George Berkeley (12 March 1685–14 January 1753) was an Irish philosopher and Anglican bishop, best known for arguing that the objects of sensory experience do not exist independently of minds. His position, which he called immaterialism, rejects material substance while affirming the reality of ordinary things, finite spirits, and God. Its familiar formula, esse est percipi—“to be is to be perceived”—applies to sensible objects, not to the active minds that perceive them. Berkeley sought to defend common experience and Christian belief against what he regarded as the skeptical and atheistic consequences of contemporary philosophy.
A major figure in early modern empiricism, Berkeley developed his central arguments in An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). His writings also address language, mathematics, natural science, religion, economic policy, and political obedience. The unity of this work lies less in a single subject than in a recurring method: examining what words signify, what experience actually supplies, and whether explanatory concepts do more than conceal confusion.
Berkeley’s philosophical importance extends beyond acceptance of his conclusions. His criticism of abstract ideas, analysis of visual perception, challenge to material substance, and examination of mathematical reasoning helped reshape debates in epistemology, metaphysics, and the foundations of science. His career as a churchman, educational projector, colonial visitor, and economic writer also places his philosophy within the religious and imperial institutions of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world.
Life, education, and principal writings
Berkeley was born near Kilkenny in Ireland into an English Protestant family. After attending Kilkenny College, he entered Trinity College Dublin in 1700, received his bachelor’s degree in 1704, and became a fellow in 1707. Trinity provided access to mathematics, experimental natural philosophy, and the philosophical controversies surrounding John Locke and René Descartes. Berkeley’s early notebooks, now generally called the Philosophical Commentaries, record his developing arguments during approximately 1707–1708. They reveal a thinker testing formulations rather than simply applying an already completed system.
His first major philosophical publication, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, appeared in Dublin in 1709. The Principles of Human Knowledge, published in 1710, presented his attack on abstract ideas and material substance in a compact sequence of numbered sections. Although its title announced a first part, no second part appeared. Berkeley later reported that a manuscript intended for a continuation had been lost during his travels in Italy. In 1713 he recast much of the position in the Three Dialogues, using the exchange between Hylas and Philonous to answer objections and give his reasoning a more accessible literary form.
During the 1710s Berkeley spent periods in London and continental Europe. In London he entered literary and intellectual circles that included Jonathan Swift and other prominent writers. His travels in France and Italy exposed him to art, architecture, and scientific discussion. His Latin work De Motu, published in 1721, examined motion and the explanatory status of concepts such as force. Alongside philosophical writing, he pursued an ecclesiastical career, becoming dean of Derry in 1724.
In the 1720s Berkeley devoted considerable effort to a plan for a college in Bermuda. The projected institution was intended to educate colonial students and Indigenous youths for Christian missionary purposes. He obtained a royal charter and parliamentary support for funding, but the promised government money was not delivered. In 1728 he married Anne Forster and sailed to North America. The couple settled near Newport, Rhode Island, where Berkeley acquired a farm called Whitehall and waited for the grant. He wrote much of Alciphron during this period. The failure of the funding scheme led to his return to Britain in 1731.
Berkeley became bishop of Cloyne in 1734 and remained closely associated with the diocese for most of the rest of his life. His later publications included The Analyst (1734), the successive parts of The Querist (1735–1737), and Siris (1744). These works show that his interests expanded rather than simply repeating the metaphysics of his youth. In 1752 he moved to Oxford, where one of his sons was studying, while retaining his bishopric. He died there on 14 January 1753 and was buried in Christ Church Cathedral.
Abstract ideas, general terms, and philosophical language
The introduction to the Principles attacks a theory of abstraction that Berkeley associated especially with Locke. On that theory, the mind can separate features that occur together in particular experiences and form general ideas representing entire classes. Berkeley questioned whether such mental operations could produce the entities philosophers described. A triangle, for example, must have some determinate shape if it is imagined: it cannot be simultaneously neither equilateral, nor isosceles, nor scalene while remaining a visual image of a triangle.
His objection was not that general thinking or mathematical proof is impossible. It was that generality need not consist in possessing a peculiar abstract image. A particular triangle can stand for all triangles when a proof depends only on features common to them, rather than on its incidental size or proportions. Likewise, a word can apply to indefinitely many particular cases without naming an abstract mental object. This account aligns Berkeley with nominalism, although his position is specifically a theory about how signs and ideas function, not simply the assertion that general words are meaningless.
The distinction matters because Berkeley regarded the doctrine of abstract ideas as support for misleading metaphysical distinctions. Philosophers claimed to conceive extension apart from every sensible quality, or existence apart from all perception. Berkeley argued that such supposed conceptions often dissolve when examined closely. Removing color, touch, and every other sensible determination does not necessarily reveal pure material extension underneath; it may leave no intelligible content at all. His criticism of abstraction therefore prepares the way for his rejection of matter rather than forming an isolated discussion of psychology.
Berkeley’s account of language also resists the assumption that every meaningful word must stand for an idea. In ordinary life, speech can encourage action, arouse emotion, establish expectations, or guide conduct. Scientific and religious language likewise cannot always be understood as a sequence of names attached to independently inspectable images. In Alciphron, this broader understanding becomes especially important: a sign may have a legitimate role within an organized practice even when no single distinct idea corresponds to it. These arguments make Berkeley a significant early contributor to the philosophy of language.
There is nevertheless a tension within this approach. Berkeley sometimes demands that opponents identify the experiential content of their terms, yet allows that important expressions do not name ideas. His distinction between an “idea” and a “notion” is central to the response: spirits and their activities are intelligible without being passive objects of sensory imagery. Whether that distinction fully protects his own vocabulary from the criticism directed at material substance remains a major interpretive question. His philosophy consequently combines a restrictive attack on empty terminology with a comparatively flexible account of meaningful linguistic use.
Vision, distance, and learned perception
An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision addresses how people perceive distance, magnitude, and the spatial arrangement of objects. Berkeley begins from the claim that distance is not immediately visible. A line directed straight toward the eye projects only a point, so the length of that line cannot itself be visually displayed in the way that a patch of color can. The problem is therefore to explain how visual experience nevertheless comes to inform judgments about objects being near, far, large, or small.
His answer emphasizes learned connections among different kinds of experience. Changes in the eyes, degrees of visual distinctness, and familiar appearances become associated with what movement and touch would disclose. Such cues do not ordinarily produce conscious geometrical calculations. A person does not need to infer distance by computing angles between optical rays. Rather, experience establishes habitual associations through which one sensory presentation suggests another. Berkeley’s objection to geometrical accounts concerns their status as explanations of ordinary perception, not the usefulness of geometry in studying light.
A central distinction is between visible and tangible objects. What is immediately seen consists of light and color arranged in a visual field; what is immediately touched includes resistance, tangible shape, and spatial relations disclosed through bodily activity. Berkeley argues that these are not simply two apprehensions of an identical sensory quality. Their connection is established through experience. A familiar visual appearance can therefore function as a sign of a tangible object without resembling what it signifies, much as a spoken word can signify something it does not resemble.
This reasoning bears on Molyneux’s problem, posed to Locke by William Molyneux in 1688. The question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish a cube and a sphere by touch, would immediately distinguish them by sight after gaining vision. Berkeley’s theory implies a negative answer before the relevant associations have been learned. Later reports of restored sight became important to discussion of the theory, though the interpretation of such cases involves medical and experimental complications. His philosophical argument itself did not depend on a controlled clinical demonstration.
The 1709 Essay does not simply announce the entire immaterialist system. Berkeley initially allows ordinary assumptions about tangible objects to remain in place while challenging assumptions about the immediate objects of vision. In later works, especially The Theory of Vision … Vindicated and Explained (1733), he more explicitly connects visual signs with a divinely ordered language of nature. The theory’s lasting importance lies partly in the distinction between sensory stimulation and acquired perceptual significance. Its historical relation to modern perception research is substantial, but Berkeley’s account remains embedded in a philosophical and theological framework different from contemporary experimental psychology.
Immaterialism and the reality of sensible objects
The Principles opens by distinguishing ideas received through the senses, ideas associated with the mind’s own activities, and ideas formed by memory and imagination. Sensible things such as apples or stones are collections of qualities: color, taste, texture, shape, and other features encountered in experience. Berkeley’s central claim is that these sensible qualities cannot exist as unperceived, mind-independent entities. Their being consists in being perceived. This is the scope of esse est percipi; the formula does not mean that perceiving minds are themselves merely perceived objects.
Berkeley’s argument challenges the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke had treated qualities such as color and taste as powers to produce experiences, while attributing solidity, extension, figure, and motion more directly to bodies. Berkeley argues that the supposedly primary qualities cannot be conceived apart from sensible presentation. Shape is always the shape of something seen or touched, and its appearance varies with perspective and circumstances. If perceptual variation undermines the claim that experienced color exactly resembles a mind-independent property, similar considerations apply to experienced size, shape, and motion.
A further argument attacks representational accounts of perception. If only ideas are immediately perceived, what warrants the claim that they resemble material objects existing outside every mind? Berkeley’s answer is that an idea can resemble only another idea. A perceived color cannot be compared with an intrinsically unperceived material color, since the proposed original is never available for comparison. The hypothesis of matter therefore fails to explain the connection it was introduced to secure. It also produces a gap between experience and reality that invites philosophical skepticism.
The argument commonly called Berkeley’s “master argument” asks whether someone can conceive a tree existing entirely unperceived. In imagining such a tree, Berkeley observes, the thinker is still conceiving it. Critics reply that this may confuse representing an unperceived object with representing an object as perceived: a thought can concern something that no one perceives without including an observer in its content. The force of the argument is therefore contested. It is best understood alongside Berkeley’s broader challenges to the intelligibility and explanatory value of material substance, rather than as an uncontested proof standing alone.
Berkeley nevertheless insists that tables, mountains, and houses are real. He rejects a philosophical account of their underlying substance, not their ordinary existence or practical importance. Sensory ideas differ from imagined ones in their vividness, regularity, coherence, and independence from an individual’s will. Fire really burns, although the relation between seeing fire and feeling pain is not explained by an imperceptible material substratum. His immaterialism is thus not the claim that experience is a dream, nor that reality consists solely of one person’s passing thoughts.
Questions remain about what unifies a physical object and makes it persist when no finite observer attends to it. Berkeley appeals both to the order governing possible experiences and to divine cognition. These resources have encouraged different interpretations of his system. Some readings emphasize objects as stable collections of ideas; others emphasize the activity and intentions of God as grounding the public world. His texts support a firm rejection of mind-independent matter more clearly than they provide a single, fully elaborated account of object identity across all circumstances.
Spirits, divine agency, and the order of nature
Berkeley divides what exists into ideas and spirits. Ideas are passive: a color, sound, or imagined figure does not itself perceive or act. A spirit is an active being that understands and wills. This distinction prevents his philosophy from reducing everything to sensory contents. Although the self is not encountered as another color or sound, its activity is known through perceiving, remembering, imagining, and willing. Berkeley calls this understanding a “notion” rather than an idea, especially in later clarifications of the Principles.
This account bears on personal identity and the philosophy of mind. The subject is not merely a bundle of the ideas it experiences, because those ideas presuppose something that perceives them. Berkeley therefore differs sharply from David Hume, whose later treatment questions whether experience reveals a continuing substantial self. Berkeley’s immaterialism eliminates material substance but retains spiritual substance. It is consequently misleading to describe his system as eliminating substances altogether or as treating minds and sensory objects in exactly the same way.
His theory of causation follows from the passivity of ideas. One idea cannot literally produce another, and a material object cannot be their cause because matter has been rejected. Finite minds can produce some ideas, as in voluntary imagination, but they do not control the ordinary succession of sensory experience. The regular, extensive, and involuntary character of that experience points, Berkeley argues, to a spirit other than the individual perceiver. The ordered world is produced by an infinitely powerful and wise divine agent.
God’s role is therefore more extensive than preventing objects from disappearing when a person leaves a room. Divine activity explains why sensory experience has a stable structure, why different people encounter a coordinated world, and why natural sequences can be relied upon. The laws of nature are established patterns in the presentation of ideas. Scientific discovery identifies those patterns and enables prediction; it does not uncover independent material powers operating behind them. Berkeley compares natural signs to language because one phenomenon regularly informs perceivers about another without needing to resemble it.
The status of objects in the divine mind remains difficult. Human perception is receptive and sensory, whereas Berkeley does not regard God as passively affected by sensations. Saying that a tree exists because God perceives it cannot simply mean that God has the same visual experience as a human observer. Interpreters accordingly distinguish divine knowledge, divine willing, and finite sensory reception in different ways. Related questions concern suffering and disorder: Berkeley attributes the natural system to divine wisdom, but his general account of orderly experience does not remove every problem addressed within philosophy of religion.
Other finite minds are known differently from one’s own mind and from sensory objects. Their existence is inferred through speech, purposeful action, and other signs of agency. Berkeley does not claim immediate sensory acquaintance with another person’s spirit. His system thus preserves a version of the problem of other minds, even while maintaining that interpersonal understanding is a normal and justified part of life.
Natural philosophy, motion, and the critique of calculus
Berkeley’s rejection of matter did not entail rejecting experiment, mathematical description, or successful prediction. His philosophy of science distinguishes the useful organization of phenomena from claims about hidden efficient causes. In De Motu (1721), he examines the language of force, action, and attraction. Such terms can organize calculations and summarize regularities without naming independently existing active entities. The danger arises when a mathematically productive expression is treated as though its utility alone established the metaphysical existence of what it appears to name.
This approach shaped his response to Newtonian mechanics. Berkeley recognized the predictive achievements of mathematical natural philosophy while questioning the intelligibility of absolute space and motion conceived apart from relations among observable bodies. Motion is understood through changes in position relative to other things, not through inspection of an independently perceived spatial container. His position anticipated some later relational criticisms of classical mechanics, although it should not be identified with subsequent physical theories. He was challenging conceptual foundations, not proposing a modern replacement dynamics.
Berkeley also resisted treating gravitational attraction as an intrinsic active power of matter. A law relating motions can be scientifically valuable even if its terms do not disclose the ultimate source of activity. In this respect his thought has affinities with instrumentalism: theories may function as reliable instruments of prediction rather than literal descriptions of hidden mechanisms. That label requires qualification, however. Berkeley did not suspend judgment about all ultimate causes. He held that genuine agency belongs to spirits and that the order investigated by science depends on God.
The Analyst (1734) addresses the foundations of the new calculus. Its subtitle identifies its addressee as an “infidel mathematician,” and the work uses mathematical criticism to challenge the claim that religious reasoning alone depends on obscure concepts. Berkeley scrutinizes both Newtonian fluxions and continental infinitesimals. His celebrated phrase “ghosts of departed quantities” targets quantities that appear to be treated as nonzero during one stage of a calculation and as nothing at a later stage.
A simple example illustrates the concern. For an increment , expansion gives
provided . Obtaining then requires an account of why the remaining may be discarded. Berkeley objected to reasoning that seemed to require both the presence and absence of the increment without adequately explaining the transition. His criticism was not that every resulting calculation was false. He explicitly considered how correct results could arise through compensating errors or procedures whose foundations had not been rigorously stated.
Later limit-based analysis supplied a framework in which the derivative is defined by a limiting relation rather than by an unexplained passage between a nonzero increment and zero. Berkeley did not anticipate that entire framework, and it would be anachronistic to portray him as having refuted calculus as subsequently formalized. His achievement was to expose genuine ambiguities in some contemporary justifications and to insist that mathematical prestige did not exempt reasoning from conceptual examination. The ensuing controversy made The Analyst an important episode in the history of mathematical rigor.
Christianity, political obedience, and colonial projects
Berkeley’s philosophical project was explicitly Christian. As a clergyman of the established Church of Ireland, he regarded belief in God, moral accountability, and religious practice as central to social and intellectual life. His attacks on material substance were partly directed against the possibility of explaining nature as a self-sufficient system without spirit or providence. Yet the philosophical arguments do not merely restate scriptural claims: they attempt to show, through reflection on perception and agency, that a world of passive ideas requires active minds.
Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher (1732) stages a series of dialogues against freethinking critics of religion. Its targets include arguments that morality can be detached from Christianity and that religious language lacks meaning unless every term corresponds to a clear idea. Berkeley draws on social observation, moral psychology, and his theory of signs. The work responds to positions associated with writers such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Bernard Mandeville, although its fictional speakers should not be treated as exact transcripts of any one opponent’s views.
In Passive Obedience (1712), Berkeley argues for nonresistance to supreme political authority. The argument is grounded in a theory of moral rules directed toward the general good, rather than a simple claim that every command of a ruler must be performed. Passive obedience allows the distinction between refusing a command judged wrong and resisting the authority that imposes punishment for that refusal. His position belongs to contemporary debates about allegiance and political legitimacy, and its practical implications are substantially more restrictive than theories allowing rebellion against unjust rulers.
Berkeley’s Bermuda scheme combined religious education with colonial expansion. The proposed college would train both colonial students and Indigenous youths, with the latter intended to return as Christian missionaries. Its educational purpose therefore cannot be separated from an imperial framework in which European institutions claimed authority over Indigenous religious and cultural life. The plan also contemplated coercive acquisition of Indigenous children in some circumstances. These features qualify accounts that present the project only as an abstract commitment to learning or philanthropy.
His North American residence also involved slavery. Berkeley purchased enslaved people in Rhode Island and held people in slavery at Whitehall. His advocacy of Christian instruction and baptism for enslaved people did not amount to opposition to the institution: he argued that conversion was compatible with continued enslavement. These documented activities form part of his institutional and religious history, alongside his support for colonial education. His gifts to Yale, including books and his Rhode Island property, connected his name with the development of higher learning in British North America.
These aspects of Berkeley’s career have become important in reassessing commemorative uses of his name. In 2023 Trinity College Dublin decided to remove his name from its principal library because of his ownership of enslaved people and his arguments concerning slavery. Such decisions concern the purposes of institutional commemoration, while the interpretation of his philosophical works involves further questions about argument, historical context, and reception. Neither subject can be adequately represented by omitting the documented colonial activities.
Economic inquiry and the late philosophy of Siris
Berkeley’s years at Cloyne brought sustained attention to Irish economic conditions. The Querist, issued in three parts between 1735 and 1737 and later revised, takes the unusual form of a sequence of questions. Rather than offering a single deductive economic system, it asks how labor, consumption, credit, public institutions, and patterns of desire affect national prosperity. The interrogative style directs attention to neglected assumptions and invites connections between everyday practices and broader economic outcomes.
One central concern is the relationship between wealth and money. Berkeley questions whether a country’s prosperity should be identified with its stock of precious metals, emphasizing instead the employment and organization of people. Money matters as a means of directing activity and facilitating exchange. This orientation led him to consider credit and a national bank as instruments for stimulating economic life. His proposals belong to early eighteenth-century debates about currency and commerce, rather than fitting neatly into later classifications such as classical economics or modern macroeconomics.
The work also examines the consequences of imported luxuries, domestic manufacturing, and entrenched poverty. Berkeley links economic performance with habits, education, social hierarchy, and the distribution of opportunities for productive work. His perspective remains paternalistic and situated within Protestant landowning society, but it does not reduce Irish deprivation to a shortage of coin. Economic development appears as a problem of institutions, incentives, and the mobilization of human capacities. This gives The Querist an important place among early writings on Irish political economy.
Siris (1744) begins from a very different subject: tar-water, a preparation Berkeley promoted as medicinal. His claims about its therapeutic value belong to the medical history of the period, not to established contemporary evidence. The text moves from this preparation through discussions of chemistry, fire, air, life, and the organization of nature, eventually reaching questions about intellect and the divine. Its title presents it as a “chain” of philosophical reflections, and its associative structure differs markedly from the numbered demonstrations of the Principles.
The later portions draw extensively on Plato, Neoplatonism, and ancient accounts of intelligible order. This has prompted debate about continuity in Berkeley’s philosophy. Some readers see a shift from the predominantly sensory language of his early writings toward a stronger emphasis on intellect and hierarchical reality. Others stress that active spirit and divine order had always been fundamental to his thought. Siris does not simply retract immaterialism, but neither is it adequately described as an unchanged repetition of the youthful system. Its mixture of medical speculation, natural philosophy, and ancient learning displays the different intellectual priorities of Berkeley’s final decade.
Reception, criticism, and continuing interpretation
Berkeley’s earliest readers often found his conclusions more striking than his arguments persuasive. The familiar objection that immaterialism is refuted by touching or kicking a solid object misunderstands his position: resistance and pain are among the sensory realities he expressly preserves. Samuel Johnson’s reported response of kicking a stone, recorded by James Boswell, captures the perceived conflict with common sense but does not establish the mind-independent material substance Berkeley denies. The disagreement concerns what solidity ultimately consists in, not whether stones resist human bodies.
Hume treated Berkeley’s reasoning as a powerful source of skeptical pressure even while rejecting its theological resolution. If arguments undermine material substance, analogous scrutiny might also threaten Berkeley’s spiritual substance. Immanuel Kant distinguished his own transcendental idealism from Berkeley’s position, insisting that empirical objects have a legitimate objective status within the conditions of possible experience. The exact adequacy of Kant’s characterization is disputed, since Berkeley himself vigorously defended empirical reality and rejected the idea that the experienced world was mere illusion.
Nineteenth-century idealists found Berkeley an important predecessor, but his system differs from accounts that make reality the unfolding of an absolute conceptual or historical process. His finite spirits are individual agents, sensible ideas are passive, and God is not simply a name for the totality of human experience. Treating all forms of idealism as interchangeable obscures these differences. Berkeley’s specific combination of empiricism, spiritual substance, and Christian theism gives his position a distinctive structure.
Early analytic philosophy engaged him through debates about perception and the distinction between an experience and its object. In “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), G. E. Moore challenged arguments that identify the object of awareness with the awareness itself. Bertrand Russell likewise examined Berkeley’s inferences from what is known in perception to what can exist. Such objections press a central question: even if access to objects occurs through experience, does it follow that the objects themselves depend on being experienced?
Modern scholarship also debates whether Berkeley should be understood as a direct realist about ordinary things, an idealist about their constitution, or a thinker whose vocabulary cuts across that opposition. Since he identifies familiar objects with what is perceived rather than with hidden material originals, there is a sense in which perception reaches reality directly. Yet that reality is not independent of all minds. Disagreement often turns on which independence claim defines realism and whether divine knowledge supplies the same kind of objectivity that materialists seek.
Other continuing questions concern the compatibility of divine perception with divine impassibility, the individuation of sensory ideas across different perceivers, and the relation between scientific explanation and spiritual agency. His theories of language and vision also retain interest independently of acceptance of immaterialism. Critical editions of the notebooks, correspondence, sermons, and later writings have broadened interpretation beyond the Principles and Three Dialogues, making the relationships among his philosophy, church career, colonial commitments, and economic inquiry central subjects of historical research.