Cheng Li-wun

Cheng Li-wun (Chinese: 鄭麗文; born November 12, 1969) is a Taiwanese politician who has chaired the Kuomintang (KMT) since November 1, 2025. She previously served in the National Assembly, held two terms in the Legislative Yuan, and was spokesperson for the Executive Yuan from 2012 to 2014. She became the second woman elected to lead the KMT, following Hung Hsiu-chu. (ey.gov.tw)

Her career spans student activism, membership in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), senior KMT communications positions, parliamentary service, and political broadcasting. Her leadership has brought particular attention to her advocacy of dialogue across the Taiwan Strait; in April 2026, she visited China and met Xi Jinping in Beijing. Her biography encompasses Taiwan’s democratization, the institutions of party and parliamentary politics, and the development of her publicly stated positions on cross-strait relations. (news.pts.org.tw)

Early life and education

Cheng Li-wun was born on November 12, 1969, in Kouhu Township, Yunlin County, Taiwan. The Executive Yuan’s biographical directory records her date of birth; Cheng has also identified Kouhu as her birthplace in accounts of her childhood. In a recollection published on November 23, 2025, she explained that her mother had returned to her maternal family’s home there to give birth while her father was stationed in Kinmen. She also recalled returning to Kouhu with her parents for Lunar New Year visits to her grandparents. These family visits maintained a connection with her birthplace after she moved away. (ey.gov.tw)

Cheng spent part of her childhood in Tainan. In remarks reported by Taiwan’s Central News Agency on March 15, 2026, she recalled living in the Yongkang area, where her grandmother’s home was located, and attending Bao Ren Elementary School and Houjia Junior High School. In a separate public recollection that month, she described growing up in a military dependents’ village in Tainan. These accounts locate her early schooling and upbringing in Tainan rather than in Kouhu, while distinguishing her childhood residence from her continuing ties to her birthplace. (cna.com.tw)

Her university education began with law at National Taiwan University. The Legislative Yuan’s official biography records her graduation from its law department, while the Executive Yuan’s English-language directory identifies the qualification as a Bachelor of Laws, or LL.B. She subsequently pursued postgraduate legal education in the United States, earning a Master of Laws, or LL.M., at Temple University’s Beasley School of Law. Both qualifications are listed as completed degrees in the government directory. (ly.gov.tw)

Cheng also undertook postgraduate study in international relations at the University of Cambridge. Her Legislative Yuan biography lists a completed master’s qualification in that subject, and the Executive Yuan directory gives its English designation as a Master of Studies in International Relations. This qualification was distinct from her postgraduate law degree at Temple. The official educational record identifies Cambridge study at master’s level, not an awarded doctorate; doctoral candidacy, where mentioned in biographical accounts, should not be treated as a further completed degree. (ly.gov.tw)

Student activism and entry into the DPP

While studying law at National Taiwan University, Cheng Li-wun participated in the Wild Lily student movement of March 1990. Her campus activities also included serving as president of the university’s University Forum Society (大學論壇社), a student discussion organization. These activities placed her within the student-activist milieu from which she entered opposition politics: during this period she campaigned for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and publicly supported Taiwanese independence. Her participation in Wild Lily is documented, although it should be distinguished from membership in the movement’s central decision-making group. (en.wikipedia.org)

The movement’s immediate demands concerned democratic institutions rather than a single position on Taiwan’s national status. From March 16 to March 22, students occupied Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Square in Taipei, challenging the continued authority of the National Assembly and demanding constitutional reform. Its four principal demands were dissolution of the National Assembly, abolition of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, a national affairs conference, and a timetable for democratic reform. Contemporary footage records student representative Fan Yun presenting these demands. They addressed the mechanisms by which political power was exercised, particularly the continued service of representatives elected decades earlier, rather than merely calling for changes in individual officeholders. (taipeitimes.com)

Cheng’s early support for independence was therefore a personal political position within a broader democratization movement, not a statement of Wild Lily’s collective platform. In later accounts, she described herself at the beginning of her career as a “Taiwanese independence fundamentalist.” That characterization is retrospective: it describes how she subsequently presented her earlier convictions, rather than constituting a quotation recorded during the March 1990 protests. Her student campaigning for the DPP and her independence advocacy are separately reported in biographical accounts. (thediplomat.com)

A concrete example of her participation in the DPP’s subsequent political debates was her involvement in the New Generation Platform for the Taiwan Independence Movement in May 1996. Cheng joined Chou Yi-cheng, Chen Chun-lin, Tien Hsin, Chung Chia-pin, Tuan Yi-kang and more than 100 signatories in endorsing the document. The initiative followed the DPP’s defeat in the March presidential election and formed part of a debate involving younger party members, including former student activists, over the opposition movement’s direction. This was a documented organizational expression of her independence position, distinct from her later descriptions of her youthful beliefs. By 1996, she had also entered elected politics as a DPP National Assembly representative; her subsequent appointment as deputy director of the party’s youth department in 2000 placed her within its central organization. (irlib.pccu.edu.tw)

National Assembly service and change of party affiliation

Cheng Li-wun served as a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) representative in the third National Assembly from 1996 to 2000. This was a national constitutional office, distinct from membership of the Legislative Yuan, the body responsible for ordinary legislation and parliamentary oversight. Although the National Assembly had formerly elected the president and vice president, constitutional reforms introduced direct presidential elections beginning in 1996. During Cheng’s term, the assembly remained an institution for amending the constitution, rather than a second chamber through which ordinary bills routinely passed. Her National Assembly service therefore preceded, and should not be counted as part of, her later legislative terms. (ey.gov.tw)

The third assembly participated in a substantial redistribution of constitutional powers. On July 18, 1997, it adopted amendments, promulgated on July 21, that removed the requirement for Legislative Yuan consent to the president’s appointment of the premier. The changes also introduced a legislative vote of no confidence in the premier and a corresponding presidential power to dissolve the legislature under specified conditions. These measures identify the institutional setting of Cheng’s service; the assembly’s collective decisions do not, by themselves, establish her individual position on each amendment. (english.president.gov.tw)

In 2000, Cheng became deputy director of the DPP’s Department of Youth. Her relationship with the party leadership subsequently deteriorated: after losing its legislative nomination contest in 2001, she increasingly criticized the DPP administration on television discussion programs. In October 2002, the party’s Taipei organization sought her expulsion, and she submitted a written protest against the proposed action. She was subsequently suspended and left the party. By the 2004 legislative election, she was standing as an independent candidate in Kaohsiung, unsuccessfully seeking a Legislative Yuan seat. These were separate stages in her departure from DPP organizational politics, not an immediate transfer from one party to another. (taipeitimes.com)

Cheng formally joined the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2005 at the invitation of its chairman, Lien Chan. She was appointed deputy head of the party’s Culture and Communications Committee and spokesperson. Contemporary television reporting recorded her arrival at KMT headquarters and her display of a new membership card, providing a concrete distinction between earlier cooperation with the opposition camp and formal party membership. Her subsequent party posts included heading the culture and communications organization. (ly.gov.tw)

The spokesperson appointment placed Cheng in an operational communications role, explaining leadership decisions and responding to journalists. On April 1, 2005, for example, she confirmed that Lien had accepted an invitation to visit China and described communications between him and KMT headquarters. Such statements document her responsibilities as a party representative. They should be distinguished from evidence about when particular personal policy convictions developed: the date of her KMT membership establishes an organizational change, not a precise date on which all her political views changed. (taipeitimes.com)

First Legislative Yuan term and electoral campaigning

Cheng Li-wun entered the seventh Legislative Yuan on February 1, 2008, as a Kuomintang (KMT) representative on its nationwide and overseas party list. Her first legislative term continued through January 31, 2012. This was an at-large mandate, not representation of a particular city or district: party-list seats were allocated through a separate party ballot, whereas constituency legislators won seats through votes cast for individual candidates in geographically defined constituencies. The electoral system provided 34 party-list seats, 73 single-member district seats and six Indigenous seats; parties required at least 5 percent of the valid party vote to qualify for list-seat allocation. Cheng’s subsequent campaign in Taichung therefore represented a change in the electoral basis on which she sought office. (ly.gov.tw)

Her committee assignments during this term covered both external affairs and domestic social policy. In the first and second sessions, she served on the Foreign and National Defense Committee. From the third through the eighth sessions, she belonged to the Social Welfare and Environmental Hygiene Committee. She also served on the Procedure Committee during the third, fourth, seventh and eighth sessions. These assignments establish the institutional settings of her parliamentary work without implying that she chaired those committees or that measures considered by them were her individual initiatives. (ly.gov.tw)

Her sponsorship of a draft referendum absentee-voting law belongs to her later parliamentary service rather than the 2008–2012 term. A Ministry of Justice report dated November 17, 2021, identifies a draft submitted by Cheng and 15 other legislators for examination by the tenth Legislative Yuan’s Internal Administration Committee. The proposal concerned a mechanism through which eligible referendum voters could apply to vote away from their registered voting location. The report records scrutiny of a bill, not the enactment of a law; its date and legislative designation distinguish it from her first-term record. (ppg.ly.gov.tw)

For the January 14, 2012 election, Cheng stood as KMT candidate number two in Taichung’s seventh legislative district. The official election bulletin defined the constituency as Taiping District and 25 neighborhoods of Dali District, excluding Donghu and Xihu. Her published platform combined national proposals with local infrastructure demands. She advocated allocating NT$800 billion over eight years to central Taiwan, described as a mechanism to retain locally generated resources and attract investment, and proposed developing Dali into a center for innovation and entrepreneurship. Transport pledges included extending the Taichung Metro Green Line toward Dakeng, Taiping and Wufeng and improving connections between Taiping and Dali. Her social-policy commitments included support for small and medium-sized enterprises, expanded childcare provision and a proposed NT$25,000 childbirth payment for women over 25 who were outside labor-insurance coverage. These were campaign commitments, not a record of completed projects or enacted benefits. (bulletin.cec.gov.tw)

Cheng received 92,369 votes, or 46.00 percent, against 101,006 votes, or 50.30 percent, for Democratic Progressive Party candidate Ho Hsin-chun. She consequently failed to secure the constituency seat, and her first period in the legislature ended with the conclusion of the seventh term. (votetw.com)

Executive Yuan spokesperson, 2012–2014

On October 20, 2012, the Executive Yuan announced that Premier Sean Chen had selected Cheng Li-wun as its spokesperson, filling the vacancy left by Hu Yu-wei’s resignation earlier that month. Secretary-General Steven S. K. Chen said that the premier had considered several candidates before deciding on Cheng after an extended conversation with her on October 19. The announcement identified her as a former Kuomintang legislator and emphasized the administration’s communication needs: Chen wanted someone familiar with the media environment who could explain policy accurately and in accessible language. Her selection thus brought a politician with experience in party communications into the cabinet’s public-facing spokesperson role. (english.ey.gov.tw)

Her work involved presenting the cabinet’s position to journalists, explaining policies across ministerial portfolios, and responding publicly to criticism of the administration. On January 13, 2013, for example, she issued a response to a demonstration in Taipei that addressed economic conditions, pension reform, media regulation, and energy security. She linked the administration’s economic response to the Economic Power-Up Plan announced the previous September and described the interministerial pension-reform task force convened by then vice premier Jiang Yi-huah. These statements communicated the government’s policy responses rather than announcing decisions made independently by the spokesperson. (english.ey.gov.tw)

Cheng remained spokesperson when Jiang succeeded Sean Chen as premier on February 18, 2013. A prominent communication task under Jiang concerned the proposed referendum on whether construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, also called the Longmen plant, should cease. On February 25, Jiang announced that the Executive Yuan was willing to put the plant’s future to a public vote. The administration presented the proposal within its stated policy of ensuring nuclear safety, reducing dependence on nuclear energy, and moving gradually toward a non-nuclear homeland; this was a proposal for a referendum, not an announcement of a completed vote or a resulting mandate. (history.ey.gov.tw)

At an Executive Yuan press conference on April 23, 2013, Cheng introduced a Ministry of Economic Affairs question-and-answer document explaining the government’s position on nuclear power and safety. She described it as the second official explanatory document on the issue and said its statistics drew on expert analysis and World Nuclear Association data rather than solely on Taiwan Power Company. In explaining the cabinet’s arguments, she cited Taiwan’s dependence on imports for more than 98 percent of its energy and its electrically isolated island system. She also distinguished the government’s preference for a gradual nuclear phaseout from demands for an immediate halt, presenting publication of the information as preparation for public deliberation over the proposed referendum. (english.ey.gov.tw)

On February 7, 2014, the Executive Yuan announced Cheng’s resignation, attributing it to personal career planning. Premier Jiang approved her departure and selected Sun Lih-chyun, then vice chairman of the Fair Trade Commission, to replace her. The announcement ended her spokesperson service across the Chen and Jiang administrations and identified Sun as the incoming officeholder, rather than describing a change in the premiership itself. (ey.gov.tw)

Political broadcasting and media work

Cheng hosted Li-wun’s Strait Talk (麗文正經話) on TVBS in 2014–2015, following her departure from the Executive Yuan spokesperson’s office. The program premiered on March 17, 2014, with a 10 p.m. broadcast on TVBS channel 56. Its opening edition examined the Kunming railway-station attack and its implications for security and economic development in China. Cheng’s guests were Liu Fu-kuo, a researcher at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, and Wang Kao-cheng, a professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies. The broadcaster’s launch announcement identified Cheng as the presenter conducting the discussion with these specialists. (taipeitimes.com)

The program combined discussions with several participants and interviews with individual political figures. On March 30, 2014, TVBS scheduled a special Sunday edition from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. concerning protests against the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement. The first hour’s announced participants were National Taiwan University philosophy professor Lin Huo-wang, Taipei city councilor Tai Hsi-chin, and Central Police University academic Yeh Yu-lan; the second featured broadcaster Jaw Shaw-kong and academic Kuo Cheng-liang. On April 14, Cheng interviewed Kuomintang Taipei mayoral candidate Sean Lien, with the advance announcement highlighting his proposal to relocate the city government westward and his pledge to donate his mayoral salary. These broadcasts placed Cheng in the role of host rather than that of a guest speaking on another presenter’s program. (news.tvbs.com.tw)

Her TVBS hosting appointment ended in September 2015. In a statement reported on September 24, the station said that her contract was expiring and that she would leave after the following Friday’s final episode, September 25. Cheng’s accompanying statement described approximately eighteen months of cooperation and said that, after discussions with TVBS, she had decided not to renew the contract while reconsidering her career plans. The station assigned the vacated slot to a new interview program hosted by Jaw Shaw-kong. This was the conclusion of a broadcasting contract, distinct from resignation from a government or party communications post. (election.ltn.com.tw)

Cheng subsequently appeared as a political discussion guest, including on China Television (CTV), where a November 2025 profile described her as a regular commentator since 2020. CTV’s own records identify specific appearances on Shumin Da Toujia (庶民大頭家): its September 21, 2021 guest list names her as a legislator alongside Chen Yu-jen, Taipei city councilor Lo Chih-chiang, and media commentator Cheng Shih-cheng. The broadcaster also lists her among participants in the August 11, 2025 edition. These records document recurring guest commentary, not a continuation of her TVBS hosting appointment or, by themselves, an official mandate to speak for the KMT. (taipeitimes.com)

Return to the Legislative Yuan, 2020–2024

Cheng returned to the Legislative Yuan on February 1, 2020, as a Kuomintang (KMT) legislator in the nationwide and overseas Chinese party-list category, rather than as the representative of a geographical constituency. She served through January 31, 2024, completing her second legislative term. This service belonged to the tenth Legislative Yuan and was separate from her earlier membership of the seventh legislature. (ly.gov.tw)

Her committee assignments changed over the four-year term. During the first through fourth sessions, in 2020–2021, she sat on the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee; she also served on the Procedure Committee during the first three sessions. She moved to the Internal Administration Committee for the fifth and sixth sessions in 2022, and to the Education and Culture Committee for the seventh and eighth sessions in 2023. Alongside these assignments, she joined the Constitutional Amendment Committee in the second session and served as one of its conveners in the third session, in 2021. (ly.gov.tw)

In the final session, Cheng also became a convener of the Education and Culture Committee. The committee’s September 25, 2023, proceedings recorded the selection of Cheng and Democratic Progressive Party legislator Fan Yun as its two conveners, following nominations by their respective caucuses and agreement to use selection rather than a contested ballot. Her convening work included chairing the November 8 meeting devoted to scrutiny of proposed 2024 budgets for the National Science and Technology Council, science-park funds, the National Science and Technology Development Fund, the National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, and the Taiwan Space Agency. That meeting’s first five agenda items were scheduled for questioning, with related motions to be submitted subsequently. (ppg.ly.gov.tw)

Her recorded legislative initiatives included amendments to the Special Education Act. A proposal to amend Article 16, submitted by Cheng, Yang Chiung-ying, Fei Hung-tai and other legislators, addressed the assessment of students’ special educational needs. Its explanatory memorandum argued that teachers’ concurrent assessment duties consumed teaching and preparation time without sufficiently clear rules governing assessment personnel. The proposed text expressly included preschool children and authorized central regulations covering assessors’ qualifications, training, concurrent-service arrangements, and dedicated assessment personnel. These were proposed administrative mechanisms for identifying educational needs and arranging support, not simply a general declaration of educational rights. (ppg.ly.gov.tw)

A separate Article 47 proposal, submitted by Cheng and Fei with other supporters, concerned the evaluation of special education provision. It sought to reduce duplicated administrative work by coordinating evaluations with school and preschool evaluation cycles, explicitly including preschools, limiting evaluation criteria to legally prescribed or officially announced items, and requiring follow-up assistance where standards were not met. Its explanatory memorandum also favored simpler procedures and digital documentation. Both bill records place the proposals within the wider Special Education Act revision process and record third-reading passage on May 29, 2023. That procedural outcome does not establish that every provision in Cheng’s original drafts was adopted unchanged; the proposals formed part of a legislative process involving numerous separately submitted amendments. (ppg.ly.gov.tw)

Election as KMT chairperson in 2025

Cheng Li-wun contested the Kuomintang (KMT) chairmanship for the first time in 2025, competing against five other candidates in the October 18 leadership election. Her principal opponent was Hau Lung-bin, a former mayor of Taipei. The remaining candidates were legislator Lo Chih-chiang, Sun Yat-sen School president Chang Ya-chung, former Changhua County commissioner Cho Po-yuan, and former National Assembly representative Tsai Chih-hung. Cheng was the only woman in the contest and presented herself as a reform candidate seeking to renew the party. Her election made her the KMT’s second elected female chairperson, following Hung Hsiu-chu, who held the position from 2016 to 2017. (taipeitimes.com)

The official result gave Cheng 65,122 votes, or 50.15 percent of valid ballots, against Hau’s 46,551 votes, or 35.85 percent. Lo finished third with 13,504 votes (10.40 percent), followed by Chang with 2,486 (1.91 percent), Cho with 1,944 (1.50 percent), and Tsai with 260 (0.20 percent). The party reported an eligible electorate of 331,145 members, of whom 130,678 cast ballots, producing a turnout of 39.46 percent. There were 129,867 valid ballots and 811 invalid ballots. Cheng’s reported majority therefore referred to valid votes cast in the internal party election, not to a majority of eligible KMT members or of Taiwan’s electorate. (kmt.org.tw)

Cheng’s campaign combined an emphasis on reform with a call for a more assertive party organization, expressed in her pledge to transform the KMT from a flock of “sheep” into “lions.” After the result, she stressed unity, saying that she had spoken with all five other candidates and would work to bring the party together for the 2026 local elections and the 2028 national elections. Hau congratulated her and urged members to set aside their differences and consolidate support behind the incoming chairperson. Outgoing chairman Eric Chu likewise congratulated Cheng and thanked the candidates for their contributions. These statements concerned the party’s organizational and electoral objectives rather than an agreement among the candidates on every policy issue. (taipeitimes.com)

The election and the transfer of office took place on separate dates. Cheng formally succeeded Chu on November 1, 2025, beginning a four-year term at the first session of the KMT’s 22nd National Congress, held at Chenggong Senior High School in Taipei. Sean Lien, convener of the party’s Central Election Supervisory Committee, presented her election certificate and conducted the transfer of the official seal; former chairman Wu Po-hsiung witnessed her oath. The ceremony installed her as head of a political party, not in a government office: the chairmanship election did not itself confer a legislative seat or an executive appointment. (knowledge.kmt.org.tw)

Party leadership and domestic policy positions

As chairperson of the Kuomintang (KMT), Cheng Li-wun’s responsibilities included directing party affairs, coordinating its organization and promoting its candidates. Article 17 of the party charter assigns the chair overall responsibility for party business and the chairmanship of the National Congress, Central Committee and Central Standing Committee. This gives the office an organizational and agenda-setting role, rather than the statutory powers of a government minister, legislator or mayor. Cheng could lead party deliberations and mobilize electoral support, but her statements did not themselves constitute legislation, budget appropriations or decisions by local governments. The charter also identifies the National Congress—not the chair acting alone—as the party’s highest authority. (kmt.org.tw)

During preparations for the 2026 local elections, Cheng’s campaigning combined appearances for mayoral candidates with support for council and neighborhood-level candidates. On September 12, 2026, she attended the inauguration of a supporters’ association for Taipei mayor Chiang Wan-an, bringing together hometown associations, overseas Chinese and new-immigrant organizations. She urged supporters to canvass and turn out voters, and called for support for KMT council and neighborhood-chief candidates alongside Chiang. In New Taipei, party records documented her attendance at a Hakka supporters’ association launch for mayoral candidate Lee Sichuan on October 3 and a further campaign rally on October 4. These were campaign endorsements and mobilization events; as of October 15, they did not establish any election outcome. (kmt.org.tw)

Cheng also incorporated nuclear power into the party’s domestic campaigning. At the September 9, 2026, Central Standing Committee meeting, she advocated increasing nuclear generation’s share of Taiwan’s electricity supply, arguing that it would help stabilize prices and address the reliable-power requirements of industrial investors. On September 16, she called for comprehensive nuclear restarts and urged a “yes” vote in the referendum scheduled for November 28. Her economic case linked electricity availability to industrial competitiveness, computing capacity and the expansion of artificial-intelligence industries; her energy-security argument presented nuclear generation as a dependable supply option. These were her stated reasons for changing energy policy, not findings that restarting particular reactors had already produced those benefits. Her campaign appeal likewise did not itself authorize a reactor to resume operation. (knowledge.kmt.org.tw)

On defense expenditure, Cheng took a publicly stated position during the 2025 leadership contest against President Lai Ching-te’s proposal to raise spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product. Associated Press reported that opposition as part of her campaign platform when covering her election on October 18, 2025. The position concerned a proposed spending increase: it should not be treated as an enacted budget ceiling, the rejection of a specific appropriation or a formal decision of the KMT legislative caucus. Her authority as party chair was distinct from the legislature’s responsibility for considering and voting on government expenditure. (apnews.com)

Cross-strait policy and the 2026 China visit

Cheng advocates dialogue and expanded exchanges across the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the “1992 Consensus”. She presents this formula as compatible with the Republic of China constitution, rather than as requiring Taiwan to abandon its institutions. In a September 16, 2026 address, she argued that accepting the consensus entailed neither concessions nor the sacrifice of Taiwan’s political system, way of life, or achievements. On August 23, she had urged President Lai Ching-te to accept it within the constitutional framework as a basis for communication and cooperation. These were Cheng’s stated constitutional and political interpretations, not an agreed definition of Taiwan’s status. (knowledge.kmt.org.tw)

Her April 7–12, 2026 visit to China took a Kuomintang delegation to Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing. Before departing, she described the trip as an effort to prevent war and demonstrate that peaceful dialogue could address cross-strait differences. It was the first visit by a serving KMT leader in a decade. On April 8, she paid tribute at Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum in Nanjing, referring in her remarks to Sun’s establishment of the Republic of China. This commemorative appearance was distinct from her subsequent discussions with Communist Party officials and business representatives. (apnews.com)

The itinerary combined political meetings with economic and social exchanges. Cheng met Jiangsu party secretary Xin Changxing and Shanghai party secretary Chen Jining on April 8, then visited Shanghai’s Yangshan Port and met Taiwanese businesspeople on April 9. In her Shanghai remarks, she pledged that the KMT would use positions in which it could exercise influence to promote economic, cultural, youth, and social exchanges. These statements expressed the party’s intended approach; the business gatherings did not constitute negotiations conducted on behalf of Taiwan’s government. (globaltaiwan.org)

On April 10, Cheng met Xi Jinping at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People in a party-to-party encounter between the KMT chairperson and the Chinese Communist Party general secretary. Cheng called for reciprocal, mutually beneficial exchanges and expressed the hope that the strait would cease to be a potential conflict zone or an arena for outside intervention. She also invited Xi to visit Taiwan. Xi, separately, asserted that people on both sides were Chinese, reiterated Beijing’s “one China” position and opposition to Taiwanese independence, and called for the two parties to work toward unification. Their statements did not establish an intergovernmental settlement. (investing.com)

On April 12, Chinese authorities announced ten measures concerning exchanges and cooperation. They proposed a regular CCP–KMT communication mechanism and a two-way youth exchange platform; promoted the normalization of direct passenger flights; and outlined agricultural, fishery, and food-market access measures. Other proposals concerned infrastructure connections between Fujian and Kinmen and Matsu, Taiwanese audiovisual productions, and renewed pilot arrangements for individual tourism from Shanghai and Fujian. These were announced initiatives, not evidence that flights, market access, tourism, or construction projects had already resumed or been completed. (www1.kmt.org.tw)

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council responded that cross-strait matters involving governmental authority required negotiations between the two governments. It characterized the package as a party-to-party political transaction that bypassed Taiwan’s administration. Consequently, the Chinese announcements were not agreements authorized by Taiwan’s government; implementation of proposals such as additional direct flights remained dependent on arrangements beyond the KMT delegation’s authority. (apnews.com)

References

1. Who’s Who in the ROC Iey.gov.tw
2. 鄭麗文粉專 2025-11-23：今天非常高興回到麗文的故鄉雲林口湖參加千人健走活動knowledge.kmt.org.tw
3. 鄭麗文出席台南黨員團拜　疾呼市長選舉勢在必得cna.com.tw
4. 出席眷村活動　鄭麗文：不該因一人出身決定是敵是友cna.com.tw
5. 立法院全球資訊網－鄭麗文委員ly.gov.tw
6. Cheng Li-wunen.wikipedia.org
7. 鄭麗文當選國民黨主席　兩岸路線藍白競合皆考驗cna.com.tw
8. Taiwan in Time: Warming up for the Wild Lilytaipeitimes.com
9. 威權走向自由 民主深化台灣 (上)｜看見台灣五十年｜華視新聞雜誌news.cts.com.tw
10. Cheng Li-wun’s Election Raises Questions for the KMTthediplomat.com
11. 鄭麗文接政院發言人 盼兼「假想敵」綠：暴走特質 爆點多ly.gov.tw
12. Introduction—Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan)english.president.gov.tw
13. New Executive Yuan spokesperson namedtaipeitimes.com
14. DPP maverick protests possible expulsiontaipeitimes.com
15. 曾披綠戰袍　鄭麗文參選：喊話扁立即舉辦台獨公投news.cts.com.tw
16. 新任發言人　鄭麗文赴國民黨報到news.tvbs.com.tw
17. 鄭麗文以戰將形象突圍　綠營出身當選國民黨主席cna.com.tw
18. KMT confirms Lien plans China triptaipeitimes.com
19. 立法院全球資訊網－鄭麗文委員（第7屆）ly.gov.tw
20. Presentation - Legislative Electionweb.cec.gov.tw
21. 法務部：公民投票不在籍投票法草案等3案書面報告（2021年11月17日）ppg.ly.gov.tw
22. 第8屆立法委員選舉選舉公報：臺中市第七選舉區bulletin.cec.gov.tw
23. 2012年立法委員選舉：臺中市第07選區投票結果完整資料votetw.com
24. Cheng Li-wun named Executive Yuan spokeswomanenglish.ey.gov.tw
25. Executive Yuan addressing issues raised by demonstratorsenglish.ey.gov.tw
26. Premiers of the Republic of Chinahistory.ey.gov.tw
27. Premier open to referendum on Longmen Nuclear Power Plantenglish.ey.gov.tw
28. Cabinet releases Q&A on nuclear power issuesenglish.ey.gov.tw
29. 孫立群將接任行政院發言人ey.gov.tw
30. New Cabinet spokesman appointedfocustaiwan.tw
31. Who is Cheng Li-wun?taipeitimes.com
32. 恐怖主義襲經濟！《麗文正經話》今晚首播news.tvbs.com.tw
33. 今晚8點《麗文正經話》談服貿news.tvbs.com.tw
34. 討好？真心？連勝文翻轉台北？news.tvbs.com.tw
35. 鄭麗文退駕T台 趙少康獨HOLD政論節目election.ltn.com.tw
36. 中視全球資訊網：政治節目紀錄ctv.com.tw
37. 中視全球資訊網：庶民大頭家ctv.com.tw
38. 立法院公報　第112卷　第63期　委員會紀錄ppg.ly.gov.tw
39. 立法院全球資訊網－第7次全體委員會議（112年11月6、8日）ly.gov.tw
40. 特殊教育法第十六條條文修正草案：議案關係文書ppg.ly.gov.tw
41. 特殊教育法第四十七條條文修正草案：議案關係文書ppg.ly.gov.tw
42. 「特殊教育法第十六條條文修正草案」，請審議案。ppg.ly.gov.tw
43. 「特殊教育法第四十七條條文修正草案」，請審議案。ppg.ly.gov.tw
44. Ex-legislator Cheng Li-wun elected as KMT chair - Taipei Timestaipeitimes.com
45. 114年中國國民黨主席選舉結果揭曉 - 中國國民黨全球資訊網kmt.org.tw
46. 鄭麗文｜中國國民黨主席 - 中國國民黨知識庫knowledge.kmt.org.tw
47. Cheng takes office with pledges - Taipei Timestaipeitimes.com
48. 中國國民黨黨章kmt.org.tw
49. 蔣萬安後援會成立 鄭主席：拜託大家全力為蔣萬安拉票催票 1128要贏，2028更要贏！kmt.org.tw
50. 國民黨的能源政策與 2026 核電公投（第 22 案）knowledge.kmt.org.tw
51. Cheng Li-Wun’s Polarizing Trip: The Kuomintang Leadership’s April Delegation Visit to Chinaglobaltaiwan.org
52. KMT chair mentions ROC, calls for cross-strait peace during China visitfocustaiwan.tw
53. Taiwan Affairs Office of the Mainland Announces Ten Measures for Taiwanwww1.kmt.org.tw