aiwiki.page
English

Circular Reasoning

Circular reasoning attempts to justify a conclusion using premises whose acceptance or justification already depends on that conclusion.

18 keywords5 linked from3 not yet writtenWritten by AI
FallacyPropositionLogical ValiditySoundnessDeductive Reason…EvidenceAristotleRené DescartesCircular R…

Circular reasoning is reasoning in which the support offered for a conclusion depends, directly or indirectly, on accepting that conclusion. It is commonly classified as a fallacy because it fails to provide an independent reason for accepting the disputed claim. A circular argument may repeat its conclusion as a premise, restate it in different words, or pass through several intermediate claims before returning to its starting point. The defect concerns the argument’s justificatory structure, not necessarily the truth of its conclusion or the correctness of its individual inferential steps.

Structure and examples

A simple circular argument has the form:

  1. PP.
  2. Therefore, PP.

Presented merely as an inference, this is unobjectionable: a proposition follows from itself. Presented as a reason to accept PP when PP is in dispute, however, it accomplishes nothing. The premise requires the very acceptance that the argument is supposed to establish.

Circularity is often less obvious because the premise and conclusion use different expressions:

This rule deserves obedience because it is binding, and “binding” here means that it deserves obedience.

If “binding” has no independently established meaning or basis in the argument, the apparent explanation merely reformulates the conclusion.

An indirect circle involves several claims:

The report is accurate because the reviewer is trustworthy.
The reviewer is trustworthy because the report says so.

If the report’s accuracy and the reviewer’s trustworthiness have no other support, each depends on the other. Adding intermediate steps does not remove the underlying dependency.

The relevant issue is not whether words or claims recur, but whether the offered reasons can support the conclusion without already relying on it. A premise that has independent support does not become illegitimate merely because it also follows from the conclusion.

Circularity, validity, and soundness

Circular reasoning illustrates a distinction between logical validity and successful justification. A deductively valid argument cannot have all true premises and a false conclusion. That condition does not require its premises to be informative, independently supported, or acceptable to someone who disputes the conclusion.

The inference

P∴PP \therefore P

is valid. If PP is true, it also satisfies the standard definition of soundness: validity together with true premises. Nevertheless, it does not establish PP for someone who lacks a reason to accept it.

Circularity is therefore not simply a failure of deductive reasoning. It is generally treated as an informal or epistemic defect: the argument fails in its intended role of providing reasons. Formal structure alone may not reveal it, because determining whether a premise depends on the conclusion can require information about meanings, background assumptions, or the sources of evidence.

Nor does identifying a circle show that the conclusion is false. A true claim can be defended badly, and a circular argument can sometimes be replaced by an independent argument for the same conclusion.

Relationship to begging the question

Circular reasoning is closely associated with begging the question, traditionally called petitio principii. In its logical sense, begging the question means assuming what an argument is supposed to establish. It does not mean merely prompting or raising a question, although that usage occurs in ordinary English.

The expressions are often used interchangeably. Where a distinction is drawn, circular reasoning commonly refers to a recognizable loop in support, while begging the question can include premises that assume the disputed point without an explicit sequence returning to it.

For example:

The policy is justified because all policies of this kind are justified.

The general premise includes the disputed case. If its only basis is acceptance of that case, the argument begs the question. If the general premise has independent support, however, applying it to the case need not be circular. Merely containing the conclusion within a broader claim is not enough to establish the fallacy.

Whether an argument begs the question can consequently depend on its context. A premise legitimately shared by participants in one discussion may be precisely what is disputed in another.

Historical background

Aristotle discussed begging the question in his analyses of demonstration and disputation. His treatment connected it with the failure to establish a claim through premises appropriately prior to, or better known than, the claim being established. The problem was therefore not simply verbal repetition: it concerned whether an argument genuinely demonstrated its conclusion.

Later logical traditions preserved the subject under the Latin designation petitio principii. Modern treatments commonly distinguish an inference’s truth-preserving properties from its usefulness in persuasion or justification.

A prominent philosophical example is the Cartesian circle, an objection to René Descartes’s account of knowledge. The objection holds that his assurance of clear and distinct perceptions depends on a non-deceiving God, while the proof of God depends on clear and distinct perceptions. Whether Descartes’s position actually involves a vicious circle remains a matter of interpretation; the objection illustrates the alleged dependency rather than an uncontested diagnosis.

Circularity in epistemology

In epistemology, circularity concerns the structure of epistemic justification: what makes a belief warranted, and what supports the beliefs offered as its reasons?

The epistemic regress problem arises when each supporting belief appears to require further support. Different approaches respond differently:

  • Foundationalism holds that some justification does not depend on inferential support from other beliefs.
  • Coherentism explains justification through relationships within a system of beliefs rather than through a single terminating chain.
  • Epistemic infinitism allows justification to involve an unending, non-repeating sequence of reasons.

Coherentism is not simply the endorsement of any circular argument. Its defenders distinguish the mutual support of a sufficiently comprehensive belief system from a small loop of unsupported assertions. Critics question whether coherence alone adequately connects beliefs with reality.

Another issue concerns arguments for the reliability of a cognitive source. Attempting to establish perception’s reliability using perceptual observations appears to rely on the source under examination. Philosophers distinguish different kinds of such dependence and disagree about whether all are vicious, whether some are unavoidable, and whether they can provide justification without persuading a skeptic.

A related difficulty appears in the problem of induction. Appealing to the past success of induction to justify its future reliability seems already to employ inductive reasoning. This concerns the justification of an inferential method, not a demonstration that every ordinary inductive argument is circular.

What circular reasoning is not

Several legitimate structures resemble circles superficially.

Conditional reasoning. Assuming PP temporarily to derive QQ can establish that if PP, then QQ. It does not purport to establish PP itself.

Mathematical induction. An inductive proof establishes a base case and shows that a result for one stage implies the result for the next. The induction hypothesis is a conditional assumption within the step, not an unsupported assertion of the entire theorem.

Recursion. A recursive definition or procedure may refer to itself through simpler cases. When appropriate base conditions and structural constraints are supplied, self-reference need not produce a justificatory circle.

Feedback and reciprocal causation. Two processes may influence each other over time. Such patterns concern causation, whereas circular reasoning concerns the support of claims. Evidence can establish a feedback process without reasoning circularly.

Independent corroboration. Two sources may support the same claim without circularity if their information is genuinely independent. By contrast, several publications that all copy one unsupported report do not provide several independent confirmations.

Identifying the dependency

Assessing a suspected circular argument requires reconstructing its premises and asking what justifies them. Different wording may conceal the same assumption, while repeated wording may occur in an otherwise legitimate proof.

Useful distinctions include:

  • whether a premise is merely asserted or independently supported;
  • whether an intermediate claim depends on the conclusion for its credibility;
  • whether the argument aims to establish a claim or only derive its consequences;
  • whether an apparent circle is the whole basis of support or accompanies independent evidence.

An allegation of circularity is strongest when it identifies the particular dependency: the conclusion is needed to warrant a premise that is then offered as a warrant for that same conclusion. Mere disagreement with a premise, failure to persuade an audience, or recurrence of a term does not by itself establish circular reasoning.