{
  "id": "market-risk",
  "title": "Market Risk",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "Market risk is the possibility of financial loss from movements in market prices, interest rates, exchange rates, volatility, and related risk factors.",
  "category": "economics",
  "subcategory": "finance",
  "type": "concept",
  "aliases": [
    "Market-price risk"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-11-03",
  "model": "pro/gpt-6.1-sol",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/market-risk/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/market-risk/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/market-risk.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "Market risk is the possibility that changes in market prices or other market-related variables will reduce the value of a position, portfolio, business, or financial institution. Its principal sources include movements in equity prices, interest rates, foreign-exchange rates, commodity prices, credit spreads, and volatility. It affects assets and liabilities as well as contracts whose values depend on underlying financial variables. A manufacturer buying imported materials, a pension fund holding bonds, and a bank dealing in derivatives can therefore face market risk through different economic channels.\n\nIn financial markets, bearing market risk helps connect financing, investment, and the transfer of uncertainty between participants. The same exposure that creates an opportunity for gain can generate losses, sometimes quickly enough to threaten an institution’s solvency. Market risk consequently matters to investment analysis, corporate financial management, accounting, bank supervision, and financial stability. Its analysis combines the identification of exposures, valuation under changing conditions, statistical loss measurement, hypothetical and historical stress scenarios, and controls over concentrations and financing.\n\nThe term has a broader meaning than the distinction between market-wide and company-specific investment risk. Market risk can include an individual issuer’s share-price movement, a change in the relationship between two interest rates, or a shift in the volatility implied by option prices. Understanding it therefore requires attention not only to the size of price movements, but also to contractual structure, portfolio composition, the time needed to exit positions, and interactions with other forms of financial risk."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Economic scope and boundaries",
      "text": "Market risk concerns adverse changes in economic value or financial results caused by market variables. A long equity position ordinarily loses value when its share price falls; a short position ordinarily loses when the price rises. For an importer with a future foreign-currency payment, appreciation of that currency can increase the domestic-currency cost even before any financial security is purchased. Exposure is thus a property of an economic position relative to a specified objective, reporting currency, and time horizon—not a property of an instrument considered in isolation.\n\nAn important distinction separates market risk from credit risk. Credit risk concerns a borrower’s or counterparty’s failure to perform contractual obligations, or deterioration in its creditworthiness. Nevertheless, a bond can fall in price because investors demand a higher credit spread even though no payment has been missed. Such spread changes are commonly measured within trading-book market risk. Default losses may also appear in trading-book capital frameworks, but their treatment is distinct from that of ordinary price fluctuations. The boundary reflects both economic mechanisms and supervisory definitions.\n\nLiquidity risk also interacts closely with market risk without being identical to it. Market liquidity risk concerns the difficulty of trading promptly without a large price concession; funding liquidity risk concerns the ability to meet payments when due. A quoted portfolio value may not be realizable if positions are large relative to trading volume. Conversely, adverse price changes can trigger collateral demands, making a solvent institution short of immediately available cash. A position that appears tolerable under a long holding horizon may therefore become dangerous when financing can be withdrawn overnight.\n\nMarket risk is not synonymous with systematic risk. In portfolio theory, systematic risk is exposure to common factors that cannot be eliminated by combining many securities, whereas idiosyncratic risk is specific to a company or instrument. Both can contribute to market-value losses. Systemic risk, a different concept, concerns disruption of the financial system and its economic functions. An institution’s market loss may remain private and contained, or may contribute to systemic disruption through leverage, interconnected exposures, and forced asset sales.\n\nMeasurement also depends on the outcome being examined. Investors may focus on total returns or performance relative to a benchmark; banks may examine daily trading profit and loss; industrial companies may focus on operating cash flows. A foreign-currency asset can rise in local currency but fall in the owner’s reporting currency. Similarly, a stable accounting carrying amount does not necessarily imply stable economic value. Historical-cost rules can delay recognition of changes that are already relevant to future cash flows or the amount obtainable through sale."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Principal risk factors and transmission mechanisms",
      "text": "Interest-rate risk arises because changing rates alter discount factors and, in some contracts, future payments. The price of a conventional fixed-rate bond generally falls when its required yield rises. Exposure is not adequately represented by a single policy rate: the yield curve can shift, steepen, flatten, or change shape at particular maturities. A portfolio hedged against a parallel rise in yields may still lose when short-term and long-term rates move differently. Floating-rate assets can also be exposed through reset dates, reference-rate differences, and contractual caps or floors.\n\nForeign-exchange risk results from changes in an exchange rate. Transaction exposure arises from contracted foreign-currency receipts or payments; translation exposure arises when foreign operations are consolidated into financial statements; broader economic exposure concerns effects on competitiveness and future business cash flows. These categories need not move together. A company may have little net foreign-currency borrowing yet face substantial exposure because its sales prices are fixed in one currency while major production costs are denominated in another.\n\nEquity-price risk includes movements in individual shares, industry sectors, and broad indices. Earnings expectations, discount rates, financing conditions, and investor demand can all affect equity values. Commodity risk involves prices of energy, metals, agricultural products, and other physical goods. Its structure often reflects storage constraints, transport bottlenecks, weather, production cycles, and differences in location or quality. Electricity is especially sensitive to delivery time and location because economical large-scale storage remains limited relative to many other commodities. Consequently, a hedge based on a related commodity or delivery point can leave substantial residual exposure.\n\nCredit-spread risk concerns changes in the compensation demanded for holding credit-sensitive instruments over an appropriate reference curve. Spreads reflect expected credit losses, liquidity, uncertainty, and risk-bearing capacity; they are not pure default probabilities. A corporate bond can therefore lose value even if the benchmark government yield is unchanged. Sovereign, corporate, and structured-credit spreads may respond differently during stress, and instruments associated with the same issuer need not move identically.\n\nVolatility and correlation are themselves important market variables. An option depends not only on its underlying price but also on the distribution of possible future prices. Implied volatility, inferred from market option prices, can change sharply even when the underlying moves little. Correlation matters for instruments linked to several assets, such as basket options and structured credit products.\n\nFinally, basis risk arises when related prices or rates do not move together as expected. A jet-fuel exposure hedged with crude-oil futures, for example, remains sensitive to refining margins and product-specific conditions. Basis risk explains why an economically sensible hedge may still produce losses when the relationship used to construct it changes."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Valuation, sensitivities, and nonlinear exposure",
      "text": "Market-risk measurement begins with a valuation function. If a portfolio’s value is \\(V(\\mathbf{x},t)\\), where \\(\\mathbf{x}\\) represents market factors and \\(t\\) denotes time, a scenario loss can be defined as\n\n\\[L=V(\\mathbf{x}_0,t_0)-V(\\mathbf{x}_1,t_1).\\]\n\nA complete profit-and-loss calculation may also need to account for contractual payments, financing costs, trades, and other cash flows during the interval. The central task is to estimate how valuation changes when the relevant market inputs change. For actively traded instruments, observed prices provide an anchor; for less liquid instruments, models and estimated parameters play a larger role.\n\nLocal sensitivity analysis approximates this relationship using derivatives. For small movements,\n\n\\[\\Delta V \\approx \\sum_i \\frac{\\partial V}{\\partial x_i}\\Delta x_i +\\frac{1}{2}\\sum_i\\sum_j \\frac{\\partial^2 V}{\\partial x_i\\partial x_j} \\Delta x_i\\Delta x_j +\\frac{\\partial V}{\\partial t}\\Delta t.\\]\n\nThe first-order terms measure approximately linear exposures. The second-order terms capture curvature and interactions between factors. This representation makes complex portfolios easier to summarize, but its accuracy depends on the size of the shock and the smoothness of the valuation function. Large movements or contractual discontinuities can make local approximations unreliable.\n\nFor bonds, duration summarizes sensitivity to yield changes. Using modified duration \\(D_{\\mathrm{mod}}\\), price \\(P\\), and yield change \\(\\Delta y\\),\n\n\\[\\frac{\\Delta P}{P}\\approx-D_{\\mathrm{mod}}\\Delta y.\\]\n\nA bond portfolio with modified duration of 5 would therefore lose approximately 5% from a parallel yield rise of one percentage point, before allowing for curvature and other influences. Convexity supplies a second-order correction. Key-rate durations provide a more detailed description by measuring exposure to movements at selected points on the yield curve rather than assuming every maturity changes equally.\n\nFor options, the Greeks describe several dimensions of exposure. Delta measures sensitivity to the underlying price; gamma measures how delta changes as that price changes; vega measures sensitivity to implied volatility; and theta measures sensitivity to time passing under a specified convention. An option portfolio can be delta-neutral yet retain substantial gamma or volatility exposure. Sensitivities also change with market conditions, so neutrality at one instant does not guarantee neutrality after a price movement.\n\nThe Black–Scholes model, published in 1973 alongside Robert Merton’s related work, helped formalize option valuation and dynamic replication. Its simplifying assumptions also illustrate the limits of model-based control: continuous rebalancing, frictionless trading, and an idealized price process do not describe every market condition. Discrete trading, jumps, changing volatility, and transaction costs can leave hedging errors.\n\nFull revaluation recalculates instrument values under each scenario rather than relying solely on local sensitivities. It is especially useful for instruments with embedded options, barriers, prepayment features, or other nonlinear payoffs. Its computational demands can be substantial, and its reliability still depends on whether the underlying valuation models represent contractual behavior and stressed market conditions adequately."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Portfolio aggregation, diversification, and leverage",
      "text": "Portfolio market risk depends on joint price movements, not merely on the risks of individual holdings. For portfolio return \\(r_p=\\sum_i w_i r_i\\), its variance is\n\n\\[\\sigma_p^2 =\\sum_i\\sum_j w_iw_j\\operatorname{Cov}(r_i,r_j) =\\mathbf{w}^{\\mathsf T}\\boldsymbol{\\Sigma}\\mathbf{w},\\]\n\nwhere \\(w_i\\) denotes a portfolio weight and \\(\\boldsymbol{\\Sigma}\\) the covariance matrix of returns. This relationship underlies modern portfolio theory, developed prominently by Harry Markowitz in his 1952 article “Portfolio Selection.” Assets need not move in opposite directions for diversification to reduce variance; imperfect positive correlation can be sufficient.\n\nDiversification is conditional on the exposures actually being different. A portfolio containing many securities may remain concentrated in one country, industry, funding source, or macroeconomic factor. Corporate bonds, equities, and commercial property can all respond adversely to a deterioration in economic activity. Conversely, instruments with different legal forms may contain offsetting economic exposures. Counting positions or issuers is therefore not a substitute for identifying common risk drivers.\n\nThe capital asset pricing model, developed in the 1960s, distinguishes market-related risk from diversifiable risk through beta:\n\n\\[\\beta_i= \\frac{\\operatorname{Cov}(r_i,r_m)} {\\operatorname{Var}(r_m)}.\\]\n\nBeta measures sensitivity to a specified market portfolio or proxy. It is useful for describing equity exposure and benchmark relationships, but it is not a complete market-risk measure. Two portfolios with similar beta can differ substantially in sector concentration, nonlinear payoffs, liquidity, and exposure to extreme losses. Historical beta can also change as business activities, financing, or market conditions change.\n\nFinancial leverage magnifies the effect of asset-price changes on equity. Suppose an institution holds assets worth 100, financed by debt of 95 and equity of 5. A 2% asset loss reduces asset value to 98 and, if debt remains unchanged, equity to 3—a 40% decline. Derivatives can create comparable economic leverage without requiring an initial cash outlay equal to the underlying exposure. Their notional amounts, however, are not reliable standalone measures of risk: contractual offsets, maturity, sensitivity, and collateral arrangements matter.\n\nCorrelation estimates require particular caution in concentrated and stressed portfolios. Co-movement can increase when investors sell different assets to raise cash, although not every correlation rises in every crisis. Relationships that appear stable during ordinary trading can change when funding constraints or market participation change.\n\nThese dependencies also affect risk allocation. The marginal contribution of a position depends on the rest of the portfolio, so a volatile asset may reduce overall risk if it offsets existing exposures. Conversely, a seemingly small position can contribute disproportionately to losses if it reinforces a large common exposure. Portfolio analysis therefore distinguishes standalone risk, incremental risk from adding a trade, and contributions to aggregate risk."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Loss distributions, value at risk, and expected shortfall",
      "text": "A probabilistic market-risk measure summarizes a distribution of possible losses over a specified horizon. The horizon might be one trading day, several weeks, or a longer investment period. The distribution can incorporate changing prices, valuation effects, and assumptions about trading or hedging. Reported numbers are meaningful only together with their horizon, confidence level, portfolio definition, and modeling conventions.\n\nValue at risk (VaR) is a loss quantile. If \\(L\\) is the loss and \\(\\alpha\\) a confidence level,\n\n\\[\\operatorname{VaR}_{\\alpha}(L) = \\inf\\{\\ell:\\Pr(L\\leq\\ell)\\geq\\alpha\\}.\\]\n\nA one-day 99% VaR of 10 million means that, under the model, the 99th percentile of one-day loss is 10 million. It does not mean that the maximum possible loss is 10 million, that losses above this amount are impossible, or that the following day’s loss is known. Nor does a daily confidence level establish a simple probability bound for annual cumulative losses.\n\nVaR became prominent in financial institutions during the 1990s. J.P. Morgan’s release of RiskMetrics in 1994 helped popularize standardized market-risk measurement using estimated volatilities and correlations. VaR offered a common monetary scale for comparing otherwise heterogeneous trading exposures. However, it reports the boundary of a tail rather than the severity of losses beyond that boundary. Two portfolios can have identical VaR and markedly different catastrophic-loss potential.\n\nExpected shortfall (ES) addresses this limitation by averaging losses in the specified tail. A definition that also handles discontinuous loss distributions is\n\n\\[\\operatorname{ES}_{\\alpha}(L) = \\frac{1}{1-\\alpha} \\int_{\\alpha}^{1}\\operatorname{VaR}_{u}(L)\\,du.\\]\n\nFor a continuous distribution under the usual regularity conditions, this corresponds to expected loss conditional on being in the worst \\(1-\\alpha\\) proportion of outcomes. At 97.5% confidence, it concerns the worst 2.5% of losses. ES measures tail severity, but estimating it reliably can require more information about rare events than estimating a less extreme quantile.\n\nUnder appropriate conditions, ES is subadditive: the risk assigned to a combined portfolio does not exceed the sum of the risks assigned separately. VaR does not satisfy subadditivity for all loss distributions, which can produce counterintuitive assessments of diversification. This does not make ES immune to model error. Both measures depend on exposure mapping, valuation, data, and the assumed future distribution.\n\nDifferent risk measures answer different questions. Standard deviation treats upside and downside deviations symmetrically; benchmark tracking error measures variation relative to an index; maximum drawdown records the largest observed peak-to-trough decline over a chosen interval. None is interchangeable with a specified loss quantile. A portfolio can have low ordinary volatility yet contain a short-option position exposed to infrequent, very large losses."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Statistical models, data, and validation",
      "text": "Three broad approaches dominate the estimation of portfolio loss distributions. Parametric methods specify a statistical model for risk-factor changes and translate it into portfolio losses. In a simple linear-normal model,\n\n\\[\\operatorname{VaR}_{\\alpha} \\approx-\\mu_P+z_{\\alpha}\\sigma_P,\\]\n\nwhere \\(\\mu_P\\) is expected portfolio profit, \\(\\sigma_P\\) its standard deviation, and \\(z_{\\alpha}\\) the relevant standard-normal quantile. These methods can be fast and transparent, but normality and linearity can understate skewness, heavy tails, and option-related nonlinearities.\n\nHistorical simulation applies observed past changes in market factors to current positions. It can preserve nonlinear valuation if instruments are fully repriced, and it retains the joint movements present in the historical sample. Its limitations follow from the same design: events absent from the sample cannot appear without additional assumptions, and a window dominated by calm conditions may imply little risk. Results can also change abruptly when a crisis observation enters or leaves the estimation window.\n\nMonte Carlo simulation generates many possible market-factor paths or shocks from a specified model and values the portfolio under them. It is flexible enough to represent multiple factors, path-dependent contracts, and complex distributions. Its flexibility does not remove uncertainty: dependence assumptions, parameter estimates, numerical precision, and valuation approximations can all affect results. A large number of simulated scenarios reduces simulation noise but cannot correct a misspecified economic model.\n\nVolatility is not constant through time. Large price changes often cluster, motivating exponentially weighted estimates and conditional-volatility models. Fat-tailed distributions, jump processes, and extreme-value methods attempt to represent outcomes that occur more often than a normal model predicts. Scaling one-day risk by the square root of time is valid only under restrictive assumptions, including a suitable stable variance structure and absence of relevant serial dependence. It can be misleading for illiquid positions, changing exposures, or returns with strong dependence.\n\nData quality is part of the model rather than merely a preliminary concern. Stale prices can suppress estimated volatility; inconsistent trading hours can distort measured correlations; corporate actions require adjustments; and short price histories can make tail estimates unstable. Proxy data introduce additional basis uncertainty when an instrument lacks a representative historical series. Missing observations must not automatically be treated as zero changes.\n\nBacktesting compares forecasts with subsequently observed outcomes. For a correctly specified one-day 99% VaR model, exceptions would average about 2.5 in 250 trading days, but random variation means this is not a fixed annual allowance. Validation also examines whether exceptions cluster, whether losses become unusually severe after an exception, and whether pricing models explain realized profit and loss. Hypothetical profit and loss, based on unchanged positions, can isolate model performance from intraday trading and changes in portfolio composition. Statistical tests complement, rather than replace, investigation of why a model failed."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Stress testing and feedback under market disruption",
      "text": "Stress testing evaluates exposures under severe but specified conditions rather than relying only on estimated probabilities. Historical scenarios reproduce selected market changes from an actual episode; hypothetical scenarios construct economically meaningful disruptions that need not have occurred before. A scenario might combine higher interest rates, wider credit spreads, falling equity prices, currency depreciation, and reduced market liquidity. Its purpose is to reveal vulnerabilities, not necessarily to assign a precise probability to the entire combination.\n\nScenario design requires consistency across risk factors. A recessionary shock may imply different interest-rate and exchange-rate responses from an inflationary supply shock. Mechanical combinations of each factor’s largest historical movement can be informative as extreme sensitivity tests, but they need not describe a coherent economic event. Scenarios also need to distinguish immediate price effects from subsequent changes in cash flows, counterparties, collateral, and management actions.\n\nSeveral historical episodes illustrate distinct weaknesses. On 19 October 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell approximately 22.6% in one day. The event demonstrated the importance of discontinuous price moves and the limitations of assuming that dynamic hedges could always be executed near prevailing prices. In 1998, losses at Long-Term Capital Management exposed the vulnerability of leveraged relative-value positions when price relationships diverged and liquidity deteriorated. Trades intended to profit from convergence could incur large interim losses before any expected convergence occurred.\n\nThe global financial crisis of 2007–2009 revealed how market losses, opaque valuations, short-term financing, and counterparty concerns could reinforce one another. During the market disruption of March 2020, intense demand for cash affected even major government-bond markets. In the United Kingdom in September 2022, sharp gilt-yield movements generated collateral pressure in leveraged liability-driven investment arrangements. These episodes show why an eventual capacity to pay liabilities does not eliminate the danger of immediate liquidity demands.\n\nFeedback makes stress losses different from a static revaluation exercise. Falling prices can generate a margin call, requiring cash or additional collateral. Institutions may then sell assets, causing a fire sale that pushes prices lower and triggers further demands. Increased volatility can also lead lenders or clearing houses to raise margin requirements. The resulting deleveraging changes the market environment in which other institutions must transact.\n\nReverse stress testing starts from an outcome, such as exhaustion of capital or inability to meet collateral payments, and asks what combinations of events could produce it. This approach can uncover concentrations that conventional scenarios overlook. Stress analysis also examines whether proposed responses are feasible: an assumption that every institution can sell the same asset, obtain new funding, or purchase protection at unchanged prices ignores the collective consequences of those actions."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Hedging, limits, and institutional control",
      "text": "Hedging changes the distribution of financial outcomes by adding exposures intended to offset existing ones. A producer can sell futures contracts to reduce exposure to a falling commodity price; a borrower can use a swap to alter fixed- and floating-rate payments; an exporter can sell foreign currency forward. An option can provide protection against adverse movements while preserving some favorable outcomes, usually in exchange for an upfront premium. Such instruments transfer risk rather than eliminate it from the financial system.\n\nA hedge must be judged against a defined exposure and objective. Reducing fluctuations in accounting profit may differ from stabilizing cash flows or economic value. A fixed-rate liability, for example, can decline in market value when interest rates rise, while its contractual payments remain unchanged. An asset-and-liability analysis examines the net effect rather than treating every movement on either side of the balance sheet as an independent loss. Pension liabilities and long-duration insurance obligations make this distinction particularly important.\n\nHedges can introduce new risks. A contract may have the wrong maturity, currency, reference rate, or delivery location. Dynamic hedging depends on the ability to rebalance and can become expensive or ineffective when prices jump. Transactions in the over-the-counter market can create counterparty exposure; exchange-traded or centrally cleared contracts can require substantial cash variation margin. An economically effective long-term hedge can therefore generate short-term funding pressure.\n\nInstitutional controls typically combine monetary risk limits with more specific constraints. VaR or ES limits may be supplemented by limits on duration, option sensitivities, issuer concentration, gross and net positions, stop-loss amounts, and stressed losses. These measures are not redundant: aggregate statistical limits can conceal concentrated exposures or offsets that fail under stress. Breach procedures define who must investigate, authorize continued exposure, reduce positions, or escalate the issue.\n\nIndependent risk management separates measurement and oversight from the trading units that take positions. Controls commonly include independent price verification, model validation, reconciliation of positions, review of valuation adjustments, and approval of new products. Model risk arises when decisions rely on incorrect models, inappropriate implementation, or use outside a model’s valid scope. An accurate calculation based on an unsuitable model remains an unreliable basis for control.\n\nAccounting treatment is another distinct layer. Fair value measurement and hedge accounting under applicable International Financial Reporting Standards or national accounting rules affect how valuation changes appear in financial statements. Economic offsets do not automatically qualify for hedge accounting, and accounting designation does not itself prove that all relevant exposures have been neutralized. Disclosure therefore often combines balance-sheet amounts, sensitivities, risk measures, and explanations of hedging relationships rather than relying on a single reported figure."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Bank capital regulation and supervisory treatment",
      "text": "International bank market-risk standards developed through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The 1988 Basel framework concentrated primarily on credit risk. Its 1996 Market Risk Amendment introduced capital requirements for market risks and permitted qualifying banks to use approved internal models, alongside a standardized approach. The internal-model framework centered on VaR with supervisory specifications, including a 99% confidence level and a ten-trading-day horizon, together with scaling and other safeguards.\n\nThe distinction between the trading book and banking book is central to these standards. The trading book generally contains positions held for trading or meeting specified related criteria, while the banking book contains other exposures, including many loans and long-term investments. This classification is regulatory rather than simply a statement about whether an asset has a market price. Foreign-exchange and commodity exposures also receive market-risk treatment beyond the trading book. Interest-rate risk in the banking book has a separate supervisory framework.\n\nThe financial crisis exposed weaknesses in pre-crisis market-risk capital, including inadequate recognition of illiquidity, credit migration, and losses outside ordinary historical experience. The 2009 revisions, often called Basel 2.5, introduced stressed VaR and an incremental risk charge for relevant trading-book credit exposures, among other changes. Stressed VaR used a period of significant financial stress to reduce dependence on the recent market environment, while the incremental charge addressed default and migration risks not adequately captured by short-horizon VaR.\n\nThe Fundamental Review of the Trading Book led to a revised standard published in 2016 and updated in 2019. Within the Basel III framework, it strengthened the trading-book boundary and replaced VaR with 97.5% expected shortfall as the central internal-model measure. It introduced explicit liquidity horizons, ranging from 10 to 120 days for different risk factors, and separate treatment for risk factors that fail prescribed modellability requirements. The objective is not to assume that every position can be exited or hedged within the same short period.\n\nThe revised standardized approach uses sensitivities-based charges, a default risk charge, and a residual risk add-on for specified exposures. Internal-model approval operates at the trading-desk level and includes backtesting and profit-and-loss attribution requirements. These tests examine whether the risk model’s factors adequately explain trading results. Failure can lead to standardized treatment for the affected desk. International standards require implementation through national or regional rules, so legal requirements and commencement dates can differ across jurisdictions.\n\nRegulatory capital is not an estimate of the largest possible market loss. It is a prescribed financial buffer calibrated within a broader supervisory framework. Bank capital absorbs losses, whereas liquidity resources meet payments; neither substitutes fully for the other. Banks can therefore comply with a market-risk capital calculation while remaining exposed to funding disruption, concentrated positions, or valuation uncertainty. Supervisory review consequently also examines governance, stress testing, model limitations, and the interaction of market exposures with the rest of the institution’s activities."
    }
  ],
  "links": [
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    "solvency",
    "credit-risk",
    "liquidity-risk",
    "systemic-risk",
    "interest-rate",
    "bond-finance",
    "yield-curve",
    "exchange-rate",
    "commodity",
    "option-greeks",
    "black-scholes-model",
    "variance",
    "financial-leverage",
    "expected-shortfall",
    "monte-carlo-method",
    "backtesting",
    "stress-testing",
    "global-financial-crisis",
    "margin-call",
    "fire-sale",
    "balance-sheet",
    "over-the-counter-market",
    "fair-value",
    "international-financial-reporting-standards",
    "basel-iii",
    "bank-capital"
  ],
  "sources": [],
  "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
}