{
  "id": "herfindahl-hirschman-index",
  "title": "Herfindahl–Hirschman Index",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index measures concentration by summing squared market shares, giving greater weight to larger firms and helping assess market structure and mergers.",
  "category": "economics",
  "subcategory": "microeconomics",
  "type": "concept",
  "aliases": [
    "HHI",
    "Herfindahl index",
    "Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-11-03",
  "model": "pro/gpt-6.1-sol",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/herfindahl-hirschman-index/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/herfindahl-hirschman-index/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/herfindahl-hirschman-index.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in a defined market. It captures both the number of firms and the unevenness of their shares: the index rises when fewer firms account for more of the market. Widely used in competition law, merger assessment, and industrial economics, the HHI describes market structure rather than directly measuring competitive conduct or market power."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Definition and calculation",
      "text": "Let \\(s_i\\) denote firm \\(i\\)’s share of a market, expressed as a fraction, and let \\(n\\) be the number of firms. Then\n\n\\[H=\\sum_{i=1}^{n}s_i^2, \\qquad \\sum_{i=1}^{n}s_i=1.\\]\n\nOn this scale, the index ranges from \\(1/n\\), when all \\(n\\) firms have equal shares, to \\(1\\), when one firm supplies the entire market. As the number of equally sized firms increases, the index approaches zero.\n\nCompetition authorities commonly express shares as percentage points instead. Writing \\(p_i=100s_i\\), the index becomes\n\n\\[HHI=\\sum_{i=1}^{n}p_i^2=10{,}000H.\\]\n\nOn this scale, a monopoly has an HHI of \\(10{,}000\\), while a market with \\(n\\) equally sized firms has an HHI of \\(10{,}000/n\\). Stating the scale is essential: an index of \\(0.25\\) on the fractional scale is equivalent to \\(2{,}500\\) on the percentage-point scale.\n\nShares may be measured using revenue, physical sales, production capacity, purchases, employment, or another variable appropriate to the competitive setting. These measures need not produce the same HHI.\n\nExample\n\nConsider a market with four firms:\n\nFirm | Market share | Squared percentage share\nA | 40% | 1,600\nB | 30% | 900\nC | 20% | 400\nD | 10% | 100\nTotal | 100% | 3,000\n\nThe HHI is therefore \\(3{,}000\\), or \\(0.30\\) on the fractional scale. Four equally sized firms would instead produce an HHI of \\(2{,}500\\). Thus, knowing the number of firms alone is insufficient to determine concentration."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Interpretation and mathematical properties",
      "text": "Greater weight on larger firms\n\nSquaring market shares gives larger firms disproportionately greater influence. A firm with a 40% share contributes \\(1{,}600\\) points, four times the contribution of a firm with a 20% share.\n\nA transfer of market share from a smaller firm to a larger firm increases the index, holding the number of firms and total market size constant. Conversely, a more even distribution of shares reduces it.\n\nThis distinguishes the HHI from a concentration ratio, such as the combined share of the four largest firms. A concentration ratio ignores how shares are distributed within the selected group and among the remaining firms; the HHI incorporates every firm’s share.\n\nEffective number of firms\n\nThe reciprocal of the fractional HHI is the effective number of firms, also called the numbers-equivalent:\n\n\\[N_{\\mathrm{eff}}=\\frac{1}{H} =\\frac{10{,}000}{HHI}.\\]\n\nThis is the number of equally sized firms that would generate the observed concentration. An HHI of \\(2{,}000\\), for example, corresponds to five equally sized firms. It does not imply that exactly five firms actually operate in the market.\n\nProbability interpretation\n\nIf two units of sales are selected independently, with the probability of selecting each firm proportional to its market share, \\(H\\) is the probability that both units come from the same firm. This interpretation explains why the same mathematical expression appears in measures of concentration and diversity outside economics.\n\nNormalization for a fixed number of firms\n\nFor comparisons that explicitly adjust for the number of firms, a normalized version is sometimes used:\n\n\\[H^*=\\frac{H-1/n}{1-1/n}, \\qquad n>1.\\]\n\nThis equals zero when all firms have equal shares and approaches one as shares become concentrated in a single firm. It is not interchangeable with the conventional HHI: normalizing away the equal-share baseline changes the interpretation and can obscure differences attributable to the number of firms."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Market definition and measurement",
      "text": "An HHI is meaningful only in relation to a specified relevant market. Market definition identifies the products and geographic area within which competitive constraints are assessed. The same firm can have a small share of a broad industry but a large share of a narrower product or local market.\n\nSeveral measurement choices matter:\n\n- Product and geographic boundaries. National industry totals may conceal highly concentrated local markets or combine products that are not close substitutes.\n- The share measure. Revenue shares reflect prices as well as quantities. Capacity shares may be informative when firms compete through available production, while transaction counts may be useful where monetary prices are zero.\n- The period measured. A single year may be misleading in markets with infrequent large contracts, seasonal demand, or rapidly changing shares.\n- The competitive decision-making unit. Businesses under common control generally need to be treated consistently with their economic relationship rather than automatically counted as independent competitors.\n- Missing firms and aggregation. Treating an “other firms” category as one firm overstates its contribution relative to calculating the shares of its individual members.\n\nFor example, if several unobserved small firms jointly hold 20% of a market, assigning them a single 20% share adds 400 points. Four separate firms with 5% each would contribute only 100 points."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Use in merger assessment",
      "text": "The HHI is widely used to screen horizontal mergers—combinations of firms that compete in the same market. Analysts consider both the post-merger level and the increase in concentration.\n\nIf two firms with percentage shares \\(a\\) and \\(b\\) merge, and all other shares remain unchanged, the mechanical increase is\n\n\\[\\Delta HHI=(a+b)^2-a^2-b^2=2ab.\\]\n\nA merger between firms with shares of 20% and 10%, for example, increases the HHI by 400 points. The calculation assumes that their shares simply combine; it does not predict subsequent changes in prices, output, entry, or customer switching.\n\nGuideline thresholds\n\nThresholds vary across jurisdictions and over time. They are policy screening devices, not universal economic boundaries between competitive and uncompetitive markets.\n\nUnder the 2023 U.S. Merger Guidelines, a merger that produces a post-merger HHI greater than \\(1{,}800\\) and increases the HHI by more than 100 points meets a structural presumption that it may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The guidelines also identify a presumption where the merged firm’s share exceeds 30% and the HHI increases by more than 100 points.\n\nThese standards differ from the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which classified markets with an HHI below \\(1{,}500\\) as unconcentrated, from \\(1{,}500\\) to \\(2{,}500\\) as moderately concentrated, and above \\(2{,}500\\) as highly concentrated.\n\nA structural presumption is not an automatic prohibition. Merger assessment also considers evidence about competitive interactions, barriers to entry, potential competition, buyer responses, and other relevant circumstances. An HHI below a screening threshold likewise does not establish that a transaction is harmless."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Relationship to market power",
      "text": "Concentration can be associated with market power, but the relationship is not mechanical. A concentrated market may face strong constraints from entry or substitution; a less concentrated market may still exhibit weak competition because of collusion, customer switching costs, or product differentiation.\n\nA formal connection arises in the standard Cournot model of quantity competition. Under assumptions including a homogeneous product, an interior equilibrium, and firms independently maximizing profits, firm \\(i\\)’s price–cost margin satisfies\n\n\\[\\frac{P-MC_i}{P}=\\frac{s_i}{|\\varepsilon|},\\]\n\nwhere \\(P\\) is market price, \\(MC_i\\) is the firm’s marginal cost, and \\(|\\varepsilon|\\) is the absolute value of market price elasticity of demand. The market-share-weighted average margin is consequently\n\n\\[\\sum_i s_i\\frac{P-MC_i}{P} =\\frac{H}{|\\varepsilon|}.\\]\n\nThis provides a theoretical link between concentration and margins under specific assumptions. It is not a general formula for inferring market power from observed HHI values in markets with differentiated products, price competition, bargaining, or other competitive mechanisms."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Other applications",
      "text": "The index can measure concentration wherever nonnegative shares sum to one.\n\n- Banking: concentration of deposits, loans, or other banking activities within a specified geographic or product market.\n- Buyer markets: concentration of purchases among buyers, including employer shares in a labor market, where concentration may inform analysis of monopsony power.\n- Trade: concentration of exports across products or destinations, or imports across suppliers.\n- Supply chains: dependence on a small number of suppliers or production locations.\n- Portfolios: concentration of investment weights across assets, issuers, or sectors.\n\nThe economic interpretation differs across these settings. Portfolio-weight concentration, for example, does not by itself measure market risk, because risk also depends on asset volatility and the relationships among asset returns."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Limitations",
      "text": "The HHI compresses a distribution of shares into a single number. Different market structures can produce the same value, and the index does not identify which firms compete most closely.\n\nIt also omits many dimensions of competition, including service quality, capacity constraints, innovation, contractual restrictions, and the ability of customers to switch suppliers. In markets shaped by network effects or two-sided interactions, a single share measure may fail to capture the relevant competitive relationships.\n\nInterpretation also faces a problem of causation. High concentration may contribute to weaker competition, but it may also result from a firm gaining sales through lower costs or better products. Economies of scale can support concentrated production even when rivalry is substantial.\n\nFinally, standard HHI calculations do not directly capture cross-shareholdings, partial ownership, or arrangements that alter firms’ incentives without combining their reported market shares. Such relationships require additional analysis rather than a simple reading of the conventional index."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Historical development",
      "text": "The index is named after economists Albert O. Hirschman and Orris C. Herfindahl. Hirschman used a concentration measure of this form in his 1945 book National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Herfindahl independently developed it in his 1950 doctoral dissertation on concentration in the U.S. steel industry.\n\nThe measure became a prominent tool of U.S. merger analysis with the 1982 Merger Guidelines, which adopted it in place of the four-firm concentration ratio as the principal numerical measure of market concentration."
    }
  ],
  "links": [
    "market",
    "competition-law",
    "market-power",
    "monopoly",
    "probability",
    "barriers-to-entry",
    "collusion",
    "product-differentiation",
    "cournot-competition",
    "marginal-cost",
    "price-elasticity-of-demand",
    "labor-market",
    "asset",
    "market-risk",
    "innovation",
    "network-effect",
    "causation",
    "economies-of-scale"
  ],
  "sources": [],
  "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
}