The 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism is the rupture in ecclesiastical communion initiated by the Russian Orthodox Church on 15 October 2018 in response to decisions by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople concerning the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Constantinople had announced that it would proceed toward granting Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence, receive appeals from previously unrecognized Ukrainian church leaders, and revoke the binding force of its 1686 document concerning the appointment of the metropolitan of Kyiv. Moscow rejected these actions as intervention in its canonical territory and declared that communion with Constantinople could no longer continue.
The immediate dispute concerned autocephaly, the status by which an Orthodox church governs itself and elects its own head without confirmation by another church. Its wider significance lay in competing understandings of authority within Eastern Orthodoxy: the prerogatives of the ecumenical patriarch, the rights of established local churches, the settlement of ecclesiastical appeals, and the relationship between church boundaries and independent states. The establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in December 2018, followed by its receipt of a decree of autocephaly in January 2019, extended the controversy across the Orthodox world.
The rupture did not create a disagreement over the principal doctrines shared by the two patriarchates, nor did it divide all Orthodox churches into two internally uniform blocs. Its practical effects concerned concelebration, sacramental participation, recognition of bishops, and interchurch cooperation. Subsequent decisions by other churches, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, added further institutional and political dimensions to the original conflict.
Ecclesiastical communion and authority in Eastern Orthodoxy
Eastern Orthodoxy comprises self-governing local churches united by common doctrine, sacramental life, episcopal succession, and recognition of one another’s hierarchies. It has no single central administration equivalent to the papacy of the Catholic Church. Each autocephalous church normally elects its own primate and governs its internal affairs through a synod of bishops. Unity is expressed through the mutual recognition of bishops and through participation in the Eucharist, especially when clergy of different churches concelebrate the same liturgy.
Within the traditional order of Orthodox primates, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople occupies first place. This precedence developed within the ecclesiastical structures of the Roman Empire and was associated with Constantinople’s position as the imperial capital. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 assigned privileges to the see of Constantinople in its twenty-eighth canon. Other canons of that council, particularly the ninth and seventeenth, became important in later arguments about appeals to Constantinople. The scope and contemporary application of these provisions are interpreted differently by the churches involved in the 2018 dispute.
Constantinople understands its primacy as involving responsibilities that extend beyond ceremonial precedence. These include coordinating relations among local churches, receiving certain ecclesiastical appeals, and acting in circumstances where disputes cannot otherwise be resolved. Moscow recognizes Constantinople’s first place in the order of honor but rejects interpretations that would give it universal jurisdiction over other autocephalous churches. The disagreement therefore concerns not whether Constantinople has precedence, but what powers follow from that precedence.
Autocephaly presents a related difficulty. Orthodox history contains several ways in which self-government has developed: through ecumenical councils, decisions by a mother church, patriarchal decrees, and subsequent recognition by other churches. No universally accepted modern procedure resolves every question about who may initiate autocephaly, whose consent is necessary, and how recognition becomes binding. Preparations for the Holy and Great Council held in Crete in 2016 did not produce an agreed procedure that the council could adopt. The Russian Church did not attend that council, although its absence also involved other disagreements.
A break in communion must be distinguished from the creation of a new denomination or the abandonment of shared doctrine. It is an ecclesiastical measure that can prohibit joint worship and sacramental participation while leaving much theological agreement intact. Its scope also depends on the decisions of particular synods. In 2018 Moscow prohibited its clergy from concelebrating with clergy of Constantinople and its faithful from receiving sacraments in Constantinople’s churches. Constantinople did not issue an equivalent general prohibition against all Russian Orthodox clergy and faithful. The rupture was therefore asymmetrical in its formal enactment.
Kyiv, Moscow, and the disputed legacy of 1686
The historical background begins with the Christianization of Kyivan Rus, conventionally associated with the baptism of Prince Volodymyr, or Vladimir, in 988. The metropolitanate centered on Kyiv developed within Constantinople’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Both Ukrainian and Russian ecclesiastical histories trace important parts of their inheritance to this medieval Christian society, although the later churches emerged through different political and institutional developments. Medieval Rus cannot simply be equated with either modern nation-state.
Following the Mongol invasions and changes in political power, the residence of the metropolitan moved northeast, first to Vladimir and subsequently to Moscow, while the title associated with Kyiv continued in use. In 1448 bishops in the northeastern territories elected their metropolitan without Constantinople’s approval, establishing Moscow’s practical ecclesiastical independence. Constantinople recognized the Moscow patriarchate in 1589, and its standing was confirmed through subsequent conciliar decisions. Meanwhile, the metropolitanate of Kyiv continued a separate institutional history in territories governed by Lithuania and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.
A central document in the 2018 conflict was issued in 1686. Under the arrangements then made, the patriarch of Moscow was permitted to ordain the metropolitan of Kyiv, who was to be elected locally. The metropolitan was also to commemorate the ecumenical patriarch first during the liturgy. The meaning of these provisions became the subject of incompatible interpretations. Moscow treated the seventeenth-century settlement as establishing its jurisdiction over the Kyiv metropolitanate. Constantinople maintained that it had granted a conditional permission to ordain rather than permanently transferred the metropolitanate itself.
The dispute was not limited to the wording of the original documents. It also concerned the legal significance of more than three centuries of subsequent administration. Moscow emphasized longstanding ecclesiastical practice and the incorporation of Ukrainian dioceses into its church structure. Constantinople emphasized the original conditions, the distinction between administrative permission and territorial transfer, and its claim that the conditions had not been maintained. The historic metropolitanate’s boundaries also differed from those of the modern Ukrainian state, complicating arguments that moved directly from seventeenth-century arrangements to contemporary jurisdiction.
An earlier example of Constantinople’s interpretation appeared in its 1924 decree granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Poland. That document referred critically to the circumstances under which the Kyiv metropolitanate and dependent territories had become separated from Constantinople. The issue was therefore not first raised in 2018, although the direct consequences of Constantinople’s new decisions were much more extensive.
In September 2018 Constantinople published historical material supporting its position. On 11 October its synod revoked the binding force of the 1686 synodal letter. Moscow rejected both the interpretation and Constantinople’s authority to reverse an arrangement it regarded as a settled jurisdictional transfer. The historical disagreement thus became an immediate dispute over which church possessed the authority to act in Ukraine.
Ukrainian church divisions after the Soviet period
The breakup of the Soviet Union transformed the political setting of Ukrainian church life. In October 1990 the Moscow patriarchate granted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independence and self-government in its administration while retaining its place within the Russian Orthodox Church. Its bishops, monasteries, and parishes constituted the Ukrainian hierarchy recognized throughout the Orthodox world before the events of 2018. Its status was extensive internal self-government rather than autocephaly.
Ukraine’s declaration of independence in August 1991 intensified demands for an independent national church. Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko, then head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, supported autocephaly. A conflict developed between him and bishops opposed to his leadership and proposed course. In 1992 a bishops’ council held in Kharkiv elected Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan to replace him. The Russian Church subsequently deposed Filaret, who became a central figure in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate. In 1997 Moscow imposed an anathema on him.
A separate institution, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, drew on the Ukrainian autocephalous movement of the twentieth century and its later revival. By the early twenty-first century, Ukrainian Orthodoxy was consequently divided among three major bodies: the church associated with Moscow, the Kyiv Patriarchate, and the Autocephalous Church. The latter two were not recognized as autocephalous churches by the other established Orthodox churches before 2018. Their lack of recognition affected whether their bishops and clergy could concelebrate with clergy elsewhere in the Orthodox world.
The division combined questions of episcopal legitimacy, national identity, language, historical memory, and relations with Russia. These factors did not map neatly onto individual religious practice. Parish membership, cultural identification, and preferences concerning church independence could differ, and opinion surveys did not necessarily measure the same thing as institutional counts of parishes or clergy. The existence of large competing organizations nevertheless made Ukraine an unusually consequential unresolved ecclesiastical problem.
Relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorated sharply after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Ukrainian political leaders increasingly presented church independence as connected with national sovereignty. President Petro Poroshenko became a prominent supporter of obtaining a decree of autocephaly from Constantinople. In April 2018 he appealed to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, with support from Ukraine’s parliament and church leaders seeking autocephaly.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy, who had become its primate in 2014, opposed Constantinople’s proposed intervention. Its leadership maintained that the existing recognized church provided the legitimate basis for resolving Ukrainian ecclesiastical questions. Supporters of Constantinople’s initiative argued instead that the long division required action capable of bringing previously unrecognized Ukrainian communities into canonical communion. These incompatible approaches shaped the confrontation that followed.
The decisions of September and October 2018
The immediate escalation began when Constantinople appointed two exarchs to Kyiv in September 2018: Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon and Bishop Hilarion of Edmonton. Their task was connected with preparations for granting Ukrainian autocephaly. Both served in Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions outside Ukraine under Constantinople. Moscow and the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church objected that the appointments had been made without their consent in territory they considered under their jurisdiction.
On 14 September the Russian Church’s Holy Synod adopted preliminary measures. It suspended the liturgical commemoration of Patriarch Bartholomew by Patriarch Kirill, suspended concelebration with hierarchs of Constantinople, and suspended participation in bodies chaired or co-chaired by representatives of the ecumenical patriarchate. These measures stopped short of the full prohibition on sacramental communion that followed in October. They nevertheless disrupted the normal public expressions of relations between the two patriarchates.
Constantinople’s synod met from 9 to 11 October and announced several decisions. It reaffirmed its intention to grant autocephaly to the church in Ukraine. It also announced the reestablishment of a stavropegion in Kyiv, an ecclesiastical institution directly subject to the ecumenical patriarch. Most consequentially, it accepted the appeals of Filaret Denysenko and Makariy Maletych, the leaders of the two previously unrecognized Ukrainian bodies, and restored them and their followers to ecclesiastical communion.
The same announcement revoked the binding force of the 1686 synodal letter concerning the ordination of the metropolitan of Kyiv. Constantinople presented these decisions as exercises of its historical rights and responsibilities. Moscow disputed the legitimacy of the appeals, the restoration of the hierarchs, and the change in the interpretation of Ukrainian jurisdiction. The two sides were therefore acting from opposed premises about both the territorial question and the ecclesiastical status of those participating in the proposed new church.
On 15 October the Russian Holy Synod, meeting in Minsk, declared that continued Eucharistic communion with Constantinople was impossible. Its statement prohibited Russian Orthodox clergy from concelebrating with clergy of the ecumenical patriarchate and prohibited lay members from receiving sacraments in its churches. The decision applied beyond Ukraine, affecting contacts with Constantinople’s dioceses, monasteries, and other institutions internationally. It was not merely the suspension of diplomatic or administrative relations.
The October rupture followed an earlier, shorter break over Estonia in 1996, when Moscow and Constantinople disputed jurisdiction over the restored Estonian church structure. That dispute had produced arrangements allowing parallel jurisdictions and the restoration of communion. The Ukrainian confrontation involved a much larger church population, the creation of a new autocephalous institution, and broader questions of authority. No comparable accommodation accompanied the October 2018 decisions.
Canonical arguments and the status of the Ukrainian hierarchy
One central disagreement concerned whether Constantinople could receive appeals from clergy disciplined by another autocephalous church. Constantinople invoked its interpretation of the canons and historical practice as a basis for hearing the appeals of Filaret and Makariy. In that interpretation, its primatial responsibilities include a role in resolving ecclesiastical disputes beyond its immediate territorial administration. Moscow rejected the existence of a general appellate jurisdiction of this kind over the decisions of other autocephalous churches.
The disagreement over Filaret’s rehabilitation was especially significant because Moscow had deposed him in 1992 and anathematized him in 1997. Constantinople had previously communicated its acceptance of the Russian Church’s disciplinary action. In 2018 it nevertheless accepted his appeal and restored him to episcopal standing. Moscow cited the earlier correspondence in opposing that reversal. Constantinople distinguished between its previous acknowledgment of the disciplinary measures and its claimed right subsequently to examine an appeal.
The status of ordinations performed within the previously unrecognized Ukrainian bodies raised a related question. Orthodox churches recognize sacramental ministry through the church’s episcopal and canonical order, but historical practice in receiving separated communities has varied. Some groups have been received without repeating ordinations, while other situations have involved additional rites or new ordinations. Constantinople’s action accepted the hierarchies concerned without requiring general reordination. Moscow challenged the canonical and sacramental basis for doing so.
These questions cannot be reduced to a disagreement over terminology. If the rehabilitated bishops were recognized as legitimate Orthodox hierarchs, they could participate in a council establishing a recognized church and elect its primate. If their standing remained invalid, as Moscow maintained, the council and the hierarchy it produced lacked the required foundation. This issue also became important for other local churches when deciding whether to recognize the new Ukrainian body.
A further dispute concerned the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and the granting of autocephaly. Constantinople argued that it was acting in a church historically connected to its own jurisdiction and exercising an established role in recognizing new autocephalous churches. Moscow maintained that Ukraine belonged to the jurisdiction of the Russian Church and that Constantinople could not create an independent church there without its consent. The absence of a universally agreed modern procedure for autocephaly made these opposed positions more difficult to reconcile.
The dispute also exposed different understandings of synodality. Moscow and several other churches called for collective Orthodox consideration rather than unilateral action. Constantinople held that its own responsibilities allowed it to address the Ukrainian question, which had remained unresolved for decades. Neither an ecumenical council nor another tribunal accepted by all parties issued a binding settlement of these competing claims.
The unification council and the decree of autocephaly
On 15 December 2018 a unification council met at Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. It brought together bishops from the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, together with two bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church associated with Moscow: Metropolitan Symeon of Vinnytsia and Metropolitan Oleksandr of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi. Most bishops of the latter church did not participate, and its leadership rejected the council’s legitimacy.
The council established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and elected Metropolitan Epiphanius Dumenko as its primate, with the title Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine. Metropolitan Emmanuel of France, representing Constantinople, presided over the proceedings. President Poroshenko attended, making visible the Ukrainian state’s support for the project. The council’s purpose was ecclesiastical unification, but its participants did not include the great majority of bishops belonging to the previously universally recognized Ukrainian hierarchy.
Patriarch Bartholomew signed the tomos of autocephaly on 5 January 2019 in Istanbul. It was formally presented to Metropolitan Epiphanius on 6 January during celebrations of the feast of the Theophany. A tomos is a formal ecclesiastical decree setting out a church’s status and associated arrangements. This document recognized the new Ukrainian church as autocephalous and established a framework for its relations with Constantinople and the other Orthodox churches.
The decree defined the new church’s territorial scope within Ukraine and made provisions concerning communities abroad, appeals, and the receipt of holy chrism from Constantinople. Ukrainian Orthodox communities outside Ukraine were not placed under the new autocephalous church by the document. Critics regarded some of these conditions as limitations on its independence. Constantinople treated them as consistent with its canonical understanding and the terms under which it had recognized other newer autocephalous churches. Autocephalous status has not historically required identical administrative arrangements in every local church.
The unification process did not eliminate all divisions among its participants. In 2019 Filaret rejected important aspects of the new arrangement and attempted to continue the Kyiv Patriarchate as a separate organization. The leadership of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine maintained that the former bodies had been dissolved as part of the December council and that the new church was the resulting ecclesiastical institution. This further dispute demonstrated that agreement on the goal of independence had not necessarily meant agreement about governance or the terms of the tomos.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy continued to operate separately and did not recognize the new body. Parishes subsequently faced decisions over affiliation, sometimes accompanied by disputes concerning voting procedures, legal registration, buildings, and access to worship. The creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine therefore changed the institutional landscape without producing a single church encompassing all Orthodox believers in the country.
Recognition by other churches and the widening rupture
Recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine proceeded unevenly. Constantinople’s decision did not automatically establish relations between the new church and every other Orthodox church. Recognition could be expressed through synodal decisions, the inclusion of Metropolitan Epiphanius in liturgical commemorations, correspondence, or concelebration. Because these forms of acknowledgment did not always occur simultaneously, individual events became closely scrutinized indicators of a church’s position.
In October 2019 the hierarchy of the Church of Greece accepted the right of Constantinople to grant autocephaly and supported its primate’s handling of recognition of the Ukrainian church. Archbishop Ieronymos subsequently commemorated Metropolitan Epiphanius in the liturgy. Moscow responded by ending communion with those Greek hierarchs who recognized or concelebrated with the Ukrainian hierarchy and by ceasing to commemorate Archbishop Ieronymos. It did not initially declare an undifferentiated rupture with every bishop of the Church of Greece.
In November 2019 Patriarch Theodore II of the Patriarchate of Alexandria recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine through liturgical commemoration of its primate. Moscow responded by severing communion with him and with Alexandrian bishops supporting that recognition. The significance extended beyond Ukraine because the Alexandrian patriarchate historically claimed Orthodox jurisdiction throughout Africa. Disagreement over Ukrainian recognition later became the immediate background to a separate jurisdictional conflict on that continent.
In October 2020 Archbishop Chrysostomos II of the Church of Cyprus commemorated Metropolitan Epiphanius. The Cypriot synod subsequently decided not to oppose the archbishop’s action, although several bishops dissented. Moscow again adopted measures directed at the primate and those hierarchs involved in recognition. These developments illustrated that differences existed not only among autocephalous churches but also within their synods.
Other churches did not follow Constantinople’s recognition. Some expressly opposed its Ukrainian decisions; others emphasized the need for wider consultation or avoided steps that would settle their position in favor of the new church. In February 2020 Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem convened a meeting in Amman intended to discuss Orthodox unity. Participation was limited, and Constantinople did not attend. The gathering did not produce an agreement accepted across the Orthodox world.
The resulting pattern was not a simple division into two mutually isolated communions. A church could remain in communion with both Moscow and Constantinople while declining to recognize the Ukrainian church. Moscow’s restrictions also varied according to the actions of particular primates or bishops. Orthodox relations thus became a network of overlapping recognitions and exclusions rather than two completely separate institutional blocs. This complexity affected joint liturgies, international meetings, and attempts to formulate common Orthodox positions.
Sacramental, institutional, and political consequences
The most immediate consequences concerned ordinary religious practice. Under the Russian Church’s October 2018 decision, its members were not to receive communion, confession, or other sacraments in churches under Constantinople. This affected travelers and diaspora communities as well as people in Ukraine. Mount Athos, the monastic peninsula in Greece under Constantinople’s spiritual jurisdiction, became a particularly prominent example. Russian pilgrims could visit its monasteries, but Moscow’s prohibition restricted their sacramental participation there.
The rupture also affected cooperation involving Orthodox bishops, theologians, and ecumenical representatives. Moscow’s September measures had already suspended participation in bodies chaired or co-chaired by Constantinople’s representatives. The controversy complicated Orthodox participation in dialogues with other Christian churches and made common Orthodox statements more difficult. It did not, however, terminate all contact between individual church representatives or erase every preexisting arrangement for cooperation.
A major institutional extension occurred in December 2021, when the Russian Holy Synod established a patriarchal exarchate in Africa and received clergy who had petitioned to join it from the Alexandrian jurisdiction. Moscow connected this action to Patriarch Theodore’s recognition of the Ukrainian church. Alexandria rejected the Russian intervention as an infringement of its jurisdiction. The dispute thereby generated a new territorial conflict far from Ukraine, involving clergy, parish organization, and the competing recognition of ecclesiastical authority.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 substantially altered the setting of the church conflict. Patriarch Kirill’s public support for Russia’s actions intensified opposition to ties with Moscow within Ukraine. On 27 May 2022 a council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy adopted changes to its governing documents and declared its full independence and autonomy. Its leadership also expressed disagreement with Patriarch Kirill’s position on the war. The declaration was distinct from joining the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and did not result in a generally recognized settlement of its ecclesiastical status.
Ukrainian state policy increasingly addressed religious organizations in relation to national security and institutional links with Russia. In August 2024 Ukraine enacted legislation establishing restrictions and procedures concerning religious organizations affiliated with a religious body based in the aggressor state. The legal framework, affiliation assessments, and implementation procedures were matters of state law, separate from the ecclesiastical question of which bishops and churches other Orthodox bodies recognized. Legal registration, ownership or use of church property, and canonical recognition remained different categories even when they concerned the same community.
The 2018 rupture consequently developed into several connected but distinct disputes: recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the extent of Constantinople’s primacy, and competing jurisdictions outside Ukraine. Restoration of communion would require ecclesiastical decisions concerning these issues, not merely an improvement in diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine. Conversely, political developments could profoundly affect church institutions without themselves resolving the canonical disagreements that produced the break.