Myanmar

Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a sovereign state on the western edge of mainland Southeast Asia. It borders China, India, Bangladesh and Thailand, and its coastline faces the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Its terrain runs from high mountain ranges in the north and west to a broad central river basin and a large tidal delta on the south coast. Because of this varied geography, the country has a wide range of ecosystems, from tropical forests and mangroves to dry zones in the central lowlands. Its position between South Asia and East Asia has shaped its history, trade routes and religious and cultural ties.

The country matters for several reasons. Its rivers, especially the Irrawaddy, have long supported farming and settlement, and its forests and coasts are among the most biologically diverse in the region. It also holds significant mineral and energy resources. Since the military takeover of February 2021, the country has been affected by an armed conflict that has caused large-scale displacement and humanitarian need, and it has drawn attention from neighbouring states and international bodies. Its politics, economy and foreign relations are therefore closely tied to the wider region.

The entry first describes the country's physical setting, including its geology, rivers, climate, ecosystems and natural resources. It then covers its people and history, from early kingdoms and British colonial rule to independence and the post-2021 period. The later sections address government, armed conflict, foreign relations, economy, agriculture, infrastructure, social services, culture and urbanization.

Name, location and borders

“Burma” and “Myanmar” derive from different registers of the same Burmese name: Bama is the colloquial form, while Myanma is the literary form. Burma was the official English-language name at independence in 1948; the Burmese-language declaration already used Myanma. In 1989, the military government changed the official English name from Union of Burma to Union of Myanmar. The United Nations records notification of the change on 18 June 1989, and the adoption of the present formal title, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, on 30 March 2011. The change therefore concerned English usage rather than the introduction of an entirely new Burmese name. (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk)

Both names remain in use because linguistic convention became intertwined with disagreement over the authority of the military government to rename the country. Some opposition organizations and foreign governments retained “Burma” rather than accept the 1989 change; the United Nations adopted “Myanmar”. Usage has subsequently evolved: in 2019, the United Kingdom changed its official short-name convention from “Burma” to “Myanmar (Burma)”, while retaining Republic of the Union of Myanmar as the formal state title. The two English names thus identify the same country, not different territories or successive states. (press-files.anu.edu.au)

Myanmar occupies the northwestern part of mainland Southeast Asia, between approximately 9°32′ and 28°31′ north latitude and 92°10′ and 101°11′ east longitude. Its five land neighbours are Bangladesh and India to the west and northwest, China to the north and northeast, and Laos and Thailand to the east and southeast. Its total territorial area is 676,578 square kilometres. The country extends roughly 2,050 kilometres from north to south and about 940 kilometres at its greatest east–west span. A broad northern and central body narrows southward into the elongated Tanintharyi coastal strip beside Thailand, reaching towards the Malay Peninsula. (myanmar.gov.mm)

The western and southern coasts face the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. The Food and Agriculture Organization gives a coastline estimate of 2,832 kilometres. Myanmar shares maritime boundaries with Bangladesh, India and Thailand: the boundary with Thailand was established by an agreement signed on 25 July 1980, and that with India by an agreement of 23 December 1986 covering the Andaman Sea, Coco Channel and Bay of Bengal. A trilateral agreement signed on 27 October 1993 fixed the India–Myanmar–Thailand maritime junction. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea delimited the Bangladesh–Myanmar boundary in the Bay of Bengal in its judgment of 14 March 2012. (fao.org)

The principal administrative units are seven regions, seven states and the Naypyitaw Union Territory. The regions are Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon; the states are Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. Naypyitaw, also written Nay Pyi Taw, contains the national capital and is administratively separate from the surrounding states and regions. The Union Territory covers 7,054 square kilometres and comprises eight townships; it borders Mandalay, Magway and Bago regions and Shan and Kayin states. (myanmarbsb.org)

Geological setting and relief

Myanmar occupies the southeastern margin of the Indian–Eurasian collision zone, where plate tectonics combines continental convergence, oceanic subduction and lateral movement along faults. At Myanmar’s latitude, the Indian plate moves relative to the Sunda block, part of the broader Eurasian plate system, at approximately 30–40 mm per year. Its motion is oblique to the western plate boundary: shortening is accommodated by subduction and thrusting beneath the Indo-Burman Ranges, while much of the northward component is taken up by the Sagaing Fault farther east. Between these boundaries lies the elongated Burma microplate, also called the Burma sliver. Both boundary systems converge northward toward the eastern Himalayan syntaxis, the sharp bend at the eastern end of the Himalayas. (doi.org)

The western mountains record successive episodes of sediment deposition, compression and mountain building, rather than a single uplift event. The Indo-Burman belt includes the Naga and Chin hills and the southern Arakan Yoma, also called Rakhine Yoma. Its western sector contains predominantly Cenozoic sedimentary rocks folded and displaced by thrust faults; farther east are strongly deformed Triassic deep-water sediments, metamorphic rocks and ophiolitic assemblages—fragments of former oceanic crust and mantle incorporated into the mountain belt. These structures contrast with the central sedimentary basins and the older continental rocks of the Shan Plateau, whose geological basement belongs to the Sibumasu terrane. Their contrasting landscapes are treated separately under physiographic regions. (ora.ox.ac.uk)

The highest relief occurs in the far north, near the eastern Himalayan syntaxis. Hkakabo Razi is conventionally assigned an elevation of 5,881 m, derived from the 1925 Survey of India, rather than a modern summit measurement. Nearby Gamlang Razi was climbed on September 7, 2013, by a Myanmar–American expedition led by Andy Tyson; processed summit GPS observations gave an elevation of $5,870 \pm 2$ m. The small difference between this measurement and Hkakabo Razi’s historical figure, together with uncertainty in the latter, makes the precise ranking of the two peaks unresolved. Both stand within the high, glaciated mountain terrain of northern Myanmar. (publications.americanalpineclub.org)

The Sagaing Fault is the principal active fault through central Myanmar. It is a right-lateral strike-slip system extending approximately 1,400 km from the Andaman region toward the northern collision zone and accommodating about 20 mm of movement annually. Its proximity to Mandalay and other central settlements makes it a major source of earthquake exposure. On March 28, 2025, the magnitude $M_w 7.7$ Mandalay earthquake ruptured approximately 475 km of the fault; published analysis identified exceptionally rapid, supershear rupture, in which the rupture front outran seismic shear waves. Earthquake sources are not confined to Sagaing: the western subduction boundary and associated thrusts accommodate compression, while networks of right- and left-lateral faults deform the Shan Plateau. (doi.org)

Subduction also produced a magmatic belt in central Myanmar. Mount Popa consists of overlapping basaltic and basaltic-andesite lava flows, pyroclastic deposits and scoria. A major slope collapse breached its crater northwestward and generated a debris-avalanche deposit estimated at 3 cubic kilometres. A 2018 volcanological study placed its last eruption approximately 8,000 calibrated years before present, using the relationship between volcanic deposits and an underlying radiocarbon-dated soil; the frequently repeated account of an eruption in 442 BCE has no corresponding physical evidence. Mineral formation reflects several distinct geological processes: northern Myanmar’s jadeitite crystallized from subduction-related fluids associated with serpentinite, whereas Mogok ruby and spinel formed in metamorphosed carbonate rocks, principally marble. Granitic magmatism and successive collisional events also contributed to tin–tungsten mineralization, linking the distribution of deposits to Myanmar’s tectonic belts rather than to present-day administrative boundaries. (volcano.si.edu)

Physiographic regions

The western mountain belt comprises the Patkai Range, Naga Hills, Chin Hills and, farther south, the Rakhine Mountains, also called the Arakan Yoma. These predominantly north–south ranges separate the interior lowlands from the narrow coastal strip facing the Bay of Bengal. Their average elevation is approximately 1,800 metres, with some summits exceeding 3,000 metres. The Rakhine coastal plain is therefore a distinct physiographic corridor rather than a westward continuation of the central basin. (unvis.it) The mountains also create a marked climatic divide: moisture-bearing southwest monsoon winds rise over their seaward slopes, cool and release rainfall, leaving substantially less moisture available to the interior. This barrier helps explain the contrast between the wet western coast and the central dry zone; it reduces inland rainfall rather than excluding monsoon weather altogether. (openknowledge.fao.org)

The Shan Plateau forms the principal eastern upland, with an average elevation of about 900 metres. Its western edge rises sharply above the central basin, locally through an escarpment approximately 600 metres high. Despite its name, the plateau is not a continuous level surface: it is deeply dissected into mountain ridges, steep valleys and intervening basins. Southward, the eastern highland system continues into the Dawna and Tanintharyi ranges. (unvis.it) Inle Lake provides a characteristic example of an upland basin: it lies at approximately 884 metres above sea level, between mountain ranges on its eastern and western sides. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) Elevation gives the plateau generally cooler conditions than the central plains. An FAO field study illustrates the transition near its western margin: Pyinyaung receives approximately 1,450 millimetres of rain annually, compared with about 750–880 millimetres around lower-lying Meiktila. Such contrasts distinguish the uplands from the adjacent dry zone without implying a uniform climate across the plateau. (openknowledge.fao.org)

The central basin occupies the broad interior between the western ranges and the Shan Plateau. Around Mandalay and Bagan, its landscape combines river plains, low sedimentary hills and isolated uplands rather than forming an entirely flat depression. The Irrawaddy, Chindwin and Sittaung occupy valleys cut into older sedimentary formations and subsequently mantled with alluvium; the Bago Mountains divide the larger Irrawaddy valley from the smaller Sittaung valley. (unvis.it) The central dry zone extends through parts of Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway, with annual rainfall generally below 1,000 millimetres. It is a climatic subdivision of the lowland basin, not a separate mountain-bounded basin. (fao.org) Mount Popa and the volcanic landforms around Monywa interrupt the lowland relief, while farther south the interior corridor broadens towards the delta plains. (kahaku.go.jp)

Tanintharyi constitutes a narrow southern coastal region between the Andaman Sea and the uplands adjoining Thailand. Its relief juxtaposes elongated mountain ranges, narrow valleys, coastal lowlands and offshore islands, rather than a broad plain comparable to the central basin. (myanmar.gov.mm) The Myeik Archipelago, also known as the Mergui Archipelago, contains approximately 800 islands, ranging from small rocky outcrops to substantial forested islands. A 2018 Fauna & Flora survey describes an overall north–south geological alignment, with predominantly granitic outer islands and many limestone islands nearer the mainland. Kyunsu, or King Island, covers approximately 45,000 hectares, while its French Bay Peak reaches 764 metres. These elevated islands make the southern coastal region a landscape of substantial terrestrial relief interspersed with marine channels, not simply a chain of low coral islands. (fauna-flora.org)

Rivers, drainage basins and deltas

The Irrawaddy, also called the Ayeyarwady, is Myanmar’s principal river system. Its drainage basin covers approximately 412,500 square kilometres, about nine-tenths within Myanmar and the remainder in China and India. The main river forms at the confluence of the Mali and N’mai rivers in northern Myanmar and flows south through the central basin to the Andaman Sea. Its largest tributary, the Chindwin, drains roughly 97,000 square kilometres, collecting runoff from the northwestern mountains and the Hukawng Valley. The Myitnge and Shweli drain substantial parts of the eastern uplands. These tributaries connect high-rainfall mountain catchments with the comparatively dry central lowlands, so river discharge there depends on rainfall far beyond the immediate valley. (ifc.org)

The Salween, known in Myanmar as the Thanlwin and in China as the Nujiang, drains a separate, predominantly mountainous basin shared by China, Myanmar and Thailand. It descends from the Tibetan Plateau through Yunnan and eastern Myanmar before reaching the Gulf of Martaban, or Mottama. Its confined valleys contrast with the extensive alluvial reaches of the Irrawaddy. Between the two systems, the Sittaung flows south between the Bago Mountains and Shan Plateau; a 2017 basin assessment estimated its catchment at approximately 34,950 square kilometres. Smaller systems, including the Bago, Bilin and Tanintharyi, also drain towards the Andaman Sea, whereas rivers on the western side of the Rakhine ranges discharge into the Bay of Bengal. (ifc.org)

The Irrawaddy delta is a low-lying network of distributary channels, floodplains and tidal waterways built by sediment accumulated from the upstream basin. Population density exceeds 180 inhabitants per square kilometre in the delta region, according to an IFC basin-planning document, substantially above that of the northern headwaters. The delta is not simply a zone where river sediment settles permanently: tides and coastal currents redistribute material between channel mouths, nearshore waters and the continental shelf. Tidal ranges are approximately 2–4 metres along the western river mouths and reach about 7 metres in the Gulf of Martaban to the east. Strong currents repeatedly resuspend fine sediment, while part of the Irrawaddy’s sediment supply travels eastward into the gulf rather than building land immediately beside its own mouths. (ifc.org)

The southwest monsoon produces pronounced seasonal changes in discharge and sediment transport. Regional studies attribute roughly 80–90 per cent of annual runoff and sediment discharge to May–October. High flows inundate low-gradient floodplains, erode banks and remobilize sediment previously stored in channels and alluvial basins. A study by Jotautas Baronas and colleagues estimated annual suspended-sediment exports of approximately 326 million tonnes for the Irrawaddy and 159 million tonnes for the Salween, with substantial uncertainty around both values. Transport also reverses seasonally near the coast: observations of Irrawaddy distributaries found sediment export during rainy-season high flows, but retention of sediment brought landward from offshore during low-flow conditions. (frontiersin.org)

Changes in river flow affect both inland flooding and coastal channel geometry. In the Sittaung estuary, the funnel-shaped Gulf of Martaban amplifies tides and generates tidal bores; the interaction of these tides with seasonal river discharge shifts channels and erodes banks. Reservoir regulation introduces another mechanism of change upstream: storage can alter the timing and extent of floodplain inundation, while sediment trapped behind dams reduces downstream deposition. Myanmar’s 2017 geomorphological assessment also identified land-cover change, water abstraction and sand-and-gravel extraction as influences on channel stability and sediment budgets, distinguishing these basin-scale pressures from the natural annual flood cycle. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

Climate and monsoon regime

Myanmar has a tropical to subtropical climate governed by the seasonal reversal of monsoon winds. Three seasons are commonly distinguished: a hot, dry inter-monsoon period from approximately mid-February to mid-May; the rainy southwest monsoon from mid-May to late October; and a cooler, relatively dry northeast monsoon from late October to mid-February. Southwest winds carry maritime moisture inland, whereas the northeast monsoon brings comparatively dry continental air. A United Nations-supported meteorological training manual estimates that May–October rainfall supplies about 95% of the national annual total. Altitude modifies this seasonal pattern: highland temperatures can approach or fall below freezing during the cool season, while the southern lowlands experience smaller seasonal temperature differences. (www4.unfccc.int)

Rainfall varies sharply across the country because mountain barriers redistribute monsoon moisture. The southern and Rakhine coastal regions receive approximately 2,500–5,500 mm annually, compared with only 500–1,000 mm in the Central Dry Zone. The western mountains produce a rain shadow, intercepting moisture-bearing winds before they reach the central basin. The resulting semi-arid conditions are therefore not simply a consequence of latitude or distance from the sea. Rainfall timing also differs: much of Myanmar has a principal peak in July or August, whereas the dry zone commonly has two peaks, in May–June and August–September. Hot-season maximum temperatures there can reach 40–43°C. Low annual rainfall, intervening dry spells and high temperatures make drought an important hazard even during the nominal rainy season. (www4.unfccc.int)

The Bay of Bengal exposes the coast to tropical cyclones, particularly before and after the southwest monsoon, in April–May and October–November. Cyclone Nargis crossed the coast near the southern Ayeyarwady delta on the evening of 2 May 2008, subsequently moving through southern Yangon and Bago. Its onshore winds piled seawater against the shallow delta coast, generating a storm surge reported at approximately 3–5 m. A World Meteorological Organization mission identified storm surge as the principal cause of destruction and loss of life, reporting about 84,000 deaths and 54,000 missing people. The delta’s low elevation, numerous waterways and limited access to high ground increased exposure to inundation. (moezala.gov.mm)

Observed climate change includes warming and geographically uneven rainfall trends. A Met Office assessment reports warming of approximately 0.2–0.4°C per decade across Myanmar during 1980–2015. Recent precipitation trends show drying in northern Myanmar, especially at higher elevations, but wetting in the south; these contrasting changes cannot be represented adequately by a single national rainfall trend. Model projections consistently indicate further warming. A 2020 study using three climate models projected national mean annual temperatures in 2050 to be 1.1–2.0°C above the 1960–2000 baseline under the low-emissions RCP2.6 pathway, and 1.7–3.0°C higher under the high-emissions RCP8.5 pathway. The ranges reflect differences among models, rather than a precise prediction for an individual year. (metoffice.gov.uk)

Future rainfall changes are less certain than warming, although the Met Office assessment assigns medium confidence to increasing average rainfall in both northern and southern Myanmar, mainly during the monsoon. More intense rainfall can increase flash-flood risk, while central Myanmar may also experience longer dry spells; higher seasonal totals do not necessarily imply more reliable water availability. Along the coast, continued sea-level rise adds to the background water level on which tides and cyclone surges act. Projections therefore distinguish several interacting hazards—heat, drought, intense rainfall and coastal inundation—rather than treating climate change as a uniform increase in rainfall or cyclone frequency. (metoffice.gov.uk)

Ecosystems and biodiversity

Myanmar’s forests range from tropical evergreen formations to temperate woodland and alpine vegetation. Lowland evergreen forests, particularly in Tanintharyi, contain species-rich tree communities dominated by dipterocarps. Mixed deciduous forests around the central basin and its surrounding hills include teak (Tectona grandis), pyinkado (Xylia xylocarpa) and bamboo. The drier central lowlands support open indaing forest, dominated by Dipterocarpus tuberculatus, with a grassy understorey. Northern mountains contain oak and conifer forests, grading into subalpine woodland and alpine meadows at higher elevations. These differences in vegetation reflect rainfall, seasonality and altitude rather than a single, uniform tropical forest environment. (cbd.int)

Coastal mangroves occur principally in Rakhine, the Ayeyawady delta and Tanintharyi. Brackish wetlands provide spawning, nursery and feeding grounds for fish and prawns, while intertidal mudflats support migratory waterbirds. Offshore, the approximately 800 islands of the Myeik Archipelago combine evergreen island forests, mangroves, coral reefs and seagrass beds. These habitats support different stages of marine organisms’ life cycles: seagrass provides forage for dugongs and sea turtles, while island forests support birds moving between islands, including the plain-pouched hornbill. Myanmar’s 2014 submission to UNESCO recorded 228 bird species and 11 seagrass species in Lampi Island Marine National Park, illustrating the close association between terrestrial and marine diversity. (cbd.int)

Myanmar contains important parts of the Indo-Burma biodiversity hotspot, with distinctive concentrations of endemic species. Central dry-zone examples include the Burmese star tortoise, hooded treepie and Burmese bushlark; the white-browed nuthatch is restricted to the southern Chin Hills. (cbd.int) Scientific descriptions continue to reveal previously unrecognized diversity. In 2020, Christian Roos and colleagues described the Popa langur (Trachypithecus popa) using genetic and morphological evidence, including DNA from a museum specimen collected more than a century earlier and samples obtained during fieldwork. The researchers estimated that only about 200–260 individuals remained in four populations in central Myanmar; this was an estimate accompanying the species’ description, not a subsequent national census. (eurekalert.org)

Conservation planning also operates at the scale of connected landscapes. The Tanintharyi Forest Corridor lies in the transition between Indochinese and Sundaic biotas and provides habitat for Asian elephants, Sunda pangolins and Gurney’s pittas. Myanmar’s 2014 UNESCO tentative-list submission outlined a potential corridor of approximately one million hectares extending about 280 km north–south. It included a 65-km gap between proposed conservation areas and connections to protected forests in Thailand. The proposal explicitly sought to connect animal populations across a continuous landscape and retain routes along which species could shift their ranges under climate change; the proposed corridor should not be confused with a single legally designated national park. (whc.unesco.org)

The protected-area network includes marine, forest and freshwater systems. Lampi Island Marine National Park was designated in 1996. Indawgyi became a UNESCO biosphere reserve in 2017, encompassing a 12,000-hectare lake, surrounding wetlands and a forested watershed. Its seasonally flooded grasslands provide habitat for hog deer, while surrounding forests support eastern hoolock gibbons and Shortridge’s langurs. (whc.unesco.org) A Convention on Biological Diversity assessment reported national terrestrial protected-area coverage of 40,764.71 square kilometres, or 6.02%, in July 2021. Its analysis of 122 mapped Key Biodiversity Areas found 78 with less than 2% protected coverage, demonstrating that designated area alone did not ensure adequate representation of important habitats. (cbd.int)

Conservation pressures differ between environments. Agricultural conversion, fuelwood collection and hunting affect terrestrial habitats, while destructive fishing directly damages marine ecosystems. (cbd.int) The 2014 Myeik submission documented dynamite fishing, illegal trawling and unregulated tourism development, alongside limited management capacity and incomplete biological surveys. Explosive fishing destroys reef structure as well as killing fish, reducing the habitat available to other reef organisms. Uncertainty over coral inventories in that submission—with estimates ranging from 95 to more than 500 species—also illustrates the uneven survey coverage across the archipelago. (whc.unesco.org)

Natural resources and environmental pressures

Teak extraction became a major commercial industry during British colonial rule. In 1856, the forester Dietrich Brandis took charge of the Bago forests and developed yield calculations based on tree growth and inventories. His methods formed the basis of the Myanmar Selection System, adopted under that name in 1920. Rather than clear-felling entire stands, the system divides a managed forest into 30 blocks, with selective harvesting in one block each year and minimum tree-size thresholds. Mature teak was traditionally girdled and left standing for three years before extraction, allowing the timber to dry sufficiently for transport by flotation along rivers. These controls did not prevent subsequent overexploitation: Myanmar introduced a raw-log export ban in 2014, a temporary nationwide logging suspension in 2016–2017, and a ten-year logging ban in Bago Yoma. (fao.org)

Mineral extraction includes copper, tin, tungsten, antimony, nickel and rare-earth elements, alongside valuable gemstones. The United States Geological Survey estimated that Myanmar accounted for 7.1% of global rare-earth production and 6.8% of tin production in 2024. Jade extraction is concentrated around Hpakant in Kachin State, while Mogok is an important ruby-producing district. Mechanized jade mining has greatly increased the scale of excavation and waste disposal. In a 2015 investigation, Global Witness estimated the value of Myanmar’s jade production in 2014 at up to US$31 billion; this was an estimated production value, not recorded export earnings or government revenue. The organization also documented opaque ownership structures and substantial differences between the industry’s estimated value and the income reaching public accounts. (usgs.gov)

Offshore natural gas provides export earnings and state income. Major developments include Yadana, Yetagun and Zawtika, associated with exports to Thailand, and Shwe, whose export pipeline supplies China. Yadana began production in 1998. Government receipts arise through the state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise’s participation in production and sales, alongside other fiscal payments. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s commodity-trading report recorded reconciled revenue from sales of the government’s oil and gas share of approximately 1.179 trillion kyat, or US$900 million, in 2017–2018—about 60% of reported extractive-sector revenue. TotalEnergies completed its withdrawal from Yadana in July 2022, transferring operatorship to Thailand’s PTTEP. (journal.jogmec.go.jp)

Deforestation reflects both timber removal and conversion to other land uses. The World Bank’s 2019 environmental assessment reported a loss of approximately 10 million hectares of forest between 1990 and 2015, averaging 1.2% annually. Identified drivers included agricultural expansion, mining, roads, dams and reservoirs; fuelwood demand also placed substantial pressure on forest biomass. Forest degradation can precede complete clearance, as valuable trees are removed while some canopy remains. Clearing vegetation and disturbing soils also weaken watershed protection and increase the sediment burden carried into waterways, linking land-use change with downstream aquatic pressures. (worldbank.org)

Mining affects rivers through excavation, sediment release and chemical contamination. A World Bank-hosted assessment illustrated extensive mining disturbance along the Uyu, a tributary of the Chindwin, and identified mercury used in gold processing as a potential source of aquatic contamination. Copper-processing tailings and contaminated mine drainage create additional pathways for pollutants, while industrial discharge and urban waste add pressures beyond mining districts. Rare-earth extraction introduces a different mechanism: vegetation is removed, boreholes are drilled into hillsides, and ammonium sulphate solution is injected to leach minerals into collection pools. Global Witness’s satellite investigation identified more than 2,700 such pools at almost 300 locations in northeastern Myanmar in March 2022, documenting the expansion of disturbed and contaminated sites. (documents.worldbank.org)

Population, ethnic groups and languages

Myanmar’s population figures differ substantially between censuses and demographic projections. The 2014 Population and Housing Census, the first since 1983, reported approximately 51.5 million inhabitants, including estimates for people in areas that were not enumerated. The Department of Population’s 2024 census Union Report gives a total of 51,375,327: 32,183,599 people directly enumerated and 19,191,728 estimated for unenumerated areas. Thus, 37.4% of the reported population was estimated rather than counted. Coverage varied sharply: only 7.8% of the estimated population of Chin State was enumerated, compared with reported complete coverage in Yangon and Ayeyawady regions. By contrast, the United Nations World Statistics Pocketbook 2025 gives a projected population of 54.851 million for 2025. These figures have different reference dates and methods; the apparent stability between the two census totals does not, by itself, establish that the population stopped growing. (asiapacific.unfpa.org)

Declining fertility, regional differences in birth rates, and population movement are important features of Myanmar’s demography. Analysis of the 2014 census estimated a total fertility rate of 2.51 children per woman, with an urban rate of 1.91 and a rural rate of 2.78; the corresponding estimates ranged from 1.85 in Yangon to 5.00 in Chin State. Conflict since February 2021 has greatly increased forced movement within the country and across its borders. UNHCR estimated that, at the end of March 2026, Myanmar had 3.7 million internally displaced people, while 1.6 million refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar were outside the country. Internal displacement changes local population distributions without necessarily changing the national total, whereas international departures affect the resident population and complicate comparisons with earlier counts. (myanmar.unfpa.org)

The Bamar, also called Burmans, form the majority, conventionally estimated at roughly two-thirds of the population. They are concentrated principally in the central lowlands and delta, although neither these areas nor the border states are ethnically homogeneous. The official classification recognizes 135 “national races,” grouped under eight headings: Bamar, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. Kayin is also commonly called Karen, and Kayah is associated with the name Karenni. These administrative categories do not correspond one-to-one with languages: broad labels may encompass several linguistic communities, while speakers of a language can identify with different ethnic groups. Consequently, the official total should not be treated as an independently established count of distinct languages or self-defined peoples. (documents.un.org)

The Rohingya are not included in the official list of 135 groups, and their recognition and citizenship status remain contested. The consequences for population statistics were evident in 2014: despite an earlier agreement allowing respondents to identify their own ethnicity, people wishing to identify as Rohingya were not permitted to do so. UNFPA subsequently reported that an estimated 1.09 million such people had not been enumerated. Ethnic identity, citizenship and census coverage are therefore separate questions; omission from an enumeration does not mean that the omitted population was absent from the country. (documents.un.org)

Burmese, officially termed the Myanmar language, is the principal language of administration and the national school curriculum, and serves as the main lingua franca between communities. More than a hundred languages are spoken, although totals depend on how languages and dialects are distinguished. Major language families include Sino-Tibetan, encompassing Burmese and the Karen languages; Tai–Kadai, including Shan; and Austroasiatic, including Mon. Chin and Kachin are broad ethnolinguistic labels rather than names for single uniform languages. Community languages also include Mandarin and Cantonese, Bengali, Urdu and Tamil. Burmese-language schooling can create an additional learning barrier for children whose home language differs from the instructional language, as UNICEF documented in Chin State in 2019. (en.wikipedia.org)

The Burmese writing system belongs to the Brahmi-derived script tradition. It is written from left to right; consonant letters carry an inherent vowel, which additional signs modify, while medial signs represent intervening consonants. Related forms and extensions of the Myanmar script write Mon, Shan, several Karen languages, Kayah and Palaung, as well as Pali and Sanskrit. Shared script ancestry does not imply mutual intelligibility: Mon and Shan, for example, belong to different language families from Burmese. Their written forms require language-specific letters and signs, including distinct vowel and tone-marking conventions. (unicode.org)

Early kingdoms and precolonial history

The Pyu city-states developed in the Irrawaddy basin from approximately the second century BCE to the ninth century CE. Halin, Beikthano and Sri Ksetra preserve evidence of early urbanization: brick walls and moats enclosed settlements connected to extensive agricultural landscapes by canals, roads and reservoirs. Water management supported intensive cultivation in the seasonally dry interior, while workshops produced iron implements, pottery and objects of gold, silver and semi-precious stone. Contacts with India helped establish Buddhism, expressed through monumental brick stupas, monasteries and inscriptions. Pyu communities adapted imported religious and architectural traditions rather than simply reproducing them; distinctive burial practices included depositing cremated remains in urns within communal funerary structures. Trading connections linked their cities with India, China and other Southeast Asian centres, also providing routes for the transmission of Buddhist teachings. (whc.unesco.org)

Bagan, also known as Pagan, became the principal centre of an expanding kingdom during the eleventh century. Anawrahta, who came to the throne in 1044, strengthened its agricultural base by repairing and extending irrigation works and promoted Theravada Buddhism as a foundation of royal authority. Control of river transport helped the kingdom extend its influence along the Irrawaddy. Royal and private patronage channelled resources into temples, stupas and monasteries: religious merit-making reinforced the king’s position as chief donor and stimulated construction, which peaked in the thirteenth century. The archaeological landscape contains 3,595 recorded monuments, including religious structures, murals, sculptures and inscriptions. The Ananda temple, commissioned by Kyanzittha, exemplifies the development of large vaulted sanctuaries. During the late thirteenth century, pressure from the Mongol Empire coincided with the weakening of royal authority; by about 1300, Bagan was no longer the country’s political centre. (bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com)

Political authority subsequently divided among several kingdoms and principalities. Ava, founded in 1364 near the irrigated Kyaukse rice lands, became a major centre in Upper Myanmar, while the Mon kingdom based at Bago, often called Hanthawaddy, drew strength from coastal commerce. Shan principalities remained important across the eastern and northern uplands. In the sixteenth century, the Toungoo dynasty reunited much of the Irrawaddy basin. Tabinshwehti captured Bago in 1539 and transferred his capital there, securing access to maritime trade. His successor Bayinnaung extended military dominance over neighbouring territories, including Ayutthaya in present-day Thailand, which his forces conquered in 1569. Portuguese mercenaries and cannon contributed to these campaigns. The empire fragmented after his death in 1581, but Anaukpetlun restored control over much of Myanmar by 1613. The restored dynasty survived until forces from Bago captured Ava in 1752. (bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com)

Alaungpaya established the Konbaung dynasty in 1752 and defeated the revived Bago kingdom during the ensuing reunification campaigns. Its rulers continued wars over neighbouring kingdoms, frontier principalities and access to the southern coast. Under Hsinbyushin, Burmese armies captured Ayutthaya in 1767, ending that kingdom, although lasting control of Siam did not follow. Chinese invasions in the late 1760s were repelled. Subsequent expansion into Rakhine and Assam brought the kingdom into direct confrontation with British power in India; the resulting nineteenth-century wars and annexations belong to the colonial period. (bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com)

Precolonial trade connected inland agricultural centres, highland communities and Indian Ocean ports rather than operating solely within individual kingdoms. Bago’s ports attracted Chinese, Indian, Arab and Southeast Asian merchants, followed by Europeans, Persians and traders from northeastern Africa. Commodities included gems, teak, cotton, rice, sugar, cloth and cowrie shells. Mottama, historically called Martaban, and Twante manufactured durable glazed jars used aboard ships to store food, water and merchandise. River transport and overland routes linked these coastal exchanges to the interior and southwestern China. On the northern route, Bhamo served as a major market for caravans from Yunnan: Burmese cotton, jade and other products were exchanged for silk, tea, metals and manufactured goods. These networks linked maritime commerce with upland production and sustained commercial connections across shifting political boundaries. (britishmuseum.org)

Colonial period and independence

British conquest proceeded through three Anglo-Burmese Wars. The first, fought in 1824–1826 between the British East India Company and the Konbaung kingdom, followed disputes along the expanding kingdom’s frontier with British-controlled India. The Treaty of Yandabo ended the war in February 1826: Burma ceded Arakan and Tenasserim and relinquished claims over Assam and Manipur. The second war, in 1852, resulted in the Company’s annexation of Pegu, including Rangoon, leaving the monarchy without its principal maritime outlet. After the transfer of Company rule to the British Crown in 1858, the third war in November 1885 brought the occupation of Mandalay and the removal of King Thibaw. Upper Burma was formally annexed in 1886; armed resistance continued after the monarchy’s abolition. (britishmuseum.org)

The conquered territories were administered within British India, with British Burma constituted as a chief commissioner’s province in 1862. Colonial administration distinguished the directly governed lowlands from frontier territories, where arrangements involving hereditary rulers and separate administrative authorities persisted. This distinction later complicated the construction of a unified independent state. Nationalist opposition included the Saya San rebellion of 1930–1932 and campaigns for greater self-government. On 1 April 1937, Burma was separated from British India and became a separately administered Crown colony with limited parliamentary self-government; Ba Maw became its first prime minister. Separation changed its administrative relationship with India but did not end British sovereignty. (nam.ac.uk)

During World War II, Japan invaded Burma in 1942, assisted by the Burma Independence Army, whose leaders included Aung San and other nationalists trained with Japanese support. The occupation initially operated through a Japanese military administration. In August 1943, Japan proclaimed a nominally independent State of Burma under Ba Maw, while retaining decisive military control; Aung San served as defence minister. Nationalist, communist and socialist leaders subsequently organized anti-Japanese resistance. On 27 March 1945, Aung San led the Burma National Army in an uprising against the Japanese, coordinating its change of allegiance with the Allied advance. British-led forces recaptured Rangoon in May 1945, and British administration was restored rather than immediate independence granted. (ndl.ethernet.edu.et)

The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) became the principal vehicle for postwar independence negotiations. The Aung San–Attlee agreement of 27 January 1947 provided for an elected constituent assembly and a process through which Burma could achieve independence inside or outside the Commonwealth. On 12 February, Aung San and Shan, Kachin and Chin representatives signed the Panglong Agreement, accepting cooperation in forming an independent union and recognizing internal autonomy for the frontier areas in principle. It was not an agreement signed by representatives of every ethnic community. The AFPFL won the April constituent-assembly election, but Aung San and several colleagues were assassinated on 19 July 1947; U Nu then assumed leadership of the independence process. (hansard.parliament.uk)

The Union of Burma became independent on 4 January 1948 as a republic outside the Commonwealth, with Sao Shwe Thaik as president and U Nu as prime minister. The British Burma Independence Act, which received royal assent on 10 December 1947, terminated British sovereignty on that date. The 1947 constitution established a parliamentary system: the president was elected by the two parliamentary chambers sitting jointly and normally acted on government advice, while the cabinet was collectively responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The bicameral legislature also included a 125-member Chamber of Nationalities, providing representation for constituent territories and ethnic communities. (legislation.gov.uk)

The constitutional union combined ethnic recognition with substantial central authority. Shan, Kachin and Karenni states and a Chin Special Division received distinct arrangements; provision was also made for a Karen State. Shan and Karenni possessed a qualified right of secession, exercisable only after ten years and requiring a two-thirds vote in the relevant state council followed by a plebiscite; Kachin State was explicitly excluded from this mechanism. Communist and ethnic insurgencies challenged the government during its first years, but parliamentary elections were held in 1951–1952 and 1956, with the AFPFL remaining the dominant governing organization. (blc-burma.org)

Political transitions, 1962–2020

On 2 March 1962, General Ne Win overthrew Prime Minister U Nu’s elected government and established a Revolutionary Council of military officers. The “Burmese Way to Socialism” combined military control, economic nationalization and restrictions on foreign engagement. Major enterprises were transferred to state ownership, while independent political activity and the press were suppressed. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), established in 1962, became the sole legal party in 1964. A new constitution, implemented in 1974, replaced the Revolutionary Council with formally civilian institutions, including a People’s Assembly, but preserved one-party rule under Ne Win. State controls, economic deterioration and the expansion of black markets characterized the socialist period. (abc.net.au)

Economic grievances and political repression produced nationwide demonstrations in 1988. Students played a central role, and the general strike of 8 August gave the movement its designation, the “8888 Uprising.” Protesters demanded an end to one-party government and a transition to democracy; military suppression killed thousands. On 18 September, the armed forces established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of independence leader Aung San, emerged as a prominent opposition figure and helped found the National League for Democracy (NLD) on 27 September. Despite restrictions on its campaign and Suu Kyi’s detention, the NLD won 392 of 485 parliamentary seats in the May 1990 election. The military authorities did not transfer power, instead maintaining military rule and pursuing a constitution-drafting process. (britishcouncil.org.mm)

The subsequent transition followed a military-designed constitutional framework rather than the implementation of the 1990 result. The 2008 constitution was adopted through a referendum criticized for procedural deficiencies. It reserved one-quarter of parliamentary seats for serving military officers and required more than three-quarters of legislators to approve constitutional amendments, thereby giving the military a blocking vote. These arrangements limited the authority of any elected majority. In the November 2010 general election, which the NLD boycotted, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won a majority. The military junta formally dissolved in March 2011, and former general Thein Sein became president of the new administration. (constitutionnet.org)

Thein Sein’s government released political prisoners, relaxed restrictions on political organization and initiated economic reforms intended to encourage investment. Changes to electoral rules enabled the NLD to re-register and participate in the April 2012 by-elections, in which it won 43 of the 44 seats it contested; Suu Kyi entered parliament. On 20 August 2012, the government ended mandatory pre-publication press censorship. This removed the requirement to submit material to state censors before printing, although powers to sanction publications and other restrictive laws remained. The reforms expanded public political activity without removing the military’s constitutional privileges. (cfr.org)

In the general election of 8 November 2015, the NLD won 390 seats across the two houses of the Union Parliament, enough to select the president despite the reserved military seats. Htin Kyaw was elected president on 15 March 2016 and took office on 30 March. Suu Kyi could not hold the presidency because constitutional eligibility provisions excluded candidates with specified foreign-family connections. The newly created office of State Counsellor instead enabled her to lead the civilian administration. The transfer therefore replaced the USDP-led government with an NLD-led one while leaving the military’s parliamentary representation and control over key security ministries intact. (anfrel.org)

The election of 8 November 2020 returned an enlarged NLD majority: 396 of the 476 contested Union parliamentary seats. The Carter Center reported that voters could freely express their choices at the polls, but identified serious structural shortcomings and the exclusion of more than two million people through conflict or discrimination. These included Rohingya disenfranchisement and constituency cancellations affecting approximately 1.4 million voters. The USDP disputed the results and demanded a rerun, while the Union Election Commission described the election as free and fair. The dispute over the vote became the immediate political context for the military takeover of 1 February 2021. (amp.dw.com)

The 2021 coup and the 2025–2026 elections

On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s armed forces detained President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and other civilian leaders, preventing the newly elected parliament from convening. Vice-President Myint Swe assumed the acting presidency and transferred power to commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing under a declared state of emergency. The military invoked alleged irregularities in the November 2020 election, which the National League for Democracy (NLD) had won; independent election observers had not found major irregularities supporting the military’s justification. Executive, legislative and judicial authority passed to the military leadership, ending the civilian government’s second-term transition. (marketscreener.com)

International responses distinguished between condemnation of the takeover and demands for restoration of civilian political processes. On 4 February 2021, the United Nations Security Council expressed deep concern about the emergency declaration and arbitrary detentions, called for the detainees’ immediate release, and urged respect for democratic institutions and human rights. The European Union condemned the coup and subsequently imposed additional targeted sanctions; its first post-coup sanctions round, on 22 March 2021, covered eleven individuals. Within Myanmar, widespread protests against the takeover developed into armed resistance, while the military continued to govern without a national legislature until March 2026. (myanmar.un.org)

The military-organized general election proceeded in three phases: 28 December 2025, 11 January 2026 and 25 January 2026. The electoral process covered 263 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, leaving 67 outside it, predominantly in areas affected by fighting or controlled by armed opponents. More than 4,800 candidates from 57 parties contested national and regional seats, but only six parties competed nationwide. Territorial coverage did not necessarily mean contested voting: the UN human rights office reported that, in the first phase, 31 candidates affiliated with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were returned without voting because they had no opponents. (apnews.com)

The exclusion of major opposition parties preceded the election. On 28 March 2023, the military-appointed Union Election Commission dissolved forty parties, including the NLD, for failing to re-register under new legislation. The UN Secretary-General expressed concern about these dissolutions. In its assessment of the 2025 electoral preparations, the UN human rights office identified political exclusion, surveillance, restrictions on movement and expression, and prosecutions under an election-protection law as obstacles to credible, free elections. It also documented intimidation and attacks by anti-military armed groups against civilians connected with the process. UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews urged rejection of the results, whereas Min Aung Hlaing maintained that their validity rested on Myanmar voters rather than foreign recognition. (marketscreener.com)

The USDP won 339 elected seats across the two national parliamentary chambers; another 166 seats were reserved for military appointees under the 2008 constitution. Twenty-one other parties won between one and twenty seats each. The lower house reconvened on 16 March 2026, the first national parliamentary sitting since the coup. On 3 April, the parliamentary presidential electoral college elected Min Aung Hlaing president with 429 votes; Nyo Saw received 126 and Nan Ni Ni Aye 29, becoming the two vice-presidents. This was an indirect parliamentary election, not a separate nationwide popular vote for president. Min Aung Hlaing had transferred command of the armed forces to Ye Win Oo during the preceding leadership reshuffle. (apnews.com)

Parliament approved thirty cabinet ministers without objection on 9 April 2026. Twenty-four were current or former military officers or USDP legislators, and eighteen had served in the preceding military government’s cabinet. Min Aung Hlaing and the two vice-presidents took their oaths on 10 April, alongside the ministers and other senior officeholders. The new administration therefore assumed office through the restored parliamentary framework while retaining substantial personnel continuity with the government established after the 2021 takeover. (apnews.com)

Government and constitutional structure

The 2008 constitution establishes a presidential system in which the president is both head of state and head of government, serving a five-year term. Presidential selection is indirect: the elected representatives of each parliamentary chamber and the military representatives collectively form three groups, each nominating a vice-president. The combined parliament then elects one of these three candidates as president; the others remain vice-presidents. Section 59 imposes eligibility requirements concerning age, residence and citizenship, including restrictions involving foreign citizenship or allegiance among specified family members. Following the military takeover of 2021, constitutional institutions operated under military control; Min Aung Hlaing was elected president on 3 April 2026 and sworn in on 10 April. (constituteproject.org)

The bicameral legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw or Union Assembly, comprises the Pyithu Hluttaw, representing territorial constituencies, and the Amyotha Hluttaw, representing states and regions. The constitution provides for a maximum of 440 lower-house seats, including 330 elected representatives and 110 serving military personnel nominated by the commander-in-chief. The upper house has a maximum of 224 seats: 168 elected members, twelve from each state or region, and 56 military nominees. Thus, one-quarter of each chamber is constitutionally reserved for the armed forces. Section 436 requires approval by more than 75 per cent of all Union Assembly representatives for constitutional amendments, giving the military bloc a blocking position when fully constituted. Amendments to specified fundamental provisions additionally require a referendum supported by more than half of all eligible voters, rather than merely a majority of votes cast. (icj.org)

Territorial government combines devolved legislative responsibilities with presidential control over regional executives. The seven states and seven regions have their own legislatures and governments, while Naypyitaw is a Union territory administered under presidential authority. Constitutional schedules allocate subjects between levels: Union responsibilities include defence, foreign affairs and currency, whereas state and regional responsibilities include specified local roads, municipal services and agricultural matters. Under section 261, the president selects a chief minister from the relevant state or regional legislature; that legislature may reject the nominee only for failure to meet constitutional qualifications. Chief ministers are responsible to the president. The constitution also provides for five self-administered zones and the Wa self-administered division, whose Leading Bodies exercise specified legislative and executive powers, including local development functions. These arrangements describe constitutional jurisdiction, not necessarily effective territorial control. (myanmar-law-library.org)

The armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, possess an institutional role separate from ordinary civilian ministries. Section 20 allows them independently to administer their internal affairs and assigns them responsibility for safeguarding the constitution. The commander-in-chief nominates serving officers for the Union ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs, and military nominees also occupy state and regional security and border-affairs portfolios. The eleven-member National Defence and Security Council includes the president, both vice-presidents, both parliamentary speakers, the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief, and four ministers. Under sections 417–418, specified emergencies permit the president, after coordinating with this council, to transfer legislative, executive and judicial powers to the commander-in-chief. (myanmar-law-library.org)

The judiciary comprises the Supreme Court of the Union, state and regional High Courts, and subordinate courts; courts-martial and the Constitutional Tribunal form separate constitutional institutions. Section 19 prescribes independent adjudication according to law, ordinarily public hearings, and rights of defence and appeal. The nine-member Constitutional Tribunal interprets constitutional provisions and determines constitutional disputes; the president and the two parliamentary speakers each nominate three members. Constitutional guarantees have not ensured institutional independence: a 2023 United Nations human-rights report described the judiciary and the national human-rights commission as effectively subsumed under military control. (icj.org)

The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was established on 5 September 2011 and received a statutory framework through legislation enacted on 28 March 2014. Its functions include receiving complaints, examining alleged violations and making recommendations concerning human rights. International accreditation is distinct from its domestic legal existence: following suspension in 2023, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions removed its accreditation in 2024, citing non-compliance with the Paris Principles, particularly lack of independence from the military. (presoffministry.gov.mm)

Armed conflict and humanitarian situation

Myanmar’s armed conflict involves the Tatmadaw, or national armed forces, ethnic armed organizations, and resistance forces formed after the February 2021 military takeover. The opposition National Unity Government announced the establishment of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) on 5 May 2021; many subsequent PDF units are affiliated with it, rather than constituting a single uniformly controlled army. Ethnic forces include the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, Karenni organizations and the Arakan Army (AA). Several have trained or supported PDFs and local defence groups. Alliances are nevertheless geographically and politically differentiated: by May 2026, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army had accepted Chinese-mediated ceasefires, while the AA, their partner in the Three Brotherhood Alliance, continued fighting in Rakhine. (euronews.com)

The principal theatres extend beyond ethnic-minority borderlands into central Myanmar. In March 2026, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported intense fighting and displacement in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, Bago and Kayin, alongside continuing clashes and aerial attacks in Karenni (Kayah), Shan, Kachin and Rakhine. Approximately half the country’s internally displaced population was then in the northwest. In Rakhine, the AA renewed attacks around Sittwe and Kyaukphyu in early January 2026. Reporting in March described advances against fortified approaches to Sittwe along the Mayu River and attacks near the Shwe Min Gan naval base, while Kyaukphyu remained another active front. These operations followed the AA’s capture of most of Rakhine; fortified urban positions, river crossings and naval facilities remained important military objectives. (myanmar.un.org)

Death estimates differ according to verification standards, reporting coverage and whether they count civilians or all combatants. OHCHR’s annual review of 2025 cited the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners’ minimum cumulative count of 7,646 civilians killed by the military since February 2021. For 2025 alone, it contrasted more than 3,220 civilian deaths reported by open sources with 1,514 individually verified by that association. These figures are not comprehensive totals for all conflict deaths. OHCHR recorded at least 982 civilian deaths from airstrikes in 2025, including 232 children, compared with 641 in 2024. Communications blackouts and inaccessible areas, notably in Rakhine, Sagaing and Kayin, left many deaths unverified. (bangkok.ohchr.org)

Displacement has likewise risen substantially, although dated observations and planning projections must be distinguished. The 2026 humanitarian response plan’s historical series recorded approximately 648,000 internally displaced people in 2021 and 2.6 million in 2023. UNICEF estimated nearly 3.8 million in June 2026, while the European Commission reported about 4 million by August, approximately 90 per cent displaced since February 2021. Repeated flight disrupts farming, employment and schooling and leaves families dependent on temporary shelter and intermittent assistance. The 2026 plan identified 16.2 million people needing humanitarian assistance and targeted 4.9 million. Its lower needs figure than the expanded 2025 estimate reflected a narrower geographical assessment, not evidence of nationwide recovery. The World Food Programme estimated that 12.4 million people faced acute hunger in 2026. (myanmar.un.org)

Humanitarian access is obstructed by hostilities, movement restrictions and administrative requirements; landmines and unexploded ordnance also prevent safe travel, cultivation and return. By the end of March 2026, humanitarian partners had reached 1.6 million people, against the annual target of 4.9 million. The Rohingya face additional, longstanding restrictions and displacement. The response plan estimated that 550,000 remained in Rakhine in June 2025, including about 153,000 in camps, mostly since the 2012 intercommunal violence, and another 82,000 displaced by subsequent fighting. OHCHR documented forced recruitment, forced labour and movement restrictions affecting Rohingya under both military and AA control. Almost 1.2 million Rohingya refugees remained in Bangladesh according to the World Food Programme’s 2026 account. (myanmar.un.org)

Foreign relations and regional role

Myanmar joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 23 July 1997. Following the February 2021 military takeover, ASEAN adopted its Five-Point Consensus on 24 April 2021: an immediate cessation of violence, dialogue among all parties, mediation by a special envoy, humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, and an envoy’s visit to meet the parties concerned. ASEAN subsequently restricted Myanmar’s representation at summits and foreign ministers’ meetings to non-political representatives, linking reconsideration to concrete progress in implementing the consensus. The Philippines assumed the 2026 chairmanship instead of Myanmar. These measures restricted political participation without terminating membership. (asean.org)

Regional engagement continued alongside these restrictions. In January 2026, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan stated that ASEAN would not endorse Myanmar’s election; the bloc had declined to send observers, although individual member states participated separately. On 12 July 2026, ASEAN foreign ministers held informal talks in Bangkok with Myanmar’s foreign minister, Tin Maung Swe. Philippine Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro, serving as the ASEAN chair’s special envoy, reaffirmed that the Five-Point Consensus remained the framework for engagement with Myanmar’s government and other stakeholders. Informal consultations therefore provided a channel for political contact distinct from unrestricted participation in ASEAN’s principal meetings. (apnews.com)

Relations with China combine economic cooperation with border-security diplomacy. Beijing mediated a ceasefire between Myanmar’s military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in January 2025, following fighting in northern Shan State. During Min Aung Hlaing’s state visit to China on 15–19 June 2026, the two governments agreed to advance the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, including the proposed Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and Muse–Mandalay railway. Their joint statement also identified existing oil and gas pipelines, yuan–kyat direct settlement, customs cooperation and agricultural market access as areas of cooperation. Security commitments covered protection of Chinese projects and joint action against telecommunications fraud, trafficking, smuggling and illegal border crossings. China explicitly supported Myanmar’s full participation in ASEAN mechanisms. (apnews.com)

India has maintained government-level engagement while tightening border controls. On 8 February 2024, its Home Ministry announced a decision to scrap the Free Movement Regime, citing internal security and demographic concerns in northeastern border states. During Min Aung Hlaing’s May 2026 visit to India, discussions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi covered border management, defence, trade and development assistance. Both sides emphasized completing the Kaladan transport project and India–Myanmar–Thailand highway. (pib.gov.in) Relations with Thailand also involve cross-border crime and the provision of utilities to border settlements. On 5 February 2025, Thailand cut electricity, internet and fuel supplies to five locations in Myanmar to disrupt online scam centres. Subsequent multinational operations transferred people released from these compounds through Thailand for repatriation, including Chinese nationals flown home on 20 February. (channelnewsasia.com)

The United States and European Union have used targeted economic sanctions against military leaders, enterprises and revenue channels. Washington designated Myanma Economic Holdings and Myanmar Economic Corporation on 25 March 2021, blocking covered assets and generally prohibiting transactions by US persons; its sanctions framework also includes restrictions on financial services benefiting Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise. (home.treasury.gov) On 27 April 2026, the EU extended its measures until 30 April 2027, covering 105 individuals and 22 entities. These comprised asset freezes, individual travel bans, an arms embargo, restrictions on military-use dual-use goods and communications-surveillance equipment, and prohibitions on military training and cooperation. The EU also withheld direct financial assistance to Myanmar’s government while calling for an end to violence and the release of arbitrarily detained prisoners. (consilium.europa.eu)

Migration and detainee issues generated further diplomatic contacts in late 2026. Nearly 1,500 Myanmar nationals departed Malaysia aboard Myanmar naval vessels on 29 September and reached Yangon on 4 October, as the first group in a staged return programme covering approximately 5,000 people. Malaysia described the programme as voluntary; the United Nations refugee agency and rights groups warned of persecution and forced-conscription risks. (apnews.com) On 8 October, Min Aung Hlaing met Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in Putrajaya. Malaysia stated that the invitation did not constitute recognition of Myanmar’s government. Separately, a US delegation visited Myanmar in September to secure businessman Adam Castillo’s release, illustrating continued issue-specific contact despite sanctions. (apnews.com)

Economic structure and reforms

Myanmar’s gross domestic product (GDP) was US$74.1 billion at current prices in 2024 in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for 25.3 percent of GDP, industry—including manufacturing, mining, construction and utilities—for 36.2 percent, and services for 38.5 percent. Manufacturing alone contributed 25.1 percent. Compared with 2015, agriculture’s share had declined from 26.8 percent, while manufacturing’s had risen from 20.8 percent; these changes in shares did not imply uninterrupted growth in production. (wdi.worldbank.org) In June 2026, the World Bank estimated that real GDP had contracted by 2 percent in the fiscal year ending March 2026. Conflict, unreliable electricity, weak domestic demand and the March 2025 earthquake constrained activity, despite partial recovery in manufacturing, construction and services toward the year’s end. Its forecast for FY2026/27 was 2 percent growth, rather than a return to the pre-crisis trajectory. (worldbank.org)

Economic reforms during the 2010s widened opportunities for private enterprise and foreign investment. Exchange-rate reform in April 2012 moved away from the old official peg, and the Central Bank of Myanmar Law, passed on 11 July 2013, established a revised legal framework for the monetary authority. Gas production, construction, services and commodity exports supported growth of 6.5 percent in 2012/13. (worldbank.org) The 2016 Myanmar Investment Law brought domestic and foreign investors under a common framework. It limited the requirement for a Myanmar Investment Commission permit to specified categories, including strategically important or large projects, potentially environmentally damaging activities and investments using state-owned land. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Garment manufacturing links Myanmar to international value chains, predominantly through cut-make-pack contracts: factories assemble garments from imported fabric and accessories rather than supplying the entire production chain. This structure generates employment but makes production dependent on imported inputs and overseas orders. (ilo.org) A September 2026 World Bank assessment reported garment employment of approximately 400,000–500,000, citing UNDP estimates—about half the pre-2020 level—even as garment shipments had increased. (worldbank.org) Extractive exports provide another major source of foreign currency: recorded natural gas exports reached US$3.44 billion in 2023. (wits.worldbank.org) Services, especially retail and tourism, have faced reduced purchasing power, shortages associated with import restrictions and conflict-related disruption. (documents1.worldbank.org)

The kyat operates within a fragmented exchange-rate system. In December 2025, the World Bank reported an official rate of 2,100 kyat per US dollar, less than half the parallel-market rate. Foreign-exchange interventions, import restrictions and tighter currency controls supported appreciation during 2025, but the gap between rates encouraged arbitrage and complicated access to foreign currency. (documents1.worldbank.org) Inflation subsequently accelerated as higher international fuel prices raised transport, production and distribution costs and increased demand for foreign currency to finance fuel imports. Consumer-price inflation reached 24.6 percent year-on-year in April 2026. (worldbank.org)

Banking conditions have combined partial stabilization with restricted access to finance. Deposits and credit increased between FY2023/24 and FY2024/25, but incomplete reporting of non-performing loans limited assessment of banks’ asset quality. In a 2025 survey of food-processing businesses, only 39 percent had a dedicated corporate bank account and 3 percent had loans or credit lines; more than 80 percent of working capital and fixed-asset purchases were self-financed. (documents1.worldbank.org) International transactions also face sanctions restrictions. On 21 June 2023, the United States designated Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, placing them on its blocked-persons list. (ofac.treasury.gov)

The informal economy was extensive before the post-2021 crisis: an International Labour Organization assessment published in 2020 put informal employment at 85.7 percent of total employment and documented reliance on savings, relatives and community support rather than publicly funded social protection. (ilo.org) UNDP estimated that poverty under the national poverty line increased from 24.8 percent in 2017 to 49.7 percent in 2023. A further 27 percent were classified as non-poor but economically insecure. These estimates drew on the 2023 People’s Pulse Survey, conducted between June and October, and describe household welfare rather than the informal sector’s contribution to GDP. (undp.org)

Agriculture, fisheries and food security

Rice is Myanmar’s principal staple and a major export crop. Its main producing areas include the Ayeyarwady delta, the Yangon deltaic lowlands, the central dry zone and the Rakhine coastal plain. Production combines rainfed lowland cultivation with irrigated rice and smaller areas exposed to drought, deep flooding or salinity. The monsoon crop supplies approximately 80 percent of annual paddy output; the secondary crop, planted from October onwards, supplies the remaining 20 percent. In September 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) forecast paddy production of 30 million tonnes for 2026/27, slightly above average, and rice exports of 2.6 million tonnes for calendar year 2026. Paddy output measures unhusked grain and is therefore not directly comparable with milled-rice export tonnage. (books.irri.org)

Other cropping systems reflect differences in rainfall and access to water. Magway and the wider central dry zone produce sesame, groundnut and pulses; rainfed pulses and sesame may be grown in successive cropping cycles or intercropped with pigeon pea. Black gram, green gram and other beans also connect farm production to export markets, particularly India and China. FAO forecast national maize production at approximately 2.1 million tonnes for 2026/27. Smallholder livelihoods combine these crops with livestock and other income sources. Cattle, pigs and poultry are important components of the livestock sector, but feed costs affect herd size and species choice: the World Bank’s 2024 agricultural assessment reported distress sales and some households replacing pigs with chickens, which were cheaper to feed. (cb.apps.fao.org)

Inland capture fisheries, coastal fishing and aquaculture supply both food and rural employment. Rivers and lakes provide accessible catches for inland communities, while inshore fisheries support coastal livelihoods. WorldFish estimates that fisheries and aquaculture together employ about 3.2 million people. Pond culture offers an additional source of income and food: small-scale systems can raise carp alongside micronutrient-rich small fish, with some production consumed by the producing household. Fish availability nevertheless depends on both ecological conditions and purchasing power. WorldFish research around Inle and Pekon lakes identified pollution, agricultural runoff, overexploitation and changing rainfall as pressures on inland fisheries; poor households may remain unable to afford fish even where it is locally available. (worldfishcenter.org)

Irrigation permits dry-season cultivation and reduces dependence on erratic rainfall, but pumping costs, canal maintenance and unequal water distribution constrain its effectiveness. At Pyawt Ywar, near Myinmu in Sagaing Region, an irrigation scheme draws water from the Mu River. An International Water Management Institute project completed in 2019 rehabilitated infrastructure and established a water-user association to increase farmers’ participation in allocation and management. Access to fertilizer is similarly uneven. The World Bank reported that fertilizer use increased by 20 percent during the 2023 monsoon season as supplies improved and prices fell, while isolated and conflict-affected farmers continued to face shortages and sometimes substituted manure or compost for chemical inputs. (2019.annual-report.iwmi.org)

National harvests and exports do not ensure household food security when conflict prevents cultivation, interrupts transport or removes income. FAO’s September 2026 assessment identified restricted field access, marketing disruptions and high input costs as continuing production constraints. Rice prices had resumed rising from March 2026, driven by seasonally tightening supplies and elevated fuel-related transport costs, and remained close to their high year-earlier levels in August. The World Food Programme estimated that 12.4 million people faced acute hunger in 2026, including one million at emergency levels; approximately 400,000 young children and mothers were suffering from acute malnutrition. Conflict, displacement, economic disruption, climatic shocks and reduced humanitarian assistance all contributed to these conditions. (cb.apps.fao.org)

Infrastructure and energy

Electricity supply depends principally on hydropower and natural gas, but installed capacity substantially exceeds the power actually available to consumers. Hydropower capacity stood at 3,262 megawatts (MW) in 2023; declining gas-fired output subsequently made generation more hydro-dependent. Reservoir drawdown to compensate for gas shortages reduces the water available for dry-season generation, while damage to the electrical grid can prevent operating plants from supplying demand centres. Gas shortages, suspended liquefied-natural-gas power plants, maintenance constraints and conflict-related transmission damage have compounded these seasonal limitations. The World Bank reported average electricity output of 3,034 MW during January–September 2025, against installed capacity of 6,880 MW. In its October 2025 firm survey, 64 percent of businesses reported outages; 32 percent had adopted solar systems and 47 percent had invested in diesel generators. These alternatives sustain production but transfer generation costs to individual users. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Large dam projects involve questions of electricity allocation, resettlement and river management as well as engineering feasibility. The Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State was planned at the confluence of the Mali and N’Mai rivers, where the Irrawaddy begins. It formed part of a seven-dam scheme whose electricity was predominantly intended for export to China. Opposition developed among affected villages and subsequently spread into wider Kachin and national campaigns, encompassing relocation, environmental impacts and the confluence’s cultural significance. President Thein Sein suspended construction in 2011 following widespread opposition. Efforts to revive the project continued: at a June 30, 2026 briefing, the Presidential Office said authorities had been instructed to consult local communities before proceeding. This represented discussion of possible resumption, rather than evidence of a completed generating facility. (cambridge.org)

The principal inland transport axis connects Yangon, Naypyitaw and Mandalay. The approximately 620-kilometre Yangon–Mandalay railway is a major passenger and freight route; Japanese-supported improvement projects were designed to rehabilitate tracks, signalling and associated facilities to address slow speeds, delays and derailments. Conflict has also changed the use of roads linking commercial centres with border crossings in Thailand and China. A September 2026 World Bank assessment described persistent transport disruption rather than general recovery: insecurity along border routes had encouraged traders to shift cargo towards maritime transport. The Yangon–Ranong container-barge connection provided an alternative to affected Thailand–Myanmar land crossings, illustrating how coastal shipping can substitute for disrupted road corridors. (openjicareport.jica.go.jp)

Port facilities connect different hinterlands and should be distinguished from proposed developments. Yangon and Thilawa provide established commercial berths, whereas the planned Kyaukphyu deep-sea port is a separate project from the operating oil terminal and pipelines nearby. The Myanmar–China crude-oil pipeline begins at Maday Island near Kyaukphyu, crosses into Yunnan at Ruili and became operational on April 10, 2017. Farther north on the Bay of Bengal, India financed Sittwe Port, inaugurated on May 9, 2023, as the maritime component of the Kaladan multimodal corridor. Its intended route combines sea transport to Sittwe, river transport to Paletwa and road transport towards Mizoram. On the Andaman-facing coast, the Yangon–Ranong service adds a maritime connection with southern Thailand. (mpa.gov.mm)

Telecommunications expanded rapidly after the 2013 Telecommunications Law opened the market to private operators, including Telenor and Ooredoo alongside state-owned MPT. According to the World Bank’s January 2022 review, mobile-network coverage had risen from less than 10 percent of the population in 2011 to near-universal availability, while 4G coverage reached approximately 95 percent within five years of its 2016 launch. Coverage, however, does not guarantee usable internet access. Since February 2021, nationwide and localized shutdowns, website restrictions and interruptions to mobile services have constrained connectivity. Conflict-related damage and the March 28, 2025 earthquake further disrupted telecommunications infrastructure, impeding communication and emergency assistance in affected areas. (documents1.worldbank.org)

Education, health and social services

Myanmar’s education reforms adopted a kindergarten-plus-12-years structure, replacing the former 11-year basic-school cycle. The National Education Strategic Plan 2016–2021 linked this change to curriculum revision, teacher training, assessment reform and expanded access to vocational and higher education. It also identified persistent dropout at the transitions from primary to middle school and from middle to high school. The 2014 census recorded an adult literacy rate of 89.5%, based on the reported ability of people aged 15 and over to read and write in any language. Regional differences were substantial: Yangon Region recorded 96.6%, compared with 64.6% in Shan State. These figures describe the population enumerated in 2014 rather than subsequent educational conditions. (unicef.org)

School participation declined markedly after the COVID-19 closures and the political crisis beginning in 2021. A World Bank study using household surveys estimated that the proportion of people aged 6–22 enrolled in educational institutions fell from 69.2% in 2017 to 56.8% in 2023. Among children aged 6–17, the out-of-school share rose from 21% to approximately 28%; families principally cited school closures and financial hardship as reasons for withdrawal. In its 2026 education overview, UNICEF estimated that around 3.5 million children were outside school or other learning arrangements, with adolescents aged 15–17 accounting for approximately 60% of that group. Alternative provision includes temporary learning spaces and non-formal instruction: during 2025, UNICEF and partners supported 854,401 children in accessing education and established or maintained 1,328 temporary learning spaces. (thedocs.worldbank.org)

The health system combines public facilities, private providers, non-profit organizations and ethnic health organizations. Its township-level public network connects hospitals with rural health centres and smaller sub-centres; midwives and community health workers provide outreach. Specialist services and health personnel are concentrated in larger cities. WHO’s March 2026 assessment described disrupted medical supply chains, reduced training capacity and difficulties retaining staff. Attacks also affect service delivery: WHO verified 70 attacks on health care during 2025, associated with 148 deaths and 186 injuries. In June 2026, the WHO-led Health Cluster estimated that 9.2 million people needed humanitarian health assistance, while its response targeted 2 million people. (cdn.who.int)

Malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS remain major infectious-disease burdens. Reported malaria cases reached 189,358 in 2024, approximately three times the 2020 level; about 90% were caused by Plasmodium vivax. Conflict, reduced testing and restricted access to treatment complicate surveillance and control. For 2024–2026, the Global Fund allocated US$78.5 million to tuberculosis programmes and US$99.4 million to HIV programmes. WHO reported that newer drug-resistant tuberculosis treatment regimens benefited more than 1,151 patients, while measures to maintain antiretroviral access supported over 215,000 people living with HIV. These programmes depend on continued medicine distribution, diagnostic services and patient follow-up despite interruptions to local health services. (cdn.who.int)

Routine vaccination coverage fell sharply in 2021 and subsequently recovered only partially. WHO reported approximately 492,000 “zero-dose” children—those missing the first diphtheria–tetanus–pertussis-containing vaccine dose—in 2021, declining to 176,000 in 2023 following catch-up efforts. WHO–UNICEF estimates for 2025 put three-dose diphtheria–tetanus–pertussis coverage at 71%, first-dose measles coverage at 71% and second-dose measles coverage at 68%. These national estimates distinguish routine coverage from the higher percentages sometimes achieved within particular campaign target populations. (who.int)

Social protection has included social pensions and maternal and child cash transfers. The latter programme began in Chin State in June 2017 and subsequently expanded to other areas; its original design provided pregnant women and mothers of children under two with 15,000 kyats monthly, paid quarterly, targeting the first 1,000 days of life. Broader welfare indicators show substantial deprivation. UNDP’s 2025 Human Development Report assigned Myanmar a Human Development Index of 0.609 for 2023, ranking it 150th. A separate UNDP report published on 8 October 2026 estimated that 32.6% of the population, approximately 17.9 million people, experienced multidimensional poverty, with another 19.5 million vulnerable to it. Health and living-standard deprivations accounted for more than 80% of the measured burden, including inadequate access to healthcare, housing, water and sanitation. (unicef.org)

Religion, culture and heritage

Theravada Buddhism shapes much of Myanmar’s communal and ceremonial life. The 2014 census’s estimate for the overall population recorded 87.9 percent Buddhists, 6.2 percent Christians, 4.3 percent Muslims and 0.5 percent Hindus. These figures included non-enumerated populations and assumed that the non-enumerated population in Rakhine State was Muslim; they are therefore not simply counts of respondents. Monasteries serve as centres of religious instruction and community activity. The shinbyu ceremony marks a boy’s entry into the monastic community as a novice, sometimes for only a short period, and links family celebration with Buddhist education and merit-making. Buddhist observance also coexists with devotion to nats, spirits honoured through shrines and ceremonies. (dop.gov.mm)

The festival calendar connects religious observance with public performance and charitable activity. Thingyan, the traditional New Year celebration, normally falls in mid-April. UNESCO describes it as a five-day festival: water pouring accompanies the symbolic cleansing of the previous year, while participants also make offerings, give food, practise meditation and pay respect to older people. In 2024, the Myanmar traditional New Year Atā Thingyan festival entered UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. Its recognition concerns the transmitted practices and knowledge surrounding the celebration, rather than a particular monument or location. (ich.unesco.org)

Christian communities include Baptists, Roman Catholics, Anglicans and other Protestant denominations, with substantial Christian populations among the Chin, Kachin and Karen. American Baptist missionaries Adoniram and Ann Judson arrived in 1813; Adoniram’s work included translating the Bible into Burmese. Muslim communities have several historical backgrounds rather than a single origin. Rakhine’s connections with Bengal and Indian Ocean commerce supported Muslim settlement and a religiously diverse court culture at Mrauk-U. Other communities developed through migration from India during British rule and through the movement of Panthay Muslims from China. Hindu communities are also associated particularly with populations of South Asian ancestry. (2021-2025.state.gov)

Burmese literature combines religious and secular traditions, while modern literary experimentation developed through universities and print publication. The scholar and educator Pe Maung Tin helped establish Burmese literature as an honours subject at Rangoon University, where the first course began in 1924. His students Theippan Maung Wa, Zawgyi and Min Thu Wun contributed to Hkit san pon byin (“Experimental Tales”), published in 1934, followed by Hkit san kabya (“Experimental Poems”). Pe Maung Tin coined hkit san, meaning “testing the times,” to describe experimentation with writing and readers’ responses. These publications became landmarks of the movement toward new literary forms. (uclmyanmar.org)

Traditional theatre includes outdoor pwe performances using human actors or puppets, often drawing on the Jataka stories of the Buddha’s previous lives. The accompanying hsaing waing ensemble combines percussion with the oboe-like hne; its distinctive pat waing consists of 21 tuned drums arranged in a circle. In quieter indoor settings, the saung gauk harp and pattala bamboo xylophone accompany songs from the Mahagita repertoire. Craft traditions include woodcarving, metalwork and lacquerware. Bagan lacquer workshops make bowls, containers and betel boxes from bamboo frameworks coated with lacquer; repeated coating, smoothing and curing create durable surfaces for detailed decoration. (bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com)

Myanmar’s World Heritage properties preserve both archaeological remains and continuing religious practices. The Pyu Ancient Cities—Halin, Beikthano and Sri Ksetra—were inscribed in 2014; their surviving brick stupas, urban remains and water-management features document settlements flourishing between about 200 BCE and 900 CE. Bagan, inscribed in 2019, encompasses eight components containing temples, stupas, monasteries, inscriptions and mural paintings, principally associated with the eleventh–thirteenth centuries. UNESCO identifies continuing pilgrimage, worship and merit-making as integral to Bagan’s cultural heritage. Conservation must therefore accommodate active religious use while protecting historic fabric; earthquakes, development pressures and inappropriate earlier restoration have affected the monuments’ integrity and authenticity. (whc.unesco.org)

Cities, urbanization and migration

Yangon and Mandalay dominate Myanmar’s urban network, while Naypyitaw functions principally as an administrative capital. A 2020 World Bank urban-transport study described Yangon as the country’s main economic centre, with more than five million urban inhabitants, and Mandalay as its second-largest city, with approximately 2.1 million. These estimates refer to the study’s urban populations rather than populations of the surrounding administrative regions. Their transport systems reflect different patterns of development: buses accounted for approximately half of Yangon’s journeys excluding walking, whereas Mandalay depended heavily on motorcycles. Government ministries began relocating from Yangon to Naypyitaw on 6 November 2005; the new capital’s name was publicly announced on 27 March 2006. Its planned layout separates government offices, residential districts, hotels and other functions into zones connected by major roads. (worldbank.org)

Myanmar’s urbanization has proceeded from a predominantly rural population base. The 2014 census figures used in the World Bank’s 2019 urbanization report placed about 15 million of 51.5 million inhabitants in urban areas—roughly 30 per cent. Employment in manufacturing, construction and services attracted migrants, but housing and municipal provision did not expand at the same pace. Complex land administration, high land costs and a limited supply of affordable housing contributed to peripheral settlement growth. The report estimated that only 33 per cent of Yangon’s population had access to piped water, illustrating the gap between urban economic concentration and service coverage. (worldbank.org)

Informal settlements are particularly prominent around Yangon’s outer townships. Mapping published by UN-Habitat in 2019 identified 423 settlements accommodating approximately 365,000 people; Hlaing Tharyar alone contained 181 settlements and nearly 125,000 residents. Other concentrations occurred in Shwe Pyi Thar, Dagon Seikkan, Insein and Dala. These locations combine access to urban livelihoods with inadequate services and insecure housing tenure. A UN-Habitat survey of Hlaing Tharyar found that most surveyed households had come from Ayeyarwady Region seeking better livelihood opportunities. Housing pressure therefore reflects not only population increase but also migrants’ limited ability to enter formal land and rental markets. (unhabitat.org)

Rural-to-urban movement follows established family and village networks. A 2015 study of Ayeyarwady and Magway found that one-quarter of households in the former and one-fifth in the latter had a member living away as a migrant; Yangon received 58 per cent of migrants covered by the study. Urban employment was concentrated in the informal economy, especially construction, restaurants and tea shops, with a smaller share working in garment factories. Conflict-related displacement has subsequently added a distinct source of mobility: UNHCR estimated 3.7 million internally displaced people nationwide at the end of March 2026. This national total is not an urban population count, although UN-Habitat reported in September 2024 that people escaping conflict were increasing pressure on Yangon’s infrastructure. (worldbank.org)

International labour migration is concentrated in Thailand, with Malaysia, China and Singapore also important destinations. The 2014 census recorded approximately 2.02 million former household members abroad, including 70.2 per cent in Thailand and 15 per cent in Malaysia. More recent IOM estimates placed approximately 4.1 million Myanmar nationals in Thailand in 2024; Thai employment records counted 2,270,382 registered Myanmar migrant workers on 1 January 2025. These measures cover different populations and cannot be treated as a single continuous series. Migrants supply labour in construction, agriculture and manufacturing, while economic need, insecurity and political instability increasingly overlap as reasons for departure. (ilo.org)

Remittances connect overseas employment to household livelihoods in Myanmar, but transfers through informal channels complicate their measurement. The Thailand Migration Report 2024 reported an assessment of 1,083 Myanmar respondents whose households had a member living and working in Thailand in 2023–2024: approximately 55 per cent received transfers through informal channels, 12 per cent through a mixture of formal and informal channels, and one-third exclusively through formal channels. Consequently, banking records alone do not capture the full scale of these cross-border household transfers. (crisisresponse.iom.int)

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