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Taqlid

Taqlid is reliance on established scholarly authority in Islamic law and, more controversially, in matters of religious belief.

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Taqlid, from the Arabic taqlīd, is the acceptance of another person’s religious or legal judgment without independently establishing that judgment through its underlying proofs. In Islam, the term most commonly concerns reliance on qualified interpreters of sharia, especially by people who lack the training to derive rulings themselves. It can describe a layperson’s acceptance of a scholar’s answer, a jurist’s adherence to the doctrines of a legal school, or, in some theological discussions, the acceptance of inherited beliefs without personal demonstration. These uses overlap but are not interchangeable.

Taqlid has been central to the organization of Islamic jurisprudence, the transmission of legal learning, and debates about religious authority. Its principal counterpart is ijtihad, the disciplined effort to derive legal judgments from recognized sources. The relationship between the two is not simply one of obedience versus independent thought: a scholar may exercise substantial interpretive judgment within a legal tradition while relying on earlier authorities in other matters. Sunni and Twelver Shiʿi traditions developed different institutions for regulating this relationship, and modern arguments about taqlid have addressed everything from legal education and state codification to the responsibilities of ordinary believers.

Meaning, scope, and related terms

The Arabic verb underlying taqlīd means to place something around the neck, especially a necklace or collar. In legal usage, the image came to suggest entrusting responsibility to another or accepting another’s judgment. Classical definitions commonly describe taqlid as accepting a statement without knowing its proof, or accepting someone’s position when that person’s statement is not itself an independently binding proof. The precise wording matters because jurists disagreed over which forms of reliance should fall within the category.

Accepting the authority of the Qurʾan or the authenticated teaching of Muhammad, for example, was generally not classified in the same way as accepting the interpretation of a later jurist. Within Islamic legal theory, revelation possesses an authority different from that of a human interpreter. Likewise, the testimony of a reliable transmitter, a judicial finding, and a scholar’s legal opinion may all warrant acceptance, but they do so under different rules. Taqlid therefore does not name every instance in which one person learns from another.

Its most straightforward setting is the relationship between a lay questioner and a mufti, a scholar qualified to issue a fatwa, or nonbinding legal opinion. A merchant asking whether a contractual condition is permissible normally receives an answer rather than reconstructing the entire legal argument. The merchant’s reliance can count as taqlid even when the mufti explains some of the reasoning. Knowing that a ruling cites a prophetic report is not necessarily equivalent to possessing the linguistic, historical, and methodological competence to evaluate that report’s legal force.

A second use concerns affiliation with a madhhab, or legal school. Here taqlid may mean accepting the school’s authoritative positions, applying its interpretive methods, or recognizing its founder as a principal legal authority. These activities involve different degrees of expertise. An advanced school jurist who compares earlier opinions is not doing exactly what an untrained questioner does, even if both are described as followers.

The word ittibāʿ, meaning following, frequently appears as a contrasting term. Critics sometimes reserve ittibāʿ for following an opinion with awareness of its evidence and use taqlid for uncritical acceptance. That contrast is influential but not a universally accepted technical distinction. Some jurists used the vocabulary less sharply, while others questioned whether a nonspecialist’s acquaintance with a quoted proof amounted to meaningful evaluation.

Consequently, translating taqlid simply as “blind imitation” imports a judgment that the Arabic term does not always carry. “Following,” “juristic adherence,” and “reliance on scholarly authority” are often more neutral, although no single English equivalent captures every legal, theological, and polemical use.

Scriptural arguments and the justification of reliance

Arguments for taqlid generally begin with a distinction between the obligations of specialists and those of nonspecialists. The Qurʾanic instruction to “ask the people of remembrance if you do not know,” found at 16:43 and similarly at 21:7, became a major text supporting consultation of knowledgeable authorities. Its immediate context concerns earlier messengers, but jurists drew from it a more general principle: those who lack relevant knowledge should consult those who possess it. Qurʾan 9:122, concerning a group that acquires religious understanding and instructs its people, also supported the division of religious labor.

A practical argument reinforced this reading. Deriving legal judgments can require knowledge of Arabic, the Qurʾan, hadith, competing interpretations, and the methods of legal theory. Requiring every person to attain such competence would make ordinary religious and economic life difficult to sustain. Many jurists therefore treated consultation not merely as permissible but as the appropriate obligation of a person unable to conduct ijtihad. On this account, responsibility is differentiated by competence rather than eliminated through dependence on an expert.

Critics invoked another set of Qurʾanic passages. Verses such as 2:170 condemn people who defend inherited practices by saying that they follow their ancestors. Other passages criticize religious leaders who mislead their followers. These texts furnished arguments against treating inherited affiliation or scholarly prestige as sufficient grounds for accepting a position. The condemnation was particularly forceful when following human authority was understood to override revelation.

Defenders of qualified reliance answered that the criticized conduct was adherence to error or rejection of divine guidance, not consultation of a competent interpreter. The relevant distinction, in their account, was between following an authority as a means of understanding revelation and treating that authority as independent of revelation. Critics could accept expertise while arguing that a particular institution or practice crossed this boundary. Thus, both sides could affirm the priority of scripture while disagreeing over how that priority should operate.

The discussion also depended on the status of legal disagreement. Jurists often distinguished decisive matters from questions in which the evidence supports probable rather than certain conclusions. In the latter domain, different qualified scholars could reach different judgments without one party necessarily being culpable. Taqlid allowed a nonspecialist to act despite that disagreement. It did not necessarily imply that every accepted ruling was demonstrably the uniquely correct divine judgment.

A persistent difficulty concerned the selection of the expert. If a layperson cannot evaluate the legal proof, how can that person evaluate the scholar? Classical answers appealed to public reputation, recognized learning, upright conduct, testimony from knowledgeable people, or comparative expertise. These criteria shifted the required judgment from mastering substantive law to identifying a credible interpreter, while leaving disagreement over how demanding that preliminary assessment should be.

The formation of legal schools and inherited authority

Taqlid acquired its enduring institutional importance as Islamic legal schools developed. During the eighth and ninth centuries, legal learning was organized around teachers, regional practices, collections of reports, and networks of students. The four surviving Sunni schools became associated with Abu Hanifa, who died in 767; Malik ibn Anas, who died in 795; al-Shafiʿi, who died in 820; and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who died in 855. Their later schools were not simply complete systems left unchanged by their founders.

Students transmitted, selected, and revised their teachers’ positions. Abu Yusuf, who died in 798, and Muhammad al-Shaybani, who died in 805, were particularly important in the formation of Hanafi doctrine. Within other schools, successive generations likewise reconciled conflicting reports, extended earlier reasoning to new cases, and determined which opinions should govern teaching and legal practice. The authority of a school emerged through this cumulative activity.

Between roughly the tenth and thirteenth centuries, school affiliation became increasingly central to Sunni legal institutions. Teaching posts, scholarly biographies, judicial appointments, and legal manuals reinforced recognizable lines of transmission. In Cairo in 1265, the Mamluk sultan Baybars established a system of four chief judges representing the four Sunni schools. Such arrangements institutionalized plurality: the state recognized several authorized traditions rather than a single undifferentiated body of Islamic law.

Within these institutions, taqlid helped stabilize expectations. A judge or mufti working within an established school could draw on a developed vocabulary, a ranked body of opinions, and precedents for resolving recurring disputes. That stability was important for areas such as inheritance, commercial transactions, endowments, and marriage, in which legal decisions structured continuing relationships. School adherence also connected local practice to scholarly networks extending beyond a particular city or ruler.

The same process generated internal criticism. Authors warned against fanatic attachment to a school, distortion of evidence to defend a preferred authority, and reliance on unqualified interpreters. Acknowledging a school’s usefulness did not necessarily entail believing that its founder was infallible. The founders themselves were widely represented in later legal literature as fallible interpreters whose opinions remained answerable to revelation.

It is therefore misleading to describe the emergence of taqlid as a single event in which independent reasoning abruptly stopped. The historical development involved the consolidation of institutions and methods of authoritative transmission. Some kinds of legal inquiry became more tightly structured by school doctrine, but interpretation, disagreement, and adaptation continued within those structures. The relevant historical question is not whether jurists either imitated or reasoned, but how inherited authority shaped the reasoning they regarded as legitimate.

Sunni practice: expertise, school adherence, and legal choice

Sunni legal literature did not treat all followers as occupying the same intellectual position. Some classifications distinguished an independent mujtahid from a jurist who reasoned within a school, a scholar capable of comparing established opinions, and a transmitter who could reliably report the accepted position. The classifications differed among authors and schools. Their common purpose was to relate the authority to issue a ruling to the kind of competence the scholar possessed.

A school-trained jurist might undertake takhrīj, extending established principles or positions to a case not expressly answered by earlier authorities. Another might perform tarjīḥ, determining which of several transmitted opinions deserved preference. These activities could require extensive reasoning without claiming the unrestricted authority associated with a school’s founding figures. Describing every such jurist as a muqallid, or practitioner of taqlid, can obscure these differences unless the author’s classification is specified.

For ordinary believers, a major issue was whether consultation of a qualified scholar required permanent adherence to one school. Some jurists strongly favored consistent affiliation, especially where it prevented opportunistic selection of rulings. Others held that a layperson did not possess a technical school affiliation in the same sense as a trained jurist and could consult different qualified muftis. The maxim that a layperson’s school is the school of the mufti consulted expresses one influential approach, not a universal rule.

Two technical debates concerned takhayyur, the selection of opinions from different schools, and talfiq, the combination of elements drawn from different legal positions. Selection could be defended as a way to address hardship or secure an appropriate ruling. It could also be criticized as pursuing concessions solely for convenience. Combination raised a further question: might a person assemble parts of different doctrines into a single act that no relevant school would recognize as valid?

Ritual purification supplied familiar examples. Schools differed over whether particular forms of touching or bleeding invalidated ablution. Critics of certain combinations asked whether a person could use one school’s ruling to disregard one event and another school’s ruling to disregard another, when the resulting state would not count as ritually valid under either complete position. The permissibility of such combinations depended on how jurists understood legal consistency, necessity, and the consequences of the act.

The distinction between a fatwa and a judicial decision also mattered. A fatwa generally advised the questioner without itself coercively settling a dispute. A judge’s ruling had binding effects within the judge’s jurisdiction, subject to the relevant rules. Taqlid could shape both activities, but judicial appointment, procedural requirements, and state directions added constraints absent from ordinary consultation. Institutional authority therefore could not be reduced to the private relationship between a follower and a chosen scholar.

Taqlid in theology and religious belief

Theological discussions asked whether the grounds acceptable for practical legal conduct were sufficient for foundational religious belief. A person may reasonably depend on a specialist for the details of a transaction, yet theologians could still require personal reflection concerning the existence of God, prophecy, or the truth of revelation. The distinction was commonly expressed as one between the foundations of religion and its practical branches, although authors differed over the boundaries of each category.

Within kalam, or systematic Islamic theology, debates about the believer who accepts doctrine through taqlid concerned several separate questions. Does inherited assent constitute genuine faith? Is the believer blameworthy for failing to examine the grounds of belief? What kind of reasoning is required, and must it take the form of a formal demonstration? These questions did not always receive the same answer. An author could recognize a person as a believer while criticizing the failure to reflect.

Thinkers associated with Muʿtazili theology generally placed considerable weight on rational knowledge and the individual obligation to investigate foundational truths. Discussions within Ashʿari theology and Maturidi theology likewise addressed the duties of reflection and the status of unreasoned assent, but contained significant internal differences. Broad claims that an entire theological school either accepted or rejected the faith of every imitator conceal these distinctions.

The disagreement also concerned what counted as reasoning. Some accounts emphasized technical argument developed by trained theologians. Others allowed that ordinary people could possess adequate grounds through simple reflection on the world, recognition of prophetic signs, or an understanding of revelation that did not involve scholastic terminology. A person lacking formal theological education was therefore not necessarily someone whose faith rested only on imitation.

Al-Ghazali, who died in 1111, illustrates the complexity of the issue. His writings distinguish the conditions of ordinary believers from the tasks of specialists, and he did not present technical dialectical theology as the necessary religious occupation of everyone. Ibn Taymiyya, who died in 1328, also criticized the claim that valid faith depended upon particular scholastic methods. Such positions should not be equated with rejecting reason; they disputed which forms of reasoning were sound and universally obligatory.

Taqlid in theology consequently had a different practical scope from taqlid in law. The issue was not simply whether a scholar could supply an answer, but whether another person’s testimony could provide the kind of knowledge or certainty required for foundational conviction. This placed the debate at the intersection of legal theory, epistemology, and accounts of religious responsibility, rather than making it merely a dispute about loyalty to a school.

Twelver Shiʿism and the authority of the marjaʿ

In Twelver Shiʿism, taqlid developed within an account of religious authority centered on the Imams and the occultation of the twelfth Imam. The Lesser Occultation is conventionally dated from 874 to 941, followed by the Greater Occultation. The absence of an accessible Imam raised enduring questions about who could interpret and apply religious law and how believers should relate to fallible scholars.

The mature Usuli approach recognizes the authority of qualified jurists to perform ijtihad and the responsibility of nonspecialists to follow qualified legal guidance. This position differed from Akhbari approaches, which emphasized the transmitted reports of the Imams and challenged important elements of Usuli legal methodology. Akhbari criticism did not mean that every believer dispensed with learned mediation. It concerned the grounds and scope of juristic authority, including the legitimacy of the methods through which jurists derived rulings.

The Usuli ascendancy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was associated with scholars including Muhammad Baqir al-Bihbahani and, later, Murtada al-Ansari, who died in 1864. During this period, the institution of the marjaʿ al-taqlid, a “source of emulation,” became increasingly prominent. A marjaʿ is a senior jurist whose practical rulings are followed by believers. Authority emerges through scholarly recognition, reputation for learning, and networks of teaching and representation rather than through a single universal appointment procedure.

In standard Usuli presentations, a legally responsible person’s practical obligations may be fulfilled through ijtihad, taqlid, or iḥtiyāṭ, precaution. Precaution means acting in a way that secures compliance across relevant possibilities, where doing so is feasible and properly understood. Taqlid is therefore not described as the sole conceivable mode of responsible action, but as the ordinary route for those who neither possess juristic competence nor consistently practice valid precaution.

Many Twelver jurists require following the most learned qualified jurist, although the criteria and treatment of uncertainty vary. Another important distinction concerns deceased authorities. Initiating taqlid of a deceased jurist is commonly restricted, whereas continuing to follow a deceased marjaʿ may be permitted under conditions specified by a living authority. These rules make contemporary juristic competence, rather than affiliation with a medieval Sunni-style school founder, central to the institution.

Practical manuals, often called risāla ʿamaliyya, communicate a marjaʿ’s rulings on worship, transactions, and other conduct. Foundational beliefs are generally distinguished from these practical rulings and are not ordinarily treated as matters to be established merely through taqlid. Moreover, recognizing a jurist as a marjaʿ does not by itself settle the separate question of that jurist’s political authority. Legal emulation and theories of government must therefore be distinguished.

Reform movements, codification, and modern controversy

Criticism of taqlid long predates modern reform. Ibn Hazm, who died in 1064, opposed the binding authority accorded to individual jurists and schools. Ibn Taymiyya criticized forms of partisanship that privileged a school position over stronger evidence, while recognizing the practical dependence of nonspecialists on knowledgeable authorities. These critiques arose from different legal projects and should not be treated as expressions of a single continuous movement.

From the eighteenth century onward, arguments about taqlid acquired new prominence in settings shaped by renewed hadith scholarship, imperial change, colonial rule, and expanding communication. Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, who died in 1762, sought to explain school disagreement and relate juristic inheritance to scriptural sources. Muhammad al-Shawkani, who died in 1834, argued vigorously against binding adherence to established schools. Their approaches differed, but both challenged accounts that made inherited affiliation an adequate substitute for examining authoritative evidence.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida associated criticism of taqlid with projects of religious and educational reform. The term could now serve as a diagnosis of intellectual rigidity extending beyond technical law. Reformist discourse called for renewed engagement with revelation and reconsideration of inherited rulings. Different reformers nevertheless disagreed over the scope of reason, the authority of hadith, and the relationship between legal change and modern institutions.

Movements associated with Salafism and South Asian Ahl-i Hadith traditions also challenged obligatory attachment to a particular Sunni school. Other South Asian traditions defended school adherence as a safeguard against inadequately trained interpretation. Deobandi and Barelwi scholars, despite disagreements on other questions, generally operated within Hanafi jurisprudence. The disagreement was therefore not between one side possessing scholarship and another rejecting it, but between competing arrangements of scholarly authority and textual interpretation.

State codification altered the issue in another way. The Ottoman Mecelle, compiled between 1869 and 1876, organized substantial portions of Hanafi private law into code form. Later legislation sometimes selected positions from multiple schools. Egypt’s personal-status legislation of 1920 and 1929, for example, used doctrinal resources beyond the dominant Hanafi tradition to reform particular rules. Such measures made the selection of authoritative law partly a legislative process.

Codification could reduce a judge’s need to choose among school opinions while increasing the importance of the state’s prior choice. It therefore did not simply replace taqlid with unrestricted ijtihad. Instead, legal authority was redistributed among jurists, ministries, legislatures, courts, and drafting committees. A rule could remain rooted in classical jurisprudence while acquiring binding force through legislation rather than through an individual litigant’s or judge’s school affiliation.

Historical interpretation and contemporary authority

Modern scholarship has reassessed the widespread narrative that an early period of ijtihad ended with the “closing of the gate of ijtihad,” after which taqlid supposedly produced centuries of stagnation. Joseph Schacht’s influential twentieth-century account helped establish a broad contrast between formative legal creativity and later consolidation. Wael Hallaq’s 1984 article “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” challenged the historical basis of treating closure as a general, settled event. Subsequent research has examined the continuing interpretive work of jurists, judges, and muftis within school traditions.

This reassessment does not mean that every later jurist claimed unrestricted independence or that school boundaries imposed no constraints. It changes the questions asked of the evidence. Commentaries, abridgments, glosses, and fatwa collections cannot be assumed to contain mere repetition because of their literary form. A commentary might redefine a technical distinction, resolve conflicting precedents, or adjust the application of an inherited rule. Innovation could occur through argument about authoritative texts rather than through explicit repudiation of them.

The problem also concerns translation. “Imitation” emphasizes reproduction; “conformity” suggests submission to an established standard; “deference” highlights an epistemic relationship between persons of unequal expertise. Each may capture part of taqlid in a particular setting. Historical analysis must identify who is following whom, in what domain, with what degree of competence, and under which institutional conditions. Without those specifications, the term can become an explanation for practices that it merely labels.

From the perspective of social epistemology, taqlid raises the general problem of dependence on expertise. A nonspecialist cannot independently verify every premise used by a legal specialist, yet still needs grounds for identifying trustworthy advice. The relevant questions concern competence, accountability, disagreement among experts, and the limits of delegated judgment. Reliance on authority is therefore not automatically the fallacy of an unsupported appeal to authority, although the invocation of prestige alone does not establish a claim.

Print, broadcasting, and the internet have changed how such authority is encountered. Believers can compare rulings from distant institutions, follow a marjaʿ across national borders, or consult scholars outside their local school. Quoting evidence has also become easier, while evaluating the authenticity, context, and legal implications of that evidence remains a specialized activity. Greater access to texts can accordingly challenge established intermediaries without removing the need for interpretation.

Contemporary collective legal bodies add a further institutional form. Councils addressing finance, bioethics, or new technologies may combine juristic expertise with technical information supplied by specialists in other fields. Their deliberations are sometimes described as collective ijtihad, but users who accept the resulting rulings still face questions of qualified reliance. The pertinent distinction is between the reasoning through which an institution produces a judgment and the grounds on which a nonspecialist accepts that judgment.