An attribute is a characteristic, quality, or feature ascribed to an entity. In metaphysics, the term often overlaps with property: being red, having a particular mass, or being capable of thought can each be described as an attribute. Its meaning nevertheless varies across philosophical traditions. In some contexts, any characteristic counts as an attribute; in others, especially the philosophies of René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza, an attribute is a fundamental feature constituting or expressing the nature of a substance, rather than a temporary condition it happens to possess.
Attributes, properties, and predication
An attribute must be distinguished from the linguistic expression used to ascribe it. In the sentence “The apple is red,” “is red” is a predicate, while redness is the characteristic apparently attributed to the apple. Predication is the act or logical structure of saying something of a subject; whether it requires the existence of a corresponding property is a further philosophical question.
In elementary logic, an attribution can be represented as:
where designates an object and is a predicate applied to it. This notation alone does not determine whether denotes a real universal, a particularized quality, a class of objects, or nothing beyond its linguistic role.
Attributes are usually distinguished from relations. Being spherical is ordinarily treated as an attribute of one object, whereas being larger than connects two objects. Some philosophers use “property” broadly enough to include relational properties, such as being larger than a particular stone, while reserving “relation” for the connection considered as a whole.
Nor does every predicate necessarily identify an attribute suitable for a metaphysical explanation. Predicates can be negative, disjunctive, context-dependent, or artificially constructed. Whether “is not a horse” or “is either red or a planet” corresponds to a genuine property depends on the theory of properties being adopted.
Essential and accidental attributes
A central distinction concerns whether an attribute belongs to what something is or merely to how it happens to be.
An essential attribute is one that an entity cannot lack while remaining that entity, or one that belongs to its nature. An accidental attribute can change without destroying the entity’s identity. A person’s current posture is a standard example of an accidental characteristic. Determining which characteristics are essential is considerably more controversial.
Essentialism gives some form of priority to natures or essential characteristics. Contemporary discussions often formulate essentiality using possible worlds: a property is necessary to an object if the object possesses it in every possible world in which it exists. However, some philosophers distinguish an object’s essence from the complete set of properties it necessarily possesses. A characteristic might be necessary without explaining what the object fundamentally is.
The distinction is also sensitive to whether the subject is an individual or a kind. A definition may identify characteristics essential to a kind without resolving which properties are essential to each particular member.
In the logical tradition associated with Aristotle, a further distinction separates an essential definition from a proprium, often translated as a “property” or “proper attribute.” A proprium belongs distinctively to a kind without expressing its essence. Traditional examples include the capacity for laughter as a property of human beings. Thus, “attribute,” “property,” “accident,” and “essence” cannot always be exchanged without altering the historical meaning.
Substance, attribute, and mode
Aristotle and the scholastic tradition
Aristotle distinguished substances from such categories as quantity, quality, and relation. An individual substance, such as a particular human being, can be the subject of different descriptions while remaining the same individual through many changes.
In scholastic discussions, the relationship between a substance and its accidents helped explain this persistence. A substance could acquire or lose certain qualities without becoming a different substance. An accident in this technical sense is not an unexpected event but a feature whose being depends on a subject.
This framework raises questions about dependence: whether qualities can exist apart from their bearers, how they belong to those bearers, and how one subject can possess many distinct characteristics.
Descartes
For Descartes, each created substance has a principal attribute that constitutes its nature. Thought is the principal attribute of mind; extension is the principal attribute of body. Particular acts of thinking, such as doubting or imagining, are modes of thought. Shape and motion are modes of extended substance.
The distinction supports Cartesian mind–body dualism. Mind and body are differentiated not merely by their current activities but by their fundamental natures. “Attribute” here therefore means more than an observable feature: it identifies what a substance is.
Descartes also uses the vocabulary of attribute, quality, and mode with distinctions that depend partly on how a feature is considered. The principal-attribute doctrine should not be treated as an exhaustive definition of every occurrence of “attribute” in his writings.
Spinoza
Spinoza gives the term an especially distinctive role. In the Ethics, he defines an attribute as what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence. There is only one substance, God or Nature, possessing infinitely many attributes. Human beings know thought and extension.
Thought and extension are therefore not attributes of two separate substances, as in Descartes’s system. They express the essence of the same substance. Particular minds and bodies are modes, understood under the attributes of thought and extension respectively.
The reference to what the intellect perceives has generated debate. Interpretations differ over how to understand the relationship between attributes, intellect, and the unity of substance. Spinoza’s technical conception should not be reduced to the everyday idea of attaching descriptive labels to an object.
What kind of thing is an attribute?
The status of attributes is a major problem in ontology. Several influential approaches offer different accounts of what it means for distinct objects to share a characteristic.
Universals
On theories of universals, different objects can instantiate one and the same property. Two red objects may share redness, rather than merely possess resembling characteristics.
Realist theories disagree about whether universals exist independently of their instances or only as instantiated in particular things. Plato and his theory of Forms provide a historically influential model of intelligible features that are not reducible to individual sensible objects, although contemporary theories of universals need not accept the rest of Platonic metaphysics.
Nominalism
Nominalism rejects universals, though nominalist theories vary considerably. Shared descriptions may be explained through resemblance among particulars, membership in classes, or the use of general terms, without positing one repeatable entity present in many objects.
Nominalism need not deny that objects are red, heavy, or fragile. Its disagreement concerns how such facts should be understood and what entities their explanation requires.
Tropes
Trope theories treat qualities as particularized instances: the redness of this apple is numerically distinct from the redness of another apple, even if the two resemble each other exactly.
Some trope theories regard objects as bundles of such particularized properties. More broadly, bundle theories attempt to explain an object through its properties rather than through an underlying bearer distinct from them. Competing theories maintain that attributes require a subject that cannot itself be reduced to a collection of attributes.
Important classifications
Several distinctions help organize contemporary discussions:
- Intrinsic and extrinsic attributes. An intrinsic attribute concerns how a thing is in itself; an extrinsic attribute depends on its relations or circumstances. Being next to a tree is a straightforward extrinsic example. A precise analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic properties is disputed, particularly where an apparently internal characteristic depends on an object’s history or environment.
- Qualitative and identity-involving attributes. A qualitative description does not identify a particular individual merely by name or identity. Being spherical is qualitative; being identical with a specified individual is identity-involving.
- Determinable and determinate attributes. Color is a determinable, while red is a more determinate way of being colored. Red itself admits more specific determinations, such as particular shades.
- Dispositional and categorical attributes. Dispositions, such as fragility or solubility, concern how something would behave under relevant conditions. Categorical attributes are commonly contrasted with these conditional tendencies, although philosophers disagree about whether the distinction marks fundamentally different kinds of property.
These classifications cut across one another. A disposition may be essential or accidental, and an intrinsic characteristic need not be essential.
Explanatory roles and limitations
Attributes allow descriptions to become explanations: an object dissolves because it is soluble, or behaves in a particular way because it has a certain physical structure. Yet merely assigning an attribute can repeat the phenomenon rather than explain it. Saying that a substance induces sleep because it has a sleep-inducing power is informative only if the proposed power contributes something beyond a restatement of the effect.
This issue connects attributes to causation and the philosophy of science. Some theories identify properties partly through their causal roles; others distinguish what a property is from the effects associated with it. Debates also concern whether all linguistically expressible properties are equally significant or whether a restricted class of natural properties has a privileged role in scientific explanation.
In philosophy of religion, “divine attributes” refers to characteristics traditionally ascribed to God, including omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness. Accounts of divine simplicity address whether such attributes introduce distinct components into the divine nature. Here, as elsewhere, attributing several characteristics to a subject does not by itself settle whether those characteristics are distinct entities, different concepts, or different ways of understanding one reality.