{
  "id": "moksha",
  "title": "Moksha",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "Moksha is liberation from rebirth and bondage in Indian religious traditions, understood variously as self-realization, freedom from karma, or communion with God.",
  "category": "philosophy",
  "subcategory": "religion",
  "type": "concept",
  "aliases": [
    "Mokṣa",
    "Mukti",
    "Liberation",
    "Spiritual liberation"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-11-03",
  "model": "pro/gpt-6.1-sol",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/moksha/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/moksha/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/moksha.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "Moksha, from the Sanskrit mokṣa, “release” or “liberation,” is the release from saṃsāra, the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, and from the conditions that sustain it. It is a central religious goal in Hinduism and Jainism, while related terms and ideas occur in Buddhism and Sikhism. Although commonly translated as “liberation,” moksha does not designate a single doctrine shared by these traditions. Its meaning depends on what is understood to be bound, what causes bondage, and what freedom ultimately consists in.\n\nIndian accounts of liberation range from the realization that the self is identical with ultimate reality to everlasting communion with a personal God, the isolation of consciousness from material nature, and the complete removal of karmic matter from an individual soul. Buddhist accounts of release generally reject the permanent self presupposed by many Hindu and Jain explanations. These differences make moksha an important subject in comparative philosophy of religion, as well as a practical ideal informing renunciation, devotion, ethical discipline, and contemplative life."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Vocabulary and historical emergence",
      "text": "The Sanskrit noun mokṣa derives from the verbal root muc, “to release” or “to let go.” Mukti is a closely related noun with much the same range of meanings. Other terms emphasize particular aspects of liberation: apavarga denotes release or final cessation in certain philosophical systems, kaivalya means “isolation” or “aloneness,” and amṛtatva, “deathlessness,” can describe transcendence of mortality. These words are not interchangeable in every context. Their significance depends on the text, school, and account of the liberated condition in which they occur.\n\nThe earliest strata of the Vedas place considerable emphasis on sacrifice, prosperity, offspring, long life, and favorable existence after death. They do not present the fully developed doctrine of moksha familiar from later philosophical literature. Nevertheless, questions about death, the person, cosmic order, and the possibility of immortality supplied important materials for subsequent reflection. It would therefore be misleading either to read all later liberation doctrines directly into early Vedic hymns or to treat their emergence as wholly disconnected from Vedic speculation.\n\nThe early Upaniṣads, particularly the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya, contain influential discussions of the self, rebirth, and release. Their oldest prose portions are commonly placed in the first half of the first millennium BCE, although exact dates remain disputed. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4 connects desire, action, and the person's destiny, while also describing a condition in which desire no longer binds. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6 develops the instruction conventionally translated as “You are that,” which later interpreters understood in sharply different ways. These texts do not offer one uniform philosophical system; they preserve multiple accounts of knowledge, immortality, and ultimate reality.\n\nThe growth of liberation-oriented thought also belongs to the wider environment of renunciant movements in northern India during the first millennium BCE. Buddhist, Jain, and other ascetic communities questioned whether household prosperity or heavenly rebirth could provide a definitive answer to suffering and repeated death. Brahmanical traditions developed in sustained interaction with this environment. The precise direction of influence in particular doctrines is often uncertain, but the shared vocabulary of rebirth, discipline, and release demonstrates a connected intellectual world rather than isolated religious developments.\n\nBy the period of the Sanskrit epics and the classical philosophical schools, liberation had become an organizing concern across much of Indian thought. Even then, disagreements persisted over its attainability, its relation to action, and whether the liberated condition possessed consciousness, bliss, individuality, or relationship."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Bondage, karma, and the aims of human life",
      "text": "Moksha is intelligible against the background of karma and rebirth. In many Indian traditions, intentional actions have consequences extending beyond a single lifetime. Birth into a new embodied existence is therefore not simply an isolated biological event but part of a continuing causal process. Liberation ends the conditions that perpetuate that process. Yet karma is understood differently across traditions: it may function as an unseen moral efficacy, as action conditioned by intention and craving, or, in Jainism, as subtle matter attached to the soul.\n\nBondage consequently means more than physical confinement or an unpleasant psychological state. It may consist in ignorance of the self, identification with body and mind, attachment to the fruits of action, domination by passions, or dependence on karmic embodiment. Pleasant experiences do not necessarily remove bondage. A person enjoying wealth or a deity inhabiting a heavenly realm can remain within saṃsāra if that condition is temporary and sustained by accumulated merit. This is why liberation is commonly distinguished from heaven: heaven can be a desirable destination within the cycle, whereas moksha terminates compulsory return.\n\nIn a widespread Hindu classification, moksha is one of the four puruṣārthas, or aims of human life, alongside dharma, artha, and kāma. Dharma concerns normative order and appropriate conduct; artha includes material resources, security, and political or economic effectiveness; kāma encompasses pleasure and desire. Moksha is often called the highest aim because it addresses the limitation shared by the other three: their results remain conditioned and perishable. The fourfold scheme developed historically, however, and should not be assumed to have governed all periods or communities equally.\n\nThe relation between liberation and ordinary duties generated enduring debate. Some traditions emphasize renunciation because actions motivated by desire generate further consequences. Others distinguish action itself from attachment to its results. The Bhagavad Gītā, especially chapters 3–5, argues that disciplined action can be compatible with liberation when performed without possessive attachment. Its portrayal of Arjuna places the problem within an active social setting rather than making withdrawal the only possible religious life.\n\nMoksha is therefore both an account of an ultimate condition and a principle for ranking human pursuits. It can relativize worldly success without necessarily declaring every worldly activity worthless. Different schools disagree about whether ethical conduct directly produces liberation, prepares the mind for liberating knowledge, expresses devotion, or prevents fresh bondage. These distinctions help explain why similar practices can occupy different places in otherwise incompatible paths."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Nondual liberation in Advaita Vedānta",
      "text": "Advaita Vedānta interprets liberation through the nonduality of ātman, the self, and brahman, ultimate reality. Its best-known classical exponent, Śaṅkara, worked in approximately the eighth century CE. In his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the Brahma Sūtra, and the Bhagavad Gītā, liberation is fundamentally a matter of knowledge rather than the production of a new state. If the self is already free in its true nature, no action can manufacture that freedom; what must end is the misapprehension that conceals it.\n\nThe central problem is avidyā, ignorance. Ordinary experience involves the attribution of bodily, mental, and personal characteristics to the self: mortality, agency, pleasure, pain, and limitation are taken to belong to what one most fundamentally is. Śaṅkara describes this through adhyāsa, or superimposition. The distinction is not simply between a valuable soul and an irrelevant body, but between the witnessing reality and the changing objects with which it is mistakenly identified. Advaita's account belongs to both metaphysics and epistemology, because an error about reality is also an error in knowing.\n\nLiberating knowledge arises through the interpretation and assimilation of scriptural teaching, traditionally expressed as hearing the teaching, reflecting on it, and sustained contemplation: śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. Ethical preparation, dispassion, self-control, and the desire for liberation are important qualifications. Their role is not to create brahman or transform the self into something previously nonexistent, but to make understanding possible. The familiar analogy of mistaking a rope for a snake illustrates how knowledge can remove an apparent danger without destroying a real snake.\n\nAdvaita gives particular importance to jīvanmukti, liberation while living. A liberated knower may continue to possess a body, speak, act, and undergo experiences. A standard explanation distinguishes already-fructifying karma, prārabdha, which sustains the present embodiment, from other karmic accumulations that no longer bind the knower. The eventual death of the body is consequently not the initial creation of freedom. Later Advaita authors developed detailed accounts of the relation between knowledge, residual mental tendencies, and the stabilization of liberation.\n\nNonduality does not mean that ordinary distinctions are treated as equally irrelevant in all contexts. Advaita distinguishes the ultimate standpoint from the empirical world in which teaching, obligation, and disciplined practice operate. Critics from other schools objected that its account threatened the reality of individuality or divine relationship. Advaitins, in turn, argued that liberation would remain limited if a fundamental division persisted between the self and ultimate reality."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Theistic Vedānta and liberation through devotion",
      "text": "Other forms of Vedānta understand liberation without accepting the strict nonduality of Advaita. Rāmānuja, conventionally dated 1017–1137, developed Viśiṣṭādvaita, often translated as “qualified nondualism.” In this account, individual selves and the world are real and exist in complete dependence on brahman, identified with the personal Lord, Nārāyaṇa. Their relation to God is frequently explained through the analogy of a body and its indwelling self. Unity does not require the disappearance of all differentiation.\n\nFor Rāmānuja, bondage involves karmic embodiment and the contraction or limitation of the soul's knowledge. Liberation removes these limitations and permits direct experience of God. The liberated self remains individual and finds fulfillment in loving service rather than in the discovery that individuality was ultimately unreal. Bhakti, or devotion, is therefore not merely a preliminary emotional aid. It is central to the orientation and fulfillment of religious life. Knowledge, action, and devotion are integrated within a theological account of dependence on divine reality.\n\nŚrīvaiṣṇava traditions also give major importance to prapatti, surrender or taking refuge in God. Later theologians disagreed about the interpretation of surrender, the role of personal effort, and the operation of grace. These debates cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between working for liberation and receiving it passively. They concern the character of dependence, the efficacy of divine compassion, and the relation between prescribed disciplines and reliance on the Lord. The liberated condition is commonly associated with Vaikuṇṭha, the divine abode.\n\nMadhva, a thirteenth-century thinker, developed Dvaita Vedānta, in which the distinction between God and individual souls is irreducibly real. Viṣṇu is independent, while souls and the world are dependent realities. Liberation includes freedom from suffering and the direct enjoyment of God, but not identity with God. Madhva's account also preserves differences among liberated souls and their capacities for bliss, illustrating that even theistic Vedānta does not offer one uniform description of salvation.\n\nVaiṣṇava devotional literature often distinguishes several forms of liberation, such as dwelling in God's realm, proximity to God, sharing divine attributes or appearance, and forms of union. Their interpretation varies by lineage. Some devotional traditions place loving service above liberation understood merely as escape from rebirth. In such contexts, the decisive question is not only whether bondage ends, but whether the proposed final condition preserves an everlasting relationship of devotion. Moksha is thus transformed from release alone into the positive fulfillment of a relation between devotee and deity."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Discriminative knowledge, yoga, and the cessation of suffering",
      "text": "In Sāṃkhya, liberation rests on the distinction between puruṣa, conscious subjectivity, and prakṛti, primordial material nature. Classical Sāṃkhya recognizes a plurality of puruṣas. Mind, intellect, ego, sensory capacities, and the physical world belong to prakṛti rather than to consciousness itself. Bondage arises because the activities of nature are misattributed to puruṣa, while the consciousness of puruṣa appears to belong to the psychophysical apparatus. Liberation is discriminative knowledge that ends this confusion.\n\nThe Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, generally dated around the fourth century CE, describes nature as operating for experience and liberation. Once its distinction from consciousness is fully understood, nature no longer serves a binding purpose for that puruṣa. The resulting kaivalya is not absorption into a universal substance. It is the independence of consciousness from identification with nature. Because puruṣa is not an agent undergoing material transformation, liberation is explained as the cessation of misidentification rather than as a physical alteration in consciousness.\n\nClassical Yoga, associated with Patañjali and the Yoga Sūtra, employs a related distinction but places systematic contemplative discipline at the center of its presentation. Yoga Sūtra 1.2 defines yoga in terms of the stilling or restraint of the fluctuations of mind; 1.3 describes the seer as then abiding in its own nature. The eight limbs include restraints, observances, posture, breath regulation, sensory withdrawal, concentration, meditation, and meditative absorption. In this framework, bodily postures are one component of a much broader liberation-oriented discipline.\n\nYoga Sūtra 2.3 identifies five afflictions: ignorance, egoity, attachment, aversion, and clinging to life. These sustain karmic consequences and suffering. Contemplative practice and discriminative discernment undermine the afflictions and ultimately sever the apparent conjunction of seer and seen. Extraordinary capacities described in the text are not equivalent to liberation and can become distractions from it. The final goal is kaivalya, not merely unusual experiences, physical well-being, or enhanced concentration.\n\nNyāya and Vaiśeṣika offer another account, commonly termed apavarga. In the opening of the Nyāya Sūtra, correct knowledge contributes to a sequence in which false cognition, defects, activity, birth, and suffering are progressively eliminated. These schools affirm enduring individual selves rather than Advaita's single nondual reality. Classical discussions often characterize liberation principally as the complete absence of suffering; whether it also includes positive bliss became a matter of debate. Their example shows that liberation in Hindu philosophy is not always defined as mystical union, devotional fulfillment, or an eternally manifest experience of consciousness."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Jain liberation and the elimination of karmic matter",
      "text": "Jainism understands moksha as the soul's complete release from karmic matter and consequent freedom from rebirth. Souls, or jīvas, are real, enduring, and individually distinct. Their inherent capacities include knowledge, perception, energy, and bliss, but these capacities are obscured through bondage. Unlike systems that interpret karma primarily as an abstract moral relation, Jain thought treats it as a subtle material substance that enters into association with the soul.\n\nActivity of body, speech, and mind permits karmic influx, while passions such as anger, pride, deceit, and greed help bind karma to the soul. Liberation therefore requires both saṃvara, stopping fresh influx, and nirjarā, shedding accumulated karma. This explains the importance of vigilance, restraint, austerity, and nonviolence. Ethical discipline is not simply obedience to a divine command; it directly affects the processes by which the soul remains bound.\n\nThe Tattvārtha Sūtra, attributed to Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmin and commonly placed in the early centuries CE, states that right worldview or faith, right knowledge, and right conduct constitute the path to liberation. These are often called the three jewels of Jainism. Their combination matters: knowledge without transformation of conduct does not eliminate the conditions of bondage, while conduct must be guided by a correct understanding of reality. Monastic vows apply these demands with greater strictness than the corresponding lay vows.\n\nJainism distinguishes omniscience, or kevala-jñāna, from final release from embodiment. An omniscient teacher may remain alive while certain karmas sustaining bodily existence continue. At bodily death, once all karma has been eliminated, the soul becomes a siddha, a perfected liberated being. Jain cosmology locates liberated souls at the summit of the inhabited universe, where they remain without renewed embodiment. Their individuality is not dissolved into a creator or an undifferentiated absolute.\n\nThe Jain traditions disagree over some conditions of final liberation. Digambara doctrine generally holds that liberation cannot be attained in a female embodiment and connects the highest monastic renunciation with abandonment of clothing. Śvetāmbara traditions affirm women's capacity for liberation and identify the nineteenth tīrthaṅkara, Malli, as female, unlike Digambara accounts. Such disagreements concern the embodied qualifications for release, not the shared understanding that liberation requires the complete destruction of karmic bondage. The Jains' twenty-four tīrthaṅkaras, culminating in Mahāvīra, exemplify the discovery and teaching of this path rather than intervention by a creator who grants salvation."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Buddhist liberation and the problem of the self",
      "text": "Buddhist traditions share the concern with release from rebirth but generally use nirvāṇa as their principal term for the ultimate goal. Sanskrit vimokṣa and related words also occur, while Pali texts use forms such as vimutti. These linguistic connections should not conceal a central philosophical difference: Buddhist accounts do not ordinarily posit an eternal ātman that is freed from embodiment. The doctrine of not-self challenges identification with any permanent, independently existing personal essence.\n\nThe Four Noble Truths connect suffering or unsatisfactoriness with its origin, cessation, and the path leading to cessation. Craving, ignorance, and grasping sustain the processes through which suffering and rebirth continue. Dependent origination explains these processes through conditioned relationships rather than through the travels of an unchanging soul. Liberation is therefore neither the annihilation of a permanent self nor the restoration of that self to its original substance. It is the cessation of the conditions producing bondage.\n\nIn Theravāda accounts, an arahant has eliminated the defilements that generate renewed existence. The distinction between nirvāṇa with a remainder and nirvāṇa without a remainder refers to liberation while the aggregates of the present life continue and the ending of that remaining embodied process at death. It does not imply that the living arahant has attained only a partial destruction of greed, hatred, and delusion. Buddhist texts also resist reducing the liberated person's final status to ordinary alternatives of existence and nonexistence.\n\nMahāyāna traditions develop the bodhisattva ideal, linking awakening with the liberation of sentient beings. The common statement that a bodhisattva simply “postpones nirvāṇa” is inadequate for many Mahāyāna accounts. Some distinguish a non-abiding nirvāṇa that is neither captivity to saṃsāra nor withdrawal into an isolated peace. In Madhyamaka, the analysis of emptiness undermines the supposition that either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa possesses an independent essence. Their nonduality does not erase the practical distinction between suffering and liberation.\n\nComparing Buddhist nirvāṇa with Hindu or Jain moksha is useful when the comparison concerns release from ignorance, craving, karma, or rebirth. It becomes misleading when a single metaphysical description is imposed on all three. Jainism's liberated individual soul, Advaita's nondual self-knowledge, and Buddhist liberation without a permanent self are not merely different names for an identical doctrine. Their disagreements concern the very identity and status of what is said to be released."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Sikh mukti and liberation within household life",
      "text": "Sikh teachings employ the term mukti for liberation and connect it with freedom from rebirth, ego-centeredness, and separation from the divine. The tradition emerged in the Punjab with Guru Nanak, whose life is conventionally dated 1469–1539, and developed through the succeeding Sikh Gurus. Its scriptural center, the Guru Granth Sahib, places liberation within a sustained emphasis on the divine Name, the Guru's teaching, truthful living, and grace.\n\nA central obstacle is haumai, commonly translated as ego or self-centeredness. This is not merely confidence or a strong personality, but a mode of existence organized around separateness, possessiveness, and attachment. Related obstacles include the familiar passions of lust, anger, greed, attachment, and pride. Release involves a reorientation in which conduct and awareness accord with hukam, divine order. The language of liberation thus concerns the character of present life as well as the ending of rebirth.\n\nRemembrance of the divine Name, often described as nām simran, is central, but it is not presented as a mechanical formula that produces salvation independently of moral life. The Guru Granth Sahib repeatedly connects spiritual understanding with the transformation of conduct and the removal of ego. Divine grace is fundamental, and the Guru is indispensable as the source of liberating instruction. A contrast appears between the gurmukh, oriented toward the Guru, and the manmukh, governed by self-directed attachment.\n\nSikh accounts frequently emphasize liberation while living. The person need not abandon family, productive work, or social responsibility in order to pursue freedom. Earning honestly, sharing resources, and serving others are integral to religious life rather than distractions from a supposedly higher realm of inward experience. This distinguishes Sikh teaching from models in which formal world-renunciation is the normal institutional setting for final release, although other Indian traditions also acknowledge liberated householders.\n\nLanguage of union with the divine occurs widely in Sikh scripture, but it should not automatically be equated with Advaita's philosophical identification of ātman and brahman. Sikh hymns use multiple poetic images to articulate dependence, love, divine presence, and the overcoming of ego. Their significance belongs to a distinctive scriptural and communal setting. Likewise, liberation cannot be reduced to an exclusively private experience: worship, shared food, service, and ethical relations form part of the lived context in which attachment and self-centeredness are addressed."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Discipline, religious authority, and access to liberation",
      "text": "Liberation traditions distinguish between the conditions needed to pursue the path and the factor that finally removes bondage. Ethical restraint may prevent harmful karma, prepare the mind for knowledge, express love for God, or enact obedience to the Guru. Asceticism may weaken attachment, exhaust karma, or symbolize the abandonment of possessiveness. Similar outward behavior can therefore rest on different causal explanations. Fasting, for example, occupies a particularly systematic place in Jain karmic discipline but does not have that same function in every Hindu, Buddhist, or Sikh account.\n\nThe authority of a teacher also varies. In many Hindu traditions, instruction from a qualified teacher establishes the correct interpretation of scripture and the means of practice. Devotional lineages may understand the teacher as a mediator of grace or as inseparable from the deity's saving activity. Buddhist teachers transmit ethical and contemplative training without necessarily claiming the power to transfer a permanent soul into freedom. Jain teachers exemplify and communicate a path whose accomplishment requires the removal of the practitioner's own karmic bondage.\n\nRenunciant institutions gave liberation a durable social form. Hindu renouncers, Jain mendicants, and Buddhist monastics organized their lives around disciplines that sharply restricted possessions, sexuality, food, and occupation. These communities depended in different ways on lay supporters, who gained merit and religious instruction through their relationships with renouncers. The distinction between lay and monastic practice did not always amount to an absolute division between those capable and incapable of liberation, but it often structured expectations about the intensity and timing of spiritual pursuit.\n\nAccess was also shaped by gender, social status, and eligibility for particular texts or rites. Some Brahmanical authorities restricted Vedic study while other religious movements articulated paths centered on devotion or divine grace that were not confined to Vedic learning. Bhagavad Gītā 9.32 is an influential example of a text extending the possibility of the highest destination to groups whose ritual or social standing was treated unequally in its historical setting. Such passages do not erase the social hierarchies present in the same textual worlds, and interpretations of their practical implications have varied.\n\nThe relation between liberation and ethics is especially important where final knowledge is said to transcend ordinary distinctions. Most traditions surround claims to liberation with demanding accounts of self-control, nonattachment, compassion, or devotion. Nevertheless, the claimed spiritual status of a teacher is not a publicly self-validating fact. Historically, recognition has depended on textual interpretation, lineage authority, observed conduct, and community judgment. Liberation is accordingly not only an abstract philosophical possibility but also a category through which religious communities organize authority and exemplarity."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Philosophical interpretation and modern reformulation",
      "text": "Moksha raises questions about personal identity: if memories, desires, bodily characteristics, and ordinary agency no longer determine a person, in what sense does liberation belong to that person? The traditions answer through their different ontologies. Jainism preserves an individual soul with unobstructed capacities. Theistic Vedānta preserves personal relation to God. Sāṃkhya separates consciousness from the activities of nature. Advaita denies that ultimate reality ever consisted of separately bounded selves. Buddhist accounts challenge the premise that release requires an enduring substance beneath the changing processes of experience.\n\nA second issue concerns whether liberation is best described negatively or positively. Terms such as cessation, isolation, and freedom from suffering emphasize what ends; descriptions of bliss, omniscience, service, or divine presence emphasize what is realized. These approaches are not always mutually exclusive. A tradition may deny ordinary pleasures while affirming an unconditioned fulfillment, or deny describable mental activity without treating liberation as a defect. Disputes arise when opponents interpret another school's negative language as mere blankness, or its positive language as the continuation of conditioned desire.\n\nThe translation of moksha as “salvation” is useful but potentially misleading. Christian salvation commonly involves categories such as sin, forgiveness, resurrection, and reconciliation with God, whereas Indian liberation doctrines often center on rebirth, ignorance, attachment, and karma. The differences are not absolute: divine grace is crucial in several Hindu and Sikh traditions, and Christian thought contains contemplative and transformative accounts of union with God. The comparative task is to specify the relevant structures rather than assume either complete identity or complete incommensurability.\n\nFrom the nineteenth century onward, Indian reformers and teachers rearticulated liberation in dialogue with colonial scholarship, science, universal religion, and social reform. Swami Vivekananda, 1863–1902, presented Vedāntic freedom to international audiences and gave practical service a prominent place in religious life. Ramana Maharshi, 1879–1950, emphasized self-inquiry and the investigation of the apparent individual self. Sri Aurobindo, 1872–1950, developed an account of spiritual transformation that did not treat release from worldly existence as the sole culmination of spiritual development. These projects drew on inherited traditions while selecting and reinterpreting them.\n\nModern scholarship consequently distinguishes textual doctrines, philosophical arguments, institutions, and lived religious practices. An Upaniṣadic passage, a medieval devotional commentary, a monastic discipline, and a contemporary teaching about inner freedom may all concern liberation without making the same claims. Psychological interpretations can illuminate attachment and self-understanding, but they do not exhaust doctrines that also assert rebirth, karma, divine reality, or the soul's final condition. Whether those metaphysical claims are accepted, reinterpreted, or rejected remains a substantive difference among contemporary understandings of moksha."
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