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Uniting for Peace Resolution

The Uniting for Peace Resolution establishes a procedure for the UN General Assembly to recommend collective measures when Security Council action is blocked by disagreement among its permanent members.

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The Uniting for Peace Resolution, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 3 November 1950 as Resolution 377 A (V), provides a framework for Assembly consideration of threats to international peace when the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility because its permanent members are not unanimous. It allows the Assembly to recommend collective measures and provides for an emergency special session within twenty-four hours when necessary. The resolution does not transfer the Council’s binding enforcement powers to the Assembly or abolish the Security Council veto.

Historical background

The resolution emerged during the Korean War and the early Cold War. In June and July 1950, the Security Council adopted resolutions concerning the conflict while the Soviet Union was absent from its meetings in protest over China’s representation at the United Nations. Those resolutions recommended assistance to South Korea and established arrangements for a unified command.

After the Soviet representative returned in August 1950, the prospect of further Council action being blocked encouraged the United States and other supporters to seek a larger role for the General Assembly. The resulting proposal aimed to prevent disagreement among the permanent members from stopping all collective consideration of a crisis.

The Assembly adopted Resolution 377 A (V) by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions. Its supporters presented it as a way to fulfil the purposes of the United Nations Charter despite Council paralysis. Its opponents argued that it encroached on powers assigned to the Security Council. This disagreement concerned the institutional division of responsibility, particularly whether the Assembly could recommend military measures.

Main provisions

Conditions for Assembly consideration

The resolution’s central provision applies when:

  • there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;
  • the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security;
  • that failure results from a lack of unanimity among its permanent members.

In those circumstances, the Assembly is to consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures.

The wording distinguishes between different situations. In the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the contemplated recommendations expressly include, when necessary, the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security. This language made the resolution significant for the development of collective security, but it did not make Assembly recommendations legally equivalent to binding Council decisions.

Emergency special sessions

If the General Assembly is not in session, the resolution provides for an emergency special session within twenty-four hours of a request.

Under the applicable procedures, such a session may be requested by:

  • the Security Council, through an affirmative vote of nine members; or
  • a majority of the members of the United Nations.

The original resolution specified seven Council votes, reflecting the Council’s original eleven-member composition. The present threshold reflects its enlargement to fifteen members.

A Council decision to call an emergency special session is procedural. It therefore does not require the concurrence of all permanent members and cannot be defeated by a permanent member’s negative vote alone. This is the principal procedural means by which the Assembly can take up a crisis despite a veto on substantive Council action.

Once convened, an emergency special session may be adjourned and subsequently resumed. Separate meetings held years apart can therefore belong to the same numbered session.

Other institutional arrangements

The resolution also established a Peace Observation Commission and a Collective Measures Committee. These bodies were intended to support observation of situations affecting peace and the study of possible collective responses.

It additionally encouraged member states to maintain elements within their national armed forces that could be made available for recommended collective action. These provisions did not establish a permanent UN army, and their practical importance became less enduring than the emergency-session procedure.

Relationship to the UN Charter

The resolution operates within a Charter framework that gives the Security Council primary, rather than exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Articles 10 and 11 give the General Assembly broad powers to discuss matters within the Charter’s scope and to make recommendations. Article 12, however, limits Assembly recommendations concerning disputes or situations while the Council is exercising its assigned functions, unless the Council requests them.

Uniting for Peace did not amend these provisions. Its operation has depended on their interpretation and on subsequent institutional practice. The Assembly and Council have increasingly considered different aspects of the same situations in parallel.

The International Court of Justice has addressed aspects of this division of responsibility. In its 1962 Certain Expenses advisory opinion, it explained that the Council’s responsibility for peace and security was primary but not exclusive. In its 2004 advisory opinion on the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, it examined the development of practice under Article 12 and found that the Assembly had not exceeded its competence in requesting that opinion.

These decisions support a substantial Assembly role without equating its powers with the Council’s enforcement authority.

Legal effect and limitations

A General Assembly resolution recommending action under Uniting for Peace is generally not binding on member states. The procedure does not enable the Assembly to impose the binding obligations that the Security Council may impose under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Several distinctions are important:

  • Recommendations are not enforcement decisions. The Assembly may recommend diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, or other measures, but the resolution does not itself compel states to implement them.
  • The veto remains intact. Referral to the Assembly does not reverse a Council vote or turn a rejected draft into an adopted Council resolution.
  • Recommendations concerning force have contested legal implications. The resolution is not generally treated as giving the Assembly the same authority as the Council to authorize coercive military action. Any use of force remains subject to the Charter and international law, including the rules on self-defence.
  • Implementation depends on additional decisions and resources. Assembly recommendations cannot by themselves guarantee troop contributions, funding, compliance, or access to affected territory.

The procedure nevertheless permits the wider UN membership to express a collective position, recommend responses, and sustain institutional consideration of a crisis.

Major applications

Suez and Hungary, 1956

The first emergency special session was convened during the Suez Crisis in 1956, after British and French vetoes obstructed substantive Security Council action. The Assembly called for a ceasefire and withdrawal and established the first United Nations Emergency Force.

That force became an important precedent for United Nations peacekeeping. It was a consent-based peacekeeping operation, not an Assembly-directed war against a state.

A second emergency special session addressed the situation in Hungary later that year. The contrast between the two crises demonstrated that Assembly recommendations could produce different practical results depending on cooperation by the states concerned.

Later crises

Emergency special sessions were subsequently convened on situations including the Congo in 1960, Afghanistan in 1980, and Palestine in several different periods. Their resolutions addressed matters such as withdrawal of foreign forces, ceasefires, humanitarian conditions, and the conduct of occupying powers.

The tenth emergency special session, first convened in 1997 concerning occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory, has been resumed repeatedly. It illustrates how the mechanism can provide continuing consideration rather than a single emergency meeting.

Ukraine, 2022

On 27 February 2022, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2623, calling an emergency special session concerning Ukraine. The vote was 11 in favour, 1 against, and 3 abstentions. Russia’s negative vote did not block the procedural decision.

The eleventh emergency special session opened on 28 February. On 2 March, the Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11/1, titled Aggression against Ukraine, by 141 votes to 5, with 35 abstentions. It demanded that Russia immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and withdraw its military forces.

The session demonstrated the continuing function of Uniting for Peace: enabling the General Assembly to consider a crisis and recommend action when permanent-member disagreement prevents substantive Security Council action, without converting those recommendations into binding Council enforcement measures.