The Convention on Cluster Munitions is a multilateral treaty that prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of cluster munitions covered by its definitions. It also requires states parties to destroy stockpiles, clear contaminated areas, and assist victims. Adopted in Dublin on 30 May 2008 and opened for signature in Oslo on 3 December 2008, it entered into force on 1 August 2010. The convention combines weapons prohibitions with humanitarian obligations and forms part of the broader fields of disarmament and international humanitarian law.
Humanitarian background
Cluster munitions are weapons that disperse multiple explosive submunitions over an area. They may be delivered by aircraft, artillery, rockets, or other systems. Their humanitarian effects arise principally from two characteristics:
- Area effects during an attack: dispersed submunitions can strike civilians and civilian objects within a broad footprint.
- Residual danger after an attack: submunitions that fail to explode as intended can remain hazardous long after fighting has ended.
Unexploded submunitions can obstruct farming, reconstruction, access to infrastructure, and the return of displaced people. Their clearance may require prolonged surveying and specialist work. These concerns connect the convention with human rights, recovery after armed conflict, and the protection of people affected by disability.
The convention establishes a categorical prohibition for states parties rather than requiring a separate assessment of whether each proposed use of a covered weapon would comply with the general rules governing attacks.
Negotiation and adoption
The convention emerged from the Oslo Process, launched by Norway in February 2007. Participating states sought a legally binding instrument addressing cluster munitions that caused unacceptable harm to civilians. Governments worked alongside civil society organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and relevant United Nations bodies.
The process developed outside the negotiating framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, where efforts to achieve agreed restrictions had not produced a comparable prohibition. Major negotiating meetings took place in Lima, Vienna, Wellington, and Dublin.
The diplomatic conference in Dublin adopted the text on 30 May 2008. The convention opened for signature in Oslo that December and entered into force six months after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.
Its approach drew on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: a weapons ban accompanied by destruction obligations, clearance requirements, international cooperation, and measures addressing the needs of affected people.
Scope and definitions
Weapons covered
Article 2 defines a cluster munition as a conventional munition designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions, each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and including those submunitions. The convention also applies to explosive bomblets specifically designed for release from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
The treaty definition, rather than a weapon’s name or general description, determines whether it falls within the prohibition.
Exclusions
The definition excludes certain munitions designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics, or chaff, as well as specified air-defence and electrical or electronic-effect munitions.
It also excludes a munition that meets all of the following conditions:
- It contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions.
- Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms.
- Each is designed to detect and engage a single target object.
- Each has an electronic self-destruction mechanism.
- Each has an electronic self-deactivating feature.
These cumulative criteria are intended to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions. A self-destruct feature alone does not remove a weapon from the convention’s scope.
Principal obligations
Prohibited activities
Article 1 requires each state party never, under any circumstances, to:
- Use cluster munitions.
- Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer them, directly or indirectly.
- Assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in an activity prohibited to a state party.
The prohibition applies in peacetime as well as during armed conflict. Article 9 requires appropriate legal, administrative, and other implementation measures, including penal sanctions to prevent and suppress prohibited conduct by persons or on territory under a state party’s jurisdiction or control.
Stockpile destruction
Under Article 3, a state party must separate covered cluster munitions from operational stocks, mark them for destruction, and destroy them as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after the convention enters into force for that state.
A state unable to meet the deadline may request an extension of up to four years. Further extensions of up to four years may also be requested under the treaty’s procedures.
Limited retention or acquisition is permitted for developing and training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for developing countermeasures. The quantity must not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary. Transfers for destruction and other expressly permitted purposes are also allowed, subject to the convention’s conditions and reporting requirements.
Clearance and risk reduction
Article 4 requires states parties to clear and destroy cluster munition remnants in contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control. For contamination existing when the treaty enters into force for the state, the normal deadline is ten years from that date. For contamination arising afterward, clearance must be completed within ten years of the end of the active hostilities during which the weapons became remnants.
States must identify and assess contaminated areas, prioritize clearance, protect civilians through marking and other measures, and conduct risk-reduction education. Extensions of up to five years may be requested, with further extensions possible.
Where a state party used or abandoned cluster munitions on another state party’s territory before the convention entered into force for it, the convention strongly encourages the former to provide assistance, including relevant information and resources.
Victim assistance
Article 5 requires each state party, with respect to victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control, to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance. This includes medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, and measures promoting social and economic inclusion.
The definition of victims extends beyond people directly injured or killed to include affected families and communities. States must assess needs, develop plans and budgets, designate a government focal point, and consult closely with victims and their representative organizations.
Assistance must not discriminate between cluster munition victims and people injured or disabled from other causes; differences in treatment should rest on relevant needs. These provisions connect with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
International cooperation
Article 6 provides for international cooperation and assistance. States parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for implementation, which may include clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and economic and social recovery.
Assistance may be delivered bilaterally or through international, regional, and nongovernmental organizations. Affected states retain their own treaty responsibilities even when implementation depends partly on outside support.
Reporting, institutions, and compliance
Article 7 requires an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention entering into force for a state party, followed by annual updates. Reports cover matters including national implementation measures, stockpiles, destruction, contamination, clearance, victim assistance, and international support.
Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences assess implementation, consider extension requests, and address questions concerning compliance. An Implementation Support Unit assists the convention’s work. The Secretary-General of the United Nations serves as depositary.
The convention does not establish a standing international inspection body comparable to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Its compliance system relies principally on reporting, consultation, clarification procedures, collective consideration by states parties, and national implementation.
Article 10 provides for peaceful settlement of disputes. States parties may, by mutual consent, refer a dispute to the International Court of Justice, but the convention does not automatically give that court compulsory jurisdiction over every dispute.
Military cooperation with non-parties
Article 21 addresses military cooperation and operations involving states that are not parties. It permits such cooperation even where a non-party might engage in conduct prohibited to a state party. At the same time, states parties must encourage adherence to the convention, promote its norms, and make their best efforts to discourage non-parties from using cluster munitions.
The provision expressly does not authorize a state party to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, transfer, or itself use cluster munitions. Nor may it expressly request their use when the choice of munitions is within its exclusive control.
The relationship between Article 21 and Article 1’s prohibition on assistance has generated differing interpretations, particularly concerning joint operations, transit, and foreign stockpiles. National implementing legislation and official interpretations therefore matter when assessing how individual parties apply these obligations.
Legal reach and limitations
The convention binds its parties; it does not, solely by its existence, impose its complete weapons prohibition on non-party states. Non-parties remain subject to applicable international humanitarian law, including rules on distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. A weapon’s exclusion from this convention likewise does not establish that every use of it is lawful.
The convention permits no reservations. States that did not sign before its entry into force may join by accession.
Withdrawal normally takes effect six months after the depositary receives notification. If the withdrawing state is engaged in armed conflict when that period expires, withdrawal does not take effect before the conflict ends. Withdrawal also does not remove obligations that continue to apply under other rules of international law.
Practical limitations include incomplete participation, continued contamination in affected countries, the resources required for clearance and assistance, and the absence of a standing inspection organization. The convention nevertheless supplies a common legal framework for prohibiting covered weapons, destroying stocks, reducing residual hazards, and supporting affected people.