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Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention prohibits anti-personnel mines and requires stockpile destruction, clearance of mined areas, and assistance to mine victims.

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The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is an international treaty prohibiting the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Its full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997, opened for signature in Ottawa on 3–4 December 1997, and entering into force on 1 March 1999, it combines weapons prohibitions with obligations to destroy stockpiles, clear mined areas, and support affected people. It is an instrument of both disarmament and international humanitarian law.

Background and negotiation

Anti-personnel mines can remain dangerous long after the fighting in which they were laid has ended. Because they are activated by a person's presence, proximity, or contact, they cannot distinguish between combatants and civilians. Contaminated land can obstruct farming, transport, access to water, and the return of displaced populations.

Before the convention, international regulation of landmines principally developed through the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II. The protocol, strengthened in 1996, regulates mines, booby traps, and other devices but does not impose a comprehensive prohibition on anti-personnel mines.

Dissatisfaction with these restrictions helped produce the Ottawa Process, a negotiating initiative involving governments, international organizations, and civil society. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, established in 1992, coordinated advocacy by nongovernmental organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross also advocated a comprehensive prohibition.

At an Ottawa conference in October 1996, Canada called for a treaty to be concluded and signed the following year. Negotiations proceeded outside the conventional consensus-based disarmament forums, with Austria preparing draft texts and Norway hosting the final diplomatic conference. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its coordinator, Jody Williams, jointly received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for their work toward banning and clearing anti-personnel mines.

Definition and scope

Article 2 defines an anti-personnel mine as a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and to incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons. A mine is a munition designed to be placed under, on, or near the ground or another surface area and detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.

The definition turns on a weapon's design and means of activation, rather than its name or whether it was manufactured industrially. A victim-activated improvised explosive device can therefore fall within the prohibition if it satisfies the treaty's definition.

Important distinctions include:

  • Anti-vehicle mines: Mines designed to be detonated by a vehicle rather than a person are not prohibited merely because they possess anti-handling devices.
  • Command-detonated devices: A munition detonated deliberately by an operator, rather than activated by its victim, does not fall within the anti-personnel mine definition solely because it is intended to harm personnel.
  • Self-destructing or self-deactivating mines: These remain prohibited when they meet the definition. The convention does not exempt anti-personnel mines because their intended operational life is limited.

The convention does not comprehensively regulate all explosive hazards left after conflict. Other instruments address categories such as explosive remnants of war and cluster munitions.

Principal obligations

Comprehensive prohibitions

Under Article 1, each state party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to:

  • Use anti-personnel mines.
  • Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer them.
  • Assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in activity prohibited to a state party.

These prohibitions apply in peacetime as well as during armed conflict. The convention contains no general exception based on military necessity.

Article 3 permits the retention or transfer of a limited number of mines for developing and training in mine detection, clearance, or destruction techniques. The number must not exceed the minimum absolutely necessary for those purposes. Transfer for destruction is also permitted.

Destruction of stockpiles

Article 4 requires a state party to destroy, or ensure the destruction of, stockpiled anti-personnel mines that it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control. Except for mines retained under Article 3, destruction must take place as soon as possible and no later than four years after the convention enters into force for that state.

The convention does not provide a stockpile-destruction extension procedure equivalent to the one available for clearance of mined areas.

Clearance of mined areas

Article 5 requires destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas under a state's jurisdiction or control as soon as possible and no later than ten years after entry into force for that state.

Pending clearance, states must make every effort to identify mined areas and ensure that they are perimeter-marked, monitored, and protected by fencing or other means to exclude civilians effectively.

A state unable to meet its clearance deadline may request an extension of up to ten years. Requests must explain the circumstances, work undertaken, outstanding requirements, and proposed timetable. Further extensions may be requested through the same procedure.

The obligation is territorial in application: it concerns mined areas under the state's jurisdiction or control, not only mines that its own forces originally laid.

Assistance to victims and affected communities

Article 6 establishes a framework for international cooperation and assistance. Each state party in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims and their social and economic reintegration. It must also provide assistance for mine-awareness programmes, mine clearance, and stockpile destruction.

Assistance may be channelled through the United Nations, international and regional organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, nongovernmental organizations, or bilateral arrangements.

Subsequent review conferences have developed more detailed political commitments concerning victim assistance. These address emergency and continuing care, rehabilitation, psychological support, social inclusion, and economic participation. Implementation intersects with disability rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Mine clearance also has consequences beyond the removal of individual weapons. It can permit the restoration of livelihoods and infrastructure, improve food security, and enable displaced people to return. These effects connect implementation with humanitarian relief and sustainable development.

Implementation, reporting, and compliance

National measures and transparency

Article 9 requires states parties to take appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities by persons, or on territory, under their jurisdiction or control. These measures must include penal sanctions.

Under Article 7, an initial transparency report is due as soon as practicable and no later than 180 days after the convention enters into force for a state. Updated reports are due annually by 30 April, covering the preceding calendar year.

Required information includes national implementation measures, stockpiles, retained mines, mined areas, destruction programmes, and measures to warn civilians.

Clarification and fact-finding

Article 8 provides cooperative procedures for clarifying compliance concerns. A state party may submit a request for clarification through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If the matter remains unresolved, it may be considered collectively by states parties. The article also provides for fact-finding missions under specified conditions.

The convention does not establish a standing inspection organization comparable to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Its implementation system relies substantially on state reporting, collective scrutiny, diplomatic engagement, and independent monitoring.

The Landmine Monitor, developed by civil society, supplies research on mine use, production, stockpiles, casualties, clearance, and assistance. It is not a treaty inspection body.

Meetings and institutional support

States parties meet to assess implementation, consider clearance-extension requests, and address other treaty matters. Review conferences examine the convention's operation and status and adopt action plans guiding implementation.

An Implementation Support Unit, hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, assists states parties and supports treaty meetings. The UN Secretary-General serves as the convention's depositary.

Participation and withdrawal

States become parties through ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. For a state joining after the convention's initial entry into force, it generally takes effect on the first day of the sixth month after deposit of that state's instrument.

Article 19 prohibits reservations, preventing states from excluding selected treaty provisions when becoming parties.

Article 20 permits withdrawal through notification to the other states parties, the depositary, and the United Nations Security Council, with a full explanation of the reasons. Withdrawal normally takes effect six months after receipt of the notification by the depositary. If the withdrawing state is engaged in armed conflict when that period expires, withdrawal does not take effect before the conflict ends.

Withdrawal does not remove obligations arising independently under other applicable rules of international law.

Significance and limitations

The convention established a comprehensive prohibition for its parties rather than a regime allowing continued use under technical restrictions. Its combination of weapons elimination, territorial clearance, and victim assistance became an important example of humanitarian disarmament.

Its reach nevertheless has limits. Treaty obligations do not automatically bind states that remain outside it. Non-state armed groups cannot become states parties, although national law and other applicable rules may prohibit their conduct. The absence of a permanent inspection system also makes transparency, access to affected territory, and political cooperation important to compliance assessment.

Clearance can be slowed by insecurity, inaccessible terrain, incomplete records, newly discovered contamination, and insufficient resources. Completion of mine clearance does not end survivors' long-term needs. Nor does removal of anti-personnel mines necessarily make an area free from anti-vehicle mines, unexploded ordnance, or other explosive hazards.