{
  "id": "renminbi-exchange-rate",
  "title": "Renminbi exchange rate",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "How China's currency, the renminbi (yuan), is priced against foreign currencies, how the People's Bank of China manages it, and why it matters for trade, finance and reserve-currency status.",
  "category": "economics",
  "subcategory": "macroeconomics",
  "type": "concept",
  "aliases": [
    "RMB exchange rate",
    "yuan exchange rate",
    "CNY exchange rate",
    "CNY/USD rate"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-10-16",
  "model": "pro/claude-haiku-5-5",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/renminbi-exchange-rate/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/renminbi-exchange-rate/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/renminbi-exchange-rate.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "The renminbi exchange rate is the price at which the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB, whose main unit is the yuan), trades against foreign currencies, most importantly the US dollar. Because the Chinese economy is the world's second largest and international trade is heavily invoiced in dollars, movements in the renminbi affect export competitiveness, import prices, inflation, corporate balance sheets and the global financial markets. Unlike a freely floating currency, the renminbi is managed: the central bank sets a daily reference rate and keeps spot trading within a band around it, so the rate reflects policy choices as well as supply and demand. Its level therefore sits at the intersection of monetary-policy, capital-account regulation and economic-growth.\n\nThe entry explains how the rate is defined and quoted, and how the regime changed from the 1994 unification of exchange rates through the 2005 and 2015 reforms to the present daily fixing system. It distinguishes the onshore CNY from the offshore CNH market, sets out the policy tools and the capital controls that limit how far the market can move the rate, and reviews the main economic theories used to explain its level, from balance-of-payments and interest-rate considerations to purchasing-power comparisons. Historical episodes such as the 2015 devaluation, the trade-war period and the appreciation since 2025 are treated in turn, followed by the contested question of whether the currency is undervalued and how international bodies assess it.\n\nThe final sections cover the economic effects of the rate on trade, prices and firms, the currency's gradual internationalization and its role in reserves and the IMF's special drawing rights, and the open research questions about how much of the rate is market-determined and how far the renminbi can become a fully convertible international currency."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Definition and quotation conventions",
      "text": "An exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of another. For the renminbi (RMB, whose unit is the yuan, CNY), the rate can be written in two directions, and the reader must know which direction a series uses before interpreting any move.\n\nQuotation styles\n\nThe usual practice in Chinese official and market sources is to quote the rate as the number of yuan per US dollar, written USD/CNY or \"CNY per USD\". A figure of 7.00 means that one dollar buys seven yuan. The opposite style, USD per CNY, gives the dollar price of one yuan. A rate of 7.00 CNY per USD is therefore about 0.1429 USD per CNY. Both forms describe the same price, but they move in opposite directions. When the dollar price of the yuan rises, the USD/CNY figure falls.\n\nThis inversion is the most common source of error. A rise in USD/CNY from 6.9 to 7.1 means the yuan has weakened (depreciated) against the dollar, and a fall in the same series means it has strengthened (appreciated). Percentage changes also depend on the base. A move from 7.0 to 6.7 CNY per USD is a fall of about 4.3 percent in the USD/CNY figure. The dollar value of one yuan, however, rises by about 4.5 percent (7.0 ÷ 6.7 − 1). Any statement about the size of a move should therefore specify the quotation direction and the base.\n\nBilateral and effective rates\n\nA bilateral rate compares the yuan with one other currency, most often the dollar. Because China trades with many partners, analysts also use effective exchange rates, which are weighted averages of the yuan's value against a basket of partner currencies, with weights usually based on trade shares. The CFETS RMB Index, compiled by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS), is the best-known official trade-weighted index of this kind. A nominal effective rate uses market exchange rates directly. A real effective exchange rate adjusts the nominal index for differences in price levels, typically using consumer or producer price indices, and is used to judge competitiveness. If domestic prices rise faster than partners' prices, the real rate appreciates even when the nominal index is unchanged. A bilateral dollar move can also differ from a trade-weighted move when the dollar moves against other partner currencies at the same time.\n\nData sources and conventions\n\nSeveral series are in common use, and they are not interchangeable. The People's Bank of China (PBOC) publishes a daily central parity, or midpoint, before the market opens, and the permitted trading band is measured from it. Onshore spot trading is recorded by CFETS, and reports may cite closing prices or weighted-average prices from that system. The offshore CNH rate, quoted mainly in Hong Kong, is a separate series that trades during hours when the onshore market is closed, so its timing and level can differ from the onshore figure. Secondary series used for research include the daily and weekly foreign-exchange releases of the Federal Reserve, which report foreign currency units per US dollar and therefore use the same direction as the Chinese convention. These figures are noon buying rates in New York, so they can differ from onshore closing prices. Other databases and vendors may invert the quotation, so the direction must be checked in each source's documentation.\n\nTerminology\n\nAppreciation and depreciation describe changes in the value of a currency that occur through market forces or within a managed float. Revaluation and devaluation describe official changes to a fixed or pegged rate. The terms \"strong yuan\" and \"weak yuan\" are used loosely in media and policy commentary. A strong yuan usually means a low USD/CNY figure, but the phrase may also refer to a rate that is stable against the basket or to a high real effective rate. Because the dollar moves against other currencies, the yuan can appreciate against the dollar while depreciating against a trade-weighted basket, and the reverse is also possible. Accurate description therefore depends on naming the reference currency, the index and the date."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Evolution of the exchange-rate regime, 1994–2015",
      "text": "The 1994 reform ended a dual-track system that had operated since the late 1970s. In 1981, the State Council introduced an 'internal settlement rate' of RMB2.8 to the USD, which applied to all trade transactions conducted via government sanctioned 'swap centres'. This rate operated alongside an official exchange rate of RMB1.5 to the USD. On 1 January 1994 the two rates were merged. The Chinese government unified the two exchange rate systems at an initial rate of 8.70 yuan to the dollar, which eventually was allowed to rise to 8.28 by 1997. The reform also reduced current-account controls, and in December 1996, the PBC announced full current account convertibility. Although the regime was nominally a managed float, in practice the RMB remains closely pegged to the USD. The RMB appreciated gradually through to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, at which point China resisted depreciation.\n\nThe rate then stayed at about 8.28 per dollar until 2005. Pressure built during this period. Maintaining the peg at 8.28 became very costly in terms of buying U.S. dollars flowing into the country from trade and investment. Speculative flows in anticipation of a revaluation also required the central bank to purchase dollars and other hard currencies. By early 2005, China's foreign exchange reserves exceeded $700 billion.\n\nOn 21 July 2005 the authorities revalued the currency by about 2.1 per cent, from 8.2765 to 8.11 per dollar, and announced a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies. The People's Bank of China stressed that this reference did not mean that the renminbi would actually be pegged to a basket of currencies. The weights were not disclosed. The Bank would announce the closing price of a foreign currency such as US dollar against the renminbi in the inter-bank foreign exchange market after the closing of the market on each working day, and would make it the central parity. Because the band was then set around a midpoint that could move daily, the new exchange rate regime is best regarded as a tightly managed float. Movements stayed well within the bands, and by early November 2005 the currency had appreciated by a maximum of 0.3% against the US dollar in addition to the initial one-off revaluation.\n\nGradual appreciation continued until mid-2008. The daily band was initially set at 0.3% above and below the central parity rate but has been raised to 0.5% since May 21, 2007. During the global financial crisis the authorities effectively reinstated the dollar link. The currency remained within a very narrow range of 6.80 to 6.87 per dollar from July 2008 to June 2010. Sources differ on the exact start of the re-peg: one dates it to August 2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis, while another places it in mid-2008.\n\nThe return to flexibility came in June 2010. The People's Bank of China announced on June 19, 2010 that it would further increase the flexibility of the exchange rate of the yuan. The following Monday, June 21, it terminated the effective dollar peg system that had been in place since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The formal regime did not change at that point. The authorities announced a renewed emphasis on exchange rate flexibility in June 2010, although there were no changes made to the de jure exchange rate system. The band was widened again later, in April 2012, from a daily range of 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent. Between mid-2010 and 2013 the currency appreciated, climbing 16.9% against a trade-weighted basket of other currencies by May 2013.\n\nThe appreciation was reversed in 2014 and 2015. Against the dollar, last year China's currency fell 2.5% against the dollar – only its second fall since 2005, according to a 2015 commentary on the 2014 movement. On 11 August 2015 the PBC changed how the central parity was set, so that the midpoint took more account of the previous day's closing rate and market-maker quotes. The change was intended to make the fixing more market-based, but markets largely read it as a devaluation. The spot rate fell sharply over the following days, the largest one-day move since the 1994 unification. The sudden depreciation triggered expectations of further falls and large capital outflows, and foreign-exchange reserves dropped by hundreds of billions of dollars over the following months. The authorities responded by tightening scrutiny of outbound transfers and household foreign-exchange purchases, and by stabilising the currency against a basket of trading-partner currencies, a framework discussed in the following section."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Current fixing mechanism and the counter-cyclical factor",
      "text": "How the central parity is built\n\nThe daily central parity, or fixing, is the midpoint around which onshore spot trades are allowed to move. After the exchange rate reform of August 2015, the fixing no longer reflected only the previous day's market price. Before the 811 reform, only the previous day's parity held significant importance. Following the reform, the central parity determination considered both the previous day's closing rate and a basket target. The inputs are a set of contributing banks' quotes. Some of the 14 lenders who submit quotes for the U.S. dollar-yuan exchange rate to the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS), part of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), every morning before it publishes its fixing have altered their models, and the PBOC makes the final determination after receiving the submissions each morning.\n\nThe basket term draws on the central bank's trade-weighted benchmark. Changes in the value of the CFETS RMB Index, which tracks the yuan against a basket of 24 trading partner currencies, feed into the calculation, and the overnight movement in that basket is measured separately from the daytime session. Research by Jermann, Wei and Yue describes the adjustment that follows: the counter-cyclical factor is defined as an adjustment that removes the impact of the currency basket from the movement between the previous closing rates and the central parity.\n\nThe counter-cyclical factor, 2017–2020\n\nIn May 2017 the PBOC added a counter-cyclical factor (CCF) to the model. It was introduced for the first time to the existing pricing model of the yuan's daily trading reference rate, aiming to moderate pro-cyclical fluctuations driven by irrational sentiment in the foreign exchange market. Officials presented it as a way to lessen possible \"herd effects\" in the market and help guide the market to focus more on macroeconomic fundamentals. Its formula has never been published, so outside analysts infer its role from fixing outcomes. Jermann and co-authors argue that the closing rate's deviation from the basket target may be caused by irrational behavior or a herding effect in the FX market.\n\nThe factor was switched off and on in 2018. In January 2018, the PBOC changed its guidelines on how to calculate submissions for the daily CNY fixing, effectively removing the counter-cyclical factor from current results. The authorities gave no reason, but the earlier suspension came when the yuan appreciated against the dollar and the cross-border capital flows showed stable trends. Reinstatement came in August 2018, when some pro-cyclical activities had shown up in the foreign exchange market, influenced by a stronger US dollar and trade frictions. Bloomberg reported that banks resumed the adjustment to mitigate the bias toward a weaker yuan.\n\nIn October 2020, the factor was dropped in practice rather than by decree. CFETS said that market-making banks made the move on their own initiative based on their judgment of economic fundamentals and market situations. Reuters, citing sources, reported that the PBOC had asked some of the 14 midpoint contributing banks to submit and adjust their models to better reflect flexibility in the exchange rate. Some analysts read the change as a sign that those tools are no longer needed because the yuan had strengthened.\n\nTrading band and the fixing as a signal\n\nOnshore spot trading is confined to a band around the fixing. One description holds that the PBOC's managed floating exchange-rate system allows the onshore CNY spot to fluctuate within a +/-2% trading band with reference to the daily midpoint. Because the fixing is set by the authorities and publicly announced, it works as a policy signal. A lower fixing indicates a stronger reference point for the yuan against the US dollar. Market participants also watch how the fixing compares with forecasts; Bloomberg noted that the fixing has been consistently stronger than expected recently, according to Bloomberg surveys.\n\nDiscretion, transparency and signalling\n\nThese elements pull in different directions. The formula is partly rule-based and partly discretionary. The official description of the CCF has been brief, and CFETS presented the 2020 change as a gain in transparency, benchmarking and effectiveness of the mid-price provided by banks. Yet the weights and the factor's size remain undisclosed, so analysts estimate them from outcomes. One study found that the three factors (the previous day's CNY closing rate, the basket target, and the countercyclical factor) can explain nearly 80% of the variation in the central parity. The remaining variation reflects judgement that cannot be read from the formula.\n\nThe result is a tension between predictability and control. Rule-based inputs let markets anticipate fixings, while an undisclosed adjustment lets the authorities respond to conditions without announcing a new rule. Because the fixing signals intent, a sudden change in its path, such as the 2018 suspension and reinstatement, is read as a statement about the government's stance on the currency, not only as a technical adjustment."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Onshore and offshore markets",
      "text": "The renminbi trades in two partly separate venues. The onshore CNY is traded inside mainland China, where it is settled through domestic systems and where the daily fixing and onshore intervention frame trading. The offshore CNH is traded mainly in Hong Kong and other offshore centres, and it developed in the early 2010s. One source dates the foundation of the offshore system to June 2011, and the People's Bank of China (PBoC) authorised the Hong Kong Financial Markets Association to publish offshore CNH spot rates based on quotations from 15 active banks onshore. The two rates therefore share one currency, but they differ in how they are set and who can trade them. CNY is shaped by policy within a managed framework, while CNH is more exposed to offshore supply and demand. Offshore participants also face fewer direct controls, which makes CNH a more sentiment-sensitive price.\n\nArbitrage and the spread\n\nUnder normal conditions the two rates stay close. If CNH trades cheaper than CNY, an investor can buy CNH with dollars offshore, move the funds to the mainland through permitted channels such as trade settlement, convert them into the dearer onshore currency, and sell the yuan back for dollars. The reverse operation works when CNH is dearer. Without capital controls this flow would restore parity, but the controls limit the movement of funds, so the gap persists as a wedge. The spread is usually a small fraction of a percent. It widens when offshore participants expect a currency move, when offshore liquidity tightens, or when the authorities act to steady the onshore rate.\n\nThe two venues also differ in cost structure. Onshore trading costs are higher and more stable because of capital-account restrictions, whereas offshore costs are generally lower but can rise sharply when liquidity tightens. As a result, spot prices can remain tightly aligned while forward prices diverge, because the expected cost of hedging differs between the venues. Offshore funding rates can also move separately from onshore rates. The relationship between offshore flows and the spread has itself changed over time. Researchers at the PIIE observed a stable link between CNH deposits and the spread from mid-2010 to early 2014, but this link appeared to break down after November 2015. They suggested that PBoC intervention aimed at narrowing the CNH–CNY gap was a possible explanation. In February 2016 the PBoC removed all limits on foreign institutional purchases of CNY bonds, a step that could help unify the two markets.\n\nClearing banks and cross-border channels\n\nOffshore clearing is organised around designated banks. Bank of China (Hong Kong) acts as the sole RMB clearing bank in Hong Kong under arrangements with the PBoC, and a 2009 agreement extended clearing for trade settlement to Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN. A 2010 revision widened the scope to other regions, allowing banks in Europe and the United States to make real-time RMB transactions through Hong Kong's system. Offshore payments settle when a correspondent bank exchanges a CNH deposit at the clearing bank. The network has since expanded to 33 offshore clearing banks across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas, which together with the Cross-border Interbank Payment System form a direct settlement network for RMB trade.\n\nStock and bond channels link the two markets more directly. The Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect began in 2014 and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong link in 2016. Bond Connect was announced in May 2017 and began trial operations in July 2017. Investors in Bond Connect may fund their purchases in CNH or in foreign currency, converting into CNY through offshore banks at prevailing rates, and they must repatriate in the same currency they used to fund the trade. Most Bond Connect activity takes place in the inter-bank market, under rules set by the CFETS trading platform. Commentators have credited the scheme with improving price discovery and information flow in mainland bond trading, although these channels mainly route foreign demand through the offshore exchange market rather than directly setting the onshore rate.\n\nImplications for policymakers and investors\n\nFor policymakers, the offshore market is both a cost and a diagnostic. A widening CNH discount is often read as a sign of capital-flight concerns or offshore yuan shortages, and it can reveal how the market interprets the central bank's fixing. For this reason, a sudden unexplained move in the spread may signal expectations of depreciation or doubts about the PBoC's fixing or the mainland economy. Intervention to narrow the spread, as researchers have suggested, is one way authorities can respond to such signals.\n\nFor international investors, the two venues offer different routes into the same currency. Those without access to onshore accounts rely on CNH for hedging and funding, and they must weigh the spread, the cost of crossing between markets and the difference in forward pricing. The reliability of offshore prices as a guide to onshore conditions is therefore conditional. Offshore quotes respond quickly to global sentiment and can be thinner in stress, so they may overshoot or move independently of onshore fundamentals. They are informative about expectations and offshore liquidity, but they are not a direct measure of the onshore rate, which the authorities still shape through the fixing and intervention."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy tools and capital-account management",
      "text": "Balance-sheet and regulatory instruments\n\nBeyond the daily fixing, the authorities influence the rate through instruments that act on banks' balance sheets. The most distinctive is the foreign-exchange risk reserve for forward sales. Financial institutions must set aside a portion of their foreign exchange forward sales as a non-interest-bearing reserve with the central bank. Because this deposit carries a cost, the ratio feeds into forward pricing. When the yuan faces strong depreciation pressure, the PBOC typically raises this ratio to increase the cost of forward FX purchases and curb speculation. The reverse applies when appreciation pressure dominates. The ratio was reduced to zero in October 2020 and raised to 20% in September 2022 to stabilize forex market expectations. On 27 February 2026 the People's Bank of China cut it back to zero, effective 2 March, which was the first time in more than three years that the central bank has adjusted this policy tool. The move followed a roughly 3% yuan appreciation in three months, from above 7.2 to 6.85 per dollar.\n\nDirect intervention, typically carried out through large state-owned banks acting on the authorities' instructions, is less visible than the fixing or the reserve ratio. Its size is rarely disclosed in real time, so analysts infer it from changes in reserves, banks' foreign-currency positions and the behaviour of the onshore spot rate relative to the fixing.\n\nReserve management\n\nThe State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) manages the foreign-exchange reserve stock, which acts as the buffer behind any intervention. Reserves reached their highest level since November 2015 in February 2026. They then fell: at the end of September 2026 they stood at US$3.400 trillion, down from about US$3.438 trillion a month earlier. SAFE attributed much of the September decline to a stronger US dollar and surging US Treasury yields, which likely led to currency translation and asset valuation changes. This illustrates that monthly changes in the stock mix valuation effects with actual transactions. SAFE's own explanation for a rise in August was the combined effects of currency translation and asset price changes. For analysts, a reserve drawdown is therefore a noisy signal of net sales of dollars, and must be read alongside valuation changes and data on the FX settlement balance.\n\nCapital-account framework\n\nControls on cross-border flows operate through licensing, quotas and approval requirements. The foreign-investor channels illustrate the pattern of gradual opening. The qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) scheme, set up in 2002, lets foreign funds invest onshore in China's yuan-denominated A shares. The RQFII scheme followed in 2011 and allowed the use of RMB held outside mainland China for investment onshore. Each investor had an individual quota tied to a share of its assets. In September 2019 the authorities announced that the aggregate quota limits for QFII and RQFII are cancelled. By then, more than 400 institutional investors from 31 countries and regions had entered through these channels.\n\nFor households and firms, the controls are stricter and remain in place. Individuals face an annual limit on converting yuan into foreign currency, which has been set at US$50,000 per person in recent years. Outward direct investment by companies requires approval or registration, and scrutiny of large or non-core overseas deals was tightened in 2016–2017 to slow capital outflows. The authorities have also eased some restrictions in steps, such as removing certain exchange restrictions for qualified foreign investors in 2018, which is consistent with a pattern of case-by-case liberalisation rather than a single reform.\n\nThe impossible trinity in practice\n\nThe impossible trinity holds that a country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and an independent monetary policy; it can pick at most two. China has chosen a managed rate, partial capital mobility and a domestic monetary framework that is still evolving. The mix shifts over time. When outflows intensified in 2015–2016, the authorities tightened controls and spent reserves to slow depreciation, which preserved the exchange-rate anchor and some room for domestic interest-rate decisions. As channels such as the Stock Connect and Bond Connect widen foreign access, the trade-off tilts towards greater exposure to global rate differentials, which makes the fixing, the reserve-ratio tool and open-market operations more important for keeping liquidity and the currency aligned. In practice, the authorities have tended to accept some loss of monetary independence in exchange for exchange-rate stability, while keeping the capital account open only in carefully bounded segments."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Economic theories of exchange-rate determination",
      "text": "Balance-of-payments approach\n\nThe balance-of-payments approach treats the exchange rate as the price that clears cross-border flows. The current account (goods, services, income and transfers) must be matched by the financial account (investment and borrowing across borders), so a surplus on one side implies net outflows on the other. In China's case, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange reported a 2025 current-account surplus of about USD 735 billion, driven mainly by goods trade, alongside a financial-account deficit of roughly USD 774 billion. Exporters who convert dollar receipts into yuan create demand for the currency, so a surplus tends to push the rate toward appreciation. Whether that pressure is realised depends on how much of the surplus is absorbed by capital outflows, reserve accumulation and controls on private conversion. The size of the surplus relative to GDP is also disputed: official briefings have described the ratio as about 2 percent in recent years, while other estimates put 2025 at around 3.8 percent, and some researchers argue that the reported figures understate the surplus because of measurement choices.\n\nInterest-rate parity\n\nInterest-rate parity links spot and forward prices to interest differentials. Under covered interest parity, the forward rate equals the spot rate scaled by the ratio of the two currencies' interest factors, so that no riskless profit can be made by borrowing in one currency and lending in the other. If the exchange rate is quoted as yuan per dollar, the relationship can be written as \\(F = S \\times \\frac{1+i_{CNY}}{1+i_{USD}}\\). When yuan rates are below dollar rates, the yuan trades at a forward premium, and offshore USD/CNH quotes show exactly this pattern. Uncovered parity adds the expectation that the spot rate will move in line with the interest differential, which implies that higher domestic yields attract inflows only if investors do not expect offsetting depreciation. Capital controls and funding frictions weaken these links: the forward wedge between onshore and offshore yuan has been persistent, and during the liquidity squeeze of late 2015 the offshore rate traded at a discount to the onshore rate for much of the remainder of the year. Interest-rate arbitrage therefore explains the forward curve well in normal conditions but fits the spot rate less closely when balance sheets or controls bind.\n\nPurchasing-power parity and the Balassa–Samuelson effect\n\nPurchasing-power parity (PPP) holds that, once traded goods are priced in a common currency, their prices should converge, so the nominal rate should track relative price levels over time. The Balassa–Samuelson effect explains why PPP systematically fails for fast-growing economies. If productivity rises faster in tradable sectors such as manufacturing, wages rise there and spread to non-tradable services, lifting their prices relative to tradables. The result is a long-run real appreciation even when the nominal rate is stable. This predicts that catching-up economies like China should appreciate in real terms.\n\nEmpirical tests have been difficult. China's real exchange rate showed no clear appreciation trend between 1990 and 2006 despite strong productivity gains. One explanation is that financial outflows from 1997 onward and trade reforms linked to WTO accession more than offset the productivity effect. Undervaluation estimates based on Balassa–Samuelson-type reasoning have ranged widely across studies, and a PPP exercise using the 2011 International Comparison Program data found no evidence of undervaluation as of that year. The results depend on how tradable and non-tradable sectors are defined, how price indices are built, whether the law of one price holds for traded goods, and how the functional form of the relationship is specified. Newer commentary has also raised the possibility of a \"reverse\" effect if productivity gains concentrate in non-tradable services, a hypothesis that remains speculative.\n\nPortfolio flows, risk sentiment and expectations\n\nAsset-market models treat the exchange rate as the price of a financial asset, which moves with news, expectations of future policy and changes in global risk appetite. This explains why short-run movements often deviate from fundamental models: balance-of-payments and PPP variables change slowly, while portfolio positions can shift within days. Research on the post-2015 central parity suggests that the drivers themselves change over time. One study found that the VIX volatility index helped explain the fixing only up to August 2015, after which the onshore rate and the offshore-onshore forward differential became more important, alongside the US dollar index. Expectations of policy matter as well: when authorities signal a change in the fixing or in capital controls, markets reprice the currency before any flows occur. For this reason, models that rely only on fundamentals rarely outperform a simple random-walk benchmark at short horizons, and forecasting the rate over months typically depends on tracking sentiment, policy signals and the interaction between onshore and offshore prices."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Major episodes and recent trends",
      "text": "The 2015–2016 depreciation\n\nPressure on the renminbi began in the summer of 2014, when mild depreciation pressure appeared and China experienced a surge in capital outflows. The August 2015 reform of the central parity was meant to make the rate more market-determined, but the currency's value against the dollar continued to be managed by the People's Bank of China. In August 2015 the central bank set the reference rate 1.9 percent below the previous day's fix, marking the steepest one-day decline in at least 20 years. The currency then moved close to 7 per dollar, before stabilizing in early 2017.\n\nThe reserve cost was large. Overall, reserves fell by $512 billion during 2015, and the decline continued into the following winter. Estimates of total capital flight for 2015 reached almost $700 billion, according to the Institute of International Finance. The Bank for International Settlements argued that much of the outflow ran through banks outside China, as firms and households reduced renminbi deposits, and banks outside China in turn reduced their cross-border renminbi deposits with mainland banks, while Chinese firms also repaid dollar debt. Other analysts stressed misreported trade invoices. A Commerzbank-style estimate (not verified here) is omitted; the best-documented figure is that misreporting of trade accounted for USD328bn of capital outflows from August 2015 to January 2016, equivalent to 78% of the decline in reserves. The authorities also restricted the flow of renminbi between the onshore and offshore markets, which helped to maintain exchange rate stability but significantly squeezed CNH liquidity. Against this background, the currency basket reference was introduced in late 2015, so that the central parity was judged against a basket of currencies rather than the dollar alone.\n\n2018–2019 and the trade dispute\n\nThe renminbi began to weaken again in 2018, as the trade conflict with the United States escalated. The IMF noted in its annual review that Beijing took steps to prop up the value of the yuan in the summer of 2018. The decisive move came in early August 2019. On August 4, China's central bank allowed its currency to depreciate to an 11-year low, breaking the politically sensitive threshold of seven yuan to one U.S. dollar, coming shortly after President Trump announced an additional tariff on Chinese imports. The PBOC set its daily reference rate at 6.9683 per dollar, stronger than the 6.9871 level forecast in a Bloomberg survey, but the market had already moved, and the yuan's slump was the worst since 2015.\n\nOn August 5, 2019, the Treasury under Steven Mnuchin determined that China is manipulating its currency. The designation was the first since the Clinton administration, and the Treasury argued that the purpose of China's devaluation was to gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade. Analysts differed on motive: some saw the depreciation as cushioning the effect of tariffs, while the PBOC argued that the market had determined the yuan's recent depreciation. The yuan later depreciated as far as 7.18 yuan to the US dollar in early September, before recovering. In January 2020, ahead of the Phase One trade agreement, the Treasury said China should no longer be designated a currency manipulator, reversing the August finding.\n\n2022–2023 pressures\n\nThe renminbi weakened again in 2022. In April, the renminbi fell sharply against the dollar in the order of 4%, the biggest move since 2015. In September the currency crossed a psychological threshold: the yuan weakened past the key 7 per dollar level for the first time in more than two years as a fragile economy and strength in the greenback weighed on the currency. Market commentary linked the decline to concerns over the health of the Chinese economy, particularly its zero-Covid stance and issues in the property market, as well as expectations of further US rate increases. Authorities leaned against the move: the People's Bank of China set the fixing 456 pips stronger than the estimates in a Bloomberg survey, to slow the yuan's slide, and a record gap had been set the previous day. The weakness went further. The yuan was at 6.3025 per dollar on February 28, 2022, then fell to 7.327 on November 1, 2022, before strengthening to 6.691 on January 16, 2023. The currency weakened again in May 2023, when the yuan slid past the key level of 7 per dollar for the first time this year, after weak April activity data.\n\nAppreciation since 2025\n\nThe official monthly series point to a reversal of the earlier weakness. The rate was about 7.3 per dollar at the start of 2025 and had moved to around 6.7 per dollar by autumn 2026. Year-on-year comparisons based on Federal Reserve data are used to measure the change over comparable periods. The drivers of this recent move are discussed in the sections on fixing and policy, and on the undervaluation debate."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Undervaluation debate and international assessments",
      "text": "Competing estimates\n\nEstimates of how far the renminbi sits from its fundamental value vary widely, and the headline numbers depend heavily on the model used. The International Monetary Fund's 2026 External Sector Report placed the midpoint of the renminbi's real effective exchange rate gap at about 21.3% undervaluation, based on China's 2025 current-account surplus. The same report's real exchange-rate index and level models, however, pointed to roughly 0.5% overvaluation and 2.7% undervaluation respectively. In June, ECB President Christine Lagarde cited IMF research putting the currency's undervaluation at 15 to 16% after adjusting for cross-country inflation differences. In July, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz put the figure at 25% to 30%. A French government body's February 2026 report gave a 20% to 25% range.\n\nOutside economists have produced comparable figures. A Federal Reserve staff note found roughly 20% undervaluation when applying the IMF's external balance assessment framework to official current-account data, rising to about 24% when an alternative current-account series was used. A commentary from a Chinese-side analyst argues that the IMF's headline figure is a mechanical reading that overstates the gap. Bank research is more moderate: BBVA Research, using macro-balance and behavioural equilibrium models, concluded that the renminbi is somewhat undervalued against the dollar and that the misalignment is far smaller than popular claims suggest. Former IMF chief economists Gita Gopinath and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas argued in print that the exchange rate is an outcome of global imbalances rather than their root cause, and that policy should not focus narrowly on the currency.\n\nWhy the models diverge\n\nMost official estimates follow a current-account approach: they compare the actual surplus with a \"norm\" and convert the gap into a real exchange-rate gap using an elasticity. The result is sensitive to inputs. Applying the IMF's elasticity to a surplus of 3.3% of GDP, for example, implies a gap of around 18%, and exchange-rate estimates shift further when the surplus is measured differently. Chinese balance-of-payments data have diverged from customs-based trade data since the 2022 methodology change, which some analysts argue understates the surplus. Real effective exchange-rate index models, by contrast, look at how prices and trade have moved over time, and they can point in the opposite direction to current-account gap models. Cross-country regressions using income or savings variables give still smaller estimates, and critics note that the outcome depends on which variables a model includes.\n\nPositions of governments and officials\n\nThe United States Treasury has repeatedly declined to label China a currency manipulator. Its January 2026 report, released amid renminbi depreciation pressure, stressed China's relative lack of transparency about exchange-rate policy and said that this opacity would not block a future designation if evidence showed intervention to resist appreciation. The July 2026 semiannual report kept China on its monitoring list of ten economies and again stopped short of a designation. Commentary on the Treasury's analysis has pointed to large undervaluation, but the report itself framed the issue around transparency.\n\nEuropean officials have taken a more confrontational line. Lagarde has argued that the undervaluation question should be discussed among global leaders and has backed including China in any G7 talks on currency valuations. Some European calls have asked for appreciation of roughly 20% to 30% to level the playing field against Chinese manufactures. The ING currency strategist Francesco Pesole does not expect a major change in Chinese policy, because Beijing balances exchange-rate stability against the risk that rapid appreciation hurts exporters.\n\nOn October 8, 2026, the People's Bank of China issued a statement reiterating that it does not pursue competitive devaluation or set a target exchange rate. The central bank said the renminbi had appreciated about 23% against the dollar since the 2005 reform, from 8.27 to around 6.7 per dollar, and that its outlook depends on forces pulling in both directions. Chinese authorities have consistently rejected the claim that the currency is systematically weak, while arguing that the rebalancing of the economy toward domestic demand will itself produce real appreciation over time.\n\nStakes and open questions\n\nThe debate matters because the currency's value bears on the size of the trade surplus, on tariff policy and on the terms of bilateral negotiations. One commentary citing the IMF's standard model estimated that a 10% move in the currency would change net exports by about 1.5 percentage points of GDP. Part of the recent appreciation against the euro reflects euro weakness rather than a deliberate policy shift, which complicates the picture for European policymakers. The US Treasury's ability to recommend a trade investigation over currency practices gives the question direct relevance to tariff decisions.\n\nThe question remains contested. Some analysts regard the undervaluation thesis as well supported in direction but uncertain in magnitude, while others treat large estimates as politically motivated. The range of published figures, from low single digits to above 25%, reflects differences in data, model structure and the treatment of China's current-account statistics. As a result, the same observed exchange rate can be cited as evidence for opposing conclusions."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Effects on trade, prices and firms",
      "text": "The exchange rate reaches the real economy mainly through the prices that exporters, importers and households face. A stronger renminbi raises the foreign-currency price of Chinese goods unless exporters absorb the change, and it lowers the yuan cost of imported inputs and consumer goods. How far a currency move passes through to prices depends on which currency contracts are priced in, how much markup exporters can absorb, and how quickly firms adjust. In practice the effects are partial and spread over several quarters.\n\nFirm-level studies of Chinese exporters find high but incomplete pass-through into foreign-currency prices. One study found that yuan-denominated export prices barely respond to exchange-rate changes, so most of the adjustment falls on the prices foreign buyers pay, and that exporters pass through more when the currency appreciates than when it depreciates, which points to price stickiness. The RMB price response to exchange rate changes is very small, indicating relatively high exchange rate pass-through into foreign currency denominated prices. Other work finds that pass-through varies with product quality, destination income and the share of pricing-to-market behaviour, and that the ERPT is higher when the Renminbi (RMB) appreciates than when it depreciates. On import prices, appreciation generally lowers the yuan prices of imported goods, but the decline is also incomplete and asymmetric. The effect on trade volumes is more contested. Some firm-level evidence shows only a moderate volume response, and it also suggests that appreciation can reduce the likelihood that firms enter or remain in export markets.\n\nCurrency exposure is concentrated in particular firms. A study of Chinese textile and apparel exporters found that a 10 percent increase in the value of the renminbi against the dollar would reduce net revenues by 5.4 percent if the firms left prices unchanged. The same study reported that most firms undertake little or no activities to hedge their foreign currency exposure, and it argued that this dollar exposure may help explain the authorities' caution about rapid appreciation. Firms that do hedge typically use forward contracts, currency swaps and options to lock in exchange rates over a horizon of months. Appreciation squeezes margins for exporters that price in dollars and have limited pricing power, while firms with dollar-denominated debt see the yuan burden of that debt fall, so the net effect depends on each firm's balance sheet. Foreign firms selling into China or sourcing from it face the reverse pattern: their yuan revenues shrink when the currency weakens and their yuan costs rise when it strengthens.\n\nFor households and the state, a stronger renminbi raises purchasing power abroad. Outbound tourism, overseas study, and the yuan cost of foreign acquisitions and dollar-priced resource imports such as oil, gas, iron ore and soybeans all become cheaper in domestic-currency terms. The same movement reduces the yuan value of foreign-currency assets, including the reserve holdings managed by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the overseas investments of Chinese companies. The rate has moved notably over the past two years: the 2026 average to date stood at about 6.82 yuan per dollar, compared with 7.19 for 2025, and in mid-October 2026 the rate was about 6.69, down 6.1% from 7.1267 a year earlier.\n\nThe exchange rate is one channel through which China's current-account surplus can adjust, but it competes with domestic demand, productivity growth and tariffs, so its macroeconomic weight is difficult to isolate. Because China is a central node in global value chains, the rate also affects firms outside China. A stronger yuan raises the dollar cost of Chinese intermediate goods, which can encourage multinationals to diversify assembly to other Asian economies, while a weaker yuan can make Chinese inputs more attractive across the supply chain. These shifts influence where production is located as much as the volume of trade, and their size depends on how firms price, source and hedge."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Internationalization and reserve-currency status",
      "text": "The renminbi's international role has grown in stages, and each stage has depended on infrastructure that lets non-residents hold, pay and borrow in the currency. The first stage was trade settlement. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese and foreign firms have been allowed to invoice and settle cross-border trade in renminbi, and the amount settled has grown steadily. In 2022, cross-border renminbi settlement totalled RMB 42.1 trillion, up 15.1% year on year, according to the People's Bank of China (PBOC).\n\nThe second stage was payment infrastructure. The PBOC began building the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) in 2012 and started operating it on 8 October 2015 with 19 direct and 176 indirect participants. CIPS is a renminbi clearing and settlement network that lets banks settle payments without routing them through correspondent accounts in third currencies. By 2024, the system's annual renminbi volume had reached RMB 175 trillion, a rise of 43% on the previous year. Its growth matters because it reduces the need for banks to use intermediary hubs, though it remains much smaller than SWIFT in participant numbers.\n\nThe third stage was offshore finance. Hong Kong became the largest offshore renminbi deposit and payment centre, and offshore renminbi bonds (dim sum bonds) and onshore panda bonds issued by foreign borrowers broadened the instruments available to foreign investors. These markets are discussed in the section on onshore and offshore trading and are relevant here because they created the liquid assets that central banks and investors need before they can hold a currency in reserves.\n\nThe fourth stage was official recognition. The IMF included the renminbi in the special drawing rights (SDR) basket on 1 October 2016, making it the first emerging-market currency in the basket, with an initial weight of 10.92%. In the quinquennial review of May 2022, the IMF kept the basket's composition unchanged and raised the renminbi's weight to 12.28%, effective 1 August 2022, while the US dollar's weight rose to 43.38% and the euro, yen and pound fell. The renminbi is now the third-largest component after the dollar and the euro. The SDR is a reserve asset that member countries can exchange for freely usable currencies, so inclusion signals that the renminbi is recognized as a reserve currency, and it encourages central banks to add renminbi holdings to their reserves. The weight does not, however, impose any obligation on members, and the actual share of renminbi in official reserves depends on each central bank's own decisions. The next SDR valuation review is scheduled for 2027.\n\nThe fifth stage is the network of bilateral currency swap lines. Beginning in late 2008, when the PBOC signed agreements with the Bank of Korea and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, it built a network that by 2025 covered more than 40 foreign central banks or monetary authorities. Under these agreements, a partner central bank can obtain renminbi in exchange for its own currency, which provides a liquidity backstop for its banking system and supports trade invoiced in renminbi. Unlike the Federal Reserve's standing lines, most PBOC swaps have been fixed-size and time-limited, and they have been drawn only modestly. As of 30 June 2025, 32 agreements were active, worth more than RMB 4.5 trillion, and foreign counterparts had drawn RMB 80.7 billion. In 2022 the PBOC and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority converted their agreement into a long-standing arrangement, a step that made the backstop more durable.\n\nThe central tension is between internationalization and the managed exchange rate. A currency used widely by non-residents for payment, investment and reserves generally needs free convertibility, deep and open financial markets, and a price set mainly by supply and demand. The authorities have accepted some of these features, notably the SDR inclusion and the expansion of clearing and swap arrangements, but they have kept tight controls on capital movements and retained a central role in setting the rate through the fixing and intervention. The result is a currency that is increasingly used abroad while remaining short of full convertibility. Policymakers have generally pursued internationalization gradually, reasoning that it should follow financial reform rather than precede it, so that greater use of the renminbi does not expose the domestic economy to sudden capital movements."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Open questions and research debates",
      "text": "Research on the renminbi has not settled several core questions, and the answers depend on which data a researcher trusts. The first is how much of the currency's movement since 2015 reflects market fundamentals and how much reflects official signalling. The central parity is set by a formula with a discretionary component, so the fixing is not a clean record of supply and demand. Researchers therefore compare fixings with onshore closing prices and offshore CNH quotes, and they test how the midpoint responds to overnight basket moves. One study divides post-2015 management into transition, basket and counter-cyclical phases, and finds that the fixing's response to market moves differed significantly across them The study identifies three post-reform periods of RMB management: transition, basket management and countercyclical management. Across these periods, the reaction of the official \"fixing\" rate to market movements differed significantly.. Phase-based designs of this kind depend on where the breaks are placed, so a shift in fixing behaviour can be read either as a policy change or as a response to changed fundamentals.\n\nThe second debate concerns the counter-cyclical factor. It was introduced in 2017 partly to limit herd behaviour in the market China introduced the \"counter-cyclical factor\" in 2017 in what regulators said was an effort to better reflect supply and demand, lessen possible \"herd effects\" in the market and help guide the market to focus more on macroeconomic fundamentals. Its direction has changed over time. For most of the past several years it was used mainly against depreciation pressure, while late in 2025 the pattern reversed and the central bank pushed back more cautiously against appreciation In the last few years, this has mostly been used to push back against heavy depreciation pressure. Towards the end of 2025, however, this pattern started to reverse, with the PBoC using fixings to push back more cautiously against appreciation. Whether the factor has reduced volatility or only displaced it is therefore contested. A smoother onshore spot can coexist with pressure appearing in offshore prices, forward points or capital flows. Evidence from stress episodes such as 2015, 2018 and 2022 is mixed, and the widening of the onshore–offshore spread in those periods is often cited as a sign that pressure was relocated rather than absorbed.\n\nThe third question concerns how capital-account opening and internationalization may change the link between domestic interest rates and the exchange rate. Under the monetary trilemma, a managed currency combined with partial capital mobility preserves some room for domestic monetary policy. As controls loosen and offshore markets deepen, that room may shrink. The empirical record is suggestive but unstable. Yield spreads against the United States tracked the USD/CNY path closely for years, and this correlation was very tight, but has visibly broken down since late 2025. A weaker link implies that other drivers, such as exporters' conversion of foreign-currency proceeds and the trade surplus, have gained weight, which in turn raises the question of how stable the trilemma trade-off will be as the financial account opens further.\n\nThe fourth set of questions concerns undervaluation and the future path of the currency. Estimates differ widely. The IMF's 2026 assessment placed the midpoint of the real effective rate gap at around 21 per cent, and one summary gives a range of 17.3% to 25.3% in 2026, with a midpoint of 21.3%. Another commentary reports the IMF range as around 12–21%, while Goldman Sachs in its 2026 outlooks and research has estimated the yuan is around 25% undervalued. The discrepancies reflect differences in benchmark current-account norms, price indices and model specification. On the trajectory, the currency has moved in one direction for an extended period, as since the start of 2025, China's renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar in pretty much a straight line, rising in value by just over 8%, from 7.3 to the dollar to 6.7. Forecasters disagree about whether this continues. Some expect a \"rise then stabilize\" trajectory for the full year, with a core trading range of 6.6 to 7.0, while others have revised their year-end targets further down.\n\nFinally, the conditions under which the renminbi could become a fully convertible reserve currency remain open. Official assessments note that international use has expanded alongside greater flexibility, yet the use of the Renminbi (RMB) in international trade and finance has risen but remains limited for transactions not involving Chinese entities. Researchers disagree on sequencing: some argue that deeper onshore markets, a more transparent fixing and open capital flows must come first, while others suggest that internationalization itself can push the authorities toward market-determined pricing. How the rebalancing of the economy, the pace of capital-account opening and the reliability of undervaluation estimates interact will determine whether the currency's appreciation becomes a durable trend or a cyclical episode."
    }
  ],
  "links": [
    "china",
    "trade",
    "inflation",
    "financial-market",
    "central-bank",
    "monetary-policy",
    "economic-growth",
    "exchange-rate",
    "hong-kong",
    "federal-reserve",
    "interest-rate",
    "open-market-operations",
    "liquidity",
    "purchasing-power-parity"
  ],
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    }
  ],
  "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
}