{
  "id": "alternative-for-germany",
  "title": "Alternative for Germany",
  "lang": "en",
  "source_lang": "en",
  "summary": "Alternative for Germany is a German political party founded in 2013, associated with Euroscepticism, nationalism, and right-wing populism.",
  "category": "society",
  "subcategory": "politics",
  "type": "organization",
  "aliases": [
    "Alternative für Deutschland",
    "AfD"
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-10-15",
  "model": "pro/gpt-6.1-sol",
  "url": "https://aiwiki.page/en/alternative-for-germany/",
  "translations": {
    "zh-Hans": {
      "url": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/alternative-for-germany/",
      "json": "https://aiwiki.page/zh/alternative-for-germany.json"
    }
  },
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "",
      "text": "Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, abbreviated AfD) is a political party in Germany, founded in 2013 against the background of the European sovereign-debt crisis. Initially identified principally with opposition to euro-area rescue policies, it subsequently placed immigration, asylum, national identity, and opposition to further European integration at the centre of its platform. Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education describes its development from a liberal-conservative formation into a party characterized by right-wing populist and far-right positions. These political descriptions are distinct from the administrative classifications used by Germany’s domestic intelligence authorities. (bpb.de)\n\nThe AfD entered the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, in 2017. At the federal election of February 23, 2025, it received 20.8 per cent of second votes and won 152 seats, becoming the second-largest parliamentary force behind the combined Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union. Its electoral strength has been particularly pronounced in eastern Germany, although its electorate extends across the country. Its development, organization, policy programme, and parliamentary activity form part of the wider history of changes in German electoral politics and relations with the European Union. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Foundation and early development, 2012–2014",
      "text": "The AfD emerged from opposition to the management of the European sovereign-debt crisis, which developed from 2010 following the global financial crisis. Its founders rejected financial assistance intended to stabilize indebted euro-area countries, including Greece, and challenged the German government’s commitment to preserving the existing monetary union. Their principal alternative was an orderly dissolution of the euro area, rather than continued financial support within it. This opposition brought together economists, business figures and conservatives dissatisfied with the established parties. (bpb.de)\n\nIn September 2012, Bernd Lucke, Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland and other euro critics established Wahlalternative 2013 (“Electoral Alternative 2013”). The initiative initially sought cooperation with the Free Voters rather than immediately creating a separate party. An unsuccessful electoral trial in Lower Saxony in January 2013, together with doubts about the Free Voters’ capacity to conduct a nationwide campaign, prompted the organizers to pursue an independent organization. The AfD was formally founded on 6 February 2013. (bpb.de)\n\nThe founders contributed different professional and political backgrounds: Lucke was an economics professor, Adam a journalist and former newspaper editor, and Gauland a former Christian Democratic Union politician from Hesse. Although all three helped establish the movement, they were not the party’s original three federal spokespeople. At the founding congress in Berlin on 14 April 2013, members elected Lucke, Adam and the chemist and entrepreneur Frauke Petry as equal-ranking spokespeople. Lucke became the party’s most recognizable public representative. (swr.de)\n\nThe early AfD combined market-liberal economics with conservative social positions. Opposition to euro-area assistance belonged to a wider economic outlook emphasizing markets rather than an exclusively monetary protest. On family, gender and immigration questions, however, the party adopted conservative or restrictive positions. Its opposition to immigration characterized as entry into welfare systems connected its economic arguments with cultural concerns. Economic liberalism therefore did not imply a socially liberal platform, even during the party’s founding phase. (bpb.de)\n\nAt the federal election on 22 September 2013, the AfD received 2,056,985 second votes, or 4.7 per cent. It fell below the five-per-cent threshold and obtained no seats in the Bundestag. Its first national parliamentary breakthrough instead came at the European Parliament election on 25 May 2014: it won 7.1 per cent and seven seats, with Lucke heading its candidate list. The elected delegation joined the European Conservatives and Reformists group. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)\n\nState-parliament breakthroughs followed in eastern Germany. Saxony became the first state to elect AfD representatives on 31 August 2014, when the party secured 9.7 per cent of the list vote. On 14 September, it received 12.2 per cent in Brandenburg and 10.6 per cent in Thuringia. These successes also strengthened eastern branches seeking a broader national-conservative and immigration-critical profile alongside the party’s original economic emphasis. (wahlen.sachsen.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Leadership changes and internal realignment",
      "text": "The AfD’s early leadership struggles concerned both political direction and control of the party organization. Bernd Lucke emphasized market economics and opposition to euro-area rescue policies, while Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland represented a stronger national-conservative orientation. These currents overlapped rather than constituting mutually exclusive blocs: economic liberalism could coexist with restrictive immigration policies, while national conservatives differed over cooperation with more radical nationalists. Lucke sought to consolidate authority through a proposed transition from collective leadership to a single chair and organized supporters in the association Weckruf 2015 (“Wake-up Call 2015”). At the Essen congress on 4 July 2015, however, Petry defeated him with approximately 60 percent of the votes against 38 percent. Jörg Meuthen, an economics professor associated with the market-liberal current, was elected the other federal spokesperson. Lucke announced his departure on 8 July. (bpb.de)\n\nThe split substantially weakened Lucke’s current: by the end of August 2015, roughly one-fifth of the party’s approximately 21,000 members had left, including several prominent economic liberals. Opposition to immigration subsequently displaced euro policy as the principal mobilizing issue during the refugee arrivals of 2015–2016. This was an acceleration of an existing shift, not an entirely new departure: eastern state branches had already broadened their appeals beyond monetary policy during the 2014 election campaigns. The change in personnel did not eliminate market-liberal policies, which remained visible in the basic programme adopted in May 2016. (bpb.de)\n\nA distinct nationalist network developed around Björn Höcke, the party’s leader in Thuringia. The March 2015 Erfurt Resolution provided the founding platform for Der Flügel (“The Wing”), challenging the federal leadership’s course and presenting the AfD as a resistance movement defending German identity. Höcke and, subsequently, Brandenburg leader Andreas Kalbitz became its principal figures. Der Flügel was an informal intra-party network, not a synonym for the entire AfD. Its influence rested on supporters within state branches and among congress delegates rather than on holding the federal chairmanship. Frank Decker’s account for the Federal Agency for Civic Education distinguishes this völkisch-nationalist current from both market-liberal and national-conservative tendencies. (bpb.de)\n\nPetry’s own authority weakened before the September 2017 federal election. She withdrew from consideration for the lead candidacy; the party instead selected Gauland and Alice Weidel. On 25 September, the day after the election, Petry announced that she would not join the AfD’s Bundestag parliamentary group, citing disagreements over the party’s direction and extremist statements by colleagues. She subsequently left the party. At the December 2017 congress in Hanover, Gauland was elected federal co-spokesperson alongside Meuthen. Gauland’s party office was institutionally separate from the parliamentary-group leadership, which he shared with Weidel. Tino Chrupalla succeeded him as federal co-spokesperson in November 2019. (dw.com)\n\nMeuthen increasingly confronted Der Flügel after previously accommodating it. Following the domestic intelligence service’s classification of the network as an established right-wing extremist organization in March 2020, the federal executive demanded its dissolution by 30 April. Its leaders formally discontinued activities under the name, and its online platforms went offline. Dissolution did not itself require supporters to leave the AfD or remove them from party office. Höcke remained in the party, and the wider current retained influence. A further confrontation concerned the executive’s May 2020 annulment of Kalbitz’s membership over inaccurate information supplied when joining; Gauland and Chrupalla opposed Meuthen in that dispute. (bpb.de)\n\nOn 28 January 2022, Meuthen resigned his leadership position and left the AfD, saying that he no longer saw a prospect of steering it toward his preferred course. The federal executive expressed regret over his departure. At the Riesa congress on 18 June 2022, delegates elected Chrupalla and Weidel as joint federal leaders, with approximately 53 and 67 percent respectively. They thereby combined party leadership with their existing joint leadership of the Bundestag parliamentary group. (tagesschau.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Party organization, membership, and resources",
      "text": "The AfD’s territorial structure follows Germany’s federal system, with 16 state associations (Landesverbände) and subordinate district and local branches. State associations have autonomy over their statutes, finances, and personnel, subject to federal party rules. The highest decision-making body is the federal congress (Bundesparteitag), which meets at least annually, normally with 600 delegates allocated among state associations by membership. It adopts programmes and statutory amendments and elects the federal executive (Bundesvorstand) for two-year terms. The executive manages the party between congresses; its offices include one or two equal spokespersons, deputy spokespersons, and a treasurer. A smaller representative body, the Konvent, coordinates federal and state organizations between congresses. (afd.de)\n\nState and federal arbitration tribunals handle internal disputes, including disciplinary proceedings and applications for expulsion. These are party bodies, not state courts. Parliamentary leadership is institutionally separate: party executives administer the membership organization, whereas parliamentary groups organize elected representatives’ legislative work. The distinction remains even when individuals occupy both kinds of office. Candidate nomination also differs from selecting campaign figureheads. Bundestag constituency candidates and state lists must be chosen by secret ballot in assemblies of eligible members or their elected representatives. The AfD’s online membership ballot selecting Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla as its leading candidates in 2021 did not replace those statutory nomination procedures. (afd.de)\n\nMembership contracted before expanding substantially: approximately 35,000 members belonged to the party at the end of 2019 and 30,000 at the end of 2021. Its published accounts recorded 39,673 at the end of 2023, while membership exceeded 55,000 by the end of 2024. In his May 2026 organizational overview, political scientist Frank Decker reported that 72 per cent of members lived in western Germany and that women constituted 21.4 per cent; members aged 36–64 were overrepresented. These figures describe the membership organization, not the party’s electorate or parliamentary delegations. (bpb.de)\n\nThe replacement of Junge Alternative (JA) changed the youth organization’s relationship with the parent party. JA had been a legally separate association whose ordinary members did not have to belong to the AfD; it dissolved in spring 2025. Its successor, Generation Deutschland, was founded in Gießen on November 29, 2025, with more than 800 participants. They elected Brandenburg legislator Jean-Pascal Hohm chairman with 90.4 per cent of the vote. Unlike JA, the successor is incorporated into the party’s organizational structure, with party membership generally required from age 16 and corresponding exposure to party disciplinary rules. The Desiderius Erasmus Foundation, established in 2017 and recognized as party-affiliated in 2018, remains a separate organization rather than a territorial branch or parliamentary group. (zdfheute.de)\n\nThe AfD receives membership dues, officeholders’ contributions, donations, and public party funding. Under Germany’s funding system, public allocations reflect both electoral performance and qualifying income from contributions and lawful donations. Its 2023 accounts recorded total revenue of €39.56 million, including €11.61 million in public funds, expenditure of €24.79 million, and net assets of €38.28 million. Foundation grants constitute a different funding stream: in a February 5, 2026 parliamentary answer, the federal government stated that the Desiderius Erasmus Foundation had not met the funding requirements for 2025 and that examination for 2026 remained ongoing at that date. (bundestag.de)\n\nDonation disputes have produced distinct administrative decisions and court proceedings. On August 11, 2025, the Bundestag president determined that the AfD had to surrender a €2,349,906.62 in-kind donation financing 6,395 election billboards. The party challenged that decision and sought repayment of the amount it had provisionally transferred. On May 7, 2026, the Berlin Administrative Court substantially dismissed its claim, holding that the true donor could not be established and that the donation was therefore impermissible. This concerned surrender of an unlawful donation, not a criminal conviction or an additional monetary penalty. The court’s announcement expressly allowed an appeal, so that judgment should not be presented as an unappealable final resolution. (berlin.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Political identity and institutional proposals",
      "text": "Political scientists use overlapping, but not identical, classifications for the AfD. Frank Decker identifies it with the right-wing populist party family, emphasizing its opposition between supposedly unresponsive elites and a people whose authentic interests the party claims to represent. Research using Cas Mudde’s concept of the populist radical right additionally emphasizes nativism and authoritarian law-and-order positions. In this framework, “radical” distinguishes acceptance of electoral procedures from rejection of liberal-democratic constraints, including pluralism and constitutional limits on majority power; it does not simply mean rejection of elections. “Far right” is also used as a broader classification: Caterina Froio, for example, describes the AfD as populist far right in her research on its visual politics. These are scholarly categories, not interchangeable legal designations or findings that a party must be prohibited. (bpb.de)\n\nThe party’s own account stresses democratic renewal rather than these classifications. Its basic programme, adopted in Stuttgart on 30 April–1 May 2016, presents it as a citizens’ alternative to established politics and affirms separation of powers, the rule of law, federalism and a social market economy. Its national orientation connects democratic self-government to shared cultural values, historical memory and a sovereign German nation-state. The programme invokes the revolutions of 1848 and 1989 and envisages cooperation among sovereign European states. These statements express the party’s self-description, rather than resolving scholarly or legal questions about its character. (afd.de)\n\nAnti-establishment arguments provide the link between this identity and institutional reform. The 2016 programme alleges that a self-interested political class has displaced citizens as the effective sovereign and that parliamentary representatives have become dependent on their parties. Decker therefore distinguishes the party’s rhetorical opposition to the establishment from its substantive emphasis on direct democracy. Its proposed Swiss-style system would let citizens challenge parliamentary legislation and initiate laws themselves. Constitutional amendments and significant international treaties would require popular approval, making referendums a proposed safeguard against transfers of national sovereignty. The programme expressly includes financial questions rather than excluding them from popular votes. (bpb.de)\n\nElectoral reforms similarly seek to reduce party organizations’ control over representation. The programme advocates freie Listenwahl, or open-list voting, for federal and state parliamentary elections: voters could distribute votes among several candidates or strike individual candidates from lists. It presents this as strengthening representatives’ independent mandates. It also proposes electing the federal president directly by popular vote, rather than through the Federal Convention, and explicitly calls for amendment of Article 54 of the Basic Law. These are proposed institutional changes, not descriptions of the existing presidential selection system. (afd.de)\n\nOpposition to professional political careers takes several concrete forms in the basic programme. Parliamentary service would be limited to four legislative terms, with an exception for directly elected representatives. The programme also proposes an upper limit of 471 Bundestag members. Under its stricter conception of separation of powers, the chancellor, ministers and state minister-presidents could not simultaneously hold parliamentary seats; parliamentary state-secretary positions would be abolished. These measures are presented as restoring the citizen-legislator and weakening party patronage, rather than merely replacing incumbent officeholders with AfD politicians. (afd.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Immigration, national identity, and social policy",
      "text": "The AfD’s programmes distinguish humanitarian protection from immigration selected for economic purposes. Its 2016 basic programme proposed replacing the individual constitutional right to asylum with a constitutional guarantee of asylum legislation, establishing protection centres in safe countries near refugees’ regions of origin, and introducing strict checks at German borders affected by irregular entry. The 2025 federal election manifesto retained the proposed restructuring of asylum, called for an opt-out from the European Union’s common asylum policy, and proposed border detention facilities and the rejection of unauthorized entrants. These are party proposals, not a description of existing legal powers: Article 16a of Germany’s Basic Law guarantees asylum to politically persecuted persons, subject to restrictions including the safe-third-country provision. (afd.de)\n\nOn deportation, the party advocates enforcing executable obligations to leave, expanding incentives for voluntary departure, and prioritizing foreign nationals considered security threats or convicted of serious crimes. Its 2025 programme also sought easier expulsion of foreign offenders and reviews of protection where the reasons for flight had ceased. For economically selected immigration, it endorsed recruiting qualified workers in shortage occupations, including healthcare, skilled trades and information technology, while giving priority to domestic labour potential. Humanitarian protection and labour recruitment would remain separate routes rather than allowing employment needs to determine asylum policy. (afd.de)\n\nNational identity is framed through Leitkultur, a guiding German culture, rather than multiculturalism. The 2016 programme identified the German language as central to national identity and proposed making it the constitutionally designated state language. These principles also inform its approach to integration: the Federal Agency for Civic Education’s account of the 2017 election programme records demands for assimilation and treats adaptation as the responsibility of immigrants rather than the receiving society. That programme also sought a return to citizenship primarily through descent and opposed dual nationality except in justified special cases. These were proposed changes, not statements of the citizenship rules then in force. (afd.de)\n\nThe 2016 programme declared that “Islam does not belong to Germany,” while affirming freedom of belief and describing law-abiding, integrated Muslims as accepted members of society. Its institutional proposals included prohibiting foreign financing of mosques, requiring state authorization for imams, withholding public-law corporate status from Islamic organizations, and banning full-face veiling in public. These positions concern Islam and religious institutions as well as integration; they are adopted programme provisions, distinct from remarks by individual officeholders. Political scientist Frank Decker’s account for the Federal Agency for Civic Education identifies Islam as a particular focus of the party’s migration politics. (afd.de)\n\n“Remigration” received an explicit federal-executive definition on January 29, 2024. The resulting position paper described lawful returns of foreigners obliged to leave, voluntary-return incentives, and the termination of humanitarian residence when protection grounds disappeared. It expressly rejected arbitrary collective deportation and the deportation of German citizens with migration backgrounds. The 2025 manifesto incorporated the term as a heading for return measures. Published federal policy must therefore be distinguished from broader proposals by other actors: Decker notes that demands extending remigration to citizens with non-German migration backgrounds do not appear in official party programmes, although he identifies such demands in public statements by important functionaries. (afd.de)\n\nSocial policy connects this cultural framework to family formation and birth rates. The 2016 programme favoured the traditional family and proposed interest-free home-purchase loans whose principal would decrease with each birth, student-loan relief for new parents, and earlier retirement linked to childrearing. The 2025 manifesto defined its family model as father, mother and children, while expressly including support for single parents, stepfamilies, and foster and adoptive families. Opposition to gender mainstreaming appears in education policy through demands against its incorporation into teaching and teacher training; the basic programme also opposed gender quotas and continued funding for gender-studies posts and projects. (afd.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Economic, fiscal, and welfare policies",
      "text": "The AfD’s founding economic programme emphasized market competition, individual responsibility, lower taxation, and a smaller welfare state. Later programmes placed greater weight on pensions and support for families, without abandoning tax reductions or fiscal restraint. Political scientist Frank Decker identifies a continuing geographical division: market-liberal positions remained particularly prominent among western German party politicians, whereas eastern branches generally advocated stronger social protection directed towards lower-income constituencies. These were competing currents rather than successive, uniformly accepted party positions. Pension policy became a principal arena of disagreement before the adoption of a compromise social-policy programme in 2020. (bpb.de)\n\nOn income tax, the party’s 2016 basic programme proposed fewer tax brackets and a substantially higher personal allowance. It also advocated Familiensplitting, extending the principle of income splitting beyond married couples to recognize families with children as an income-sharing unit. Alongside these reductions, it proposed a constitutional ceiling on aggregate taxes and compulsory charges relative to gross domestic product. Its 2025 federal-election programme specified a €15,000 personal allowance, indexed against inflation, and called for abolishing inheritance tax, the suspended wealth tax, and municipal property tax (Grundsteuer), with compensation for municipal revenue losses. (afd.de)\n\nThe party’s fiscal policy combines these tax proposals with commitments to balanced budgets and gradual debt repayment. The 2016 basic programme explicitly supported reducing outstanding public debt; the 2025 election programme opposed any relaxation of Germany’s constitutional debt brake. Its proposed financing measures emphasized expenditure reductions, including cuts to climate-related programmes, overseas projects, and payments to the European Union. These were proposed savings, not revenues already secured to finance the party’s commitments. (afd.de)\n\nThe pension compromise was adopted at the Kalkar congress on 28–29 November 2020. It retained the statutory pay-as-you-go system, rather than replacing it with a predominantly privately funded arrangement. Retirement would become more flexible, but benefits would still depend on contributions and retirement timing: earlier retirement would entail deductions, while continued employment would increase entitlements. To improve the position of pensioners with low incomes, the programme proposed excluding 25% of statutory pension income from the means test for basic old-age assistance. It also sought to bring politicians into statutory pension insurance and restrict civil-servant status to sovereign public functions, thereby placing more future public employees in the contributory system. (afd.de)\n\nFamily support was linked directly to pension financing. The subsequent pension platform proposed reimbursing parents’ pension contributions by €20,000 per child, without reducing their pension entitlements; where previous contributions were insufficient, the amount would be credited against future contributions. Crucially, reimbursement was to come from taxation, not from reducing the parents’ accumulated pension rights. The same platform proposed financing pension subsidies through spending cuts in migration, climate, and EU policy. This distinguished the promised family benefit from its proposed budgetary funding source. (afd.de)\n\nThe 2025 programme added retirement without deductions after 45 qualifying working years. Its approach to working-age benefits was more restrictive: employable Bürgergeld recipients still receiving benefits after six months would be required to undertake community work. For foreign nationals, it proposed a ten-year record of social-insurance employment without supplementary benefits as an eligibility condition and a one-year limit on receipt. These were proposed changes to benefit rules, not descriptions of existing entitlements. (afd.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Energy, climate, and pandemic-related positions",
      "text": "The AfD rejects the objective of transforming Germany into a carbon-neutral economy and disputes the established scientific explanation of human-caused climate change. Its basic programme presents climatic variation as a continuing natural phenomenon and rejects policies premised on reducing human carbon dioxide emissions. These are party positions, not scientific findings. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2023 synthesis concluded that human activities, principally emissions of greenhouse gases, had unequivocally caused global warming; global surface temperature in 2011–2020 was approximately \\(1.1^\\circ\\mathrm{C}\\) above the 1850–1900 average. The disagreement therefore concerns the physical basis for climate policy as well as its costs and instruments. (afd.de)\n\nOpposition to Germany’s energy transition, or Energiewende, translates into proposals to dismantle support mechanisms and regulatory requirements. The basic programme calls for abolishing the Renewable Energy Sources Act, including subsidies and priority grid access for electricity generated under its provisions, and removing building-energy requirements. Its 2025 federal-election manifesto additionally proposes abolishing the carbon dioxide levy, reducing energy and electricity taxes, and stopping further wind-power expansion. The party presents these changes as measures to lower costs and restore competition; they are proposed changes rather than descriptions of existing policy. (afd.de)\n\nThe 2025 manifesto combines a return to nuclear power with continued reliance on coal and natural gas. It proposes restarting existing nuclear plants as quickly as possible and rebuilding the technical and institutional capabilities needed for nuclear generation. Coal and gas would maintain electricity supply until that return, while the planned lignite phase-out would be abandoned. For gas supplies, it calls for commissioning the remaining intact Nord Stream 2 pipeline string and repairing damaged Nord Stream infrastructure. In transport, it advocates retaining combustion-engine vehicles, overturning restrictions described in the programme as a combustion-engine ban, and ending public financing of electric-vehicle charging infrastructure. These proposals link energy supply and industrial policy rather than treating nuclear power as a substitute for all fossil-fuel generation. (afd.de)\n\nDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, the party moved from initial support for some containment measures, particularly border closures, towards opposition framed around civil liberties and government overreach. By April 2020, its parliamentary group was seeking a relaxation of restrictions. A motion rejected by the Bundestag on 23 April called for restaurants, hotels, shops and service businesses to reopen subject to distancing and hygiene requirements. This early reopening proposal still accepted specified precautions; it was not a demand to remove every protective measure. Later party rhetoric portrayed restrictions more broadly as impermissible infringements of freedom. (bpb.de)\n\nOpposition to vaccination mandates subsequently became a specific parliamentary demand. On 26 January 2022, Martin Sichert, Thomas Seitz, Stephan Brandner and other AfD deputies submitted motion 20/516 against a statutory COVID-19 vaccination requirement. It also sought repeal of the requirement for health and care personnel scheduled to apply from 15 March 2022. The Bundestag rejected the AfD motion on 7 April by 606 votes to 79. A separate proposal for mandatory vaccination of people aged 60 and over also failed that day, by 378 votes to 296, with nine abstentions; its defeat was a distinct parliamentary decision, not the adoption of the AfD motion. (dserver.bundestag.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "European integration and international relations",
      "text": "The AfD’s European policy developed from opposition to euro-area crisis management into a programme for reversing supranational integration. Its founding opposition to financial assistance and shared liabilities within the euro area did not initially amount to an unconditional demand to leave the European Union. Its subsequent programmes increasingly emphasized returning EU competences to national governments and rejecting a European federal state. The 2021 Bundestag election programme explicitly demanded German withdrawal from the EU, commonly termed “Dexit”. The 2025 programme instead proposed replacing the existing Union with a Bund europäischer Nationen—a federation or association of European nations. This envisaged cooperation among sovereign states rather than a federal government exercising authority over them. (bpb.de)\n\nThe distinction concerned both institutional design and the proposed route of change: the 2021 demand specified German exit, whereas the 2025 document advocated a planned transition to a new European economic and interest-based community. It identified four shared purposes: a common market, external-border protection, strategic autonomy in security policy, and preservation of European cultures and identities. Competences outside genuinely shared interests would return to national governments. The proposal therefore retained organized European cooperation while rejecting the existing distribution of authority between EU institutions and member states. (afd.de)\n\nIn defence policy, the 2025 programme called for restoring conscription, improving Bundeswehr personnel and equipment, and strengthening Germany’s defence industry. It retained NATO membership as a central security instrument until an independent, operational European military alliance could be established. On Russia, it demanded the immediate removal of economic sanctions, restoration of trade, and repair of the Nord Stream pipelines. It envisaged Ukraine as a neutral state outside both NATO and the EU. These were proposed changes in German and European policy, not descriptions of existing arrangements. (afd.de)\n\nThe AfD parliamentary group’s opposition to arming Ukraine was documented after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. During the Bundestag debate on 28 April 2022, co-leader Tino Chrupalla warned that further weapons deliveries could draw Germany into the war. The Bundestag nevertheless adopted the cross-party motion supporting comprehensive assistance, including heavy weapons, by 586 votes to 100, with seven abstentions. A separate AfD motion seeking a parliamentary veto over war-weapons export authorizations, subject to a subsequent government override, was rejected in June 2023. These interventions combined opposition to deliveries with demands for greater parliamentary control over export decisions. (bundestag.de)\n\nThe party’s European parliamentary alliances also changed. Its seven MEPs elected in 2014 initially joined the European Conservatives and Reformists group. Following the 2015 party split, the two remaining AfD MEPs moved into different right-wing groups in 2016. From 2019, the AfD delegation belonged to Identity and Democracy alongside France’s National Rally, Italy’s League and Austria’s Freedom Party. On 23 May 2024, that group expelled the delegation following Maximilian Krah’s comments disputing blanket criminal responsibility among members of the Nazi SS. (bpb.de)\n\nOn 10 July 2024, the AfD helped establish the Europe of Sovereign Nations group (ESN), initially comprising 25 MEPs from eight countries, including 14 AfD representatives. AfD politician René Aust and Poland’s Stanisław Tyszka became its co-chairs. This parliamentary group must be distinguished from the European political party of the same name, registered on 30 September 2024: the former organizes MEPs within Parliament, whereas the latter is a separately constituted transnational party organization. (euronews.com)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Electoral performance at federal, state, and European levels",
      "text": "The AfD failed to enter the Bundestag at its first federal election in 2013, receiving 4.7% of valid second votes and winning no constituencies. Its 2017 result—12.6% and 94 seats—made it the third-largest party in parliament. Support declined in 2021 before rising to 20.8% in 2025, when it won 152 seats, second only to the combined CDU/CSU. The following figures are final official election results; constituency seats are included in, not additional to, total seats. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)\n\nFederal election | Second-vote share | Constituencies won | Total seats awarded\n22 September 2013 | 4.7% | 0 | 0\n24 September 2017 | 12.6% | 3 | 94\n26 September 2021 | 10.3% | 16 | 83\n23 February 2025 | 20.8% | 46 | 152\n\nThe table records seats awarded through elections, rather than subsequent parliamentary-group membership. For 2021 it uses the original final result: the partial repeat election in Berlin on 11 February 2024 subsequently raised the rounded nationwide AfD share to 10.4%, without changing its allocation of 83 seats. Constituency victories and proportional entitlement are distinct: second votes determine party seat allocations, subject to the electoral threshold. Under the rules applied in 2025, parties generally required 5% nationwide, with an exception for parties leading in at least three constituencies and an exemption for national-minority parties. A constituency plurality also required sufficient second-vote entitlement in the relevant state to produce a seat. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)\n\nIn elections to the European Parliament, the AfD increased its German vote share from 7.1% and seven seats in 2014 to 11.0% and eleven seats in 2019, then 15.9% and fifteen seats in 2024. These are mandates won on its electoral lists, not the later size of any European parliamentary group. Unlike federal elections, Germany’s European elections in all three years operated without a statutory percentage threshold. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)\n\nState-parliament breakthroughs began in Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia in 2014; the party first entered western state parliaments in Hamburg and Bremen in 2015. On 1 September 2024, the Thuringian organization, led by Björn Höcke, finished first with 32.8% and 32 of 88 seats—the AfD’s first first-place finish in a state election. It also received 30.6% in Saxony and 29.2% in Brandenburg that September, finishing second in each. Further first-place results followed in September 2026: 43.8% and 39 of 83 seats in Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, and 38.2% in Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania on 20 September. These electoral rankings did not themselves determine government formation. (bpb.de)\n\nExpansion was not uninterrupted. In Schleswig-Holstein on 8 May 2022, the AfD received 4.4%, falling below the 5% threshold and losing its parliamentary representation. Municipal executive elections provided a different route to office, based on individual candidacies and, where necessary, runoffs. Robert Sesselmann won the Sonneberg district-administrator runoff on 25 June 2023 with 52.8%; Hannes Loth won the Raguhn-Jeßnitz mayoral runoff on 2 July with 51.1%. These were victories for specified local offices, distinct from proportional council elections or later changes of party affiliation by incumbent officeholders. (bpb.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Electoral geography, voter composition, and campaigning",
      "text": "The AfD’s electoral strength is geographically uneven, but its eastern strongholds should not be confused with the numerical distribution of its electorate. At the February 2025 federal election, it led in all five eastern territorial states, with second-vote shares ranging from 32.5 to 38.6 percent. Nevertheless, approximately 70 percent of its nationwide votes came from the western states, whose electorate is much larger. Eastern rural areas affected by population loss have been particularly favourable territory; western support also includes industrial and lower-income areas. The party’s first-place second-vote results in Gelsenkirchen and Kaiserslautern in 2025 demonstrate that its concentrations are not exclusively rural or eastern. (bpb.de)\n\nOfficial representative election statistics provide a firmer basis for comparisons by age and sex than election-night surveys. For 2025, this exercise covered 2,689 polling districts, including postal-voting districts, using specially marked ballots rather than respondents’ recollections. The Federal Returning Officer reported AfD support of 25.2 percent among men and 16.7 percent among women; men supplied 59 percent of the party’s second votes. Support peaked at 27.0 percent among 35–44-year-olds and reached 25.7 percent among 45–59-year-olds, compared with 19.0 percent among 18–24-year-olds and 11.6 percent among voters aged 70 or older. These figures distinguish the percentage of each demographic group voting AfD from each group’s share of the AfD electorate. (bundeswahlleiterin.de)\n\nEducation, occupation and economic circumstances are principally measured through surveys, not marked ballots. Infratest dimap’s 2025 election survey estimated AfD support at 38 percent among manual workers, 34 percent among unemployed voters, and 21 percent among both salaried employees and the self-employed. Among respondents describing their economic circumstances as poor, its estimated share was 39 percent. These are within-group voting rates, not the composition of the party’s electorate. (tagesschau.de) Frank Decker’s synthesis for the Federal Agency for Civic Education identifies intermediate educational qualifications as predominant and notes that workers and unemployed people together constituted only about one-quarter of AfD voters. Neither local unemployment nor the proportion of foreign residents alone adequately explains its support. (bpb.de)\n\nVoter-transfer estimates likewise describe several recruitment streams. Infratest dimap’s modelling attributed roughly one-third of the AfD’s newly gained voters in 2025 to previous nonvoters and another third to CDU/CSU and FDP voters. Such transfers are estimates combining surveys and aggregate results, not direct tracking of individual ballots. (bpb.de) Asked which issue mattered most, 38 percent of surveyed AfD voters named immigration and 33 percent internal security. Political dissatisfaction coexisted with affirmative attachment: 54 percent described their choice as motivated by conviction in their party, against 39 percent citing disappointment with other parties. These responses do not support treating the entire electorate as either purely protest-driven or socially homogeneous. (tagesschau.de)\n\nCampaigning combines social media with parliamentary visibility and public mobilization. Party, candidate and parliamentary-group accounts circulate material directly, bypassing journalistic selection; parliamentary speech extracts provide reusable short-video content. A 2026 Hans Böckler Foundation study of the 2024–2025 campaign documented videos assembled from Bundestag and other speeches. (bpb.de) An Institute for German Economic Research analysis of MPs’ TikTok accounts recorded approximately 98 million views for AfD politicians’ videos posted between November 1, 2024, and February 16, 2025; three of the ten most-viewed videos belonged to Alice Weidel. These were video views, not unique viewers or demonstrated vote conversions. (iwkoeln.de) Online communication also accompanies a movement-oriented strategy, illustrated by participation in Pegida demonstrations and protests against pandemic restrictions. Such connections establish overlapping channels of mobilization, but audience metrics alone cannot determine how many people attended events or changed their vote because of online exposure. (bpb.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Parliamentary activity and relations with other parties",
      "text": "The AfD’s parliamentary groups conduct opposition work through bills, motions, questions to governments, plenary debates, and committee proceedings. These activities belong institutionally to the elected representatives and their groups, rather than to the party executive or party congress: parliamentary rights attach to members and groups, not to the party organization itself. In the Bundestag’s nineteenth electoral term, 2017–2021, the AfD group submitted 3,479 Kleine Anfragen—minor interpellations requiring written government answers—and 19 major interpellations. The FDP submitted 3,747 minor interpellations in the same term. These figures measure the use of scrutiny procedures, not legislative success or the quality of individual questions. In calendar year 2021, across the nineteenth and twentieth terms, the AfD also introduced 175 substantive motions. (bundestag.de)\n\nCommittee membership gives AfD representatives opportunities to examine legislation, question ministers, and participate in specialist deliberations even when their proposals lack majority support. Membership and committee leadership are distinct: in May 2025, the AfD held ten of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s 42 seats, while its six nominees for committee chairmanships failed to obtain majorities in the constitutive elections. A concrete example of substantive committee work was its parliamentary group’s motion to halt the dismantling of German nuclear power stations, rejected by the responsible environmental committee on 4 June 2025. Such proceedings should be distinguished from the adoption of energy policy by a party congress. (bundestag.de)\n\nOther parties’ policies of non-cooperation are commonly described as the Brandmauer, or “firewall,” a German form of cordon sanitaire. The term encompasses several different practices: excluding the AfD from governing coalitions, refusing negotiated parliamentary cooperation, declining to support its candidates for offices, and seeking majorities without its votes. These are political commitments rather than one uniform parliamentary rule. The CDU’s federal congress resolution of 8 December 2018 rejected coalitions and comparable forms of cooperation with the AfD. Local practice has nevertheless included cooperation on individual council proposals; such arrangements do not by themselves constitute a governing coalition. (bpb.de)\n\nCommon voting outcomes must likewise be distinguished from coalition agreements or jointly negotiated legislation. On 29 January 2025, a CDU/CSU motion advocating tighter migration controls passed the Bundestag with AfD support, provoking renewed disputes over the firewall’s scope. The resolution did not itself amend the law. On 31 January, a separate CDU/CSU immigration bill failed by 338 votes to 349, with five abstentions, despite receiving 75 affirmative votes from AfD members. The two proceedings therefore produced different institutional outcomes: approval of a political demand and rejection of proposed legislation. (bpb.de)\n\nThe Thuringian minister-president election demonstrated the consequences of accepting AfD votes for executive office. On 5 February 2020, FDP candidate Thomas Kemmerich won the third ballot with 45 votes against incumbent Bodo Ramelow’s 44, with one abstention; the AfD-backed candidate, Christoph Kindervater, received none. The ballot was secret, but the result was understood as Kemmerich’s election with CDU, FDP, and AfD support. National party leaders repudiated the outcome, and Kemmerich formally resigned on 8 February. This was an election of a government head through convergent votes, not the conclusion of an AfD–CDU–FDP coalition agreement. (parldok.thueringer-landtag.de)\n\nNon-cooperation does not eliminate the influence of a sufficiently large parliamentary minority. Following Thuringia’s 2024 election, the AfD held 32 of 88 seats, giving it more than one-third of the chamber. Decisions requiring two-thirds of all members—including parliamentary amendments to the state constitution—require at least 59 votes, whereas all other groups together held only 56 seats. Acting cohesively, the AfD could therefore prevent that threshold from being reached without supplying a governing majority or controlling ordinary legislation. (db-thueringen.de)"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Intelligence classifications and judicial proceedings",
      "text": "The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) is Germany’s federal domestic intelligence service. Its responsibilities include gathering and evaluating information about activities directed against the free democratic basic order. A Verdachtsfall, or suspected extremist case, means that sufficient factual indications justify investigating possible anti-constitutional activity; it does not establish that the organization is conclusively extremist. This status permits surveillance, including intelligence methods where the applicable legal requirements are met, rather than automatically authorizing every intrusive measure. The service’s activities are subject to executive and parliamentary oversight and judicial review. (verfassungsschutz.de)\n\nThe BfV classified the federal AfD as a suspected case on February 25, 2021. Cologne Administrative Court upheld that treatment on March 8, 2022, followed by the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia on May 13, 2024. On May 20, 2025, the Federal Administrative Court rejected the party’s complaint against the refusal to permit a further appeal. Those proceedings concerned the evidentiary threshold for suspicion, not the subsequent, stronger classification. Federal and state assessments also concern distinct organizational subjects: Saxony’s intelligence office classified the Saxon branch as confirmed right-wing extremist on December 8, 2023, while the BfV separately classified the then youth organization, Junge Alternative, in April 2023. Neither assessment by itself determined the federal party’s classification. (bverwg.de)\n\nOn May 2, 2025, the BfV announced that it had upgraded the federal party to a confirmed right-wing extremist organization (gesichert rechtsextremistische Bestrebung). It argued that the party’s prevailing ancestry-based conception of national membership denied equal standing to certain German citizens, particularly those with migration backgrounds from predominantly Muslim countries. The AfD brought proceedings on May 5, rejecting the allegations and arguing that the evidence did not establish an extremist character defining the whole party. The BfV subsequently suspended the upgraded designation pending the interim court decision. (nrwe.justiz.nrw.de)\n\nOn February 26, 2026, Cologne Administrative Court granted interim relief in case 13 L 1109/25. It prohibited the BfV from classifying or treating the federal party as confirmed right-wing extremist, or publicly announcing that status, until completion of the first-instance main proceedings, 13 K 3895/25. Its provisional assessment found anti-constitutional activities within the party, but insufficient grounds to establish that they characterized the party as a whole. This was not a final judgment on the merits and did not invalidate surveillance under the lower suspected-case threshold. (nrwe.justiz.nrw.de)\n\nIntelligence classification and a political party prohibition are separate legal mechanisms. Under Article 21 of Germany’s Basic Law, only the Federal Constitutional Court can declare a party unconstitutional and order its dissolution; the BfV cannot do so through an intelligence assessment. Applications may be brought by the Bundestag, Bundesrat or federal government. Prohibition requires more than opposition to constitutional principles: the court examines active pursuit of anti-constitutional aims and concrete indications that achieving them is at least possible. Accordingly, an administrative intelligence designation does not itself prohibit a party, while an interim injunction against that designation does not decide a party-prohibition case. (bundesverfassungsgericht.de)"
    }
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  "sources": [
    {
      "title": "Etappen der Parteigeschichte der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273130/etappen-der-parteigeschichte-der-afd/?i=273188&show=image&type=galerie"
    },
    {
      "title": "Gründungsparteitag der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.swr.de/swrkultur/wissen/archivradio/gruendungsparteitag-der-afd-100.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Alternative für Deutschland wird von Spitzentrio geführt",
      "url": "https://www.welt.de/newsticker/news2/article115279662/Alternative-fuer-Deutschland-wird-von-Spitzentrio-gefuehrt.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Bundestagswahl 2013",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2013/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Endgültiges amtliches Ergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2013",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2013/2013-10-09-endgueltiges-amtliches-ergebnis-der-bundestagswahl-2013.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse früherer Europawahlen",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/dam/jcr/0872e1f8-935a-45d6-a0f1-a3352fb4bc69/ew_ergebnisse_gesamt.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Endgültig gewählte Bewerberinnen und Bewerber: Europawahl 2014",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/europawahlen/2014/gewaehlte.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wahlergebnisse: Landtagswahl 2014 in Sachsen",
      "url": "https://www.wahlen.sachsen.de/landtagswahl-2014-wahlergebnisse.php"
    },
    {
      "title": "Landesweite Wahltermine und Wahlergebnisse",
      "url": "https://wahlen.brandenburg.de/wahlen/de/landesweite-wahltermine-und-wahlergebnisse/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Landtagswahl am 14. September 2014: Landespressekonferenz",
      "url": "https://wahlen.thueringen.de/landtagswahlen/presse/2014/Wahlanalyse_LW14.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Die AfD: Werdegang und Wesensmerkmale einer Rechtsaußenpartei",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/rechtspopulismus/271484/die-afd-werdegang-und-wesensmerkmale-einer-rechtsaussenpartei/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Etappen der Parteigeschichte der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273130/etappen-der-parteigeschichte-der-afd/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Die Organisation der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273133/die-organisation-der-afd/"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD rückt mit Petry-Wahl nach rechts",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-parteitag-117.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Vorsitz – Petry gewinnt Machtkampf gegen Lucke",
      "url": "https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/afd-vorsitz-petry-gewinnt-machtkampf-gegen-lucke-100.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Gründer Lucke verlässt Partei",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/lucke-afd-parteiaustritt-101.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD – Zweifel an der Auflösung des rechtsextremen „Flügels“",
      "url": "https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/afd-zweifel-an-der-aufloesung-des-rechtsextremen-fluegels-100.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Frauke Petry to leave far-right populist AfD",
      "url": "https://www.dw.com/en/frauke-petry-co-chair-of-the-far-right-afd-to-quit-the-party/a-40686693"
    },
    {
      "title": "„Ankündigung von Höcke und Kalbitz ist eine Scheinauflösung“",
      "url": "https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ankundigung-von-hocke-und-kalbitz-ist-eine-scheinauflosung-5064808.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Meuthen – aktuelle Nachrichten",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/thema/meuthen"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Politiker reagieren unterschiedlich auf Meuthen-Austritt",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/reax-meuthen-101.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Parteitag wählt Chrupalla und Weidel",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-chrupalla-weidel-101.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundessatzung",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/satzung/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Informationen zu Kandidaturen",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2025/informationen-wahlbewerber.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Rechenschaftsberichte der Bundestagsparteien veröffentlicht",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-1050024"
    },
    {
      "title": "Neue AfD-Jugendorganisation Generation Deutschland gegründet",
      "url": "https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/afd-jugendorganisation-gruendung-protest-100.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Rechenschaftsberichte der Parteien (Parteienfinanzierung)",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/rechenschaftsberichte-247146"
    },
    {
      "title": "Drucksache 21/4006",
      "url": "https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/040/2104006.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Plakatspende in Millionenhöhe an AfD unzulässig (Nr. 25/2026)",
      "url": "https://www.berlin.de/gerichte/verwaltungsgericht/presse/pressemitteilungen/2026/pressemitteilung.1669167.php"
    },
    {
      "title": "Die Programmatik der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273132/die-programmatik-der-afd/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Grundsatzprogramm – Alternative für Deutschland",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/grundsatzprogramm/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Programm für Deutschland",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "The Visual Politics of the Alternative for Germany (AfD): Anti-Islam, Ethno-Nationalism, and Gendered Images",
      "url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/10/1/20"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD Bundestagswahlprogramm 2025",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/AfD_Bundestagswahlprogramm2025_web.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Art 16a GG",
      "url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_16a.html?level=1"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wie stehen die deutschen Parteien zu den Themen Migration, Integration, Flucht und Asyl?",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/migration-integration/regionalprofile/deutschland/255670/wie-stehen-die-deutschen-parteien-zu-den-themen-migration-integration-flucht-und-asyl/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Remigration",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/remigration/"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD Bundestagswahlprogramm 2025 – Druckversion",
      "url": "https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/AfD_Bundestagswahlprogramm2025_druck.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Die Programmatik der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273132/die-programmatik-der-afd/?p=0"
    },
    {
      "title": "IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers",
      "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2023/03/Doc4_Approved_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Vorschläge zur Bewältigung der Coronakrise abgelehnt",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2020/kw17-de-normalisierungsstrategie-691626"
    },
    {
      "title": "Drucksache 20/516: Keine gesetzliche Impfpflicht gegen das COVID-19-Virus",
      "url": "https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/005/2000516.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "AfD-Fraktion legt Antrag gegen eine Impfpflicht vor",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-879262"
    },
    {
      "title": "Impfpflicht gegen SARS-CoV-2 (Antrag der Fraktion der AfD)",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/plenum/abstimmung/abstimmung?id=770"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundestag stimmt für Lieferung schwerer Waffen an die Ukraine",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw17-de-selbstverteidigung-ukraine-891272"
    },
    {
      "title": "Antrag der AfD-Fraktion zu Waffenexporten abgelehnt",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-954628"
    },
    {
      "title": "(Die) AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/511455/die-afd/"
    },
    {
      "title": "There is another group in the EU Parliament, even further to the right than the Patriots: it is Europe of Sovereign Nations",
      "url": "https://www.eunews.it/en/2024/07/10/there-is-another-group-in-the-eu-parliament-even-further-to-the-right-than-the-patriots-it-is-europe-of-sovereign-nations/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Decision of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations of 30 September 2024 to register Europe of Sovereign Nations as a European political party",
      "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32024D06005"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Bundestagswahl 2017",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundestagswahl 2021: Endgültiges Ergebnis",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/52_21_endgueltiges-ergebnis.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Bundestagswahl 2021, ursprüngliches Ergebnis",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/archiv/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Bundestagswahl 2025",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2025/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wahl zum 21. Deutschen Bundestag: Heft 5, Teil 1",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/dam/jcr/ac076b14-5fbd-446a-a006-3a6cb20450fb/btw25_heft5-1.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wiederholung der Bundestagswahl 2021: Endgültiges Ergebnis",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/10_24_endgueltiges-ergebnis.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Das Wahlsystem: Bundestagswahl 2025",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2025/informationen-waehler/wahlsystem.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Europawahl 2014",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/europawahlen/2014/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Ergebnisse Deutschland: Europawahl 2024",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/europawahlen/2024/ergebnisse/bund-99.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Das Wahlsystem: Europawahl 2024",
      "url": "https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/europawahlen/2024/informationen-waehler/wahlsystem.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wahlergebnisse und Wählerschaft der AfD",
      "url": "https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273131/wahlergebnisse-und-waehlerschaft-der-afd/"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundestagswahl 2025, Heft 4: Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe nach Geschlecht und Altersgruppen",
      "url": "https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/63623bc5-20fc-449f-a032-7ecd508f04ad/btw25_heft4.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Wahl zum 21. Deutschen Bundestag, Heft 5, Teil 2",
      "url": "https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/f91781de-8057-4647-ba67-30fdac8a65a3/btw25_heft5_2.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundestagswahl 2025 – Ergebnisse und Analysedaten",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2025-02-23-BT-DE/index.shtml"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bundestagswahl 2025: Wer wählte die AfD – und warum?",
      "url": "https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2025-02-23-BT-DE/umfrage-afd.shtml"
    },
    {
      "title": "TikTok im Bundestagswahlkampf: Zwischen Selbstdarstellung und politischer Botschaft",
      "url": "https://www.iwkoeln.de/studien/hendrik-boehmer-jan-felix-engler-zwischen-selbstdarstellung-und-politischer-botschaft.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Gewerkschaftliche Kampagnen von rechts. Narrative, Netzwerke und Kommunikation von Zentrum (Automobil) im Kontext der Betriebsratswahlen 2018 und 2022. Mit einer Einschätzung der AfD-Bundestagswahlkampagne 2024/2025",
      "url": "https://www.boeckler.de/fpdf/HBS-009303/p_fofoe_WP_393_2026.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Rechte der Opposition im Deutschen Bundestag",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/905754/WD-3-096-22-pdf.pdf"
    },
    {
      "title": "Statistik der Parlamentarischen Kontrolltätigkeit – 19. Wahlperiode",
      "url": "https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/533192/bde1352bd5082669edaef4757e551398/kontroll_taetigkeiten_wp19-data.pdf"
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      "url": "https://www.bverwg.de/200525B6B23.24.0"
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      "title": "Sächsischer AfD-Landesverband als gesichert rechtsextremistische Bestrebung eingestuft",
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