{
  "id": "yemeni-civil-war",
  "title": "Yemeni civil war",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "The Yemeni civil war is a multiparty conflict that fractured Yemen’s government, drew foreign intervention, and produced a prolonged humanitarian crisis.",
  "category": "history",
  "subcategory": "",
  "type": "event",
  "aliases": [
    "Yemen civil war",
    "War in Yemen",
    "Yemeni conflict"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-11-04",
  "model": "pro/gpt-6.1-sol",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/yemeni-civil-war/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/yemeni-civil-war/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/yemeni-civil-war.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "The Yemeni civil war is a multiparty armed conflict that developed from Yemen’s failed political transition after the 2011 uprising. Its principal national confrontation emerged in 2014, when the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, seized the capital, Sanaa. The conflict became an internationalized war in March 2015 with the intervention of a Saudi-led military coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognized government. It encompasses several overlapping struggles: competition for national authority, southern demands for independence or autonomy, local disputes over territory and resources, and regional confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran. This article covers its development through the end of 2024.\n\nThe war fragmented Yemen rather than producing a stable division between two unified sides. Houthi authorities consolidated control over much of the populous northwest, while the internationally recognized government and several formally allied but competing organizations controlled territories elsewhere. Foreign military involvement, attacks across Yemen’s borders, and disruption of Red Sea shipping extended the conflict’s consequences beyond the country. The collapse of incomes, public services, and commercial access contributed to a humanitarian emergency whose effects greatly exceeded deaths directly recorded on battlefields.\n\nA nationwide truce in 2022 substantially reduced large-scale fighting, but it did not establish a comprehensive peace. Rival administrations, armed forces, currencies, and revenue systems persisted. From late 2023, Houthi attacks on shipping and subsequent foreign strikes added a new regional dimension without resolving the internal disputes over Yemen’s political order."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Historical divisions and the failed transition, 1990–2014",
      "text": "The contemporary conflict grew out of institutions and grievances that preceded the 2011 uprising. North and South Yemen united on 22 May 1990, joining two states with different political systems and international alignments. Northern president Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of the unified republic. Disputes over power-sharing, military integration, and resources led to a north–south war in 1994, which Saleh’s forces won. Many southern officers and civil servants subsequently lost positions, while disputes over land and access to public employment helped sustain southern opposition. The Southern Movement, commonly called Hirak, emerged in 2007 as a broad and internally diverse campaign against these arrangements.\n\nIn the northern governorate of Saada, the Houthi movement developed from a religious and political revival associated with Zaydi Islam, a branch of Shiʿi Islam historically influential in Yemen’s northern highlands. Its emergence reflected local religious competition, opposition to government policies, and dissatisfaction with the distribution of state resources. Government forces fought six rounds of war against the movement between 2004 and 2010. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, an early leader, was killed in 2004; his brother Abdulmalik subsequently became the movement’s principal leader. These wars expanded Houthi military organization and left substantial destruction and displacement in the north.\n\nYemen’s 2011 protests formed part of the Arab Spring. Demonstrators demanded an end to Saleh’s long presidency, while defections divided the armed forces and political elite. A Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, signed in November 2011, provided for Saleh to transfer presidential powers in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Vice-president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi became president following a February 2012 election in which he was the sole consensus candidate. Saleh nevertheless retained influence through his political party, family relationships, and networks within the security establishment.\n\nThe National Dialogue Conference, held from March 2013 to January 2014, sought agreement on constitutional arrangements, southern grievances, rights, and institutional reform. Its participants endorsed a transition toward a federal system, but the subsequent proposal for six regions encountered strong opposition. Houthi leaders objected to the boundaries and economic prospects of their proposed region; important southern constituencies rejected arrangements they considered inadequate to address demands for self-determination. Disagreement over federalism therefore concerned access to ports, oil revenues, and political influence as well as constitutional design.\n\nThe transition also unfolded amid poverty, unreliable electricity, insecurity, and weak state finances. Efforts to restructure the armed forces did not fully dismantle personal chains of command. Fuel-subsidy reductions in 2014 intensified public discontent. The combination of unresolved regional claims, elite competition, economic pressure, and fragmented military authority created opportunities for armed organizations to challenge the transitional government."
    },
    {
      "heading": "The seizure of Sanaa and foreign intervention, 2014–2015",
      "text": "During 2014, Houthi forces advanced from their northern base toward Sanaa, defeating tribal and military opponents along the way. Their capture of Amran in July weakened forces associated with General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the Islah party. The advance was facilitated by cooperation with military units and political networks linked to Saleh, despite the previous wars between Saleh’s government and the Houthis. This alliance brought together two actors with different political objectives but a common interest in undermining the post-2011 distribution of power.\n\nOn 21 September 2014, Houthi forces took control of major institutions in Sanaa. A United Nations-brokered Peace and National Partnership Agreement envisaged a new government and security arrangements, but it did not reverse the armed takeover. Houthi influence over ministries and security institutions expanded. In January 2015, fighting around the presidential compound and restrictions on senior officials culminated in the resignations of Hadi and his government. In February, the Houthis announced arrangements to replace existing political institutions.\n\nHadi escaped to Aden later that month, withdrew his resignation, and sought to re-establish presidential authority there. Houthi-aligned forces, including units loyal to Saleh, advanced southward. Their approach to Aden transformed the struggle over the capital into a broader war for control of the state. Hadi subsequently left for Saudi Arabia and requested external military assistance.\n\nOn 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia and coalition partners began an air campaign known as Operation Decisive Storm. The coalition’s stated purpose was to restore the internationally recognized government and reverse the Houthi advance. Saudi Arabia provided the leading air and military role, while the United Arab Emirates became particularly influential in operations in southern and western Yemen. Other participating states contributed in different ways and for different periods. Coalition operations included air strikes, support for local ground forces, and controls over access to ports and airspace.\n\nThe United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2216 on 14 April 2015. It demanded that the Houthis withdraw from seized areas and relinquish weapons taken from military and security institutions, and imposed a targeted arms embargo on designated individuals and associated forces. The resolution became a central diplomatic reference, although its demands did not produce a military withdrawal.\n\nCoalition-backed Yemeni forces pushed Houthi-Saleh forces out of Aden during the summer of 2015. Hadi’s government subsequently used Aden as its temporary capital, but its practical authority remained uneven. The intervention prevented the Houthi-Saleh alliance from consolidating control over the whole country; it did not restore a unified national administration or military."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Armed coalitions, local power, and competing governments",
      "text": "The war’s principal camps were coalitions rather than coherent institutions. In the northwest, the Houthis combined a centralized leadership with supervisory networks operating alongside ministries, local authorities, and security agencies. Control of Sanaa gave them access to administrative records, taxation mechanisms, state media, and much of the former national bureaucracy. Their forces drew on fighters mobilized through local networks as well as personnel and equipment inherited from military units. A Supreme Political Council, established in 2016 during the Houthi-Saleh alliance, provided an institutional structure for the authorities in Sanaa.\n\nThe alliance with Saleh broke down violently in December 2017. Following clashes in the capital, Saleh called for a change in relations with the Saudi-led coalition. Houthi forces killed him on 4 December. They subsequently consolidated control over Sanaa and reduced the independent influence of his networks there. Some former Saleh-aligned personnel later joined opposing forces, including formations led by his nephew Tariq Saleh on the western coast. This realignment illustrated how wartime loyalties could follow leadership networks rather than a fixed national ideological division.\n\nOn the opposing side, the internationally recognized government retained diplomatic recognition but depended heavily on external assistance and locally organized armed forces. Units described as government forces differed in training, political affiliation, and responsiveness to central command. Islah, a party combining several political and religious currents, had influence within parts of the anti-Houthi camp, but did not represent all forces supporting the government. Tribal organizations also played important roles, particularly in Marib and al-Jawf, while retaining their own local interests.\n\nThe Southern Transitional Council was established in May 2017 under Aidarous al-Zubaidi. It advocated southern independence and developed a strong position in Aden and parts of the south with support from the United Arab Emirates. Its armed affiliates opposed the Houthis but also fought forces associated with Hadi’s government. Other southern communities and political organizations did not necessarily accept the council’s claim to represent the former South Yemen, making the southern question internally diverse.\n\nJihadist organizations operated outside these principal coalitions. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula exploited the weakening of state authority, most prominently by controlling Mukalla from April 2015 until April 2016. The Islamic State also carried out attacks, including bombings of mosques in Sanaa in March 2015. Counterterrorism operations against these organizations constituted a separate, although intersecting, military campaign.\n\nLocal authority consequently depended on a combination of armed control, negotiated relationships, revenue collection, and service provision. Governors, tribal mediators, municipal officials, business networks, and security commanders could exercise substantial influence even where national leaders claimed formal jurisdiction. Maps showing a territory as belonging to one camp often concealed overlapping institutions and limited administrative reach."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Major campaigns and the struggle for western Yemen, 2015–2018",
      "text": "The early campaigns established a durable geographic pattern. Coalition-backed forces secured much of the south, while the Houthi-Saleh alliance retained Sanaa and a large part of the northern highlands. The country’s terrain shaped operations: mountain roads and narrow approaches favored defensive positions, while the western coastal plain permitted different forms of mechanized advance. Control of a provincial capital did not necessarily imply control of surrounding districts, and front lines frequently divided transport networks rather than following administrative borders.\n\nTaiz became one of the war’s most protracted urban fronts. Anti-Houthi forces held much of the city, while Houthi forces controlled surrounding areas and principal approaches. Fighting, shelling, mines, and restricted roads divided communities and complicated access to food, medical treatment, and employment. Routes that had once taken minutes could require long journeys over mountain roads. The conflict in Taiz also involved competition among nominally allied local forces, limiting attempts to establish unified security and administration.\n\nMarib acquired increasing military and economic significance. It contained important energy facilities and became a center for the internationally recognized government’s forces and for people displaced from Houthi-controlled areas. Coalition support helped prevent its capture in the early phase of the intervention. Farther north, fighting around al-Jawf and routes toward Sanaa produced repeated advances and reversals without a decisive breakthrough into the capital.\n\nOn the western coast, coalition-backed forces captured the port town of Mokha in early 2017 and advanced northward. Their formations included southern fighters, the Giants Brigades, and later forces associated with Tariq Saleh. In 2018 they launched an offensive toward Hodeidah, the major Red Sea port under Houthi control. The city’s importance extended far beyond its military position: Hodeidah and nearby Salif handled large volumes of food, fuel, and other imports supplying heavily populated areas.\n\nThe prospect of a prolonged battle around the port generated international concern because Yemen depended heavily on imported staples and fuel. Damage to port infrastructure or the interruption of commercial shipping could affect people far from the front. The offensive reached the outskirts of Hodeidah, but diplomatic pressure and negotiations prevented a full assault on the city center.\n\nThe December 2018 Stockholm Agreement provided for a ceasefire in Hodeidah, arrangements concerning Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa ports, a prisoner-exchange framework, and an understanding on Taiz. A UN mission was subsequently established to support the Hodeidah arrangements. The agreement helped avert a major battle for the port, but disputes over the identity of local security forces, redeployments, and revenue administration limited implementation. It reduced one immediate danger without settling the wider war."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Southern fragmentation and the Marib offensive, 2019–2021",
      "text": "After 2018, conflict within the anti-Houthi camp became increasingly visible. In August 2019, forces associated with the Southern Transitional Council took control of Aden following clashes with government forces. The confrontation exposed a central contradiction in the coalition’s political project: organizations fighting the Houthis did not agree on whether Yemen should remain unified, who should govern the south, or how armed formations should be incorporated into national institutions.\n\nSaudi Arabia brokered the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019. It envisaged political power-sharing, the return of the government to Aden, and the reorganization of military and security forces under state authority. Implementation proceeded unevenly, with recurring disputes over appointments and deployments. The Southern Transitional Council declared self-administration in April 2020, then abandoned that declaration later in the year as negotiations resumed. A power-sharing cabinet including southern council representatives was formed in December 2020.\n\nThe arrival of that cabinet at Aden airport on 30 December 2020 was struck by explosions that killed and injured civilians and officials. The attack underscored the insecurity of the government’s temporary capital. More broadly, the agreement did not eliminate separate armed commands or resolve the constitutional question of southern independence. Political inclusion and military integration remained distinct problems.\n\nMeanwhile, the Houthis expanded eastward. Their capture of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf governorate, in March 2020 increased pressure on Marib. During 2021 they intensified operations around Marib city and advanced through districts to its west and south. For the internationally recognized government, the city represented a major remaining stronghold in northern Yemen, an important administrative center, and a gateway to energy resources. For the Houthis, taking it offered the prospect of strengthening both territorial control and bargaining power.\n\nThe Marib campaign involved repeated ground assaults, artillery fire, missiles, drones, and coalition air strikes. It also threatened large populations already displaced by earlier fighting. Tribal mobilization and coalition support contributed to the city’s defense. Despite substantial Houthi advances in the governorate, Marib city remained outside Houthi control through the period covered here.\n\nIn late 2021, Houthi advances into parts of Shabwa threatened additional southern and eastern routes. A counteroffensive by the Giants Brigades in early 2022 reversed those gains in several districts. The sequence demonstrated that battlefield outcomes depended not only on the strength of the two principal camps, but also on the redeployment of particular armed formations and changes in external support. Neither the southern power-sharing process nor the Marib campaign produced a decisive national settlement."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Foreign involvement and the regional security dimension",
      "text": "Saudi Arabia’s intervention reflected concern over developments along its southern border, the collapse of an allied government, and the growing relationship between the Houthis and Iran. Riyadh provided air power, financing, weapons, training, and diplomatic support to the internationally recognized government and associated forces. Cross-border fighting and Houthi missile and drone attacks made the conflict a direct Saudi security issue. The related Houthi–Saudi Arabian conflict included attacks on border areas, airports, and energy infrastructure.\n\nThe United Arab Emirates was a major coalition participant, particularly in southern Yemen and along the western coast. It trained and supported local armed organizations and took part in operations against both Houthi forces and al-Qaeda. Although it reduced its direct military deployment in 2019, relationships with partner forces continued to shape the conflict. Saudi and Emirati policies overlapped in opposing the Houthis, but differed over some local partners and the organization of political authority in the south.\n\nIran supported the Houthis politically and materially. UN expert investigations documented weapons, components, and technical characteristics linking parts of the Houthi arsenal to Iranian designs or supply networks, while interdictions exposed maritime smuggling routes. The development of Houthi missile and drone capabilities reflected both inherited Yemeni military stocks and external assistance. Evidence of support does not by itself establish that every Houthi decision or operation was directed from Tehran; the movement maintained its own leadership, territorial interests, and domestic political objectives.\n\nThe United States and United Kingdom supplied weapons and other forms of assistance to coalition members. US assistance included aerial refueling of coalition aircraft until November 2018. Washington also conducted a separate counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaeda in Yemen. In February 2021, the US administration announced an end to support for offensive operations in the war, including relevant arms sales, while maintaining support for Saudi territorial defense. The practical distinction between offensive and defensive assistance became an important policy issue.\n\nOman maintained channels to the Houthis and hosted diplomatic contacts, giving it a different role from the states participating in the intervention. Kuwait hosted an extended round of peace talks in 2016. Regional diplomacy therefore operated through several tracks: coalition military coordination, UN mediation, bilateral contacts, and negotiations facilitated by neighboring states.\n\nThe conflict is often described as a proxy war, but that term captures only part of its structure. Foreign assistance substantially affected military capabilities and diplomatic calculations, yet Yemen’s divisions arose from identifiable local and national disputes. Southern independence demands, competition over Marib’s resources, tribal relationships, and rival state-building projects could not be reduced to a single Saudi–Iranian confrontation."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Economic fragmentation and the financing of war",
      "text": "Yemen’s economic collapse resulted from the interaction of physical destruction, divided institutions, reduced production, restrictions on trade, and declining household incomes. Before the war, the country already relied heavily on imported food and fuel, while oil and gas revenues were important sources of public finance and foreign exchange. Disruption of energy exports and domestic commerce weakened the state’s capacity to pay employees and maintain services. The economic effects spread beyond battle zones because supply chains, banks, and government payrolls linked the whole country.\n\nA decisive institutional split occurred in September 2016, when Hadi’s government relocated the headquarters of the central bank from Sanaa to Aden. Rival authorities subsequently exercised separate monetary and regulatory functions. Salary payments to many public employees became irregular or ceased, undermining schools, hospitals, sanitation, and local administration even where buildings remained intact. Disputes over who should finance public salaries became a recurring issue in negotiations.\n\nCurrency practices also diverged. The authorities in Aden issued new banknotes, while Houthi authorities prohibited their circulation in areas under their control in late 2019. Different exchange rates developed between territories using different note supplies and regulatory systems. Transfers across these zones incurred additional costs, and businesses faced uncertainty over exchange, compliance, and access to banking services. Currency depreciation in government-controlled areas increased the local cost of imported necessities.\n\nArmed actors and governing authorities financed themselves through combinations of customs receipts, taxes, telecommunications revenue, fuel markets, checkpoints, and external assistance. Rival customs collection points could impose repeated charges on goods traveling between regions. Control over ports, oil fields, road junctions, and border crossings therefore had direct fiscal value. These revenues also created interests in maintaining particular territorial arrangements, even when the national economy continued to contract.\n\nOil exports from government-controlled ports provided an important remaining source of revenue until Houthi attacks on export terminals in late 2022 disrupted shipments. The Houthis linked pressure on oil exports to demands concerning revenue distribution and salaries. The suspension further constrained the internationally recognized government’s finances. Disputes over banks, air travel, and financial regulation subsequently became instruments of pressure alongside military threats.\n\nCommercial imports and humanitarian assistance followed different procedures but depended on many of the same facilities. Port inspections, damaged roads, fuel availability, insurance charges, and delays affected the prices paid by households. The UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, established in 2016, facilitated commercial shipping to ports outside government control while supporting implementation of the arms embargo. Remittances from Yemenis abroad remained an important household resource, but they could not replace lost national production or restore unified economic administration."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Civilian harm, displacement, and the humanitarian emergency",
      "text": "The war’s humanitarian consequences extended beyond deaths caused directly by air strikes, shelling, and ground combat. Loss of income, food-price increases, damaged water systems, reduced vaccination and treatment capacity, and interruptions to electricity contributed to preventable illness and mortality. A 2021 United Nations Development Programme assessment projected that the war would account for approximately 377,000 deaths by the end of that year, with a majority resulting from indirect causes. This was a modeled estimate, not a count of individually documented fatalities, and should not be treated as interchangeable with recorded combat deaths.\n\nMillions of people were displaced within Yemen, many repeatedly. Families sought shelter in rented housing, with relatives, in unfinished buildings, or in informal settlements vulnerable to floods and fire. Marib and other areas receiving large displaced populations faced increasing pressure on water, schools, and health facilities. Yemen also continued to receive migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa, some of whom became stranded or exposed to violence and detention.\n\nFood insecurity reflected both shortages in particular locations and the inability of households to buy available food. The loss of salaries, employment, and assets could be as important as the physical supply of grain. Malnutrition particularly affected young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women. Humanitarian classifications distinguished severe food insecurity from a formal famine determination; widespread hunger did not mean that every affected district met the technical criteria for famine.\n\nThe deterioration of the health system amplified infectious disease risks. A major cholera epidemic began in 2016 and expanded dramatically in 2017. Damaged water and sanitation infrastructure, interrupted waste collection, displacement, and difficulties obtaining treatment contributed to transmission. Surveillance reports frequently recorded suspected cases, a category that must be distinguished from laboratory-confirmed infection. The COVID-19 pandemic later placed additional pressure on a health system already divided and under-resourced.\n\nUN investigators and humanitarian and human rights organizations documented violations by multiple parties. Coalition air strikes hit civilian locations, including markets, medical facilities, weddings, funerals, and a school bus in Saada governorate in August 2018. Houthi and other armed forces carried out attacks affecting civilian neighborhoods, recruited children, and used mines or other explosive devices that continued to endanger civilians after front lines shifted. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and restrictions on expression were documented in different areas of control.\n\nLegal assessment turns on the rules of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Civilian casualties alone do not establish the legality or illegality of a particular strike, but patterns of attacks and the circumstances of individual incidents have generated extensive investigations. Accountability remained limited. The UN Human Rights Council did not renew the mandate of its Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen in October 2021, ending that investigative mechanism. Restrictions on humanitarian access and the detention of aid personnel further complicated relief operations."
    },
    {
      "heading": "The 2022 truce and negotiations over a political settlement",
      "text": "After earlier negotiations failed to end the war, a UN-mediated truce entered into force on 2 April 2022. Initially agreed for two months, it was extended twice, remaining formally in effect until 2 October. Its provisions included a halt to offensive ground, aerial, and maritime military operations inside Yemen and across its borders, the facilitation of fuel shipments into Hodeidah, limited commercial flights from Sanaa, and talks on opening roads in Taiz and elsewhere. It was a practical de-escalation arrangement rather than a final political settlement.\n\nThe truce produced a marked reduction in large-scale fighting and cross-border attacks. Commercial flights resumed from Sanaa, including a first flight to Amman in May 2022, and fuel imports through Hodeidah increased. These changes had direct consequences for travel and market supply. Road-opening negotiations, especially around Taiz, proved more difficult. Local clashes, casualties from mines, and disputes over implementation continued despite the broader decline in military operations.\n\nA major political reorganization occurred days after the truce began. On 7 April 2022, Hadi transferred his presidential powers to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, chaired by Rashad al-Alimi. Its membership brought together leaders associated with different anti-Houthi political and military constituencies, including the Southern Transitional Council and western-coast forces. The council was intended to coordinate these groups and conduct negotiations, but its establishment did not automatically unify their armed forces, administrative systems, or long-term objectives.\n\nThe truce expired in October 2022 without a further formal extension. Nevertheless, the parties did not immediately return to the previous intensity of nationwide warfare. Negotiations continued over public-sector salaries, oil revenues, roads, ports, and airport access. Saudi-Houthi contacts, supported by Omani mediation, became increasingly important. Such contacts could address border security and external military involvement, but questions remained about how any resulting arrangements would relate to a comprehensive Yemeni political process.\n\nThe restoration of Saudi–Iranian diplomatic relations announced in March 2023 provided a more favorable regional setting for de-escalation, although it did not itself settle Yemen’s conflict. Saudi and Omani representatives visited Sanaa in April, and a Houthi delegation visited Riyadh in September. A major prisoner release in April 2023, facilitated by the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, demonstrated that negotiated agreements could produce concrete results even without a final peace accord.\n\nIn December 2023, the UN special envoy announced commitments by the parties toward measures including a nationwide ceasefire, salary payments, resumed oil exports, and an inclusive political process, to be developed into a UN roadmap. Outstanding questions included southern representation, security arrangements, revenue sharing, and the future relationship between rival governing institutions. The emerging diplomatic framework remained vulnerable to both domestic disagreements and widening regional hostilities."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Red Sea escalation and the unresolved conflict, 2023–2024",
      "text": "From October 2023, the Houthis launched missiles and drones toward Israel and subsequently expanded attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They presented these operations as support for Palestinians during the Israel–Hamas war. In November, Houthi forces seized the vehicle carrier Galaxy Leader and detained its crew. Subsequent attacks affected vessels with differing ownership, operating arrangements, and destinations, and were not confined to ships with a clearly established direct Israeli connection.\n\nThe geography of the Bab el-Mandeb gave these operations international significance. Shipping passing between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal must traverse the strait and the Red Sea. Missile and drone attacks, combined with the risk of boarding or damage, led major shipping companies to divert vessels around southern Africa. Longer voyages increased transit times, fuel consumption, and shipping costs. The maritime campaign thus affected international trade while also increasing risks to Yemen’s own import-dependent economy.\n\nIn December 2023, the United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational maritime security initiative. US and allied warships intercepted missiles and drones and responded to attacks on shipping. Beginning in January 2024, the United States and United Kingdom carried out strikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen. The European Union launched Operation Aspides in February 2024 as a defensive maritime operation. These deployments had different mandates and participation arrangements, although all responded to threats in the same shipping corridor.\n\nAttacks caused deaths among seafarers and damage to merchant ships. The bulk carrier Rubymar, struck in February 2024, sank in March while carrying fertilizer, raising environmental concerns. An attack on True Confidence in March killed crew members. In July, a Houthi drone struck Tel Aviv and killed a civilian; Israel subsequently attacked Hodeidah, including port-related and energy facilities. Further exchanges later in 2024 expanded the number of external actors conducting strikes inside Yemen.\n\nThe maritime escalation did not erase the distinction between the internal civil war and the regional conflict. Many Yemeni opponents of the Houthis were not parties to their Red Sea campaign, while the Saudi-led intervention and the US-led maritime response had different immediate objectives. Saudi Arabia’s continued interest in de-escalation also differed from the more direct military confrontation between the Houthis, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel.\n\nBy the end of 2024, Yemen remained politically and economically divided despite the reduction in large-scale internal fighting since 2022. Houthi authorities retained Sanaa and much of the northwest; the Presidential Leadership Council and associated but competing forces controlled other territories. Aid operations faced funding constraints, administrative restrictions, and detentions of personnel, including UN staff. Negotiations still had to address the distribution of revenues, payment of salaries, freedom of movement, the status of armed organizations, and the relationship between national institutions and southern political demands."
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