political life. Liberal socialism, in Rawls’s usage, combines social ownership of productive resources with democratic liberties and may use markets. His willingness to consider either arrangement shows that justice as fairness is not defined by an unconditional commitment to private ownership of productive property. The choice depends partly on historical circumstances and on how institutions function in practice.

Political equality also requires more than equal voting rights. Rawls singles out the fair value of political liberties: citizens comparably motivated and able should have broadly comparable opportunities to influence political decisions, regardless of economic position. This concern links economic structure to democracy. If wealth reliably purchases political access or controls the public agenda, the formal possession of identical liberties does not secure the required political relationship among citizens.

Justice between generations is addressed through the just savings principle. Each generation must contribute appropriately to establishing and preserving the conditions of a just society, including its institutions and material and cultural basis. Rawls rejects an indefinitely rising demand for accumulation merely to maximize the welfare of future people. Once just institutions can be sustained, further net accumulation need not be required by justice. The problem differs from dividing resources among contemporaries because earlier generations cannot receive reciprocal material benefits from later ones. His treatment therefore asks what savings requirements people could accept as a rule applying across successive generations, rather than simply extending the difference principle unchanged through time.

Political liberalism and reasonable pluralism

Political Liberalism reconsidered a problem within the account of stability presented in A Theory of Justice. A free society is likely to contain enduring disagreement about religion, philosophy, and comprehensive morality. Such disagreement is not necessarily evidence of ignorance, bad faith, or defective reasoning. The exercise of reason under free institutions can itself produce diverse convictions. Rawls called this condition reasonable pluralism and argued that a just political order must be able to endure without requiring everyone to accept the same comprehensive doctrine.

His explanation includes the “burdens of judgment”: sources of conscientious disagreement such as complex evidence, different assessments of relevant considerations, vague concepts, and the influence of divergent experiences. A reasonable person recognizes that these difficulties can lead others to conclusions different from their own. Reasonableness also involves willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, provided others do likewise. It is distinct from rationality understood as the effective pursuit of one’s aims. A person can be strategically rational while refusing any fair terms of social cooperation.

Political liberalism therefore presents justice as a political, not a comprehensive, conception. It concerns the basic structure of a constitutional democratic society and draws upon ideas available within its public political culture, especially citizens understood as free and equal. It does not purport to resolve every question about personal virtue, religious truth, or the best form of life. Citizens are attributed two moral powers: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. Their political equality does not require identical talents, beliefs, or preferences.

Stability can arise through an overlapping consensus. People who hold different reasonable comprehensive doctrines may endorse the same political conception for different reasons internal to their own views. A religious believer might defend equal liberty through a theological account of conscience, while another citizen supports it through a secular moral philosophy. Their agreement is deeper than a temporary bargain based on the existing balance of power. Rawls contrasts it with a modus vivendi, which may dissolve as soon as one party becomes strong enough to impose its preferred order.

This revision changes the public justification of justice as fairness without abandoning its egalitarian principles. Rawls no longer expects the well-ordered society to share a single comprehensive Kantian outlook. Political liberalism also allows that a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions may be available, rather than insisting that every legitimate democratic decision must presuppose agreement on all details of his own theory. The central problem becomes how coercive political power can be exercised legitimately among citizens who remain divided about fundamental questions beyond politics.

Public reason, constitutional legitimacy, and civil disobedience

Rawls’s idea of public reason specifies the kinds of justification appropriate when citizens exercise political power over one another on fundamental matters. His liberal principle of legitimacy holds that political power should be exercised in accordance with constitutional essentials that citizens might reasonably be expected to endorse as free and equal. This is not a requirement of unanimous actual consent to every decision. It concerns whether the framework and its justification respect citizens’ equal political standing rather than relying exclusively on a disputed religious or philosophical authority.

Public reason applies especially to constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice. Constitutional essentials include the general structure of government and fundamental rights; questions of basic justice concern the central requirements governing social and economic institutions. Rawls gives particular attention to the public political forum: judges, government officials, legislators, candidates for public office, and citizens considering fundamental political choices. His account does not impose the same restrictions on every discussion in society. Religious associations, universities, voluntary organizations, and other parts of the background culture remain settings for extensive debate in comprehensive terms.

In his later account, citizens may introduce comprehensive religious or philosophical reasons into public political discussion, subject to a proviso: adequate public political reasons must be supplied in due course to support the proposed exercise of coercive power. This position is not a simple ban on religious language. Nor does it identify secular comprehensive philosophies as automatically public while treating religious arguments as uniquely problematic. The relevant distinction is between reasons grounded solely in a contested comprehensive doctrine and reasons expressed through a reasonable political conception that other citizens can assess as political equals.

Rawls calls the corresponding expectation a duty of civility. It is a moral duty rather than a general legal restriction on expression. Public reason also leaves room for disagreement and ordinary democratic procedures: citizens can acknowledge common standards of justification while reaching conflicting judgments. Courts occupy an important place because they must publicly explain constitutional decisions, but Rawls does not regard judges as the only or infallible interpreters of political justice.

A related but distinct account of civil disobedience appears in A Theory of Justice. Rawls defines it as a public, nonviolent, conscientious political breach of law intended to bring about a change in law or government policy. His discussion primarily concerns a nearly just constitutional society, where serious violations can be challenged by appealing to a shared sense of justice. Civil disobedience differs both from ordinary criminal evasion and from revolutionary rejection of the political order. Rawls examines conditions such as the gravity of injustice, the use of normal political appeals, and coordination among aggrieved groups, while recognizing that civil disobedience can help stabilize just institutions by correcting serious departures from their professed principles.

International justice and the law of peoples

The Law of Peoples extends Rawls’s contractual approach to relations among political societies, but it does not simply apply the domestic difference principle worldwide. Its central participants are “peoples,” understood through their political institutions, common sympathies, and moral commitments, rather than states conceived only as organizations pursuing power. Rawls initially considers liberal peoples and then asks whether a shared international order can also include certain nonliberal societies. This change of subject—from individual citizens within one basic structure to organized peoples—shapes the content and limits of his international theory.

The principles of the law of peoples include respect for peoples’ freedom and independence, observance of treaties, equality among peoples, nonintervention, a right of self-defense but no general right to wage war, respect for human rights, restrictions on the conduct of war, and a duty to assist peoples living under unfavorable conditions. These principles address both peaceful cooperation and the circumstances in which coercion may be justified. Rawls rejects expansionist warfare and distinguishes the treatment of political leaders and combatants from the protection owed to civilian populations.

A controversial feature of the account is its recognition of “decent hierarchical peoples.” Such societies are not liberal democracies, but they maintain a common-good conception of justice, protect a specified range of human rights, and provide a genuine consultative role for members of society. Rawls argues that liberal peoples should tolerate societies meeting these conditions as members in good standing of a society of peoples. His imagined example, “Kazanistan,” is intended to show how a society with an established religion might nevertheless satisfy standards of international decency. It is a philosophical construction, not a description of an actual country.

The role assigned to human rights is correspondingly specific. They set limits on acceptable domestic arrangements and help determine when nonintervention and recognition are warranted. Rawls’s list for this purpose is narrower than the complete set of liberal constitutional rights. This distinction reflects his attempt to identify international standards that do not require every society to adopt a liberal democratic constitution. It has also generated criticism from writers who argue that the account accepts too much hierarchy or protects political equality inadequately.

Rawls proposes a duty of assistance to “burdened societies” whose circumstances prevent them from sustaining just or decent institutions. Its target is institutional capacity, not continuous equalization of wealth among societies. Once a people can maintain adequate institutions, the duty can reach a stopping point even if substantial international inequalities remain. Cosmopolitan critics, including Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, have argued for more extensive global distributive requirements. Their disagreement with Rawls concerns, among other things, whether the global economy creates a structure of cooperation and coercion sufficiently comparable to a domestic basic structure to require stronger egalitarian principles.

Criticism, influence, and continuing interpretation

Rawls’s work reorganized debates across ethics, political philosophy, jurisprudence, and political economy. It made the justification of social institutions a central concern of English-language philosophy and supplied a common vocabulary for arguments about liberty and equality. His influence did not depend on widespread acceptance of every component of his theory. The original position, priority of liberty, difference principle, and distinction between comprehensive and political justification became reference points for competing approaches. His papers and books also generated debates within egalitarian thought about what should be distributed, which inequalities matter, and how institutional justice relates to personal conduct.

Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) offered an influential libertarian alternative. Nozick’s entitlement theory assessed holdings through principles governing acquisition, transfer, and rectification, rather than through their conformity to a preferred distributive pattern. The disagreement was not simply over how much redistribution is desirable. It concerned whether justice fundamentally evaluates historical processes of acquisition or the institutional conditions under which holdings and opportunities arise. Utilitarian critics, including John Harsanyi, challenged Rawls’s reasoning under uncertainty and defended choice models that gave a more central role to expected utility.

Communitarian criticism focused on Rawls’s conception of the person and the abstraction involved in the original position. Michael Sandel argued that its account inadequately captured the constitutive importance of attachments and communal identities. Other critics questioned whether a political conception could be independent enough of controversial moral commitments to secure the agreement Rawls sought. Rawls’s later work answered part of this challenge by emphasizing that the conception of citizens as free and equal is political, not a complete metaphysical account of human identity.

Other objections addressed the reach of Rawlsian equality. Susan Moller Okin argued that a theory of justice must examine the internal organization of the family and gendered divisions of labor rather than assuming an already just household. Rawls’s later discussions explicitly treated the family as part of the basic structure, while debate continued about the implications. Amartya Sen’s capability approach questioned whether primary goods adequately capture advantage when people differ in their ability to convert resources into actual freedoms. Disability, illness, and unequal needs expose difficulties in using a common resource-based measure. G. A. Cohen, meanwhile, argued that egalitarian justice should constrain individual choices and incentives more deeply than Rawls’s institutional focus allowed.

Critics of ideal theory, notably Charles W. Mills, questioned whether abstraction from actual histories of racial domination can obscure the institutions and practices that a theory of justice needs to explain. These objections concern the explanatory priorities of political philosophy as well as the content of particular principles. Rawls’s posthumously published Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (2000) and Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2007), together with the collected essays and later editions of his major works, provide additional evidence for interpreting his relationships to earlier thinkers and the development of his own arguments.