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Sense and Reference

Sense and reference distinguish how an expression presents its subject from what it designates, explaining informative identities, meaningful non-referring expressions, and differences in belief reports.

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Sense and reference are two aspects of linguistic meaning distinguished by Gottlob Frege, most explicitly in his 1892 essay “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” usually translated as “On Sense and Reference.” An expression’s reference is what it designates; its sense is the way that reference is presented. Two expressions can therefore designate the same thing while differing in cognitive significance. The distinction became foundational in philosophy of language and analytic philosophy, particularly in discussions of identity, meaning, and the representation of thought.

Terminology and scope

Frege’s German terms are Sinn and Bedeutung. Sinn is conventionally translated as “sense,” whereas Bedeutung has been translated as “reference,” “meaning,” or “denotation.” Because “meaning” in ordinary English covers more than Frege’s technical notion of Bedeutung, translations using that word require care.

“Reference” can mean either the relation between an expression and what it designates or, especially when explaining Frege, the designated entity itself. “Referent” more specifically names that entity.

Frege applies the distinction not only to names but also to complete declarative sentences and, with important technical qualifications, to expressions for functions and concepts. His account therefore concerns the semantic organization of language rather than merely the naming of objects.

The puzzle of informative identity

The central motivation is a puzzle about identity statements. Compare:

a=aa=a

and

a=b.a=b.

The first appears trivially knowable without investigation. The second, when true, can communicate a discovery. Yet if aa and bb designate the same object, an account of meaning based solely on their referents seems unable to explain the difference.

Frege’s familiar example concerns “the morning star” and “the evening star.” Both designate Venus, but they present it differently: as the conspicuous celestial object observed in the morning and as the one observed in the evening. Learning that the morning star is the evening star connects two previously distinguishable ways of identifying one object.

The distinction is therefore:

  • Same reference: both expressions designate Venus.
  • Different senses: they present Venus in different ways.
  • Informative identity: the statement reveals that the two presentations converge on one object.

The example illustrates a contrast in cognitive significance, not a difference between two celestial objects. The astronomical discovery concerns the world, even though its informativeness depends on how that world is presented in thought.

This problem connects the theory of meaning with epistemology: what someone can learn from a statement depends on more than which objects its words designate.

Sense as a mode of presentation

A sense is often described as a “mode of presentation” of a referent. Understanding an expression involves grasping such a mode of presentation, not merely encountering the object to which the expression refers.

Sense is not a private mental image

Frege distinguishes sense from the subjective images, memories, or feelings that a word may evoke. Different people can associate different images with the same expression while understanding it in the same way. Senses are intended to be publicly shareable, making communication and disagreement possible.

In his broader philosophy, Frege treats thoughts as objective rather than as private psychological episodes. This position connects his semantics with questions in philosophy of mind and ontology, although accepting a distinction between presentation and reference does not by itself require accepting Frege’s account of abstract entities.

Sense determines reference

In Frege’s framework, a sense determines a reference when there is one. The converse does not hold: one referent can be presented through different senses.

“Determines” expresses a semantic relationship, not a guarantee that every speaker can successfully locate or recognize the referent. Nor does grasping a sense guarantee that an appropriate referent exists.

Sense is not simply a dictionary definition

Frege’s notion should not be identified without qualification with a verbal definition or a uniquely identifying description. Descriptions provide useful examples of modes of presentation, and Frege sometimes explains names through associated descriptions. Nevertheless, whether all senses can be specified descriptively, and how the senses of ordinary proper names should be understood, remain interpretive questions.

The Fregean distinction is consequently broader than the claim that every proper name is an abbreviation for a description.

Sentences: thoughts and truth-values

Frege extends the distinction to complete declarative sentences:

Expression Sense Reference
A singular term, in an ordinary referring use A mode of presentation An object
A complete declarative sentence A thought A truth-value

A sentence’s sense is the thought it expresses. This is an objective content that can be grasped, accepted, or rejected, rather than the psychological act of thinking. It is closely related to what later philosophers call a proposition, though theories of propositions differ substantially.

A sentence’s reference, in Frege’s technical account, is one of two objects: the True or the False. These truth-values are central to his treatment of truth and logic.

This yields a striking result: all true sentences have the same reference, and all false sentences have the same reference. “Venus is a planet” and “Two plus two equals four” express different thoughts but have the same truth-value.

The claim does not mean that all true sentences mean the same thing. Their different senses preserve their different contents.

Compositionality and substitution

The distinction operates within a broadly compositional account of language: the semantic contribution of a complex expression depends on the contributions of its parts and their combination.

In ordinary extensional contexts, replacing a term with another term having the same reference preserves the reference of the whole expression. For a complete sentence, this means preserving its truth-value.

For example, if “the morning star” and “the evening star” refer to Venus, replacing one with the other in a straightforward astronomical predication preserves truth. The resulting sentences may nevertheless express different thoughts because their component expressions have different senses.

This separates two questions:

  1. Does substitution preserve truth?
  2. Does substitution preserve cognitive content?

Frege’s answer is that preservation of reference need not preserve sense.

Belief reports and indirect reference

The distinction becomes especially important in reports of belief, knowledge, and other propositional attitudes. Someone may accept:

The morning star is visible before sunrise.

while failing to accept:

The evening star is visible before sunrise.

This can happen if the person does not know that both expressions designate Venus. Reports of what that person believes cannot therefore always substitute the expressions without changing truth-value.

Such environments are commonly called referentially opaque contexts. Frege’s explanation is that expressions in indirect discourse can have an indirect reference: instead of designating their customary referents, they designate their customary senses.

Thus, in the relevant reading of “Mira believes that the morning star is visible,” the embedded clause refers to the thought that Mira is said to believe, rather than merely to a truth-value. Differences between the ordinary senses of “the morning star” and “the evening star” can consequently affect whether the belief report is true.

This solution preserves a systematic relationship between substitution and reference, but it introduces further questions. Nested reports—such as statements about what one person believes another person believes—require increasingly complex treatment. Whether Frege’s account adequately captures ordinary belief attribution remains disputed.

Expressions without reference

The distinction also explains how an expression can be intelligible without designating anything.

A phrase such as “the largest prime number” can have a graspable sense even though no largest prime number exists. Likewise, a fictional name may occur in discourse that readers understand without designating an actual person.

Frege discusses the possibility that “Odysseus” has a sense while lacking a reference. His point is not that the historical status of Odysseus has been settled by semantics, but that understanding the name need not establish the existence of its bearer.

For ordinary assertoric sentences, Frege holds that a constituent singular term’s failure of reference can prevent the whole sentence from having a truth-value. This differs from automatically classifying every such sentence as false.

The result creates difficulties for fictional discourse and negative existential statements such as “Odysseus does not exist.” Later approaches, including free logic and theories of fictional objects, offer different treatments of reference failure.

Related distinctions and later developments

Russell’s theory of descriptions

Bertrand Russell addressed several of the same problems through his theory of descriptions. On Russell’s analysis, a definite description such as “the present king of France” is not fundamentally a name standing for an object. A sentence containing it is analyzed through claims about existence, uniqueness, and predication.

This allows Russell to analyze sentences containing empty descriptions without adopting Frege’s treatment of those descriptions as singular terms with sense but no reference. The disagreement concerns both semantic structure and the logical form of apparently simple statements.

Intension and extension

Rudolf Carnap developed a related distinction between intension and extension. In many later semantic frameworks, an intension is modeled through the extensions an expression has across possible worlds.

This resembles the sense–reference distinction but does not reproduce it exactly. Two sentences may have the same truth-value in every possible world while differing in cognitive significance. Ordinary possible-world intensions can therefore be too coarse-grained to capture everything Frege intended senses to explain.

Direct-reference theories

Saul Kripke challenged descriptive theories of proper names and introduced influential arguments concerning rigid designation. A rigid designator designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. Many descriptions, by contrast, identify whichever object satisfies them in a given world.

Direct-reference theories hold, in different forms, that a name’s contribution to propositional content is its bearer rather than a descriptive sense. Such theories must still explain why co-referring names can differ in informativeness and why substitution can fail in attitude reports. Rejecting Fregean senses does not eliminate the phenomena they were introduced to explain.

Context-sensitive expressions

Expressions such as “I,” “here,” and “now” show that linguistic meaning must also account for context. Different speakers can use “I” with different referents despite using the same linguistic expression.

Later theories of indexicality distinguish stable linguistic rules from the contents produced in particular contexts. These distinctions intersect with Frege’s account but cannot simply be identified with sense and reference.

Continuing questions

Several issues remain central to debates about the distinction:

  • Identity of senses: What makes two senses the same or different? Cognitive significance motivates the distinction but does not automatically provide a precise criterion.
  • Public meaning and individual understanding: If speakers associate different identifying information with a name, it is difficult to specify what shared sense, if any, they grasp.
  • Informational granularity: A semantic theory may identify expressions that are equivalent in truth conditions even when a reasoner does not recognize their equivalence.
  • Attitude reports: Reports of belief and knowledge are sensitive not only to reference but also to presentation, context, and standards of attribution.
  • Ontological commitment: Frege’s objective thoughts and senses raise questions about the status of abstract entities and how thinkers apprehend them.

These questions distinguish the broad insight that reference does not exhaust cognitive significance from the stronger claim that Frege’s particular theory supplies the correct explanation.